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INTRODUCTION 
The socioeconomic history of  twentieth-century Central America has yet to be written from  primary 
sources. By contrast, other, more distant, periods of  the Isthmus' history have been thoroughly 
studied. The colonial period is superbly described and analyzed in Murdo McLeod's 
'^ socioeconomic" history of  Central America from  1520 to 1720. It is the most authoritative study 
available about colonial times and is likely to remain so for  many years.1 
Periods such as the nineteenth century and the independence from  Spain are relatively well 
covered, although there does not yet exist an economic history of  the past century comparable to 
that available for  the colonial period.2 A study of  the "political economy" of  Central America from 
1920 to the present has been published recently. It constitutes the most complete study available of 
the contemporary period, but it draws mainly on secondary sources.3 
The documents included in this collection constitute primary sources about the most decisive 
external economic relationship of  twentieth-century Central America. As they reveal, the presence 
of  the United States is so pervasive that it constitutes one of  the main keys to understanding the 
present economic and social evolution of  the Central American countries-Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. In fact,  the documents presented here give ample support 
to the conclusion that, for  Central America, the twentieth is the American century. 
Few direct references  will be found  to conditions prevailing in the Central American countries, 
or to the positions they adopted in negotiations with the United States Government and with United 
States corporations. With few  exceptions, the point of  view that appears in the documents is that of 
the United States Government, as reflected  in dispatches transmitted by diplomats stationed in 
Central America. Those interested in the Central American viewpoint will have to look for  it in the 
national archives of  each country. 
The publication of  this limited sample demonstrates the richness of  the primary sources available 
in the National Archives of  the United States. The collection presented here is representative, but 
hardly exhaustive. Important events during the period covered are not mentioned because pertinent 
documents were not found  in the Archives. For example, under the general economic headings 
researched, no documents could be found  concerning the economic consequences of  the military 
intervention of  the United States in Nicaragua from  1911 to 1933. 
The choice of  the period covered, 1906-1956, was pragmatic since, in the National Archives 
starting from  1910, the documents are classified  by subject. This classification  system facilitated 
access to documents that deal specifically  with economic relations between Central America and 
the United States. The last year covered, 1956, is the most recent currentlyavailable under the rules 
of  declassification  of  the National Archives. 
Some previously published (but rarely seen) documents are included because they illustrate the 
different  subjects covered, particularly at the beginning and the end of  the period. Some of  the 
1Spanish Central  America: A Socioeconomic  History,  1520-1720.  (Berkeley. University of  California  Press, 1973). 
2Ralph Lee Woodward, Class Privilege and Economic Development: The Consulado de Comercio de Guatemala, 
1973-1871 (Chapel Hill: The University of  North Carolina Press, 1966). 
"Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The  Political  Economy of  Central  America since 1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987). 
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published sources date from  1906 and 1925, and others are as recent as 1956. Their inclusion allows 
the reader to compare the state of  these economies over a span of  50 years. Such comparison in 
turn permits the identification  of  profound  socioeconomic changes the region experienced during 
the half  century covered. 
Several other purposes are served by gathering and publishing these documents. It is expected 
that they will entice historians to examine the very special relationship that has prevailed between 
the United States and Central America throughout this century. The documents speak for 
themselves: they illustrate the dynamics of  this relationship and the stages through which it has 
passed. Finally, the documents confirm  the prevalence of  certain characteristics of  Central 
American development.4 
The Central American States have enjoyed a dynamic economic relationship with the United 
States during the 50-year period covered by these documents. Their publication may discourage 
gross generalizations that misinterpret and freeze  the dynamics of  this intense and varied 
relationship. 
First of  all, the documents confirm  that in the twentieth century the United States emerged as the 
most important trading partner, source of  finance  and investor in the isthmus. At the beginning of 
the century, the United States was already supplying more than half  of  Central America's imports 
and absorbingan equalshare of  itsexports. The other two most important tradingpartners, England 
and Germany, were already far  behind. 
This dominant trading position persisted and intensified  during the years of  the Great Depression 
and the Second World War, and it became a special relationship with the signature by the five  Central 
American Governments of  reciprocal trade agreements. These agreements remained in force  into 
the 1950s, postponing the first  steps towards industrialization generated by the exceptional 
functioning  of  world markets during the depression and the war. 
Finally, it is illustrative that with the loosening of  these special trading relationships, the Central 
American overnments intensified  their commercial interdependence by undertaking a process of 
economic integration. 
The United States was also dominant throughout the period as a source of  development finance, 
notwithstanding several British loans to Costa Rica and Guatemala. With the end of  the Second 
World War, the Export-Import Bank emerged as the main source of  finance,  and the first  loans 
were granted by the multilateral financial  agencies. 
Throughout the period, the United States remained the principal source of  direct foreign 
investment in Central America. Ubiquitous from  the first,  it encompassed the whole spectrum of 
investments demanded by the export of  bananas, including the transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure. 
The documents presented here illustrate a number of  basic, enduring features  that the 
development process in Central America has regularly exhibited. For instance, there is ample 
evidence of  the overwhelming dominance of  a few  agricultural products exported to a limited 
number of  markets. 
The levels of  domestic economic activity are intimately linked to the fortunes  of  two agricultural 
exports: coffee  and bananas. As a result, Central America's development exhibits wild booms 
followed  by profound  busts. The Great Depression of  the 1930s epitomizes the prolonged downturn 
caused by a precipitous fall  in the prices of  the principal exports, followed  by a period of  relative 
prosperity generated by equally spectacular increases in the prices of  the basic agricultural exports. 
A rather brief  but vivid -even impressionistic- description of  what the Great Depression meant 
for  these export-led economies will be found  in Chapter I, in the form  of  a witty report dispatched, 
on 24 January 1933, by a United States commercial attaché. This picturesque description of  the 
devastating consequences of  the Great Depression in Central America furnishes  a sobering vantage 
point from  which to confirm  that the 1980s, like the 1930s, constitute another lost decade for  the 
development of  the isthmus. 
Because of  the erratic nature of  the region's socioeconomic evolution, investments in physical 
infrastructure  are inherently protracted. Given the elusiveness of  sustained development, the 
4ECLAC, Notas  sobre el  trasfondo  histórico  del  desarrollo  centroamericano  (ECLAC/MEX/ODE/35), January 1980. 
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isthmus exhibits, well into the second half  of  the twentieth century, an impressive lack of  physical 
integration due to the very limited availability of  modern transportation. This is poignantly 
illustrated by two documents reproduced in the first  section of  chapter I: the first  is a consolidated 
report of  the United States consuls posted in Puerto Cortes, La Ceiba and Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 
of  7 February 1916. This document makes detailed recommendations to United States exporters 
about how to trade with Honduras. Included are detailed instructions for  packing: United States 
exporters are advised to keep in mind that "Honduras is mountainous. The trails are rough and 
difficult  and packing becomes an important matter. Merchandise for  consumption or sale at the 
port towns or for  Tegucigalpa maybe sent in regulation packing cases or bales but for  strictly interior 
destination they should be sent as nearlyas possible in size and weight, for  mule back transportation." 
The next document deals with Central America as a "market for  American goods"and contains 
precise instructions to "commercial travelers" on "canvassing Central America". Present travelers in 
the region be struck by contrasting their own experiences with these detailed recommendations, 
made in 1925, concerning travel in Central America. To travel a short distance in the Gulf  of  Fonseca 
between Corinto, in Nicaragua, to Amapala, in Honduras, the author recommends a boat from  the 
Mexican States Line which sailed every eight days, or another from  the Pacific  Mail Steamship Co. 
which sailed "about every 22 days." 
Effective  physical integration began for  the Isthmus in the latter half  of  the nineteenth century 
with the construction of  railroads to link the coffee  plantations to the ports. Foreign investors later 
completed the national railway systems to serve the banana plantations. The decisive link between 
export booms, investment and the development of  physical infrastructure  is fully  confirmed  by a 
document reproduced in chapter IV. It describes in detail the state of  the national railway networks 
in 1925. A few  years later, the Great Depression and the consequent drying up of  investment left 
these networks in virtually the same state they are in today. 
Further, it is evident that if  not for  the foreign  investment linked to banana exports, the 
development of  even these limited means of  transportation would have been even more cumbersome. 
By 1953, the railways still constituted the dominant means of  transportation. Construction of 
highways lagged far  behind.5 
Finally, another characteristic of  the development of  Central America during the first  half  of  this 
century can be found  in the fragmentation  of  the isthmus and the virtual absence of  physical links to 
facilitate  economic interdependence among the individual countries. Because Central American 
countries specialized in the export of  a few  agricultural products, their economies functioned  with 
their backs turned toward each other: economic interdependence was unknown before  1956. 
The documents are classified  by subject and presented chronologically in five  separate chapters. 
The first  chapter contains documents about the general economic conditions that prevailed in 
Central America in three different  periods: the beginning of  the century, the Great Depression and 
the post- Second World War years. 
The second chapter includes documents about the commercial relations between the United 
States and the Central American countries. This chapter is also divided into three sections: the first 
deals with the negotiation of  reciprocal trade agreements, the second contains evaluations of  the 
functioning  of  these instruments, and the third highlights the conclusion of  these special trading 
relationships. 
The third chapter contains documents on development finance,  as it was granted during the 1920s, 
and illustrates some of  the difficulties  experienced by certain countries in servicing their external 
debts during the Great Depression. Examples are offered  of  more recent lending activities, in the 
form  of  two Export-Import Bank credits granted during and after  the war, one to a government and 
one to a private corporation. Other documents in chapter III describe difficulties  faced  in obtaining 
external financial  resources. The chapter closes with a detailed description of  the financial  system 
of  each country at the beginning of  the 1950s. 
The fourth  chapter deals with foreign  investment, giving examples of  investments in 
telecommunications, railways and bananas. Important differences  appear rather neatly in the 
5ECLAC, El transporte en el Istmo Centroamericano (E/CN.12/356) Mexico City, September 1953. 
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negotiations of  these investment flows  during the 1930s and the 1950s. The chapter closes with a 
review of  the prospects for  foreign  investment, which were judged favorable  in the early 1950s by a 
team of  international consultants. 
Finally, the fifth  chapter contains a set of  brief  but highly illustrative documents about the process 
of  economic integration which the five  Central American Governments began to promote during 
the 1950s. 
The subsequent decades of  sustained development led to spectacular increases in intraregional 
trade. This increase lasted until the beginning of  the present decade, when the isthmus began to 
experience yet another downturn, which has nearly wiped out much of  the interdependence that 
emerged during the boom years. Economic integration in Central America has proven to be as 
vulnerable to external shocks as are the individual economies. 
Each chapter contains a brief  introduction describing the documents included. Footnotes have 
been added where needed for  clarity. 
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CHAPTER I 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
This chapter contains documents that survey general economic conditions in the region during the 
first  quarter of  the Twentiety Century, the Great Depression, and post-World War II. 
A . U.S. Ascendance, 1906-1925 
1. COSTS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF TRANSPORTATION (1906) 
From: Hutchinson, Lincoln, Special Agent of  the U.S. Department of  Commerce and Labor, 
Report on Trade  Conditions  in Central  America and on the West Coast of  South America 
59th Congress, 2nd Session, House of  Representatives, Document No. 154. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office,  1906), pp. 9-10,66-79,90-100. 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
GENERAL  CONDITIONS 
The geography of  the six Central American States1 is so well known as to call for  little comment in 
this place. In order, however, to understand certain features  of  the commercial development of  these 
countries, it is necessary to emphasize one or two points which are sometimes overlooked. The six 
States of  Guatemala, Honduras, British Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica together 
form  a long narrow strip of  land extending from  southeast to northwest over a distance of  some 800 
miles. The width varies from  about 60 miles to over 300; and the total area is estimated at 176 927 
square miles, or somewhat larger than our State of  California.  So far  as mere latitude is concerned, 
this entire section is tropical, the northern-most point being in about 18Q and the southernmost in 
about 82 north latitude. But throughout the entire length runs a backbone of  mountains rising more 
or less abruptly from  the coast, reaching in places altitudes of  10 000 or 12 000 feet,  inclosing many 
plateau regions, and greatly tempering the climate of  much of  the interior. 
OBSTACLES  TO  TRANSPORTATION 
Probably the most important effect  commercially of  the presence of  this mountain backbone is the 
difficulty  which it presents to transportation between the two coasts or from  either coast into the 
'The Republic of  Panama should, properly speaking, be included among the Central American States. That country 
has, however, attracted so much attention and been so fully  reported on since the establishment of  independence and the 
beginning of  active work in the Canal Zone that it is unnecessary to add further  details in this place. The commercial 
conditions there, aside from  the unusual features  introduced through the influx  of  American capital and enterprise, may be 
regarded as similar to those existing in the neighboring States. 
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interior. The lowest pass from  coast to coast is in Nicaragua, with an elevation of  between 100 and 
200 feet.  In the other countries far  greater altitudes have to be overcome; in Costa Rica, for  example, 
over 4 000 feet,  and in Guatemala, nearly 5 000. These altitudes have prevented the construction of 
railways from  coast to coast, and have maintained a sort of  commercial separation between the west 
and the east slopes of  the countries. The western slope belongs still to the commercial sphere of  the 
Pacific  and the eastern to that of  the Atlantic. There is at present no railroad crossing the whole of 
the very short distance from  the Atlantic to the Pacific  side. In some cases such roads have been 
begun and have been pushed a greater or less distance from  one side or the other or both, and in 
one or two cases, as in Costa Rica and in Guatemala, there are prospects of  an early completion. In 
the main, however, the economical passage of  goods from  the one coast to the other is at present an 
impossibility; and even in districts near either coast the transportation of  goods is a costly and 
uncertain affair.  Ox carts or pack animals are the burden bearers, and many of  the roads, which are 
bad enough even in the dry season, become virtually impassable during the rainy months. This 
commercial separation of  the two coasts has important practical consequences, which will be 
discussed more fully  in another place. 
POPULATION  AND  COMMERCE 
The population of  the six States is, in general, very sparse, the total number of  inhabitants being 
estimated at about 4 100 000. This population is, however, very unevenly distributed. The smallest 
of  the six States -Salvador— with an area of  but 7 225 square miles, has a population density of  140 
per square mile, while the largest, Nicaragua, with an area of  49 200 square miles, shows a density 
of  only 8.5 per mile. In both area and population British Honduras is insignificant  (7 562 square 
miles and about 37 000 inhabitants), but her nearest neighbors, Honduras, Guatemala, and Salvador, 
constituting the northern half  of  Central America, form  the most important group among the six 
States. The combined area of  these three is about one-half  of  the total area of  the six, but their 
population is 80 per cent of  the total. 
DEVELOPMENT  WILL  INCREASE  TRAFFIC 
The commercial activity of  the people as a whole is not great. The total imports of  the six countries 
probably reach a value of  about $16 000 000 per annum, or a little less than $4 per capita. But in this 
respect, again, we find  great differences.  Costa Rica is the most active in proportion to population, 
her export and import trade together reaching nearly $30 per capita. The others are far  behind, 
except British Honduras, whose commercial statistics, are, however, swelled by a large transit trade 
and are therefore  misleading. The exports and imports of  Nicaragua reach a value of  about $10 per 
capita; of  Guatemala, $9; Salvador, $7, and Honduras, $6.30. 
Three of  the countries in question have been going through a period of  commercial depression 
in the past two or three years, due, in part at least, to poor crops of  coffee,  combined with low prices 
in the world market. Those most affected  have been Guatemala and Honduras. Nicaragua has 
suffered  in less degree, at least so far  as the effect  on foreign  trade movement has been concerned. 
Costa Rica has felt  the coffee  depression less than any of  the others, because of  the development 
there of  another great industry-banana raising. Thus we find  that in some sections foreign  trade has 
declined in recent years, while in others it has grown rapidly. It is probable that the growing sections 
represent the more normal condition of  the whole, for  where decline has taken place it can be traced 
to causes which are mostly of  temporary character. The countries all have great resources. New 
investments of  foreign  capital are taking place, and new enterprises are being developed. It is safe 
to assume that the next few  years will see a fairly  rapid growth of  trade in all the countries. 
UNITED  STA  TES  LEADS IN  IMPORTS 
The imports of  Central America are such as are always characteristic of  countries whose industries 
are chiefly  extractive: Textiles, implements, tools, machinery, and foodstuffs.  In this respect Central 
America does not differ  materially from  most of  the countries of  South America. It does differ  from 
them, however, in that the United States holds the lion's share of  the trade. Taking the six countries 
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as a whole, it is probable that the United States supplies at least 50 per cent of  their total foreign 
purchases, and our trade is growing in most satisfactory  manner except in the countries which have 
been suffering  commercial depression. Commercial statistics in most of  the six countries are either 
entirely lacking or are incomplete or unreliable, so that comparisons must be made by employing 
the export statistics of  the countries which supply the goods sent to Central America. The three 
principal competitors for  the trade are the United States, England, and Germany, and their export 
statistics are shown in the annexed table. The figures  represent average annual values for  the five-year 
periods in United States gold. 
Table 1.1.1 
AVERAGE ANNUAL EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND 
GERMANY TO CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES, FOR SPECIFIED PERIODS 
United States United Kingdom Germany 





































It will be noticed that the United States stands first  in all of  the countries except Salvador. England 
takes second place except in Salvador, where she leads, and Germany stands third. In Costa Rica, 
Honduras, British Honduras, and Nicaragua we have made great gains, and although we have lost 
in Guatemala and Salvador the decline is simply a part of  a general decline in the trade of  those 
countries. 
EXTRACTIVE  INDUSTRIES 
It has already been explained that the industries of  these Central American States are chiefly 
extractive. The products are mainly tropical in character, although in the uplands some few 
commodities common in temperate climates are also exploited. Manufactures  in any broad sense of 
the term are wholly lacking, but in some of  the towns small industries, such as beer brewing, ice 
making, the manufacture  of  matches, of  furniture,  etc., are to be found.  The demand for  foreign 
implements, tools, machinery, etc., is therefore  connected almost wholly with the development not 
of  these embryo manufactures  but of  the forest  and agricultural industries and the exploitation of 
the mineral deposits which are found  in some districts. 
The character of  the chief  industries, as well as the lines of  future  development in all of  the 
countries, is perhaps best illustrated by analyzing the course of  trade and industry in one of  them, 
which, as already stated, has developed the greatest commercial activity-Costa Rica. It is the more 
satisfactory  to do this, as the statistical department of  that Republic has developed a high degree of 
efficiency,  which makes it possible to obtain very complete data. 
COSTA RICA 
BANANAS  AND  COFFEE  CHIEF  EXPORTS 
The chief  exports of  Costa Rica are coffee  and bananas, these two items together making up over 
90 per cent in value of  all shipments abroad. Hard woods, hides, and small quantities of  precious 
metals supply the major part of  the remaining 10 per cent. In the other five  countries the exports 
comprise nearly the same list, but in different  proportions. In most of  them coffee  occupies the 
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leading place, while in Costa Rica bananas have risen to a point of  equality with coffee  and bid fair 
soon to surpass it. The value of  coffee  exports has remained nearly stationary during the past ten 
years; in 1896 it was $4 310 000 and in 1905 only $3 774 000. Banana exports, on the other hand, have 
grown with astonishing rapidity from  $565 000 in 1896 to $3 648 000 in 1905. The market for  Central 
American bananas is extending rapidly, the last few  years having seen large sales in England, and it 
is certain that the success of  the industry in Costa Rica will stimulate the development of  the banana 
lands of  the other five  countries. 
IMPORTS  BY  COUNTRIES 
The decline in the value of  coffee  exports from 
Costa Rica has been more than offset  by the 
increase in banana exports, and the total 
value of  shipments of  all commodities to 
foreign  countries has therefore  increased from 
$5 333 000 in 1896 to $8148 000 in 1905. And this 
growth in exports has naturally been 
accompanied by a development of  the import 
trade through general increase of  purchasing 
power, as well as through the increased demand 
for  the paraphernalia needed by the expanding 
industries. In this growing import trade the 
United States has played a more and more 
important part, as is well illustrated by the 
following  table (1.1.2) showing the percentage of 
imports from  the principal countries: 
The share of  the United States has increased from  a bare superiority over that of  England to an 
excess of  some 9 per cent over England, Germany, and France combined. 
COMMODITIES  FROM  THE  UNITED  STATES 
The general character of  the import trade of  Costa Rica, and to a large extent that of  the other 
Central American countries as well, is illustrated by the following  figures  compiled from  the import 
statistics for  the year ending December 31,1905, showing the principal imports into Costa Rica in 
1905, with percentage of  each coming from  the United States: 
Table 1.1.3 
SHARE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE IMPORT TRADE OF COSTA RICA IN 1905, 
BY CLASSES OF COMMODITIES 
From United States 
Class Total 
Value Per cent 
Textiles $1171159 $243 674 20.8 
Foodstuffs,  including breadstuffs, 
provisions, wines, etc. 1070262 670882 62.7 
Iron and steel, and manufactures  of 777336 525 078 67.5 
Paints, pigments, dyes, etc. 157690 92 577 58.7 
Chemicals, drugs, medicines, etc. 147306 66401 45.1 
Paper, and manufactures  of 111330 31814 28.6 
Tobacco, and manufactures  of 100899 66 684 66.5 
Carts, carriages, etc. 
Leather, unenumerated 
73 398 71889 97.9 
76874 55 126 71.7 
Lumber 66137 65 738 99.4 
Coined money 501601 501601 100.0 
All other articles 985 425 314599 31.9 
Total 5 239477 2 706 063 46.9 
Table 1.1.2 
SHARE OF LEADING COUNTRIES IN THE 
IMPORT TRADE OF COSTA RICA, 1894-1905 
(Percentages) 
Year England United 
States Germany France 
1894 32.03 34.59 19.21 7.79 
1897 26.92 3.64 21.01 10.00 
1898 19.61 44.80 15.50 10.80 
1899 19.60 54.00 14.55 5.90 
1900 27.30 46.50 13.59 5.94 
1901 21.83 46.77 13.50 5.43 
1902 23.94 54.08 12.47 5.25 
1903 21.57 50.20 11.07 6.47 
1904 19.27 52.20 12.50 4.60 
1905 19.73 46.88 12.90 5.24 
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The above table gives a sufficiently  clear idea of  the chief  classes of  commodities imported into 
Costa Rica from  the United States, but a more important question remains -the growth or decline 
of  our trade in specific  articles. The following  table (1.1.4) throws light on this point. It gives annual 
average values, in United States gold, of  the principal exports from  the United States for  the five-year 
periods stated:. 
Table 1.1.4 
AVERAGE ANNUAL IMPORTS OF SPECIFIED ARTICLES INTO COSTA RICA 
FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1895-1904 
Article 1895-1899 1900-1904 
Textiles 
Foodstuffs,  including breadstuffs,  provisions, 
wines, liquors, etc. 
Iron and steel, and manufactures  of 
Tobacco, and manufactures  of 
Wood, and manufactures  of 
Chemicals, drugs, medicines, etc. 
Leather, and manufactures  of 
Scientific  instruments and apparatus 
Oils 
Carts, carriages, other vehicles, and parts 
Paper, and manufactures  of 

























In all of  these, and they constitute the bulk of  American trade with Costa Rica, there has been 
marked increase. There are, however, certain small items (some of  them included in one or another 
of  the above groups) in which our trade has declined. The more important of  them are: 
Article 1895-1899 1900-1904 
Live animals $9 200 $8 600 
Books, maps, engravings, etchings, etc. 7 400 4 800 
Fish 21600 16 000 
Wines, spirits, and liquors 44 600 29 200 
Paraffin  and paraffin  wax 26 200 23 000 
Perfumery  and cosmetics 4 600 3 400 
Vegetables 15 600 15 000 
INCREASES  AND  DECREASES 
The decline in our exports of  live animals seems to be merely a part of  a general decline in purchases 
of  such animals. Larger numbers are being raised within the country itself  and in the neighboring 
Republics, and it is not probable that any considerable supplies will be brought from  the United 
States. The demand must be confined  to a few  animals for  breeding purposes. 
Books, maps, engravings, etchings, etc. (of  which the largest item is books), do not present a very 
promising field  for  American exporters. American illustrated papers, chromos, lithographs, etc., 
have a certain sale, but books imported are of  course printed chiefly  in Spanish or French, and 
American publishers, with a rather limited market for  works in those languages, can hardly compete 
with Spanish, French, and German houses. 
In fish  the United States continues to hold the larger part of  the market in spite of  the decline. 
The falling  off  is difficult  to explain. It seems likely to be only temporary, though Spain, France, 
Germany, and Italy are sending considerable quantities, especially of  sardines and canned shellfish. 
In perfumery  and cosmetics the share of  the United States is small at best. France is the chief 
source of  supply and seems likely to remain so. 
The falling  off  in our sales of  vegetables is so slight as to be of  little significance.  The same can 
not be said, however, in regard to the decline in our sales of  wines, liquors, etc. A few  years ago there 
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were indications that we were building up a fair  trade in these goods, especially in wines. The foothold 
then obtained seems now to have been lost in favor  of  Portugal, Spain, and France. 
HONDURAS 
SHARE  OF THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS 
The statistical office  of  the Government of  Table I.1J 
Honduras has recently prepared a statement of  the FOREIGN TRADE OF HONDURAS, YEAR 
foreign  trade of  the country for  the fiscal  year ENDED JULY 31,1905, BY COUNTRIES 
ended July 31, 1905. The figures  are of 
considerable interest as emphasizing the 
preponderance of  the United States in the 
commerce of  the Republic. 
The total imports of  the country for  the year 
were valued at $2 362 760, and of  this amount the 
United States furnished  $1689 900, or over 70 per 
cent. The exports were more than twice as large as 
the imports ($5 564 003), the United States taking 
$4 622 700, or more than 80 per cent. The share of 
other countries is shown by the following  table 
(1.1.5): 
The principal items of  export are the various 
natural vegetable products of  the country, these 
reaching a value of  $2 593 700. Mineral exports 
were valued at $1998 700 and animal exports at 
$909 000. Among the vegetable products exported, bananas are by far  the most important, the total 
value of  shipments being $2 078 400. Cocoanuts come next, with $210 900; then hard woods, with 
$128100; rubber, with $83 900; coffee,  with $52 700, and sarsaparilla, $30 000. 
The chief  mineral export is copper, $1154 000; gold and silver make up most of  the balance, 
$813 700. The only important animal products exported are cattle, $595 600, and hides and skins, 
$298000. 
Countiy Imports into Honduras 
Exports from 
Honduras 
United States $1689900 $4 622 700 
England 212800 85500 
Germany 185 000 217400 
British Honduras 95 000 74400 
France 66500 3600 
Nicaragua 56600 15 500 
Spain 21300 
Salvador 8400 18 600 
China 8000 
Japan 1800 
Guatemala 1600 130 000 
Cuba 900 391100 
Panama 200 1300 
Costa Rica 3800 
All others 15 000 
Total 2362 800 5564 000 
COMMANDING  POSITION  OF THE  UNITED  STATES 
The report from  which the above figures  are 
compiled illustrates the great strength of  the 
United States in the markets of  Honduras, but it 
fails  to reveal the equally important fact  that the 
commanding position of  the United States has 
been attained only in recent years. Ten years ago 
the sales of  the United States to Honduras were 
not only much smaller in absolute amount, but 
they constituted a far  less important share in the 
total purchases of  that country. And the increase 
has shown itself  not merely in one or two classes 
of  goods but in nearly every important item of  our 
trade. The following  figures  illustrate the 
development of  exports from  the United States, 
values being stated in United States gold. The 
figures  represent annual averages for  two 
five-year  periods. 
Table 1.1.6 
AVERAGE ANNUAL IMPORTS OF SPECIFIED 
CLASSES OF ARTICLES INTO HONDURAS 
FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1895-1904 
Class 1895-1899 1900-1904 
All foodstuffs,  including 
breadstuffs,  provisions 
wines, liquors, etc. $131600 $220 300 
Cotton goods 181400 278 900 
Iron and steel and 
manufactures  of  92 600 151100 
Chemicals, drugs, medicines, etc. 35 400 51 300 
Explosives 21 700 42 900 
Quicksilver 43 300 47900 
Wood, and manufactures  of  20 000 38 900 
Leather, and manufactures  of  14 700 33 200 
Sugar and molasses 14400 20400 
Oils 10500 19100 
All goods 667200 1 057 200 
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The only goods showing a decline between the two periods are a few  unimportant ones: Scientific 
instruments and apparatus, $5 700 to $4 500; notions, $2 300 to $1900; soap, $8 100 to $6 600; and 
bottled wines, $2100 to $1400. 
Besides the foregoing  more important classes of  goods there are many others which show a similar 
increase -paper, candles, cars, carriages and other vehicles, coal, earthen and china ware, glassware, 
rubber manufactures,  lamps and chandeliers, matches, oilcloths, paints, etc., perfiimery  and 
cosmetics, manufactures  of  straw and palm leaf,  tinware, etc. The rapid rise of  the United States to 
the controlling position in the commerce of  Honduras is but one of  many illustrations of  what our 
exporters may do in time in many parts of  Spanish America. 
GUATEMALA 
REVIVAL  OF COMMERCIAL  LIFE 
Mention has already been made of  the fact  that Guatemala has in recent years been passing through 
a period of  commercial depression which has reduced the purchasing power of  the country to 
considerably below what it was ten years ago. A period of  prosperity and speculation, culminating 
in 1898, was followed  by collapse, and the falling  price of  the staple product of  the country -coffee-
has greatly hindered recovery. The severity of  the crisis is well illustrated in the commercial dealings 
of  Guatemala with foreign  countries. In 1897 the United States sent to Guatemala goods to the value 
of  $2 992 000; in 1898 this figure  dropped to $1163 000, and in 1900 to $765 000. England in 1896 
sent $2 000 000; in 1899, $640 000. Germany, in 1897, $800 000; in 1898, $440 000; and in 1899, 
$250 000. The lowest ebb of  the important trade was reached in 1899 and 1900. Since then there has 
been a gradual recovery, hindered by the low price of  coffee  and by the recent revolution, yet 
sufficiently  marked to give promise that the 
country's trade will soon return to the position it 
had reached before  the crisis. 
The official  figures  of  imports for  the year 1904 
showed considerable increase over previous 
years. Those for  1905, which have just been 
published by the Guatemalan Government, 
exhibit still further  advance. Beginning with the 
years immediately following  the crisis the figures 
are shown in the annexed table (1.1.7), which 
represent annual average values for  the three-year 
periods stated and for  1904 and 1905 separately: 
Table 1.1.7 
FOREIGN TRADE OF GUATEMALA, 1899-1905 
Year Imports Exports 
1899-1901, per annum $3714500 $7761100 
1902-1904, per annum 4009 900 7767400 
1904 5 041100 7551 900 
1905 6884400 8 237800 
UNSETTLED  COMMERCIAL  CONDITIONS 
The country is still far  from  having returned to a sound commercial condition. Its trade is still much 
below the figures  of  ten years ago, confidence  is still weakened by the existence of  a depreciating 
and fluctuating  currency and by revolution, and coffee  prices still remain low. Yet the increase in 
trade, the improved quotations of  Guatemalan securities held abroad, the resumption of  work on 
several public and semipublic undertakings -such as the Northern Railway- and several other factors 
seem to indicate that the worst is over. Throughout the period of  depression the commerce of  the 
United States with Guatemala has suffered  in common with that of  other countries, but in less degree, 
and to-day, although our trade is smaller than it was ten years ago, our share in the total is larger. 
EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS  BY  COUNTRIES 
The first  table on the next page shows the average annual values of  exports and imports for  the eleven 
years ending with 1904 and for  the year 1905 between Guatemala and the United States, England, 
Germany, and France. 
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Table 1.1.8 
TRADE OF GUATEMALA WITH SPECIFIED COUNTRIES, 1894-1905 
Imports into Guatemala Exports from  Guatemala 
Country 







United States $2125 300 36.6 $3 067000 44.8 $2 166 600 25.9 $2 875 300 34.9 
England 1222 700 22.6 1570 100 22.9 1287400 15.4 1050 500 12.8 
Germany 1 151 000 20.0 1408 500 20.6 4506 000 53.8 4 078 600 49.5 
France 534 700 9.2 269500 3.9 201 300 2.4 25 300 .3 
French trade with Guatemala has sunk almost into insignificance;  English and German have 
remained nearly stationary, with a slight increase in their share of  the imports and some decline in 
their share of  the exports, while that of  the United States has increased in both respects. Our share 
in the import trade in 1905 was nearly as large as that of  England, Germany, and France combined. 
GROWTH  OF IMPORTS 
Table 1.1.9 
PRINCIPAL ARTICLES OF IMPORT INTO 
GUATEMALA SHOWING INCREASES IN 1905 
It is a common statement that American exports to Guatemala consist chiefly  of  food  stuffs,  and I 
have repeatedly been told by persons supposedly familiar  with the facts  that the reason for  the recent 
increase in American trade is the shortage of  Guatemalan maize crops, which has made necessary 
the purchase of  foreign  supplies. An examination of  the figures  proves this to be but partial truth. It 
is true that foodstuffs  constitute the largest single item in our exports to Guatemala; it is likewise 
true that a very considerable part of  the increase in Guatemala's imports in 1905 consisted of  these 
same goods, but these facts  tell but part of  the tale, for  there are other extremely important items in 
our trade with Guatemala which show similar increase with foodstuffs.  In 1905, when Guatemala's 
purchases of  food  stuffs  from  the United States were abnormally large, they formed  only about 
35 per cent of  her total purchases from  us; at least 
an equal percentage is made up of  sundry 
manufactured  goods, of  which the chief  are iron 
and steel and textiles. On the other hand, the 
growth in Guatemalan imports is in many lines of 
goods which offer  us a market. The shortage of  the 
Guatemalan maize crop affected  mainly the 
importation of  breadstuffs,  the increase for  the 
year being $558 000 (from  $450 000 in 1904 to 
$1 008 000 in 1905), but other increases are 
scarcely less significant,  as will be seen from  the 
following: 
There were also many other smaller items. In 
most of  the classes of  goods in which Guatemalan purchases have made marked gains the United 
States has contributed largely increased amounts, and in all of  them except textiles and glassware 
the United States already holds the bulk of  the trade. We furnish  89 per cent of  the breadstuffs,  50 
per cent of  the other foodstuffs,  42 per cent of  the iron and steel, 92 per cent of  the coal, 98 per cent 
of  the tallow, 22 per cent of  the glassware, and 21 per cent of  the textiles. 
1904 1905 
Other foodstuffs $168 000 $409 000 
Iron and steel 176 000 422 000 
Textiles 1 249 000 1467000 
Glassware and porcelain 17 000 48 000 
Coal 49 000 69 000 
Tallow 39 000 73 000 
KINDS  OF GOODS NEEDED 
A clear idea of  the kinds of  goods in demand in Guatemala and the position of  the United States in 
the trade may be obtained from  the following  table (1.1.10), which includes all principal items of 
Guatemalan import (values in United States gold): 
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Table 1.1.10 
PRINCIPAL IMPORTS INTO GUATEMALA AND SHARE OF UNITED STATES 
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152 200 78 600 51.6 
107600 21700 20.2 
24 300 9400 38.7 
93 800 68 200 72.7 
76400 16 800 22.0 
60550 6 800 11.2 
19 300 11200 58.0 
30000 22400 74.9 
13 300 6500 48.7 
32400 23 000 70.9 
92400 33 600 36.4 
702100 298 000 42A 139 200 180 000 +29.6 
18 600 17.8 16500 20 800 + 26.1 
38 500 8 700 22.4 6300 9400 +49.2 
5 700 3100 54.8 14100 11300 -19.9 
42 700 42 300 99.1 
27300 9 200 33.8 
51500 33 000 64.1 
6500 4900 76.0 
14400 1900 12.9 
72400 39 800 55.0 13 700 30 900 + 125.5 
69300 63900 92.2 7700 32 000 + 315.6 
72 000 54 300 75.4 31300 40 900 + 30.7 
25 400 15 800 62.3 12500 13500 + 8.0 
128 200 59 100 46.1 35 300 33400 -5.4 
22 000 21700 98.6 19000 22 200 + 16.8 
16 400 4100 25.0 1300 2600 + 100.0 
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HINTS  FOR AMERICAN  EXPORTERS 
The bulk of  American trade with Guatemala is seen to be in foodstuffs  and in iron and steel goods, 
and in both of  these classes of  commodities as a whole we supply a larger share than any other 
country. There are many separate items included in these headings in which we are, however, far 
behind some of  our competitors. A more detailed examination of  these latter may offer  hints to our 
exporters as to lines in which their trade might be increased. The annexed table (1.1.11) shows 
specified  imports into Guatemala, share of  the United States therein, and principal sources of 
competition in 1905: 
Table 1.1.11 
GUATEMALA: IMPORTS, U.S. SHARE AND PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF COMPETITION IN 1905 
Article All countries 
United 
States Chief  competitors 
Breadstuffs: 
Rice $37 100 $26 500 Germany 
Malt 32 300 21200 Chile 
Crackers, etc. 5 600 3 900 England, Germany 
Paste preparations 4 100 1800 Italy 
Provisions: 
Butter 4 600 2 800 Germany 
Cheese 8 300 , 3 500 Italy, Germany 
Hams, bacon, sausages 4 700 500 Spain 
Sundry preserved goods: 
Wooden coverings 9 800 8 200 Germany, Spain 
Other coverings 79 800 40 200 Germany 
Sweets and confits 11000 4 200 England, Germany 
Beverages: 
Mineral waters 6 500 1600 England, France 
Beer 44 800 6 400 Germany 
Spirits 54 600 18 200 France 
Ginger ale 2 600 600 England 
Liquors 7 300 400 France 
Cider 1600 400 Spain 
Wine red 41 700 14 500 France, Spain 
Wine, white 35 700 2. m Spain, France, Germany 
Wine, sparkling 12 500 65 France 
Table oil 9 900 3 200 France, Spain 
Iron and steel 
Electrical material and apparatus i 20 700 5 900 Germany 
Firearms-revolvers 6 600 6000 Spain 
Others 6 100 670 Germany, Belgium, England 
Household utensils 76 400 16 800 Germany 
Pumps 2 400 1 100 Germany, England 
Pipes and fittings 19 300 11200 England, Belgium 
Hardware 13 300 6 500 Germany 
Tools and implements 131900 31 100 Germany, England 
Galvanized roofing 60 500 6 800 Germany 
Machinery driven by animal, water or 
steam power 113 300 45 200 England, Germany 
Typewriters 3 075 2 774 Germany 
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COMPETITION  IN  TEXTILES 
In textiles the United States holds but 21 per cent of  the total trade, yet there are certain lines of 
these goods in which we are making progress, which is prophetic of  considerable changes in the near 
future.  In woolen, linen, and jute manufactures  we hardly compete at all, but in silks we already hold 
the largest share, and in several classes of  cottons we have made marked progress. The table (1.1.12) 
on this page shows imports of  silk and cotton goods into Guatemala, share of  the United States 
therein, and principal sources of  competition in 1905. 
Table 1.1.12 
GUATEMALA: IMPORTS OF SILK AND COTTON GOODS, U.S. SHARE, 
AND PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF COMPETITION IN 1905 
Article All countries 
United 
States Chief  competitors 
Silk goods: 
Ready-made goods $63 300 $38 900 China, Japan 
Shawls and mufflers 32 100 20 200 Japan 
Ribbons 19 500 35 Germany, England 
Umbrellas and parasols 
4 500 750 Germany, Italy 
Silk floss 16 500 7100 England, Japan 
Piece goods 18 300 1300 Japan, France, Germany 
Cotton goods: 
Ready-made goods 45 900 3 600 England, Germany 
Ribbons 4 700 130 Germany 
Corsets 4 500 600 Germany, England 
Drills 135 200 53 $00 England, Germany 
Blankets 24300 4 000 England, Germany 
Thread and yarn 190 200 1800 England 
Umbrellas and parasols 4 700 1800 Germany 
Underclothing 56 600 4 200 Germany 
Piece goods 
Unbleached 372 200 134 700 England 
Bleached 114 800 8 200 England 
Dyed 92 700 38 500 England, Germany 
Prints 124 600 43 900 England 
Twills 33 500 300 England 
All others 120 300 10 400 England, Germany 
Towels 10 400 250 England 
In cottons the United States makes the best showing in drills, unbleached and dyed goods, and 
in prints. There is a steadily increasing demand for  American goods of  this sort not only in Guatemala 
but in all Central America. The difficulties  which stand in the way of  increased business are chiefly 
those which affect  the sale of  our cotton goods in all Spanish America. They have been repeatedly 
alluded to. 
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NICARAGUA, SALVADOR, AND BRITISH HONDURAS 
Little need be added as to the trade of  Nicaragua, Salvador, and British Honduras. The conditions 
existing there are similar to those already described as pertaining to the neighboring States, 
Nicaragua and British Honduras belonging to the group whose commerce has advanced in recent 
years, and Salvador to the group where commercial depression has made itself  felt. 
A considerable portion of  the trade of  British Honduras is probably transit trade to Guatemala. 
The United States has made definite  advances in nearly all important commodities, our total exports 
rising from  an average of  $511000 for  the five  years 1895-1899 to $813 000 for  the years 1900-1904, 
the increase affecting  all chief  classes of  commodities with the single exception of  malt liquors, which 
have decreased from  an average of  $11800 per annum to $9 300. 
In Nicaragua there has been a total increase from  $1005 000 per annum to $1405 000, but it has 
not been quite so general for  all classes of  commodities. In addition to malt liquors, which have 
dropped from  $20 900 per annum to $17 200, must be mentioned wines, which have fallen  from 
$19 300 to $11600; and cars, carriages, etc., which show a decrease from  $10 300 to $7 800 per annum. 
Salvador presents directly opposite conditions. Our total exports have decreased from  $1163 000 
per annum to $794 000, and the decline affects  all commodities except cotton goods, explosives, and 
leather manufactures.  Even iron and steel, in which lies our greatest strength in Spanish America, 
have fallen  from  $252000 to $152 000 per annum. The decline is part of  a general movement, however, 
and can not be regarded as permanent or affecting  the United States alone, and its significance  is 
more than offset  by the growth from  $179 000 to $233 000 per annum which has taken place in our 
sales of  cotton goods. It is said that in prints, especially, in spite of  the depression in Salvador, 
American goods are rapidly ousting the European. 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
The physical characteristics of  Central America are such that the densest population, and hence the 
greatest commercial activity, are found  on the Pacific  slope of  the Republics. British Honduras lies 
wholly on the Atlantic slope, but its population and commerce are both small, and it has, therefore, 
been left  out of  consideration in the following  analysis of  the transportation problems of  Central 
America. On neither the Atlantic nor the Pacific  lowlands of  any of  the Republics is the population 
dense. Climatic conditions have caused the inhabitants to seek the plateau and mountainous regions; 
there are no large towns on either coast; the capital cities and all important centers of  population 
are in the interior at elevations ranging from  1 000 to 5 000 feet,  and as the central backbone of 
mountains is nearer the Pacific  than the Atlantic, the center of  population lies on the Pacific  side. 
Thus it results that the commercial approach to these countries, as a whole, has been made from 
the Pacific.  In Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, and Nicaragua about seven-eighths of  the foreign 
trade passes through Pacific  ports; and even in Costa Rica the completion of  the railroad from  Puerto 
Limón on the Caribbean Sea to the capital has not wholly stopped the importation or exportation 
of  goods via Pacific  ports. 
DISTANCES  TO  NEW  YORK  AND  SAN  FRANCISCO 
Over against the advantage which the west coast (more properly, southwest coast) has through its 
proximity to the populated areas, must be set another advantage which is found  on the east 
(northeast) coast -nearness to the great commercial centers of  Europe and America. From New 
York to Puerto Limón (Costa Rica), San Juan del Norte (Nicaragua), or Puerto Barrios (Guatemala) 
is approximately 2 000 miles, while the distances2 from  San Francisco to corresponding ports on the 
Pacific  side are: To Punta Arenas (Costa Rica), 3 100 miles; to Corinto (Nicaragua), 2 870 miles, 
and to San José (Guatemala), 2 565 miles. From New York via the Isthmus of  Panama the distances 
2These are distances with stops at way ports; direct routes are much shorter 
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to the Pacific  coast ports exceed those to Puerto Limón, San Juan del Norte, and Puerto Barrios, as 
follows:  To Punta Arenas, 500 miles; Corinto, 780 miles, and San José, 1080 miles. From Europe 
the distances are approximately 2 500 miles farther  than from  New York to both coasts of  Central 
America. 
As a mere question of  transportation, therefore,  the future  importance of  the west coast as 
compared with the east coast depends upon a double set of  rates, the cost of  carrying goods to the 
east-coast ports plus the cost of  carrying them thence to the centers of  population in the interior, 
compared with the cost of  transportation to the Pacific  coast ports plus the international freights  on 
that slope. In all the countries except Costa Rica the cost of  transportation from  the eastern ports 
is virtually prohibitive. There has been some traffic  from  San Juan del Norte into the interior of 
Nicaragua via the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, but that has now ceased, temporarily at least. 
There are plans afoot  for  opening railroads both here and in Guatemala, but at present Costa Rica 
alone has any real transportation facilities  on the Caribbean side. The most useful  comparisons of 
rates are therefore  to be made in this country. 
SEA AND  INTERNAL  FREIGHTS 
The question, as already suggested, is a twofold 
one; both sea freights  to Central America and 
internal freights  within Central America must be 
considered, and this can best be done by examining 
them separately. 
First, sea freights  to Central American ports. A 
sufficiently  clear idea of  the situation is given by 
comparing the rates to chief  Central American 
ports from  Europe, from  New York, and from  San 
Francisco. The following  figures  (and all rates 
quoted in this report) are taken so far  as possible 
from  actual bills of  lading. Where this has been 
impossible, the published schedules of  the 
steamships lines concerned have been used. There 
are undoubtedly some cases in which rebates are 
allowed or in which certain alterations may have 
been made, but the figures  in the tables are 
probably a close approximation to the actual 
average charges. 
Table 1.1.13 
TYPICAL FREIGHTS FROM NEW YORK AND 
EUROPEAN PORTS TO PUERTO LIMON, 
COSTA RICA 




' Or 40 cents per 100 pounds. 
Or 16.8 cents per cubic foot. 




Iron cot Southampton 15.2 16.0 
Iron beadsteads do. 15.2 16.0 
Do. Manchester 15.2 16.0 
Wire netting Southampton 15.2 16.0 
Earthenware do. 12.2 16.0a 
Wine, in casks Bordeaux 21.4 
Do. Barcelona 13.1 
Wine, in bottles 16.0* 
Shellfish,  canned Barcelona 43.3 52.1b 
Codfish Hamburg 52.9C 16.0 
Biscuit London 17.2 16.0 
Apollinaris do. 17.1 16.0 
COMPARISON  OF NEW  YORK  WITH  EUROPEAN  RATES 
With one or two exceptions in the above list rates 
from  New York are somewhat higher than from 
European ports. The differences  in favor  of 
Europe are greater at the northern ports of 
Central America. Hamburg rates, for  example, are 
only about one-third higher to Puerto Barrios 
(Guatemala) than to Puerto Limón, whereas New 
York rates to Puerto Barrios range from  25 to 
nearly 200 per cent greater than to Puerto Limón. 
The following  figures  illustrate the differences: 
These figures  illustrate the well-known fact  that 
although New York is some 2 500 miles nearer to 
Central America than the principal European 
ports, and although our trade with Central america 
is as large as that of  England, Germany, and 
Table 1.1.14 
RATES ON SPECIFIED ARTICLES FROM NEW 
YORK TO PUERTO LIMON AND PUERTO 
BARRIOS 
Article To Puerto Limón 
To Puerto 
Barrios 
Beer" $6.40 $12.00 
Beans and pease b 8.00 12.00 
Flour in sacks b 4.10 12.00 
Iron bar, sheet, rod, etc.b 8.00 12.00 
Lumber c 12.00 15.00 
Illuminating oila 6.40 12.00 
Barbed wire b 7.00 12.00 
Salt" 4.10 12.00 
Rate per cubic feet. 
Rate per 2 000 pounds. 
c Rate per M feet. 
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France combined, yet freights  from  New York are certainly no lower than those from  Liverpool, 
Southampton, or Hamburg, and in some instances, at least, are much higher. If  the distances from 
the United states and from  Europe were nearly equal, or if  the amount of  goods offering  from 
transportation were relatively small, as in the case of  many of  the countries of  South America, this 
state of  affairs  could easily be understood, but under existing circumstances it is hard to explain. 
However, whatever the explanation may be, the fact  is that the United States does not get the benefit 
of  proximity to Central America which might be expected. In mail and passenger communication 
we do get such benefit,  and this probably goes a long way toward explaining our preponderance in 
the Central American markets; but so far  as mere freight  charges are concerned we have no 
advantage over Europe. 
RATES  TO  COSTA  RICA  AND  GUATEMALA 
Turning now to the rates from  the Atlantic and Pacific  coasts of  the United States to Central 
America, we find  typical freights  from  New York and San Francisco to Costa Rica, which are given 
in the following  table (1.1.15). 
Table 1.1.15 
RATES ON SPECIFIED ARTICLES FROM NEW YORK AND SAN FRANCISCO 
TO COSTA RICAN PORTS a 
(Per  ton of  40 cubic feet,  or2 000pounds) 
New York to 
Article 
Beer 
Beans and pease 
Corn 
















































































* Rates are small lots, less than 5 tons; on larger lots there is usually a considerable rebate. 
Per ton measure or $13 per ton weight. 
® Per ton measure. 
The rates usually quoted on dried and canned fruits,  canned salmon, etc. are $8 per ton. The above figures,  however, are taken from 
freight  bills on shipments actually made. 
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NEW  YORK  AND  SAN  FRANCISCO  COMPARED 
As might be expected, freights  from  San Francisco to Punta Arenas are cheaper than from  New 
York (with the single exception of  illuminating oil), in spite of  the fact  that the distance from  New 
York via Panama is five  or six hundred miles shorter than from  San Francisco (2 500 miles as against 
3147). The transfer  across the Isthmus partly accounts for  the difference.  From New York to Puerto 
Limón the rates in general are lower than from  San Francisco to Punta Arenas. This, too, might be 
expected, the distance being eleven or twelve hundred miles less between the first  two than between 
the last two. But there are a few  of  the items in the list which show a higher rate for  the 2 000 miles' 
run from  New York than for  the 3100 miles from  San Francisco. These are beans, pease, corn, malt, 
and live animals. On lumber and rice the rates are the same by both routes. Primage from  New York 
is 10 per cent; from  San Francisco, nothing. 
In the rates to Guatemala there is a greater difference  in favor  of  San Francisco, as will be seen 
by typical freights  from  New York and San Francisco, given on the opposite page. 
Table 1.1.16 
RATES ON SPECIFIED ARTICLES FROM NEW YORK AND SAN FRANCISCO TO GUATEMALAN 
PORTS8 
(Per  ton of  40 cubic feet,  or2 000pounds) 
Article 











Beer $12.00 $14.80 b $7.00 
Bran 12.00 14.80 b 12.00 c 
Beans and pease 12.00 13.00 d 7.00 
Cement 7.10 13.00 7.00 
Doors, etc. 12.00 14.80 b 8.00 
Flour, in sacks 12.00 13.00 d 6.00 
Hay, in compressed 
bales 12.00 13.00 d 16.00 
Iron, bar, rod, 
sheet, etc. 12.00 13.00 d 9.00 
Nails, spikes, etc. 12.00 13.00 d 8.00 
Machinery (except 
heavy lifts) 12.00 14.80 b 8.00 b 
Oats 12.00 14.80 b 2.00 c 
Illuminating oil 12.00 14.00 10.00 
Rice 12.00 b 13.00 c 8.00° 
Salt 12.00 b 13.00 d 7.00° 
Wine 12.00 14.80 b 8.00 
Barbed wire 12.00 b 14.80 b 7.00 
Lumber 15.00 24.00 12.00 
Shingles 4.50 2.00 
* Special rates on lots of  S tons and upward. 
By measure or $13 per ton weight. 
® By weight only. 
Or $14.80 per ton measure. 
It appears therefore  that with few  exceptions rates from  San Francisco are lower not only than 
those from  New York and Europe via Panama, but also than those to corresponding ports on the 
Atlantic side of  Central America. San Francisco shippers have an advantage so far  as mere cost of 
transportation is concerned. In time, however, they are at a disadvantage, the voyage from 
31 
San Francisco to San José, Guatemala, occupying from  fourteen  to sixteen days and to Punta Arenas 
twenty days, while from  New York to corresponding ports on the opposite coast requires only eight 
or ten days. 
RAILROAD  ADVANTAGES  TO  SAN  FRANCISCO 
Table 1.1.17 
RELATIVE AMOUNTS OF SPECIFIED 
ARTICLES IMPORTED INTO COSTA RICA 
FROM THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC 





From Pacific  coast 
Value Per cent 
In the four  northern Republics, where 
transportation facilities  on the Atlantic slope have 
not yet been developed, this advantage to San 
Francisco in sea freights  is emphasized by a fur  ther 
advantage in land freights.  In Costa Rica, on the 
other hand, the Northern Railway gives through 
rail connection from  Puerto Limón to the capital, 
San José, and much freight  is carried to the interior 
by that road which before  its construction was 
imported via Punta Arenas. The rail freights  from 
Puerto Limón are extremely high, but are kept at 
such a point that they give importations by that 
route a bare advantage. The actual cost of  carrying 
goods from  New York to San José (steamship and 
railroad freights  combined) is in most cases a little 
less than the cost from  San Francisco via Punta 
Arenas. On a few  lines of  goods, it is true, the costs 
from  San Francisco are a little less, but not enough 
to counteract the influence  of  the quicker service 
from  New York. Partly as a result of  this it happens 
that certain typically California  goods go to Costa 
Rica from  New York rather than from  San 
Francisco, such, for  example, as dried and canned 
fruits  and vegetables. 
Following is a list of  some of  the principal goods 
which might be shipped to Costa Rica from  San 
Francisco, but which are at present imported 
mainly from  the Atlantic States (values being given 
in United States currency): 
Some of  the articles in this list are, beyond doubt, chiefly  of  Pacific  coast origin, such as the canned 
and dried fruits  and vegetables, the wine, and a good deal of  the fish;  yet the Pacific  coast sends but 
a small percentage of  them to Costa Rica direct. They go to New York and other eastern points and 
are reshipped. 
Codfish $30135 $43 0.1 
Other fish 24423 769 3.1 
Beef,  salt or 
pickled 27906 201 .7 
Other preserved 
goods, except fruits 12441 555 4.3 
Wheat flour 335559 6122 1.8 
Corn meal 12 321 129 1.0 
Other meal 3 702 27 .7 
Crackers 9 701 441 4.3 
Fresh vegetables 366 51 12.2 
Beans (frijoles) 15 880 595 3.6 
Fruit: 
Fresh 3 305 75 2.2 
Preserved 1925 472 19.7 
Dried 2028 245 10.8 
Wine: 
White 44 400 90.1 
Red 1543 661 30.0 
Cordage 17944 469 2.6 
QUESTION  FOR PACIFIC  COAST  SHIPPERS 
A question of  vital importance to Pacific  coast shippers is whether this is a necessarily permanent 
condition. There are many indications that it is not, and that our western merchants can secure a 
good direct trade if  they are prepared to take advantage of  important changes which are promised 
in the near future.  Taking San José, the capital of  Costa Rica, as a common point, the present 
conditions are as follows:  Goods from  New York (and Europe) are shipped to Puerto Limón, and 
from  there direct by rail, 102 miles, to San José. From San Francisco, on the other hand, they go to 
Punta Arenas; thence by rail, 13 miles, to Esparta; then by ox cart, 15 miles, to Santo Domingo, and 
finally  by rail, 41 miles, to San José. The 15-mile cart haul usually costs more than the 3 100 miles of 
sea freight  and the 55 miles of  rail freight  combined, averaging $12 per ton (somewhat less in the dry 
season and considerably more in the wet). 
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PROSPECTIVE  REDUCTION 
Table 1.1.18 
PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE RATES FROM 
PUERTO LIMON AND PUNTA ARENAS TO 
SAN JOSE, COSTARICA 
(Cents  per 100 pounds  or cubic foot) 
From From Punta Arenas 
But the Costa Rican Government is now rapidly 
pushing the construction of  a road to close the gap 
of  15 miles between the railways, and it is 
probable that before  the end of  the present year 
there will be an all-rail route from  Punta Arenas 
to San José. The Government will own this 
railway, and strong assurances have been given 
that the freight  rates on the completed line will be 
the same per mile as hold at present on the two 
sections now in operation. If  this promise is 
fulfilled,  there will be a great saving in through 
freights  from  Punta Arenas to San José, with 
corresponding advantage to all importers via the 
Pacific  coast port. The following  table (1.1.18) 
illustrates the probable extent of  the change. It 
shows freights  to San José, Costa Rica, from 
Puerto Limón and Punta Arenas. 
It is not to be supposed that the rates on the 
Northern Railway, from  Puerto Limón to San 
José, will remain as high as they now are after  the 
completion of  the new road. They are almost 
certain to fall;  but the fact  that this road is some 30 miles longer than the new one, that it runs through 
more difficult  country, and that it must pay dividends on a high capitalization, will, under competitive 
conditions, tend to keep the rates permanently higher than the new rates from  Punta Arenas. The 
completion of  the new railway will, therefore,  undoubtedly stimulate trade between our Pacific  States 
and Costa Rica. The extent of  this stimulation will depend upon what reductions in freights  the 
Northern Railway and the steamship lines from  New York to Puerto Limón may be able to make. 
Puerto-
Article Limón Present Possible 
rate: future 
All Rail and rate: 
rail cart Rail 
Beer 90.0 94.6 44.9 
Beans and pease 81.2 88.8 37.4 
Corn 56.3 88.8 37.4 
Flour 81.2 88.8 37.4 
Iron, bar, sheet, etc. 81.2 88.8 37.4 
Barbed wire 81.2 88.8 37.4 
Cordage 90.0 94.6 44.9 
Dried fruit 47.0 32.8 20.7 
Canned fruit 47.0 36.7 20.7 
Canned salmon 47.0 42.2 20.7 
Canned oysters 47.0 35.3 20.7 
Illuminating oil 47.0 56.0 20.7 
GREA T  CHANGES  PROMISED 
In two other Central American countries -Nicaragua and Guatemala- great changes in 
transportation facilities  are also promised for  the near future.  In Nicaragua the Government has 
recently contracted a loan for  £1000 000, a part of  which sum is to be devoted to the building of  a 
railway from  Monkey Point, between Bluefields  and San Juan del Norte, on the Caribbean Sea, to 
the eastern shore of  Lake Nicaragua. This will give lake and rail transportation from  the Caribbean 
to Managua, the capital, and the surrounding most thickly populated section of  the country. At the 
same time it is possible that the route from  San Juan del Norte via the San Juan River and Lake 
Nicaragua, recently abandoned, will be reopened. The distance to Managua, however, by either of 
these routes, is from  two to three times as far  as from  the Pacific  port of  Corinto, which has the 
additional advantage of  possessing a fairly  good harbor; and even after  the completion of  the new 
plans (which is by no means assured) the Pacific  route is likely to remain the cheaper. 
COMPETING  RAILROAD  IN  GUA  TEMALA 
In Guatemala the project for  establishing all-rail connection with the east coast seems much nearer 
realization. Steps have already been taken for  the rehabilitation of  the old railway from  Puerto 
Barrios to the interior and the filling  in of  the 60-mile gap between its terminus and the capital 
-Guatemala City. It is thought that the road will be in operation within a year or eighteen months. If 
the opening of  this through rail connection between Puerto Barrios and Guatemala City results in 
competition in rates with the Southern Railway (from  Guatemala City to the Pacific  port of  San 
José), as it surely will unless some sort of  combination is effected  between the two roads, it will reduce 
the cost of  importing goods from  our Pacific  coast States. The present rates on the Southern, which 
are noncompetitive, are extremely high. It is altogether probable that competition will bring 
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reductions which will keep the cost of  transporting goods to Guatemala City from  San Francisco 
lower than from  New York. New York shipments must be carried approximately 2 000 miles by sea 
and 170 miles by rail, while from  San Francisco the sea distance is but little more (2 500 miles) and 
the rail distance is much less (74 miles) through a less difficult  country than the new road will traverse. 
PACIFIC  COAST  ADVANTAGE 
In general, therefore,  we may conclude that so far  as transportation charges are concerned our 
Pacific  coast exporters not only have certain advantages in the Central American market, but that 
these advantages are likely to remain permanent. In Costa Rica the opening of  the all-rail route to 
the Pacific  will be of  direct assistance, while in Nicaragua and Guatemala the contemplated 
connections with the Caribbean coast are not likely seriously to reduce the advantages which the 
Pacific  routes now old. Just what is going to be the result of  the opening of  the Tehuantepec route 
it is difficult  to say, but the cost of  transshipment from  steamer to rail and back again from  rail to 
steamer will be a handicap which will probably continue to give the all-steamer route from  San 
Francisco an advantage except as to time and as to certain high-class goods. 
It being a fact  that our Pacific  coast holds this advantage in the matter of  transportation facilities, 
the question naturally follows,  Why is it that our Pacific  coast trade with Central America is relatively 
small? There are many reasons. The mention of  the more obvious of  them will indicate their nature. 
1. Many goods that are in active demand in Central America are not at present produced in our 
Pacific  coast States, and there are few  such goods that can stand the rail freights  from  eastern points 
to San Francisco for  shipment south. Points from  Chicago westward do ship some articles of  high 
value compared with weight or bulk via this route, but they are the exception rather than the rule. If 
the West (California,  for  instance) can build up manufactures  under the stimulus of  cheap oil fuel, 
there are many articles for  which a market could be found  in both Central America and western 
South America. Wire, nails, hardware, mining machinery, furniture,  glassware, bottles, etc., may be 
mentioned as examples. 
2. Many goods of  local production on the west coast, such as California  canned and dried fruits 
and vegetables, and wines, are sold only at abnormally high prices in our western markets. California 
producers have for  many reasons found  it to their advantage to permit the marketing of  their goods 
to pass into the control of  eastern middlemen. Central and South American importers can, 
consequently, in many instances get better prices on such goods in New York or Chicago than in 
San Francisco. Whether such arrangements are to remain permanently advantageous under 
conditions of  increasing demand in Spanish America is a question for  producers to determine. 
German competition overestimated 
3. There is an unaccountable tendency on the part of  many of  our exporters to overestimate the 
seriousness of  foreign  competition in Central America. In discussing the trade of  these countries 
with numerous "travelers" for  American houses one is struck with their exaggeration of  what the 
Germans, in particular, are doing in these markets. The common answer to the question why our 
trade is not larger is that the Germans are driving us out. This is partially true of  a few  lines of  goods, 
but as a general statement it is utterly without foundation,  and the sooner our exporters get rid of 
the idea the better it will be for  them. It is unnecessary to repeat here the statistics which have been 
presented at length in other reports. Suffice  it to say that in most of  the more important articles of 
Central American import the United States not only holds the bulk of  the trade, but is increasing 
her share of  the total. 
"Good-enough  " goods 
4. There is a tendency among some of  our exporters to regard inferior  grades of  goods as "good 
enough" for  Spanish America. Many of  the goods characteristically Californian  -for  instance, such 
as canned and dried fruits  and vegetables- are of  the nature of  luxuries in Central America. They 
are consumed mainly by the wealthier classes, who are able and willing to pay good prices, who know 
how to distinguish between different  grades of  goods, and who in return for  their money demand 
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the best. Much injury is done to the reputation of  our goods through attempts to "dump" poorer 
grades. 
5. With notable exceptions there seems to be a lack of  persistence and enterprise in "pushing" 
Pacific  coast goods. A single example will illustrate. California  wine is well liked in Central America, 
where known, but there is little evidence that much effort  is made to make it more widely known. 
The bottled wines, in general, are too high priced to sell well in competition with European, but wine 
in barrels does fairly  well. When imported thus, however, and bottled in Central America, the work 
is often  carelessly done; there is no uniformity  in the shapes and sizes of  bottles; they are untidily 
sealed and are often  without either caps or labels. In this form  it does not advertise itself  as it might 
if  our exporters by organized effort  could insure proper handling, could furnish  labels and caps, or 
even set up bottling establishments at principal points. 
6. And finally  must be mentioned once more the oft-recurring  difficulty  in regard to inferior 
packing and unwillingness to grant credits, which are a characteristic -fortunately  decreasingly so-
of  all American export trade. 
In closing, it remains only to repeat the conviction expressed in previous reports that an increased 
market for  Pacific  coast goods is a possibility not only in Central America, but on the whole west 
coast of  Spanish America as far  south as Peru, and for  some goods as far  even as Chile. 
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2. DOING BUSINESS IN THE ISTHMUS (1916) 
From: Consular Recommendations on Honduras Trade; American Consulate, Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, to Secretary of  State, Washington, February 7,1916; Unnumbered Despatch, 
615.111, Central Decimal Files 1910-29, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records 
Administration, Washington, D.C. 
AMERICAN CONSULATE 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras, Feb. 7,1916 
SUBJECT: Consular Recommendations on Honduras Trade 
THE HONORABLE 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 
WASHINGTON. 
SIR: 
I have the honor to submit herewith a joint report in quadruplicate of  "Consular 
Recommendations on Honduras Trade," which is a collaboration by Consuls Gamon and Boyle 
and the writer. The idea of  the report was suggested by Consul Gamon who also furnished  by 
far  the greater part of  the subject matter and when he was transferred  to Corinto, the several 
reports were sent to me for  editing and combining in one report. 
We hope that the very considerable investigation and study we have made in order to 
prepare the report, may be of  practical use to the Department. 
I have the honor to be, Sir, 
Your obedient servant, 
(signed) 
American Consul 
Enclosure: Report as stated. 
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CONSULAR RECOMMENDATIONS ON HONDURAS TRADE 
Joint  Report by 
John A. Gamon, Consul at Puerto Cortes 
Walter F. Boyle, Consul at Ceiba 
E. M. Lawton, Consul at Tegucigalpa 
Introductory 
The United States enjoys a greater percentage of  the trade and commerce with Honduras than 
any other country. This was the case before  the beginning of  the European war and the percentage 
is now even larger. Recommendations by Consular officers  in the past, on shipping conditions, have 
been helpful  in developing such trade extension and it is believed that a further  study with occasional 
suggestions will continue to be of  benefit.  Especially does this seem pertinent in view of  the demand 
and interest in the United States for  increased trade with Latin America. Consular officers  are 
constantly receiving inquiries not only from  manufacturers  entirely inexperienced in export business 
but from  firms  of  long years of  practical experience as well. 
A Consular officer  is in a position to see the shortcomings of  certain trade transactions as well as 
note the excellent results in others. With the chance of  being considered academic, it seems almost 
necessary to remind exporters that a satisfied  customer in Central America, as at home, is the 
greatest aid for  extending sales and helping to establish a reliable and permanent reputation. Lack 
of  tact in handling credit inquiries, failure  to conform  to shipping instructions, poor packing, faulty 
invoicing, are some of  the complaints against American exporters, which happily are gradually 
lessening but which must be entirely eliminated in order to permanently retain foreign  trade in the 
face  of  probable post bellum European competition. 
The Central American importer is interested in getting his goods through with the best dispatch 
and the least confusion.  He has become accustomed to pretty fair  service from  European houses. 
Errors credited to the packing room, billing desk and such like matters he considers not of  his 
concern. Even willingness to rectify  an error will not compensate him for  loss of  time and incidental 
costs. For the exporter who desires to build up a business, a transaction does not end with the sale. 
Every satisfactory  transaction concluded by an American house not only makes the next sale easier, 
but also sheds a favorable  light upon a fellow  American exporter. 
The following  report may be of  value to new exporting houses if  not to the more established firms. 
That the latter receive their share of  complaints is proof  that time does not always produce paragons. 
These suggestions are not exhaustive but are believed to be pertinent. They are offered  not in a 
spirit of  complaint so much as a desire to attain the best. The building up of  a general reputation 
for  American trade can only be attained by constant endeavor on the part of  the individual. In 
considering the following  suggestions examples should not be dwelt on extensively, lest the principle 
be lost sight of  in the study of  the example: they are noted merely to illustrate and in many cases to 
show the inconvenience and cost that may arise when the principles are not understood. 
General Features 
There are three Consular districts in Honduras corresponding to the ports of  Puerto Cortes and 
Ceiba on the north coast and Tegucigalpa the capital in the interior. The latter has Amapala for  its 
port of  entry which is located on Tigre island in the Pacific  Bay of  Fonseca. The towns of  the north 
coast have certain short railroads connecting with the banana lands and in general, with the long 
stretch of  low lands adjacent to the coast. The interior and southern portions have no railroads and 
not many wagon roads with the exception of  the automobile road from  the Pacific  subport of  San 
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Lorenzo to Tegucigalpa. Unless specifically  instructed all freight  for  central and southern Honduras 
must be shipped via Amapala. The towns of  Santa Barbara and Santa Rosa de Copan are extreme 
interior points supplied from  the north coast. 
Many conditions and shipping requirements suitable for  one coast are not suitable for  the other 
ports. Under the following  subheads, such requirements will be noted, so that while treating of  the 
country as a whole, the varied necessities for  each of  the three Consular divisions will be indicated. 
SeaPorts:  Ports of  Entry 
Trujillo, Ceiba, Tela, Puerto Cortes and Omoa are the important ports of  the north coast. The 
direct distance from  New Orleans or Mobile to these ports is about 930 miles or three days direct 
sailing and from  New York the distance is about 1730 miles. The only Pacific  port is Amapala, on 
Tigre Island and imports are reshipped in lighters to the mainland port, a distance of  about 25 miles. 
Unlike most of  the Atlantic ports, Amapala has no pier, so that all goods are lightered ashore. 
All important firms  in the interior have agents at the ports for  clearing goods and forwarding  to 
destination. 
Steamship  Lines and  Shipping  Routes 
The United Fruit Company has weekly service from  New Orleans with intermediate stops at 
Belize, British Honduras, and at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala. The run consumes five  days. The same 
company also had fortnightly  sailings from  New York to Puerto Cortes, Tela and Ceiba with 
intermediate stops at Jamaica, British Honduras and Guatemala points and direct weekly service to 
Tela and Ceiba from  New Orleans but owing to inferior  landing facilities  at Ceiba, they do not bring 
freight  to that port. 
The steamers of  Vacarro Brothers and Company maintain a minimum service of  two trips a week 
to Ceiba and a monthly service to Roatan and Trujillo, all their ships sailing from  New Orleans. 
Considerable freight  from  New York destined for  Honduras is shipped from  that city to New Orleans 
by the vessels of  the Southern Pacific  R. R. Co., and there transferred  to the Vacarro Brothers and 
Company steamers. 
Occasional fruit  steamers arrive from  Mobile and Galveston and other American ports as also 
Schooners and other sailing vessels in the lumber and coasting trade. 
Freight and passenger rates and sailings maybe ascertained at the offices  of  the United Fruit Co., 
17 Battery Place, New York City and 630 Commonwealth Street, New Orleans. Also at the offices 
of  Hubbard-Semurray Steamship Co., Whitney Bank Building, New Orleans and of  the Vacarro 
Bros & Co., offices,  Queen and Crescent Building, New Orleans. 
For  Amapala 
Small vessels of  the Salvador Railway Co., ply somewhat irregularly between Salina Cruz, Mexico 
and Colon, Panama and touch at Amapala, and the ships of  the Pacific  Mail S. S. Co., from  San 
Francisco to Panama maintain a fortnightly  service more or less regularly, to Amapala. With the 
proposed continuation of  the latter and the additional service as rumored by the steamers of  W. R. 
Grace & Co., it is hoped that Amapala will have a minimum service of  not less than two steamers 
each way per month. The rumored closing of  the service of  the Pacific  Mail steamers, brought a 
number of  inquiries from  various lines, some of  which may yet establish regular sailings. Occasional 
vessels of  others lines are beginning to arrive. All-water transportation from  New York to San 
Francisco touching at Amapala is much desired in order to give quicker transit and less deterioration 
of  goods by extra handling and long exposure to the extreme heat of  Panama. A seven ton auto truck 
was held recently, four  and a half  months in Panama, awaiting a steamer with derricks sufficiently 
heavy for  unloading in Amapala and groceries, chemicals, gasoline, etc., suffer  loss in value by being 
side tracked on the transisthmian part of  the trip. 
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Interior  Freighting 
The Honduras National Railroad extends from  Puerto Cortes to Potrerillos, a distance of  about 
59 miles. This is hardly more than one fourth  the distance across the country, from  north to south. 
There are short "banana" or timber roads built from  Omoa, Tela, Ceiba and Trujillo of  a total length 
of  about 200 miles but these are of  little value for  general freighting  purposes. From the several 
ports and from  points on the railroads as well as from  Tegucigalpa, merchandise is distributed all 
over the interior by pack trains. 
Honduras is mountainous. The trails are rough and difficult  and packing becomes an important 
matter. Merchandise for  consumption or sale at the port towns or for  Tegucigalpa may be sent in 
regulation packing cases or bales but for  strictly interior destination they should be sent as nearly as 
possible, in size and weight, for  mule back transportation. On the north coast 200 pounds is 
considered a mule load and 250 pounds for  the south coast. This does not mean one single package 
of  200 or 250 pounds but two boxes or packages as nearly equally divided as Practicable. As an 
illustration, two small steamer trunks make an ideal mule load, but a single 250 pound trunk of  the 
"Saratoga" type is well nigh impossible to handle for  mountain trails. If  packing instructions with an 
order, call for  shipment to be made for  mule freighting,  the shipper should bear this point in mind 
and pack accordingly. 
Import  Tariffs 
More than half  of  the government revenues of  Honduras is produced by customs duties. This 
tariff  is more liable to revision upwards than down and while such charge does not concern the 
exporter as much as the importer, there are certain rules and regulations which if  not understood 
by the export house, may cause expense, delay and trouble to the man importing. Neglect of  this 
point, especially where explicit instructions have accompanied the order, is particularly exasperating 
to the foreign  merchant. A copy of  the Honduras Import Tariff  (Arancel de Aduana) should be in 
the hands of  every exporter to Honduras. It is printed only in Spanish but may be obtained from  the 
Department of  Hacienda at Tegucigalpa, or by writing to the American Consul at Tegucigalpa. 
Price, fifty  cents in American currency or if  sent to Consul, American postage stamps will be 
accepted. 
While the exporter is not primarily concerned with the clearing of  goods through the Honduras 
customs, he is expected and held accountable by the importer, to follow  certain instructions in the 
matter of  invoicing, bills of  lading, etc., all of  which will enable the agent at this end to clear without 
unnecessary worry, trouble and penalty. 
In addition to the duties scheduled in the tariff,  there are also assessed toll, ware-house and road 
charges and port and sanitary taxes, besides a surtax of  five  percent on the total duty. These several 
items in the last fiscal  year were equivalent to more than ten percent of  the total tariff  duties. As 
most of  these items as well as customs duties are charged on gross weight, they are mentioned here 
to show how desirable it is to eliminate unnecessary weight but this will be more fully  discussed under 
the subject of  packing. 
Under the rulings of  the present import tariff  all shipments with the exception of  parcel post 
packages must be accompanied by consular invoice certified  by the Consul of  Honduras, and a copy 
of  the commercial invoice of  the goods shipped. The Consular invoice must be in the Spanish 
language. The commercial invoice may be in English but one point must be borne in mind, viz: the 
consular and commercial invoices must agree in all facts  and details and cover all of  the goods 
manifested.  A copy of  the bill of  lading should be included for  the use of  the custom house broker 
or agent to trace any shortage or correct freight  charges. 
Weights shown on consular invoices must be exact and should be expressed in kilograms, 
(1 kilogram equivalent to 2.2 lbs.) Weights on commercial invoices must check with consular invoices 
but may read in pounds. It is however advisable to give even these weights in kilograms. In case the 
weights given on invoices exceed actual weight, the duty is levied on the greatest weight shown and 
there is no recourse for  correction. For this reason, clerical errors may prove to be expensive 
mistakes. In case the actual weight exceeds by ten percent the weight shown on the invoice, the 
importer must pay in addition to the duties, a fine  amounting to ten percent of  the full  value. All 
papers and weights are closely checked at the port of  entry. There should be no error as to the 
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number of  packages in a shipment and every package should carry a consecutive number plainly 
marked on both package and invoice. 
When instructions are furnished  by Honduras importers for  declaration on invoices, these should 
be followed  explicitly. It would be advisable when such declarations are not furnished  to request 
that they be supplied with subsequent orders. Wrong wording is costly. Some time ago a shipment 
of  ox-yokes was made to one of  the more important merchants of  Honduras. The declaration of  the 
consular papers read "ox-collars". There is no such classification  in the Honduras tariff,  but there 
is a collar classification  and while the customs official  probably knew there was an error in the 
declaration, he had no power to determine the duties except in accord with the declaration. The 
duties amounted to over twenty cents per pound, whereas if  the goods had been declared as 
agricultural implements, there would have been no duty, as agricultural implements are on the free 
list. 
Classification  for  consular invoicing is a service of  a very expert nature and save in the most 
routinary shipments should be placed in the hands of  some one thoroughly informed  in the customs 
tariff  and of  long experience in invoicing goods to Honduras. For example, barbed wire if  invoiced 
as fence  wire or simply as a bale or roll of  wire would be subject to a duty of  about six cents per 
pound, while if  invoiced as barbed wire the duty would be less than one cent per pound. A metallic 
refrigerator  might be invoiced as a piece of  metal furniture  made of  iron with adornments of  other 
metals and subjected to a duty of  three cents a pound, while if  invoiced as a refrigerator,  the duty 
would be twelve cents per pound. 
It is not positive that in every instance the custom house would allow the lower classifications  to 
stand, and in some instances the classification  might be treated as an attempt to defraud  and it is on 
this account that the services of  an expert should be secured, who would know from  experience the 
minimum classification  that will be accepted. On this score, exporters must be careful  that the 
importer, in his desire to secure his goods at the lowest classification  does not give directions for  a 
classification  on the invoice so fraudulent  that a strict compliance therewith will place the American 
exporter in a bad light. 
Forwarding  of  Shipping  Papers: 
Invoices, bills of  lading and all papers connected with the clearing of  the shipment should be sent 
on time to the consignee or his agent. This means that papers should be sent by the most direct 
route. Promptness in forwarding  papers covering consignments of  coal oil, fireworks  and 
inflammables,  heavy machinery and zinc roofing  is especially imperative as agents are allowed only 
three days after  arrival of  goods for  clearing the custom house. Exceeding this time incurs penalty. 
Cases have been known of  papers addressed to Atlantic or Caribbean coast towns, because of 
carelessness in directing or routing, to have gone via Panama and Amapala, or other neighboring 
countries. 
Correspondence  with Honduras 
A common error of  American business houses is to address mail to Spanish Honduras and many 
of  the largest and most important business houses in Honduras show Spanish Honduras on their 
letter heads, advertisements, etc., as the country in which they are doing business. The term Spanish 
Honduras is an old one and is perhaps used with an idea of  distinguishing it from  British Honduras, 
but as there is no such political division as Spanish Honduras, it is far  better to address mail to the 
Republic of  Honduras or simply Honduras. 
The postal rates fixed  by the Universal Postal Union apply to all mail matter except parcel post 
mails for  Honduras, consequently letters prepaid at the two-cent or domestic rate are subjected to 
a fine  of  double the deficient  postage. This is an important point to bear in mind as it is an error 
frequently  committed by American business houses and invariably considered by the Honduras 
business man as the first  indication that the American house is not acquainted with the first  elements 
of  foreign  trade. That a few  minutes study of  North and Central American geography would be 
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invaluable is indicated by the fact  that when the papers in the United States published some months 
ago, the news of  the adoption of  domestic postage rates with British Honduras, the merchants here 
began to receive a tremendous amount of  penalty postage letters. So common an error is it, that 
many houses simply decline to accept any mail not fully  prepaid. 
Spanish is the official  and commercial language of  the country. When in doubt, send letters and 
literature in that language, because it is always understood, even though the customer is Chinese, 
French or German. Catalogues are especially most effective  in Spanish, because they should be such 
as can be shown to people who understand only Spanish. Such correspondence and literature 
demonstrate at once that the house is not a novice at foreign  trade. 
Parcels  Post 
Overseas shipments may be made to Honduras by freight  or parcels post; express service has not 
yet been undertaken. While the great majority of  importations come in as freight  shipments, 
nevertheless parcels post may be used to exceptional advantage with a great many articles. This is 
particularly true for  the Tegucigalpa or Pacific  coast district, where shoes by the gross, shirts and 
cotton goods in substantial amounts, hats, haberdashery, and a large variety of  goods are being 
received by mail. Shipments of  this kind require no consular papers nor clearing papers at 
destination. There are no penalties for  wrong weight, no charges for  toll, warehouse or road tax, no 
port charges, or any of  the items enumerated under the subject of  import tariff  except the duty on 
the classification  of  the contents plus five  per cent plus five  cents postage. It is especially 
advantageous for  small parcels of  valuable goods, where the tariff  duty is high as on silk scarfs,  laces, 
embroideries, casimeres, because excess weight of  packing is eliminated. But for  any small shipment 
it forms  a very cheap and convenient way, as the cost of  a consular invoice, stamped paper in the 
custom house, custom house brokerage, etc., will pay the postage on several eleven pound packages. 
Interior freight,  always a very expensive item is also avoided. For interior and Pacific  coast points, 
all parcels are routed via Panama, except from  California. 
Freight  Shipments 
Freight shipments are handled in three principal ways: First: By shipment of  a unit order direct 
from  manufacturer  or exporter. There seems to be no particular class of  goods to which this naturally 
applies unless perhaps heavy machines, automobiles, etc. The size of  the shipment, delay in 
assembling a mixed shipment or any number of  other reasons may determine the question. Second: 
By assembled shipments. Often  importers wish to make purchases direct from  several individual 
manufacturers  or sellers with instructions to send to some broker or forwarding  agent at some 
convenient point in the United States. Invoices and shipping papers are sent as well and when all 
deliveries are made, the consular papers, insurance and other documents are drawn and all the goods 
are despatched under one shipment. 
When this method is used, care must be had to make the delivery at the specified  date. A delay 
of  a few  days may mean the delay of  embarkation or else the necessity of  splitting the shipment with 
the consequent extra set of  consular invoices and other shipping documents and generally as added 
storage charge. This method does not necessarily mean that the assembling or forwarding  agent will 
undertake the account for  the importer. The agent seldom if  ever acts as a banking factor.  The 
account is handled directly between the importer and manufacturer  or seller. The forwarding  agent 
often  is one of  the several exporters or sellers, who undertakes this work in connection with his own 
fractional  part of  the consignment making a nominal charge for  the work of  assembling and 
forwarding  the shipment. 
Third: The third method of  purchase and shipment is through commission agents located at 
convenient points of  shipment in the foreign  country. In cases of  this kind the agent undertakes the 
purchase, assembling and shipment of  the complete order, charging a fixed  percentage for  his 
services. This method has many points in its favor,  such as close touch with prevailing market 
conditions, possibility of  purchase in large quantity with resulting price advantages, etc. For Pacific 
coast deliveries, this method is the most popular in this country, while on the Atlantic side, a majority 
of  the shipments are those assembled by forwarding  agents. There are no strictly wholesale houses 
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in all Honduras. All dealers are general dealers and even those which supply the smaller stores are 
also retailers themselves. 
Packing 
The subject of  packing has been discussed so persistently and so exhaustively, that repetition may 
seem unnecessary. The ocean freights  to Honduras are based largely on cubic displacement and 
the customs tariffs  of  the country are assessed on the gross weight of  the shipment with but very few 
exceptions, so it follows  that the packing of  the goods must be to the end of  securing both minimum 
weight and minimum displacement. At the same time, it must be remembered that in packing for 
the interior, (especially Pacific  coast freight  where the port handling is more than ordinarily severe) 
safety  for  the goods must not be sacrificed  for  saving in customs charges. 
Many pages could be written on the subject of  packing to secure these ends and many instances 
of  failure  to observe the same quoted, but there is one general rule which if  followed  out to the letter 
will solve the problem for  American exporters, and that is to always request that the Honduras 
importer state the manner in which he desires his goods packed and to follow  out the instructions 
to the letter. Many firms  here do specify  the manner of  packing with the stipulation that the 
American exporter will stand the cost of  excess freight  and customs charges for  failure  to comply 
with instructions. 
Packing for  domestic trade and packing for  foreign  shipment are two different  things and the 
more the importer becomes impressed with this fact,  the more friendly  will become his relations with 
the foreign  importer. On invoices from  European houses there is generally found  an item of  charges 
to cover the cost of  packing. The importer does not look with disfavor  upon this charge if  he gets 
something for  his money. Possibly American houses would do well to use more care in packing and 
make a separate charge for  the service. High prices with superior packing may dominate low prices 
and poor packing. Conditions of  goods upon arrival becomes an important factor  in competition. 
It is not uncommon for  glassware to arrive at coast towns with breakage running up to twelve or 
fifteen  percent, as against an average breakage in German shipments of  two percent, while for 
interior points the breakage is very much higher and window glass for  Tegucigalpa often  arrives with 
half  the contents broken and in extreme cases not a single whole light remaining in a box. It must 
be remembered that not only freight  charges apply to the broken articles as well as to that part of 
the shipment which reaches destination in good condition, but the import duty is levied on gross 
weight, including the damaged articles as well as the sound ones. 
The packer should learn everything possible concerning the physical conditions of  the district for 
which he is packing and then use common sense. Among other things do not use second hand 
packing cases. Make  the shipment as compact as possible. The importer does not like to pay cubic 
freight  charge for  empty and waste space. If  necessary, build boxes, crates and cases to measurement 
to fit  the size of  the shipment. It is unfortunate  that the man in the packing room is unable to view 
the results of  his work when the package arrives at destination. Many good points might be picked 
up by inspecting incoming shipments from  European countries although the details of  such packing 
do not necessarily determine the details of  packing necessary for  Honduras shipments. 
Rules might be formulated  to place in the packing room but even if  these rules were considered 
by the man doing the work, they might at times become misleading. No hard and fast  rules can well 
be determined upon for  even one district of  a country and packing for  export becomes quite a study. 
Consider, for  example, the journey of  a single package sent by freight  to Tegucigalpa. Loaded first, 
we will say, in New York, unloaded at Colon, trans-shipped by railroad or lighter to Panama City, 
loaded again into the hold of  a ship, unloaded again by reckless stevedores at Amapala into a lighter 
and carried ashore on men's backs from  the lighters, dumped down on the beach and later taken 
into the custom house and opened up for  custom's inspection, dumped again into a lighter and 
carried twenty-five  miles in an open boat to the mainland and dumped on a mud flat,  thence to the 
warehouse and in due season loaded on a two wheeled ox cart or on mule back and taken a six day 
journey over a mountain road until it finally  reaches Tegucigalpa, an average time of  sixty days from 
New York. Here the case may have to be broken up for  mule back transportation, as all roads to 
the interior are mule trails only. In addition to the actual handling, it has had to endure the extreme 
heat of  Panama, with probable tropical rains, exposure to sun and ocean spray. 
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The conditions for  a given market should therefore  be studied thoroughly and it is worse than is 
advised to turn the actual packing over to the uninitiated or the thoughtless. It is money well spent 
to place a well paid man in charge of  the packing for  the foreign  market, (one who would give the 
subject very close study and who understands taking instructions) then insist on thorough inspection 
during the work. As a rule, the "bale" system prevails for  all articles which can be so packed, and it 
is well to bear in mind that articles not more than three feet  long or fourteen  inches in diameter and 
weighing one hundred to one hundred and twenty-five  pounds, or divisors thereof,  are available for 
ultimate shipment by pack mules. Bales must be tightly compressed and contents properly arranged 
with the bands so protected that they will neither cut nor rust the contents. Former complaints of 
insufficient  press work on textiles by American mills are much less common now than in times past, 
so that American bales are now as compact as those from  European houses. 
In no part of  Honduras are goods such as shoes, shirts, clothing, sacks, etc, received in packing 
cases in their original paste-board boxes as is customary in the United States. Even on the north 
coast, it has been tried out and found  less satisfactory  than to supply the display boxes (if  requested) 
of  the collapsible sort, apart from  the goods themselves. Even the fact  that goods sent in original 
packages are more easily unpacked, stored, displayed and kept in better shape, does not offset  the 
increased ocean freights  and custom charges. 
It may be well to again bring up the subject of  packing of  mixed articles. By this is meant the 
danger of  having articles carrying low tariff  assessed at the higher tariff  of  articles in the same 
package. If  properly manifested  with invoices carefully  specifying  the contents of  each separate box, 
there is not much danger of  customs' fines,  but in general the practice should be avoided as far  as 
reasonably convenient. An order for  silverware for  Honduras was accompanied by instructions to 
remove the silver from  their display boxes, wrap in tissue and ship in bulk while the display boxes 
were to be shipped separately and apart. It is putting it very mildly to say that the importer was 
provoked, when the shipment arrived with the silver carefully  wrapped in tissue, but in their original 
packages,  so that he paid tariff  duty of  two pesos (76 cents) per pound on the boxes which otherwise 
would have cost but a fraction  of  a cent per pound. 
Another kind of  mixed packing was recently received at a mining camp in Honduras. The 
shippers had instructions to pack for  mule back freighting.  In his anxiety to get out boxes of  proper 
weights, the packer evidently found  himself  with a quantity of  glassware of  say seventy five  pounds, 
so to make up the other required fifty  pounds, he added that amount of  half  inch machine bolts. The 
fragments  of  glassware and the bolts were well mixed long before  arrival. 
Marking 
Superfluous  marking should be avoided. Caution marks such as "This side up", "Fragile", etc. have 
doubtful  value. Marks as to nature of  the contents sometimes invite pilfering.  Have the marks in 
plain letters. It is probable that a stencil with letters three inches high, in plain clear cut type and 
made with permanent paint, is the best for  average use. The customer's shipping mark should appear 
clearly on each package and marking on one side should be sufficient.  The use of  tags should be 
discouraged, wherever it is possible to put the mark on the article, bale or box. Every package should 
bear a serial number and this number must conform  to the number or numbering given in the invoice. 
Care should be taken that marking on bale goods does not penetrate to the contents, as in the case 
of  textiles. 
Terms  of  Payment and  Credit 
Credit conditions are slightly different  in the northern and southern part of  Honduras. On the 
north coast the market has come more directly under the influence  of  American methods while in 
the southern (Tegucigalpa) district the longer credits are supplied by having the orders placed 
through local banks or importing houses who advance the money on interest and enable the 
purchases to be made more or less on a cash basis. Of  course there are select firms  in both districts 
whose commercial rating is sufficient  for  all needs but even with such firms,  unwillingness to offer 
more than ninety, sixty, or even thirty days credit need not handicap sales, provided the subject is 
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handled in a reasonable and courteous manner. It is reasonable to suppose that such firms  would 
take exception to demand for  cash with order accompanied with strong undertone of  suspicion or 
distrust. 
Long term credits if  granted, are only so in the cases of  carefully  selected houses. Such credits 
are not demanded so persistently as in former  times. The drop in the value of  the silver peso during 
the past year has been an object lesson to many merchants. A great quantity of  merchandise had 
been sold to the "Haciendados" or farmers  on credit when the value of  the silver peso was 42 cents 
in gold. With the beginning of  the European war the value of  silver money started on a decided 
decline and many accounts were settled with pesos worth 35 cents or even as low as thirty three. The 
foreign  accounts had to be settled in gold and with a prevailing high exchange rate. The merchant 
had no moratorium to ease his conscience as Honduras declared no such expedient. This has served 
as a strong object lesson for  short term credits and long term credits have been cut down to a 
minimum. The good influence  will naturally extend also to the future  buying policies of  the 
merchants. 
Reasonable credits will always have to be extended in some cases, for  after  all, this is a matter of 
personal convenience. Where travelling representatives do not cover the field  or where the firms 
seeking credit are not quoted in mercantile reports, the exporters can probably arrange to have the 
business conducted through local houses who exercise some of  the banking functions  and carry the 
account, receiving say six percent on the deferred  payments. 
On the north coast districts, a parallel might be drawn on the loans made to small and large 
planters and the financing  of  the cotton planter of  the South. Generally the loan takes the form  of 
a credit to be drawn against in merchandise. This account is balanced when the harvest is made. 
Often  the payment is made in produce of  one sort or another. This condition has been supported 
in the past by the willingness on the part of  some houses (usually European) to carry accounts of  the 
merchants for  an extended period or until the planter can realize on his crop. Often  a period of  six, 
nine or even twelve months may intervene between shipment of  the goods and the settlement of  the 
account. It is quite true that the European exporter often  is not a manufacturer,  but rather a 
commission house just as some of  the banks are now doing in Honduras. Thus the loan phase of  the 
transaction becomes very evident and that this feature  has been taken up by American capital 
recently becoming interested in Tegucigalpa banks is evidence that other means are beginning to be 
considered by the American exporter in his desire to assist in the work of  financing  "bona Fide" 
undertakings abroad. It may be said that in general, so far  as Honduras is concerned, the much 
discussed foreign  credit terms question has reached a satisfactory  solution and that American 
products may be sold on substantially the terms in vogue at home. 
Travelling  Representation:  Local Agents Catalogs 
The north coast districts are visited at frequent  and regular intervals by travelling salesmen from 
the United States but very few  such salesmen cover the Tegucigalpa district. A very satisfactory 
automobile service now connects Tegucigalpa with the Pacific  port and American firms  should send 
their representatives to at least study the southern part of  the country. German and English firms 
do this and the southern district consequently has a greater percentage of  imports from  Europe. In 
north coast towns and in Tegucigalpa, manufacturers  agents and brokers offices  are beginning to be 
established, so that travelling men may establish agents if  the business warrants. 
Travelling men must have at least a working knowledge of  Spanish. A dinner jacket or evening 
dress is a desirable part of  his baggage as there are often  advantages to be gained by mixing socially. 
Their samples pay full  duty as though entered for  consumption, but on their departure from  the 
country the same is refunded  except the five  percent in gold on the sum of  the duties. No federal 
tax is exacted as a license to do business but the larger towns usually exact from  five  to ten dollars 
as a municipal tax, for  each visit of  a commercial traveller. 
The first  condition necessary to one entering this field  of  business is a spirit of  willingness to meet 
conditions. New and better ways of  doing business must not be pushed too bluntly. Some things 
may seem incorrect and foolish  but it must be remembered that this trade has been a matter of  growth 
and there has probably been a reason for  doing things in the customs now pursued. Improved 
methods should and can be presented in a way that will not offend  and no doubt they will be given 
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fair  consideration. Suggestions presented in a courteous maimer are looked upon with far  more 
favor  than those presented in a blunt, cocksure manner. A good salesman, even in domestic sales 
often  finds  it necessary to present his point as a suggestion and there is even more reason to show 
this flexibility  with the Latin-American. This is a point which cannot be emphasized too strongly, 
not only in personal sales work but in correspondence. 
Where exporters do not care to send travelling men, combinations can often  be effected  by one 
salesman representing two or more non-competing lines. But failing  in this, local agents may be 
appointed. On this score, American manufacturers  frequently  exercise poor judgement. A leading 
soap concern notified  their Honduras customers who had been buying through New York agents 
that in future  they could be supplied only through a newly appointed agent living in a small interior 
town of  Honduras, remote from  mails and transportation. Another extremely important food 
products company already doing a fine  business in Honduras, elected to select as Honduras agent, 
a man whose lack of  financial  responsibility is so notorious that all the old customers would be driven 
away. At an interior mining camp one of  the employees is Honduras agent for  a number of  very 
desirable lines, which established firms  in the large towns would be glad to represent. 
Exclusive agencies should not be given for  the whole of  Honduras. Until better transportation 
methods are provided, the north coast is as distinctly remote from  the southern section as the Atlantic 
from  the Pacific.  It is much better to have an agent in each district. Generally speaking, such 
agencies should not be undertaken by merchants here, for  the reason that most of  the stores import 
a general line and will not purchase from  competitors when they are short of  stock. A merchant 
having the exclusive agency to an article would probably not reach outside of  his own clientele. If 
an article of  this description is required, other merchants will import through their New York or San 
Francisco agents and at the very start, frustrate  the exclusive agency attempt. It would be well to 
study the field  very closely before  giving an exclusive representation for  any one of  the three consular 
districts and this becomes a greater study when the whole country is involved. There are few  if  any 
firms  in Honduras who are in a position to properly display or push sales outside of  their own 
immediate location. 
In the line of  catalogs and literature, American manufacturers  lead the world but catalogs alone 
will not capture foreign  trade. Consular officers  in Honduras maintain perfect  files  of  catalogs, 
indexed by name and by article and make every effort  to have them consulted by the public yet the 
actual use made of  these files  is discouraging. Foreign trade is usually a contest between a catalog 
and a travelling man. Catalogs are seldom consulted except on old established lines of  goods and 
new goods are seldom introduced except by the personal effort  of  some one, whether travelling 
representative or local agent. At present, the large sums expended in catalogs sent to Honduras do 
not produce adequate returns. Perhaps in certain lines at least, such as agricultural implements, if 
the catalogs were a little less elaborate, and, printed in Spanish, were sent direct to a selected list of 
names supplied by the consuls, the returns would be more satisfactory.  Follow-up letters, in 
courteous Spanish, with as much of  a personal tone as possible, might prove very satisfactory. 
Conclusion 
Honduras is a debtor nation. Despite the large exports of  gold, silver, fruit  and hides, the imports 
are now nearly double the amount of  exports. The purchasing power of  the country is small but 
growing. There are only 600 000 inhabitants in an area not any larger than the state of  Louisiana of 
which one third is practically unexplored. It therefore  does not at present offer  a large field  for  the 
American exporter. But because it is one of  the smallest and least developed of  Latin American 
countries is no indication that it is unworthy of  the best attention of  American manufacturers. 
Because of  the fact  that the country has been more or less inaccessible, the Honduras people have 
not had the opportunity of  advancement enjoyed by other nations and their wants are fewer.  For 
this same reason, more proportional progress is possible, and is developing, than in many countries 
less favored,  so that a proper appreciation of  the commercial possibilities in the future  will merit the 
serious study and attention of  American exporters in general. 
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3 THE REGION AS AN EXPORT MARKET (1925) 
From: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Caribbean 
Markets  for  American Goods:  I.  Central  America. By Hector Lazo, Chief,  Caribbean Section, 
Latin American Division. Trade Information  Bulletin No. 329, April, 1925, pp. 1-16. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Caribbean region, comprising the West Indies, Central America, Venezuela, and the 
Caribbean section of  Colombia, is as much a distinctive trade area for  the American 
manufacturer  as Canada or Australia. This region or group of  countries, while contiguous to 
the other countries of  Latin America, has very little direct contact with them because of  the 
fact  that most of  the established lines of  water transport treat the Caribbean area as a separate 
unit. Steamers bound for  Brazil and the River Plate do not enter the Caribbean ports, and 
steamers routed to the Caribbean rarely go farther  south than the Venezuelan ports before 
returning to the United States or Europe. A travelling salesman covering Latin America will, 
of  course, visit the Caribbean territory as well as the rest of  South America, but it will mean a 
break in his journey and a transfer  from  one transportation system or group of  steamship lines 
to another. Freight shipments from  eastern and southern United States to this territory in 
practically every instance are made by steamers routed only to Caribbean ports. The growing 
trade of  the Caribbean area with the Pacific  ports of  the United States is by the way of  Colon 
in the Canal Zone as a port of  transshipment, no direct routes from  the west coast to the 
Caribbean Sea having yet been established. 
The importance of  the Caribbean countries is shown by our trade with them during 1924, 
which amounted to $875 958 041, of  which $510 212 009 represented imports from  and $365 
746 032 exports to them. In order of  importance, Cuba ranks first,  Porto Rico second, Colombia 
third, and the Central American group fourth. 
This pamphlet, the first  of  a series covering Caribbean markets, is an analysis of  Central 
America as a purchaser of  American goods. For the convenience of  the exporter planning a 
trip for  himself  or his representative a suggested salesman's route through Central America 
has been included. Further information  on any specific  points may be had by applying to the 
Bureau of  Foreign and Domestic Commerce at Washington or to any of  its district and 
cooperative offices  throughout the country. 
Julius Klein, Director 
April, 1925 
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CARIBBEAN MARKETS FOR AMERICAN GOODS 
I. CENTRAL AMERICA 
PURCHASING  SEASONS 
Central America, in common with the other countries making up the Caribbean group, is distinctly 
an agricultural region dominated by a small number of  products. The success or failure  of  these 
crops influences  to a marked degree the prosperity of  the countries, and consequently the volume 
of  trade. This is forcibly  illustrated by the fact  that coffee  is responsible for  over 75 per cent of  the 
exports of  Salvador, 35 per cent of  the exports of  Nicaragua, about 30 per cent of  the exports of  Costa 
Rica, and well over 75 per cent of  the exports of  Guatemala; sugar represents 12 per cent of 
Nicaragua's exports, 5 per cent of  Salvador's, 7 or 8 per cent of  Costa Rica's, and 5 per cent of 
Guatemala's. Bananas make up almost 10 per cent of  Guatemala's exports, about 20 per cent of 
Nicaragua's, approximately 50 per cent of  Costa Rica's, and from  65 to 70 per cent of  those of 
Honduras. 
It is therefore  apparent that the harvest time and the crop-selling seasons will be the major 
purchasing seasons. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find  that actual export figures  from  the United 
States to Central America denote two distinctly marked purchasing seasons. An analysis of  our 
monthly exports for  the 12-year period 1913 to 1924, inclusive, shows highest total exports for  that 
period in the months of  October and December, there being a marked falling  off  in February, March, 
and April, with distinctly higher figures,  approximating the totals of  the fall  and winter months, in 
May and June, and again dropping off  during the summer months of  July and August. 
The above analysis refers  to total exports by values from  the United States to all of  Central 
America for  the 12 years between 1913 and 1924. It is interesting to note that, despite wide variations 
in total yearly exports, there is a remarkable uniformity  shown by general increases and decreases 
year by year according to the seasons indicated above. Coffee,  which is the most important single 
product of  Central America, is picked from  August to December, and the crop is practically all 
shipped by June; the sugar season extends approximately from  December to May, while bananas 
represent a more evenly divided all-year-round product, with the heaviest shipments taking place 
between April and September. 
The extent to which the above-mentioned commodities enter into the commercial life  of  the 
country determines in a large measure the fluctuations  in the monthly import trade of  the particular 
country. For example, in Honduras, where coffee  and sugar are but minor crops, the seasonal 
variations are much less noticeable than in the other Central American countries with the exception 
of  Panama. In Honduras, in fact,  a survey of  several years shows heaviest importations from  the 
United States in the first  three months of  the year -in anticipation of  the banana crop, rather than 
after  it has been harvested. 
Guatemala and Salvador, on the other hand, show very pronounced increases in April, May, and 
June, dropping in the succeeding months of  the summer but rising markedly in September and 
usually showing the greatest totals in November. Nicaragua also shows distinct increases in 
November, December, and January, November being the highest month and July and August usually 
the lowest, while Panama, because of  the unique nature of  its trade, shows an even level month by 
month, although a slight increase is observable during the last months of  the year in anticipation of 
the tourist trade. 
Statistical tables for  a period of  years bring out the fact  that there is an almost identical variation 
in the exportation of  principal commodities from  the United States to Central America, coinciding 
in general with total seasonal shipments. 
The great purchasing seasons in Central America are therefore  those which immediately precede 
our greatest export period to that region, namely, January, February, March, July, August, and 
September. 
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HOW  TO  SELL TO  CENTRAL  AMERICA 
Considering Central America as a unit, the usual method for  large merchants is to do business 
directly with the manufacturer  or exporter in the United States. This is by no means the sole method, 
however, as in many cases are effected  through commission agents with sample displays. Direct 
dealings are the general rule with the larger merchants in practically all the Central American 
countries. 
The main contact, however, should be made personally and not through printed matter. Central 
American merchants and importers, in common with so many others, have their mails crowded with 
papers, letters, and general advertising materials, much of  it in defective  Spanish, and even though 
these be hurriedly read through, as a general rule they do not open a market. Such printed matter 
is, however, valuable as follow-up  material. The original contact, and one to be renewed periodically 
to be most effective,  should be a personal sales trip undertaken by the export manager ora competent 
representative. 
In selecting commercial travelers to represent the firm  great care should be exercised to choose 
high-type men, who not only can understand the habits of  the people but who have a command of 
Spanish. It is of  great importance that such men be thoroughly posted on customs regulations and 
transportation conditions, as otherwise losses of  time and merchandise may very well result. 
As pointed out above, the greatest purchasing seasons in Central America -that is, the most 
appropriate seasons for  selling trips through this region- are January to March, and July to 
September. This, of  course, applies only to general exports, as there are certain commodities which, 
because of  their very nature, are of  value at seasons other than those mentioned above. This would 
be the case, for  example, with sugar-milling machinery, importations of  which would take place 
probably at the conclusion of  the grinding season. 
CANVASSING  CENTRAL  AMERICA 
In the following  proposed route, schedules and time-tables have been used which are the latest 
available at the time of  writing. It should be remembered, however, that time-tables and fares  are 
subject to change without notice, and the steamship and railroad companies should be consulted for 
verification  and exact times of  departure. All prices are given in United States currency, as payment 
for  transportation charges and hotel bills can be made in practically all towns and cities mentioned 
in American dollars. 
COMMERCIAL  TRAVELERS'ROUTE  COVERING  CENTRAL  AMERICA 
Central America can, of  course, be approached in several different  ways. The following  route is 
recommended as a feasible  and practical way to cover the various countries, permitting the 
commercial traveler a sales tour through Mexico at the conclusion of  his trip through Central 
America. 
Sailings.  From New York to Cristobal, Canal Zone: Vessels of  the United Fruit Co. leave every 
Saturday at 11 a.m., going via Habana, Cuba, and arriving at Cristobal on the second Tuesday out. 
Among the other lines having sailings from  New York to Cristobal are the Panama Railroad 
Steamship Line, the Grace Line, the South American Steamship Co., and the Pacific  Steam 
Navigation Co. 
In this connection it must be borne in mind that the start of  the journey may equally be made from 
New Orleans, San Francisco, or Los Angeles. The start from  New York has been chosen merely as 
being representative and convenient. 
Cristobal  (Colon),  Panama. Samples possessing no commercial value are admitted free  of  duty, 
while others are admitted under bond; and samples must be reexported through the port of  entry 
unless formal  notification  to the contrary is given. A license is required of  travelers to do business 
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in Panama, being approximately $25 for  periods ranging from  one to six months. Municipal licenses 
vary in length and cost. 
The most important commercial cities in Panama are Colon and Panama City, the chief  wholesale 
houses being located in these two centers. Panama City is reached from  Colon via rail in about two 
hours and at small cost. 
Hotels at Colon: The Washington, Grand Imperial, Royal, Astor. Rates vary from  $3.50 to $7 a 
day. Hotels at Panama City: Tivoli, European plan, meals a la carte, rates, $3.50 and $4.50 a day; 
Hotel Central, American plan, $3.50 to $7 a day; Hotel Internacional, American plan $4 and $5.50 
a day; and others. (The Washington Hotel at Colon and the Tivoli at Panama City are owned by the 
United States Government). 
Cristobal to Port Limón, Costa Rica. United Fruit Co. vessels leave Cristobal Wednesday 
afternoon,  arriving at Port Limon the following  day. The fare  is approximately $25. 
Port Limón is the Atlantic terminus of  the transcontinental railroad across Costa Rica. Samples 
of  no commercial value are admitted under duties of  approximately 2 centavos per pound (about 
cent United States currency), but samples with value must pay full  duties, returnable under certain 
conditions. The customs inspector should be consulted. There is also a small duty on advertising 
matter. No Government license is required to do business in Costa Rica, but the various 
municipalities impose a license fee  in varying amounts. Charges for  baggage will necessarily depend 
upon the number of  pieces and will be levied on total weight. The traveler should be prepared for 
rather high rates on this score. 
The three important commercial centers in Costa Rica are Port Limon, San Jose (the capital), 
and Puntarenas (the Pacific  port). Other cities can well be canvassed from  these three centers, as 
desired. Port Limon has a small population, but is the center of  the important fruit  trade and the 
headquarters of  an important commercial area. It is the chief  port of  the Republic. 
Hotels in Port Limón: The Lodge (privately owned), Park, Londres, Caribe, and America. Rates 
vary from  $3 to $6 a day, American plan. 
Port Limón to San José.  Daily trains leave Port Limon around 9 a. m. for  a run of  approximately 
6 hours. The distance is slightly over 103 miles, and the fare  about $2.50. San José is the capital of 
the country and the chief  commercial center. Hotels in San José: Grand Hotel Français, American 
plan, rates, $3.50 to $10 a day; Washington Hotel, American plan $3 to $8 a day; Europa, American 
plan, $3 to $5 a day; Continental, American plan, $1.50 a day. The larger wholesale houses have their 
headquarters in San Jose. The city also affords  convenient headquarters for  canvassing the near-by 
smaller cities. It should be remembered that the traveler is allowed only a small amount of  baggage 
free  on the railroad, the rest being payable at the rate of  about 1 cent per pound. 
San José  to Puntarenas.  Puntarenas is the Pacific  coast terminus of  the railroad and the Pacific 
port of  the country. It is approximately 69 miles from  San José, fare  about $1.50; time required about 
six hours. Hotels at Puntarenas: Imparcial, Europa, and Victoria; rates range from  $2.50 to $5 a day, 
American plan. 
Puntarenas to Corinto,  Nicaragua.  The Pacific  Mail Steamship Co. vessels of  the New York-San 
Francisco route and the Kosmos Line of  the Hamburg-Pacific  coast service are the only two 
steamship lines with a regular service calling at Puntarenas. During the height of  the coffee  season 
many smaller vessels and tramp steamers call, and communications are comparatively frequent.  The 
steamer from  Puntarenas to Corinto takes approximately one day, fare,  $35. In case sailings are to 
be delayed greatly, it may be found  convenient to return to the Canal Zone and take a direct steamer 
to Corinto. 
Corinto,  Nicaragua.  Samples of  no commercial value are admitted free,  others under bond or 
corresponding deposit. Hotels: Lupone, Boston, Europa. Rates from  $2 to $5 a day, American plan. 
Not a great deal of  purchasing is done at Corinto, and the traveler will want to leave soon for  the 
interior cities, Managua and intermediate points. There are two daily trains from  Corinto to Leon. 
The latter city and Granada are two other important points besides the capital, Managua. Both of 
these cities can be reached from  the capital. These three centers usually supply the interior region. 
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Corinto  to Managua.  Distance approximately 87 miles, fare  about $3. Trains leave daily from 
Corinto at 7 a. m., arriving at Managua at 1.20 p.m. First-class passengers are allowed 65 pounds of 
baggage, all excess being subject to regular baggage freight  rates. 
Hotels in Managua: Lupone, $4 and up per day; Aster, American plan, $3.50 and up per day; 
America, $3 and up per day. Other hotels are Central, Estrella, and Veleo. Hotels in León: 
Metropolitan, $4 a day, American plan; España, $3 a day; and Roma, $2.50 a day. Hotels in Granada: 
Alhambra and Versailles, $3.50 a day in both, American plan. Granada is reached from  Managua 
in two hours by rail. 
In canvassing Nicaragua it is important to note that the eastern or Caribbean coast of  Nicaragua 
is practically inaccessible from  the Pacific  coast and should not be attempted until the salesman 
reaches the Atlantic coast of  Guatemala and Honduras. It is possible to travel from  Managua by 
roundabout methods to San Juan del Norte (or Greytown) via small steamers on the San Juan River, 
or by mule back over more or less defined  paths. On the other hand, Bluefields,  the most important 
city on the Caribbean coast, is covered with comparative ease from  Ceiba and Trujillo, Honduras. 
Corinto  to Amapala, Honduras.  Sailings every 8 days, Mexican States Line, or about every 22 days, 
Pacific  Mail Steamship Co., sailings being available with greater frequency  during the heavy shipping 
season. 
Samples without commercial value are admitted free  of  duty into Honduras if  weighing under 25 
pounds. Samples with commercial value -that is, all those not defaced  to make sale impossible- are 
admitted under full  duty, refundable  at reexportation and after  the payment of  a certain fixed  amount 
of  approximately 1 cent a pound. Municipal licenses are required in Honduras for  varying lengths 
of  time and on payment of  stipulated fees. 
Amapala, Honduras, is of  little commercial importance to the traveler. He may be obliged, 
however, to spend a night or two awaiting the launch to the mainland. Hotels: Morazan and Palacios; 
rates from  $3.50 to $5 a day, American plan. A launch conveys the traveler from  Amapala to San 
Lorenzo on the mainland. Fare is $1.50 per person, baggage extra. 
San Lorenzo (Amapala)  to Tegucigalpa.  The journey is made by automobile. Fare approximately 
$10 per person, or $65 for  special car. The distance is 81 miles, and time required from  5 to 7 hours. 
Tegucigalpa is the capital and most important commercial center in southern Honduras. Hotels: 
Agurcia, $4 per day, American plan; Ambos Mundos, $3 a day up. The chief  wholesale houses are 
established in Tegucigalpa, and the trade of  the interior in the southern half  is done from 
Tegucigalpa. 
From Tegucigalpa it is necessary to return to Amapala, as the communication with the northern 
coast is insufficient  and impracticable for  the commercial traveler. 
Amapala to La Union,  Salvador.  Distance approximately 20 miles, launches and small steamers, 
although launches are to be preferred  because of  the shallow water, which makes steamer navigation 
slower and more circuitous. Fare, $8. Time, about two hours, by launch. Hotel in La Union: Italia. 
Samples of  no commercial value are admitted free  into Salvador; samples with value under 
provisional deposit, returnable at reexportation, which does not have to be through original port of 
entry. A certified  memorandum, however, should be obtained at the port of  entry. Advertising matter 
is taxable at varying rates, and municipal licenses are required. The fee  for  such licenses varies. La 
Union is not a large purchasing center, but is conveniently located with respect to San Miguel. 
La Union  to San Miguel.  Daily trains leave La Union at 6 a. m. and arrive at San Miguel at 8.25 
a.m. Considerable distributing trade is done from  San Miguel. Hotels in San Miguel: 
Hispano-Americano, $1.50 to $3 a day, with meals. 
San Miguel  to San Salvador.  Distance, 107 miles. Daily trains leave San Miguel at 8.25 a.m. and 
arrive in San Salvador at 5 p.m. San Salvador is the capital of  the Republic and the most important 
trade center. Many important wholesale houses have their headquarters in this city, and there is a 
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large number of  important retailers who do direct importing. Hotels in San Salvador: Nuevo Mundo, 
Astoria, Italia, Occidental. Rates from  $2.50 to $4 and up, including meals. 
From San Salvador it is possible to go by direct rail to Sonsonate, if  desired, although the majority 
of  the wholesale houses established there are branches of  the larger ones in San Salvador. 
San Salvador  to Santa  Ana. Santa Ana is the second largest city of  the Republic and is a very 
important trade center. Large houses established there do a good deal of  direct importing, and they 
are well worth cultivating. It is 48 miles distant from  San Salvador on the Salvador Railway, with 
daily trains, the fare  being approximately $2. Leading hotel: Florida, $1.50 to $3, with meals. 
From Santa Ana the traveler will proceed to Guatemala City by either one of  two routes. During 
the dry season, from  November to May, it is much more preferable  to go overland by auto; during 
the rainy season, May to October, the roads are not suitable for  this traffic,  and the traveler must 
return to Acajutla, thence by steamer to San Jose, Guatemala. 
Santa  Ana to Guatemala City.  Overland, November to May. This trip is made daily, fare  being 
approximately $25 and the time of  the trip from  11 to 14 hours. Extra charge is made for  baggage. 
When possible, this route is much to be preferred,  as it avoids a return to Salvadorian ports, 
transshipping for  a short sea trip, and again landing in Guatemalan ports, with a rail trip to 
Guatemala City. 
At Guatemala City, baggage will be taken direct to the custom-house for  clearance. Samples 
without commercial value are admitted free.  Samples which have commercial value may be cleared 
under bond, good for  two months. 
Hotels  in Guatemala City:  Palace, $5 a day, with meals; Grace Gran Hotel, $5 a day, with meals; 
Iberia, $4, with meals; Continental, $3.50 a day, with meals. 
Guatemala City is by far  the most important trade center of  the Republic, being the headquarters 
for  the principal houses doing both wholesale and retail business. A large number of  retailers do 
direct importing, and they are, as a rule, located in Guatemala City. During the rainy season it is 
necessary for  the traveler to return to San Salvador from  Santa Ana, thence to Acajutla for  steamer 
connections. 
San Salvador  to Acajutla.  Via the Salvador Railway, 65 miles distant. Daily trains with stop-overs 
at Sonsonate, the customs clearing house. Hotels in Acajutla: Occidental and Las Americas, rates 
from  $3.50 up, American plan. Trains leave San Salvador at 7 in the morning, arriving in Acajutla in 
the early afternoon. 
Acajutla to San José,  Guatemala.  Via Pacific  Mail Steamship Line or the Mexican States Line. 
Trip takes about one day, fare  $18. San Jose, Guatemala, is the most important Pacific  coast port, 
but of  no commercial value to the traveler. There are no hotels in the port proper, and the traveler 
will want to leave as soon as possible. If  necessary to stay over night, Hotel Marina, in the town offers 
fair  accommodations for  $3 a day. The customhouse at San Jose is merely a transit customs for  hand 
baggage only, trunks being cleared through the main customs at Guatemala City. 
San José  to Guatemala City.  Train leaves daily at 8.45 a.m. for  Escuintla, 28 miles distant. Escuintla 
is a fairly  important commercial center and might be well worth a day's stop-over. Two daily trains 
leave Escuintla for  Guatemala City, at 6 a.m., arriving at 10.15 a.m., and at 2.45 p.m., reaching 
Guatemala City at 5.25 p.m. The fare  from  San José to Escuintla is approximately $1 and from 
Escuintla to Guatemala City about $1.50. 
Hotels  in Escuintla:  Ferrocarril and Central, $3 and $3.50 a day, American plan. 
Guatemala City  to Quezaltenango.  Quezaltenango is the second largest city in the country. The 
trip is made by auto, daily, leaving Guatemala City. It is not especially recommended except in the 
dry season. 
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Hotels  in Quezaltenango:  Palace, European plan, $1 a day; Modelo, American plan, $3 a day. 
Some of  the Guatemala City houses have branches in Quezaltenango, and the city is well canvassed 
from  Guatemala City. 
Guatemala City  to Puerto Barrios. Trains leave Guatemala City daily at 7 a.m. Fare, $9.90, with $4 
extra for  parlor car, only hand baggage allowed free.  A stop-over made at Zacapa for  lunch. Arrive 
Puerto Barrios 6.40 p.m. Puerto Barrios is of  no commercial importance except for  fruit  company 
commissary. Hotels: Hotel del Norte, $5 a day, American plan. 
Puerto Barrios to North  Coast  of  Honduras.  Fortnightly service leaving Puerto Barrios for  Puerto 
Cortéz, Tela, Puerto Castilla, and return to Puerto Barrios or direct to New Orleans. Puerto Barrios 
to Puerto Cortéz, fare,  $20, can be done within 24 hours. Samples of  no commercial value and 
weighing less than 25 pounds are admitted free.  Samples with value must be covered by a deposit to 
the extent of  duties. Advertising matter is dutiable. Principal business at Puerto Cortéz is done by 
importing retailers, A good deal of  packing is done for  the interior, and there is schooner connection 
with British Honduras, Guatemala, and the Honduran ports of  Tela, Ceiba, and the Bay Islands. 
Hotels: Italia, Defevre.  Rates from  $3 to $5 per day, American plan. 
Puerto Cortéz  to San Pedro  Sula.  By the national railway, daily departures. San Pedro Sula is an 
up-to-date town and a very important trade center and distributing point for  the north coast interior 
points. Hotels at San Pedro Sula: International, Washington, American, and New York. 
Puerto Cortéz  to Tela.  Reached either by steamer or schooner in a one-day trip. Fare 
approximately $20. Tela may also be reached by railroad from  Puerto Cortéz. A large fruit 
commissary has headquarters here and is worth attention. It is an important port. Hotels: Cabañas, 
$2.50 and $3.50 per day; Double Day, same rates; Balderach, $2 up. 
Tela  to La Ceiba. La Ceiba is one of  the most important ports on the north coast. Hotels: Roma, 
and Italia, rates $4 per day, American plan. Both wholesale and retail business is large in Ceiba, with 
a large fruit  company commissary located there. 
La Ceiba tp Trujillo  (or  Puerto Castilla).  By steamer, fare  approximately $20; fortnightly  sailings 
and also coastwise schooner traffic.  The business importance of  Trujillo has diminished with the rise 
of  Puerto Castilla, where a large fruit  company commissary is well worth a visit. Hotels: Trujillo, 
Codina, and Steiner. 
Direct sailings from  Puerto Castilla or Trujillo to New York via Santiago, Cuba, or to Puerto 
Barrios, Guatemala, and thence to New Orleans. The salesman wishing to cover Cuba can proceed 
via Santiago, and those intending to cover Mexico can return to Puerto Barrios to make connections 
via New Orleans. 
From Tela it is also possible to go to Cape Gracias, Nicaragua, and thence by schooner to 
Bluefields,  and from  Bluefields  direct to New Orleans. 
CURRENCIES 
In virtually all Central American countries American currency circulates freely  at the present time. 
On the Atlantic coast it preponderates and has practically caused the various native currencies to 
disappear. In interior cities it is convenient to have some native currency, and for  this purpose any 
bank will exchange small amounts of  American dollars. At the present time exchanges are practically 
stabilized. Following are the currencies in use in the various countries of  Central America: Panama, 
United States dollar; Honduras, United States dollar and Honduran peso, 2 to the dollar; Salvador, 
United States dollar and colon, 2 to the dollar; Nicaragua, United States dollar and cordoba of  equal 
value to dollar; Costa Rica, United States dollar and colon, 4 to the dollar; Guatemala, United States 
dollar and peso, 60 to the dollar. 
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PRINCIPAL BANKS 
Costa  Rica. Banco Internacional, Banco de Costa Rica, Mercantil de Costa Rica. 
Guatemala.  Banco Americano, Colombiano, Occidental, Internacional, Agrícola, Banco de Guatemala. 
Honduras.  Banco de Honduras, Banco Atlântida. 
Nicaragua.  National Bank of  Nicaragua, Anglo-Central American Bank. 
Panama. American Foreign Banking Corporation, Banco Nacional. 
Salvador.  Banco Salvadoreño, Occidental, Agrícola-Comercial. 
AGENCIES AND REPRESENTATIVES 
The advisability of  appointing an exclusive agent in Central America is one which must be decided 
by the exporter, taking into careful  consideration the volume of  business done. The appointment of 
agencies and representatives has not developed to the extent found  in Mexico and Cuba, as the 
volume of  transactions has not warranted the expenditures of  office  upkeep and the many incidental 
outlays connected with such agencies. In some cases representative commission agents have been 
given an agency in connection with various other agencies they hold, and it is only in comparatively 
rare cases that there will be found  in Central America an agent or representative exclusively devoted 
to one commodity. Accordingly, as pointed out above, the most successful  method to do business 
with Central America is through the personal trip of  a competent home representative, who will 
establish his contacts. 
ADVERTISING IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
As elsewhere, advertising plays an important part in any sales campaign in Central America. The 
most suitable method depends to a large extent upon the commodity to be advertised. 
The most common method pursued thus far  has been advertising through the daily press in the 
various countries. The press reaches practically all the buying public and the method is quite 
effective. 
An important factor,  which must not be overlooked, however, is the fact  that American magazines 
circulate to a very considerable extent in central America, and that all advertisements are examined 
with care. It might therefore  be worth while to so word advertisements that they will be international 
in their appeal. 
One very effective  advertising method, and one too often  overlooked by the American exporter, 
is the accompaniment of  appropriate advertising matter with each purchase. In this category should 
be mentioned, for  example, tin tongs accompanying each box of  fancy  crackers; tin, wooden, or 
paper-pulp utensils accompanying similar commodities as an aid to service; prizes or similar 
advertising matter inclosed in sealed packages, etc. Depending upon the commodity handled, 
however, the exporter should determine the most effective  method of  advertising. 
FOREIGN COMPETITION IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
The United States stands in a commanding position in Central America's import trade in practically 
all commodities and supplies approximately 70 per cent of  all merchandise imported into those 
countries. Nevertheless, foreign  competition is active and growing since the close of  the European 
war, and it should not be discounted by the American exporter. It should be remembered that 
European nationals have for  years been established in those countries, that prominent plantation 
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owners and merchants are either European born or direct descendants of  Europeans, and that 
contacts with Europe were of  long and satisfactory  standing prior to the war. 
Furthermore, there are certain commodities which have a long-standing reputation in those 
markets. Thus, for  example, English textile fabrics  have a reputation for  low price consistent with 
quality, and British competition to American trade is keenest in the textile line; French perfumes, 
toilet waters, and toilet soaps are known in every town and hamlet; Japanese and Chinese silks are 
not only cheaper but widely known; German hardware tools, and drugs have long been known 
throughout Central America. The following  tables (1.3.1, pages 1 and 2) show imports into the various 
countries of  Central America by principal countries of  origin. All values are in United States dollars. 
Table 1.3.1 
VALUE OF IMPORTS 1913-1923 
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Table 1.3.1 (concluded) 
Into Nicaragua 


















































Total 7 712 047 7 912 653 13 864389 5309 902 5123 505 7 269432 
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Total 8 684109 7 517 989 22369 997 9177 802 8342 584 9 785 841 
* Figures unavailable. 
Incomplete. 
c Estimated. 
Taking Salvador as a typical Central American market and analyzing three years of  commodity 
imports into that country, we find  that the United States leads as a supplier of  foodstuffs  and 
practically all manufactured  goods except perfumery  and cosmetics, wines, laces and embroideries, 
paper manufactures,  china and pottery, and woolen and silk manufactures. 
Great Britain leads in laces and embroideries, jute bags, and affords  the United States the greatest 
and most active competition in all textiles, particularly cotton and woolen goods, and in iron and 
steel machinery. 
France leads in perfumes  and cosmetics and competes actively in drugs and chemicals, wines, 
glassware, silk manufactures,  paper goods, and machinery. 
Spain holds a commanding position as a supplier of  wines but does not offer  any serious 
competition to American goods as a whole. 
Germany competes in all lines of  hardware and machinery, electrical goods, but particularly in 
paper and paper products. 
Italy competes in wines and to some extent in textiles and textile manufactures. 
Japan holds first  place as a supplier of  silk manufactures.  China-ware and pottery in considerable 
quantities are also shipped from  Japan to Central America. 
Similarly, in Nicaragua, the United States leads all other nations in everything but liquors, wines, 
jute bags, crude and refined  petroleum, newsprint paper, and a few  small items such as refined  sugar 
and cotton thread. 
British competition is again apparent and most prominently in plain woven, twilled, and other 
cotton manufactures,  leading in cotton yarns and thread. British competition is also active in the 
importation into Nicaragua of  earthenware, porcelain and pottery, jute bags and cloths (Great 
Britain leads in this), firearms,  confectionery,  preserves and canned fruits,  hats, caps, and such 
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manufactures  as domestic ware and utensils, iron and steel manufactures,  agricultural machinery, 
etc. 
Germany is a prominent competitor in Nicaragua in all iron and steel manufactures,  particularly 
tools, hardware, scientific  instruments, cutlery, domestic wares and utensils, cement plates and other 
jewelry, electrical machinery and appliances, paints, pigments, colors, and varnishes, toys, paper 
manufactures,  and particularly in aluminum manufactures  (in which Germany holds first  place), 
malt beverages, chemicals and drugs, etc. 
French competition, although apparent in many lines is not serious except in the conventional 
and accepted lines of  perfumes  and toilet soaps, wines and distilled liquors (French wines lead all 
others), scientific  instruments, silk, and silk manufactures. 
Italian wines are prominent imports into Nicaragua, but otherwise Italian goods in only small 
quantities enter the country. 
Japanese activities in Nicaragua are more limited than in some of  the other countries, like 
Guatemala, Salvador, and Panama. Japan sends some metals, some cotton manufactures,  small 
quantities of  glassware, and manufactures  of  leather, offering,  as elsewhere in Central America, the 
greatest competition in manufactures  of  silk, both cloths and clothing. 
Thus we find  foreign  competition in Central America active and general, but, except in a few  lines, 
not seriously menacing the supremacy of  the United States. 
AMERICAN EXPORTS TO CENTRAL AMERICA 
Generally speaking, American exports to Central America have shown a tendency to increase in the 
last 10 years. However, Central America's dependence on a limited number of  crops, and the fact 
that acreage is not being increased materially, restricts to a very marked degree Central America's 
purchasing power. Even in extremely prosperous years the per capita imports of  the various 
countries is comparatively low. Nevertheless Central America offers  an increasingly important field 
for  investment, and with increased investments and production there will follow  increased purchases 
abroad. The United States, because of  its geographic proximity and the prominence attained by 
American goods, stands in a commanding position with respect to Central America and should share 
materially in any increase of  trade of  that region with the outside world. 
The following  table (1.3.2) shows American exports to the Central American counties, with the 
exception of  Panama, for  the period 1910-1924, inclusive. Panama is not listed because a great 
proportion of  our exports is destined for  the Canal Zone proper, whereas Panama's imports from 
the United States have already been listed above. 
Table 1.3.2 
VALUE OF UNITED STATES EXPORTS TO CENTRAL AMERICA, 1910-1924 
(In  United  States  dollars) 




1910 1959 246 1605 493 1690 792 1 316 957 3 050 510 30 219 369 
1911 2 431 769 2126 014 2 475 792 2 100 713 3410 376 33 475 583 
1912 2519052 2461269 2486878 2421284 3 647187 37 083 539 
1913 3658587 3168 762 2 925 807 2 389971 3514 908 40 220 282 
1914 3 601813 4 873512 2 629 034 2155 138 3 501 386 39 439117 
1915 2 769270 5004443 2087678 2 101 966 2 413 318 33585 728 
1916 3 848 030 4 609415 3169104 3 048 340 3568 206 41 703 906 
1917 5 386 277 5 692 554 4533 613 4 392 244 3 984 854 52 517 749 
1918 5563493 4 618 129 4377688 3479332 1903 224 43582 982 
1919 8 391535 7691928 6 694597 5 934418 4 920 724 58 570 911 
1920 10 202620 15 361 919 9542 964 8 148 018 9 777625 89 777 438 
1921 6 091 660 11673 985 3 628 068 4 546734 4 053 937 55 084 516 
1922 5 459 720 9 959 284 4 116 709 4 850 781 4 040 766 44 791244 
1923 6 314 254 11256 928 4 989 709 5 214 250 4 835 166 56196693 
1924 8 823542 9100974 6 250499 6491955 5 975 384 64 843 901 
56 
It will be observed that our total exports to Central America for  1924 were more than double 
those for  1910. Proportionate and even greater increases are shown for  all the countries except Costa 
Rica and Panama. Honduras shows an increase of  approximately 400 per cent in the period 
1910-1924; Guatemala of  some 350 per cent; Nicaragua about 270 per cent; Salvador 390 per cent; 
Costa Rica 95 per cent; and Panama including the Canal Zone about 28 per cent. 
REGIONAL ADVANTAGES OF THE UNITED STATES 
A survey of  several years of  exporting from  the United States to Central America shows our export 
trade to those countries to be dominated by two principal shipping points -New York and New 
Orleans particularly New York. This is true even in the case of  Salvador which country has no 
Atlantic seaboard and must receive its New York shipments either via the north (Atlantic) coast of 
Guatemala or through the Panama Canal. Taking the last four  years of  exporting for  which full  figures 
are available the following  table (1.3.3) shows the percentage of  the total exports to each one of  the 
countries shipped through the various customs districts: 
Table 1.3.3 
PERCENTAGE OF SHIPMENTS BY CUSTOMS DISTRICTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO 
CENTRAL AMERICA, 1920-1923 
Customs 
district Costa Rica Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama Salvador 
Massachusetts 1.5 a a a a a 
New York 70.0 55.0 29.0 50.0 60.0 64.0 
Maiyland a a a a 1.0 3.0 
Virginia a a a a 4.0 a 
New Orleans 21.0 31.0 66.0 85.0 16.0 4.0 
Los Angeles 1.0 a 1.0 1.0 3.0 2.5 
San Francisco 4.1 10.0 2.0 10.0 8.0 21.0 
Oregon a a a a 4.0 1.5 
a Less than 1 per cent. 
The preponderance of  shipments from  New York and New Orleans is obviously due to extensive 
transportation facilities  as well as to the fact  that a very large proportion of  the goods imported into 
Central America are in a large measure manufactured  in eastern United States. 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHIPMENTS TO CENTRAL AMERICA 
Advertising  matter.  When sending advertising matter to Central America it is worth while to 
investigate first  and ascertain the amount of  duties the various classes of  material pay in the different 
countries. 
Shipment  of  goods.  It is important to remember that Central America has a general revenue tariff 
based to some extent on the value of  the article but to a far  greater extent on the gross weight of  the 
shipment. It therefore  is important to pack goods in the lightest manner possible consistent with 
safety. 
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Mixed  goods  consignments.  In the case of  consignments of  mixed goods great care must be taken 
to indicate clearly the quantity and quality of  the separate articles of  such mixed consignments 
because otherwise the entire consignment will be assessed at the rate chargeable to the most valuable 
portion of  its contents. If  willful  omission is made of  the mention of  the various goods the shipper is 
liable to a fine  in certain cases. Whenever the Central American merchant makes specific 
recommendations on the point it is important to follow  them and there should be a thorough 
understanding in the matter between shipper and customer. 
Routing of  goods.  It is most important to route the merchandise properly. Goods intended for 
Tegucigalpa Honduras particularly heavy goods should be routed via Amapala, and not via the north 
coast ports. Similarly, goods intended for  Managua, Nicaragua, should be shipped via Corinto on 
the Pacific  and not the Atlantic ports, as in both cases communication is very difficult  and costly and 
in certain instances impossible. 
Language ofcorrespondence  and  advertisingmatter.  One of  the greatest complaints brought against 
American exporters is the use of  defective,  meaningless, and in some cases ludicrous language, as a 
result of  poorly translated correspondence and advertising material. In the first  place, 
correspondence, catalogues, etc., should be in correct Spanish. However, it is better to send a correct 
English letter than a Spanish letter poorly written. Incorrect use of  language is an indication of 
carelessness which may lead the Latin American merchant to conclude that he is not 
considered as a client valuable enough to merit the greatest care and attention. The same applies to 
the language of  catalogues and all advertisements, and this work should be intrusted to a capable 
and accurate translator. Instances of  this sort of  shortcoming are reported almost daily, with 
considerable losses to the American exporter. 
Honoring  the claims of  clients.  In perhaps too many instances claims of  merchants on account of 
shipments which have not been made according to specifications,  or upon which some other 
legitimate claim is in order, have been ignored or disallowed by the American exporter. This will 
not only result in failure  of  repeat orders, but will create a great deal of  antagonism and lack of 
confidence.  If  the market is worth cultivating, it is worth holding. Possibility of  claims should be 
reduced to a minimum, as adjustment of  such is rarely sufficient  to overcome the prejudice aroused. 
Extension of  credits.  Promiscuous extension of  credits should not be indulged. While it is a fact 
that the majority of  the Central American merchants have met and are meeting their obligations, in 
no case should shipments be made to new clients until their credit ability and general reputation 
have been investigated fully.  It must be remembered that the cost of  protesting drafts  is very high, 
in addition to being a very slow, long-drawn-out process, and often  results in nothing. The question 
of  credit in export selling should be as conservatively treated as it is in domestic trade. 
The fact  that American business, which acquired a very large share of  Central America's trade 
during the war, has been able to hold it in practically all lines is proof  of  the fact  that aggressive and 
proper cultivation of  Central American markets must necessarily Honoring  the claims of  clients.  In 
perhaps too many instances claims of  merchants on account of  shipments which have not been made 
according to specifications,  or upon which some other legitimate claim is in order, have been ignored 
or disallowed by the American exporter. 
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B. The 1930s: The Great Depression 
4. AUTOMOTIVE SALES SURVEY, GUATEMALA (1932) 
From: Automotive Sales Survey for  First Half  of  1932 (In answer to questionnaire No. 321); Special 
Report (Unnumbered) submitted by Assistant J. E. Dyer, Assistant Trade Commissioner, 
Guatemala, Guatemala, September 17, 1932; Reports of  the Commercial Attaché in 
Guatemala, 1928-35, Records of  the Department of  Commerce, Record Group 151; N.A. 
FOREWORD 
Every automotive dealer in this territory has been called on so that we could form  a comprehensive 
and accurate picture of  the market conditions during the first  six months of  1932. The net result of 
the investigation only confirmed  our pre-conceived opinion that the automotive market is practically 
non-existent at this time. It has been impossible to secure exact figures  on the number of  units sold 
in the various classes and categories. Dealers are not inclined to divulge this information  as it would 
show to what extent their sales have declined and as a result tend to weaken their credit standing, 
both personally and in business. 
Government statistics are not yet available on imports and it will in all probability be some months 
before  figures  can be secured. The Customhouse is very much behind on their statistical data as the 
classified  lists for  the calendar year 1931 have not been published. The 1931 imports will have to be 
published before  anything can be done on the 1932 figures. 
Under present conditions it is practically impossible to make an automotive report containing 
information  of  other than a negative nature. Due to lack of  statistics and the usual informative 
material we are forced  to submit the present report as running comments on matters of  interest 
rather than adhering to the questionnaire. 
IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
General Comments 
During the halcyon days of  1927-1928 a fair  average price for  coffee  can be said to have been $19.00 
to $20.00 a quintal. The average price, to the producer, for  the 1931-1932 crop will not exceed $7.00 
a quintal. As the entire economic structure of  the country is built on its production and sale of  coffee 
it will be readily seen that this has been materially shaken through the drop in market value. The 
growers have made many economies and in some cases have been able to bring their cost of 
production down to a point when they are at least able to meet expenses and in a few  cases to actually 
show a small profit.  Some of  the methods of  economizing are of  doubtful  nature, however, as the 
maintenance of  plantations and buildings is being neglected in many instances. While practices of 
this kind are sometimes necessary they are apt to prove expensive in the long run. 
Although the growers continue to carry on the reduction in the amount of  money they put in 
circulation has caused severe curtailment in all merchandising and general business activities. These 
some doubtful  economies and general retrenchments have extended into almost all fields  of  business, 
the automotive being no exception. 
OUTLOOK FOR ENSUING PERIOD 
Prospects for  sales during the remainder of  this year are dismal to say the least. It is firmly  believed 
that the only turnover that can be looked for  will be in the lower medium and the low price models. 
Up to 1930 Guatemala was not a good market for  cheap automobiles. One of  the things noticed by 
most new comers was the surprising proportion of  high priced cars. The trend since that time has 
taken the demand through all classes to its present low level. 
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Many owners of  expensive cars have placed them in storage as they cannot afford  to pay the 
operating and maintenance expenses. Some of  these are turning to small cheap cars while others are 
doing without personal transportation. Another factor  which has influenced  the market is the street 
work that has been done in the last two years. Within this period many of  the principal business 
streets have been paved making it possible to ride in light cars with much more comfort  than was 
possible formerly.  During the time that all streets were still cobble or flagstone  the riding qualities 
of  heavy cars as against the light models was far  superior. The apparent difference  tends to diminish, 
however, with road and street improvement. 
Stocks of  new cars have fallen  almost to the vanishing point. In fact  there are some dealers who 
do not have even a single model for  demonstration purposes, and are attempting to make sales from 
printed literature. Other dealers have one or two on their floors  and the largest stock we have been 
able to locate was six cars, two of  which were hangovers from  the 1931 models. 
A few  trucks were sold during the first  three or four  months of  this year. There were in most cases 
chassis only and were destined for  bus service with locally made bodies. Sales were practically nil 
the last two months, and will probably remain at the same level until late November or December 
when some improvement might take place. 
Motorcycle sales, if  any, have been so small that these may be disregarded. No prospects for 
improvement in the near future  can be seen at this time. 
Sales of  service appliances are expected to be small as the field  has been well covered. In fact 
present garage and service station equipment is thought to be far  in excess of  the requirements. 
The turnover in replacement parts has not come up to expectations. It had been supposed that 
this branch of  the trade would show an actual increase due to the number of  old models which have 
been kept in service. Sales, although far  from  reaching the looked for  volume have not declined to 
the extent of  affiliated  lines. 
Dealers inform  us that owners are doing everything possible to postpone the day when parts must 
be replaced. Formerly battered fenders  gave way to new ones. Now they are straightened, patched 
and painted until they will no longer hold together. Noisy differentials  and transmissions are left  to 
run until the last crash and grind has been squeezed from  them. Pistons are allowed to slap and 
valves blow by until there is insufficient  compression to run the cars, and when this point is reached 
many of  them are laid up with the hope that the day will eventually come when their owners 
havesufficient  means to have them overhauled and placed in service again. 
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5, MONTHLY BUSINESS REPORT ON GUATEMALA (1933) 
From: Monthly Business Report; Economic and Trade Notes No. 16; Submitted by George Curtis 
Peck, Commercial Attaché, Guatemala, Guatemala, January 24, 1933; Reports of  the 
Commercial Attaché in Guatemala, 1928-1935; Records of  the Department of  Commerce, 
Record Group 151; N.A. 
MONTHLY BUSINESS REPORT 
FORWORD:  There is gloom in Guatemala as they meet the current año, for  the vista's  muy mala 
and the country hace daño-,  and the only chap charlante whom we've known to cut a caper is the guy 
negociante  -see remarks, our caption, "PAPER". So, with lengua  quite unguarded, if  on tela  or tabaco, 
all our contacts' talk is larded with "Caramba]"  and "Carajol" 
El cafe  has hit the bottom; los guineos droop and drizzle; carreteras?  haven't got'em; el comercio's 
a fizzle.  No  hay lack of  woman's wailing;/o/ío mucho sound statistics; and the presidential failing  is 
piensa en ballistics. 
Not & crédito  is flowing;  not a deudor  is listo\  not a quetzal  paid that's owing by the government-
no pisto. 
So we're filing  this informe  more or less salvar  our faces;  ya we're thinking cuán enorme UNO 
NUEVE  TREINTA  TRES  is. 
ELECTRICAL:  Kilowatt-hour consumption of  electrical current in Guatemala City decreased 
nearly seventeen per cent in 1932 compared with 1931 (Actual K-h for  publication, was 16 285 247 
and 13 951 601). The three largest individual consumers of  current are the Brewery, the Novella 
Cement Company, and the Mariscal Water Supply Company. The Brewery output for  the year is 
reported to have been 50 per cent below normal. Due to an almost cessation of  construction the 
cement plant output decreased lamentably, while the amount of  current used by the water company 
recorded a slight decrease. A consumers' strike early in the year also reduced the amount of  current 
used. Following the strike a reduction in the cost of  current to consumers was granted. The Empresa 
Guatemalteca de Electricidad does not look for  any appreciable increase in current consumption 
for  1933. Preferred  stock dividends are being paid, but payment on common stock has been 
discontinued. 
DRUGS  AND  CHEMICALS-.  Dealers,  in drugs and chemicals report 1932 as an extremely bad 
year. Sales are said to have been only some 30 to 20% of  the volume of  previous good years. 
Heretofore,  when business was brisk, the tendency was toward overstocking. Latterly, however, 
stocks have been allowed to decrease until now many of  the larger dealers are considerably 
understocked. This would normally be taken to indicate renewed activity in buying. Unfortunately 
this does not hold true at present, as replacement supplies are purchased in extremely small lots 
-from  hand to mouth- and even so, the dealers are finding  themselves hard pressed to make payment. 
It is feared  that, as a result of  the recent legislation governing the importation and handling of 
drugs, medicinal products and pharmaceutical specialties, the American manufacturer  is in danger 
of  losing ground in this market. The Germans, America's chief  rival in the drug and chemical field, 
appear more willing to comply with any and all legal requirements as to the registration of  their 
products, and do this without protest, in many instances -at an actual monetary loss- but they are 
firmly  entrenched. No detail is too small to receive their promptest and most scrupulous attention. 
In this respect the American exporter is inclined to be more lax, and in the present case this attitude 
may cost American drug and chemical exporters the supremacy, which they have heretofore  held, 
in this line in Guatemala. 
PAPER  : As a direct result of  the Government's strenuous efforts  to cope with the Cigarette Paper 
situation by means of  a general tightening up on the importation of  all kinds of  paper which could 
conceivably be used in the making of  Cigarettes, we are informed  by one of  the principal paper 
dealers in this city that his sales of  high-grade American Toilet Paper have recently increased by 
some 2 000 per cent. Toilet Paper having so far  apparently escaped the vigilance of  the Authorities. 
'Guatemalan colloquialism for  cash. 
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In this connection it may be noted that both the roll and block Toilet Paper are equally in demand. 
Requests have been received, by the dealer mentioned above, that he endeavor to obtain block Toilet 
Paper without punched holes, such as are often  made in this kind of  paper for  hanging on hooks. 
PAINTS:  Only one firm  in Guatemala City, handling paints, appears to have maintained sales at 
about normal (Leon Guttman). A'l the others report poor business. Stocks on hand of  ready-mixed 
paints are more than sufficient  to meet immediate requirements. Two or three firms  report almost 
no movement in the last six months. The situation is due to lack of  construction and postponement 
of  repainting on the part of  owners of  buildings the rentals of  which have markedly decreased and 
in some instances are uncollectible. 
Ready-mixed paints for  interior and exterior use, 12-14 pounds to the gallon, and retailing at from 
$1.15 to $1.50 a gallon, and cement paints, continue to fill  the demand. Orders are being placed this 
month for  cement paints and bitumen plastics for  use on corrugated iron roofing,  to be used before 
the arrival of  the rainy season. 
AGRICULTURAL  MACHINERY:  The market for  agricultural machinery is practically at a 
standstill. Prices of  agricultural products are so low that farmers  are unable to buy new machinery, 
and are having to patch up their old implements or go without. Another important factor  in this 
connection is that wages have decreased to such an extent that it proves cheaper to employ manual 
labor than machinery. In this connection it may be noted that not only have wage rates been lowered, 
but gasoline has shown a steady increase in price during the past several years due to additional 
taxes. Furthermore, and as a direct result of  cheap labor, machinery and implements are lying idle 
on many farms  and may be bought for  a mere song. 
Still another reason for  the extremely depressed condition of  the market is that many farmers 
have abandoned large tracts of  their cultivation on account of  the very limited market for  their 
produce, and are merely raising enough to give them a living since any surplus is so often  sold at a 
loss. 
IRON-STEEL  HARDWARE:  In addition to the abnormally depressed state of  the market, 
American goods in the iron-steel hardware lines are being subjected to the keenest competi tion from 
European sources. Belgian iron and steel products particularly are taking advantage of  the present 
exchange rate, and as they quote Pounds Sterling they are able to undersell American products and, 
for  the present at least, practically control the market for  these commodities. 
A large proportion of  the shelf  hardware entering this market from  foreign  sources is 
manufactured  by American branch factories  abroad, which taking advantage of  cheap labor, low 
freight  rates, and the exchange, can underquote the American home factory's  prices in this market. 
Hardware dealers are feeling  the pinch probably more than dealers in other lines as they are so 
situated that they must carry large stocks of  slow moving but expensive articles. Many of  the dealers 
complain that they are unable to move merchandise which they bought several years ago, as the 
prices they can obtain today are considerably lower than the cost of  the articles when they were 
bought. 
COFFEE:  According to information  secured 
from  our best contacts in the coffee  exporting 
business, Guatemala's 1931-1932 coffee  exports 
ending September 1932 amounted to 88 063 450 
lbs. Monthly shipments are as follows: 
December 1932 coffee  exports amounted to 
93 498 sacks or 13 375 085 lbs., of  which 59 252 
sacks went to Europe and 34 246 sacks were 
consigned to the U.S. Comparative figures  for 
last year were: Total shipments 99 416 sacks; 
Europe 81586; and U.S. 17 830. For the first  three 
months of  the 1932/1933 crop, namely October, 
November, December, the shipments amounted 
to 203 812 sacks. Of  this Europe took 119 513 
sacks as against 84 299 sacks shipped to the U.S. 
Table 1.5.1 
GUATEMALA: COFFEE EXPORTS, 1931-1932 
Lbs. 
October 726480 
November 6 202460 
December 14 172 070 
January 14 9% 960 
February 14 537830 
March 12345 990 
April 10 137 350 
May 7 794500 
June 3508 995 
July 1 632 310 
August 1 074 690 
September 933 815 
Total 88 063 450 
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The new crop has started off  very well as to quantity as compared with last year, the figures  for  which 
are as follows:  Total shipments during October, November, and December 1931: 147 693 sacks; 
Europe took 123 711 sacks of  this total, and the U.S. took 23 982. It will be noted that the U.S. is 
taking a much higher percentage of  the whole so far  this year. This we believe can be attributed to 
the Brazilian trouble, and as this now appears to have eased up somewhat, it is highly problematical 
whether the U.S. will continue to take so much of  Guatemala's crop in the new year. 
Table 1.5.2 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY: 
MONTHLY AVERAGE USE OF TOBACCO, 
FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1932 
Lbs. 
TOBACCO:  The Tabacalera Nacional 
(British American Tobacco Co.) reports 
cigarette production off  75% in volume and 50 
per cent in value for  1932 compared with normal 
years. This was in part due to increased taxes but 
chiefly  to depressed conditions. The company for 
the past six months, has been using a monthly 
average a little short of  20 000 pounds of  tobacco 
classified  as follows: 
Stocks on hand at present of  native tobacco 
are sufficient  for  two and one-half  years; 
imported, four  months, at present rate of  production. Indications and expectations are that the 
company's production for  1933 will be 20 per cent below that for  1932 unless some unforeseen  change 












PROFESSIONAL:  The professional  gentry of  Guatemala have suffered,  in common with 
commercial and industrial interests as a result of  the depression. Dentists and doctors report 1932 
business as being from  20 to 25% of  that done in normal times. One of  the leading dentists in 
Guatemala City states that his business in December netted him but $12.00. 
Lawyers say there is considerable business available if  one wants to sue bankrupts and collect no 
fees.  The technical professions  are particularly hard hit because of  lack of  construction and other 
activities requiring their services. With the exception of  two or three who specialize on army 
uniforms,  tailors are barely existing. 
In the departments business is reported to be almost at a standstill. Two firms  have moved from 
Quezaltenango to Guatemala City. The Retalhuleu Electric Company has accounts long overdue 
from  the municipality. 
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6. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION OF COSTA RICA (1932) 
From: Economic and Financial Situation of  Costa Rica; Despatch No. 1148 from  Legation of  the 
United States of  America San José, Costa Rica, to Secretary of  State, Washington, October 
17,1932; 818.51/546; Central Decimal Files 1930-39, RG 59; N.A. 
LEGATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
San José, Costa Rica 
October 17,1932 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION 
OF COSTA RICA 
The Honorable 
The Secretary of  State 
Washington 
Sir: 
I have the honor to forward  herewith a comprehensive and detailed memorandum prepared 
by Mr. Werlich, Secretary of  this Legation, on October 14,1932, in respect of  the economic 
and financial  situation of  Costa Rica. The purpose of  this memorandum is to give a faithful 
picture of  conditions as they are today. No attempt has been made to discuss the commercial 
situation of  the country, the latter being in the scope of  the Consular establishment at this 
capital. 
Respectfully  yours, 
(signed) 







San José, Costa Rica, 
October 14,1932 
MEMORANDUM 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION OF COSTA RICA 
It is unsatisfactory  to make any comparisons with other countries when discussing the 
financial  and economic situation of  Costa Rica. This statement is based on the peculiar social 
organization of  the Republic, a country of  small proprietors where the standard of  living is 
fairly  low and where climatic conditions are such as to reduce the essential comforts  to a 
minimum. Moreover, it is dangerous to deal at any length with official  figures.  Published official 
statistics are always far  behind and when obtained by request are generally incomplete; voted 
budgets are rarely permanent or effective.  The demands of  the populace vary according to 
income -luxuries, the most common are a $12 hat or a pair of  store shoes for  a barefooted 
peon- are seized upon avidly or foregone  without murmur. 
It is estimated that governmental income will amount to 020 000 000 during the present 
calendar year, whereas expenditures, exclusive of  the service on the foreign  debt, will nearly 
equal that amount. A moratorium, or at least a three-year deferment  has been made effective 
on one important foreign  bond issue (American 7%, 1926 - $7 284 000) and a similar 
operation is now being concluded for  another important issue (British 5%, 1911 -
approximately $7 000 000). It is estimated that the national indebtedness amounts to 
$31579 000 (foreign  $24 330 000, domestic $7 249 000) for  the country's 500 000 inhabitants, 
or $63.16 per capita and that the Government's present annual interest charges are $1230 000. 
Costa Rican foreign  commerce for  recent years is as follows: 
Table 1.6.1 






8 689 900 
7 000 000 
$16 333 100 
15 042 000 
12500 000 
In foreign  trade, Costa Rica was very prosperous for  a number of  years -until the end of 
1929- when the world economic depression had its reaction. Coffee  (Costa Rica's most 
important export item) prices declined and purchases slowed up. Banana shipments declined 
rapidly due to exhaustion of  the soil-and decreased purchasing power in former  markets, as 
well as to tariff  barriers in Europe; the world's cacao market has gone to pieces. The outlook 
for  an improvement in export receipts is not bright. The demand for  local coffee,  a high-priced 
product, has failed  through European depression with a corresponding decline in national 
income as well as in the governmental revenue from  the $1.50 per bag (70 kilos) export tax. 
The cheaper grades of  Costa Rican coffee  have just been subject to a mild boom through 
a demand from  the United States. This demand is due to the diminished Colombian exports 
and possibly to some extent to the general upping of  coffee  prices in the United States through 
the São Paolo revolution of  the last few  months. However, Costa Rica was only able to replace 
Colombia due to the low levels to which its best grades of  coffee  had been forced  through 
depression. Whether Costa Rican coffee  can hold its recent position in the American market 
is doubtful;  and, with today's purchasing power in Germany and Great Britain, it is 
questionable whether the high grade coffees  will be able to command sales even at further 
reduced prices. 
It cannot be said that export prospects for  Costa Rica appear bright for  the next few  years; 
no reason occurs for  an improvement in the banana market or the coffee  market,and in fact  it 
is probable that coffee  prices will go even lower. If  Costa Rica can dispose of  its agricultural 
products abroad, regardless of  the price, there will be some margin of  profit.  Coffee  plantation 
workers up to 1930 and in some cases through 1931 received from  60 to 75 U.S. cents a day, 
and plantation owners left  the management of  the affairs  in the hands of  overseers. Today, the 
laborer gets along without discomfort  on 33 cents a day and the owner administers the estate. 
During coffee  boom days, farms  were bought, through mortgage loans with the 
governmental banks, at high prices; city houses were acquired under the same scheme. It is 
probable that only in rare cases will these purchasers be able to earn sufficient  profit  on their 
holdings to maintain the services on their mortgages and, that therefore,  in spite of  past or 
future  mortgage facilities  such as semi-moratoria, many of  these holdings will revert to the 
Government banks in lieu of  funds. 
The present currency circulation of  the Government is slightly under 026 000 000 of  which 
022 816 000 are paper issues of  the Banco Internacional, and the feasibility  of  further  increases 
seems questionable. 
Economic and financial  morale has been improved slightly since the inauguration of  the 
Ricardo Jiménez regime during the past month of  May. President Jiménez has surrounded 
himself  with some capable assistants, such as Minister of  Finance Carlos Brenes (Ortiz). The 
latter is not an experienced financier,  but he has a hard-headed determination which, coupled 
with the personal ascendancy of  the President, injects confidence  into the country. This 
confidence  has been bolstered, temporarily at least, by the successful  negotiations for  a 
three-year suspension of  services on the American 1926, 7% issue, and the prospects of  a 
similar suspension on the British 1911,5% bond issue. 
President Jiménez has not, as yet, effected  the drastic governmental economy which had 
been expected of  him; on the other hand, he has succeeded so far  in staving off  further  major 
raids on the Treasury, such as extensive public works programs. Finance Minister Brenes is 
using the savings effected  through the suspension on the American loan for  cleaning up minor 
obligations, such as the dollar advances by foreign  banks and services on smaller bonded 
obligations. 
The Costa Rican bankers and exporters have not made the way too smooth for  the 
Government or for  the country's credit. They refuse  to make available locally their gold credits 
from  abroad at the "pegged" exchange rate established by the National Exchange Control 
Board. The country and the Government constantly face  a gold shortage which might be 
alleviated if  valuta holders were willing to place exchange at the country's disposal. Active 
steps are now being initiated by the banks whereby the sway of  the Control Board will be 
lessened in the belief  that gold assets will then be made available. 
At the beginning of  this memorandum mention was made of  the social element. No concern 
need be felt  for  the welfare  of  the average Costa Rican. On the other hand, the future  for  the 
finances  of  the Government cannot be bright for  many years, and it would seem that even with 
the most perfect  financial  administration, the securities issued or guaranteed by the Costa 
Rican State are quoted today far  above their true value. 
(signed) 
McCENEY WERLICH 
Secretary of  Legation 
McCW/BZ 
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7. FINANCIAL SITUATION OF NICARAGUA (1947) 
From: Financial Situation in Nicaragua - Report by IMF Mission; Office  Memorandum, U.S. 
Department of  State to CPA: Mr. Reid, Mr. Barber and ARA: Mr. Woodward, Mr. Daniels 
from  CPA: Mr. Heins; December 12, 1947; 817.51/12-1247 CS/A; Central Decimal Files 
1945-49, RG 59; N.A. 
CONFIDENTIAL Declassified  NARA 
Office  Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
DATE: March 16,1949 
TO: CPA: Mr. Reid, 
Mr. Barber 
ARA: Mr. Woodward 
Mr. Daniels 
FROM: CPA: Mr. Heins 
SUBJECT : Financial Situation in Nicaragua - Report by IMF Mission 
The attached correspondence from  Managua relates to the study made by a Mission from 
the International Monetary Fund which was in Nicaragua from  February 2 to February 25. 
The Mission claims to have found  evidence of  irregular and dishonest practices by high 
Nicaraguan officials.  It has made specific  recommendations to the Nicaraguan officials  with 
respect to action to be taken in order to bring some order out of  the present chaos. The situation 
is allegedly so serious that the Fund's representatives found  it necessary to be brutally frank 
with the Nicaraguans. They apparently found  Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa less able or less 
interested in the problem than the other Nicaraguans with whom it was discussed. 
Nicaragua's general financial  situation has been growing steadily worse during the past 
several years. With no slackening of  imports and the current very poor coffee  crop, it has now 
reached a very critical stage. About two years ago the government obtained a well secured loan 
of  $4 000 000 from  the Bank of  America. In October 1948 it arranged a $500 000 credit from 
the International Monetary Fund to be repaid by May 1949, and also obtained a contingent 
promise for  $500 000 additional credit to be extended shortly. The first  credit is still 
outstanding and the second credit did not materialize because Nicaragua did not take remedial 
measures satisfactory  to the Fund. 
It is understood the IMF Mission has made the following  recommendations: 
1. Immediate steps should be taken to balance the national budget and to stop the deficit 
financing  of  the government's operations.. 
2. All deposits made by importers against approved import permits should be 
transferred  to the Issue Department of  the National Bank of  Nicaragua and should be frozen. 
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3. No further  expansion in the credit being granted by national banking institutions of 
Nicaragua. 
4. That import permits hereafter  be authorized only with official  exchange, to a monthly 
total of  not exceeding in the neighborhood of  $800 000. That imports be classified  as essential, 
non-essential, or luxury. That the Import and Exchange Control Board be completely 
reorganized. 
Although by March 4 Nicaragua had made no over-all decision concerning the Mission's 
recommendations, certain isolated steps had been taken. Press announcements on March 3 
stated it would be necessary to curtail government expenditures. Similarly, statements on 
February 28 and March 2, announced (1) a change in the approving agency for  applications 
for  import permits and exchange; (2) no further  import permits would be issued on an 
importer's own fund  basis; and (3) no further  permits of  any kind would be issued pending the 




8. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VISITS NICARAGUA (1953) 
From: Consultation of  International Monetary Fund Officials  with the Government of  Nicaragua; 
Foreign Service Despatch No. 79 from  AmEmbassy, Managua to the Department of  State, 
Washington, August 19,1953; 817.10/8-1953; Central Decimal Files 1950-54, RG 59; N.A. 
Air Pouch UNCLASSIFIED 
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
FROM: AmEmbassy, Managua Desp. No. 79 
TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON August 19,1953 
REF: CERP, October 22,1952, Section D-6 
SUBJECT: Consultation of  International Monetary Fund Officials  with the Government 
of  Nicaragua. 
In accordance with Article XIV of  the IMF statutes (which provides that member countries 
which maintain exchange restrictions incompatible with the IMF Agreement shall consult each 
year with the IMF for  a review of  such restrictions) a group of  IMF officials  arrived at Managua 
last week and held discussions with key financial  authorities of  this country. Nicaraguan 
officials  who participated in the talks were the Minister of  Economy, Dr. Jesus Sanchez R.; 
the Minister of  Finance, Dr. Rafael  Huezo; and the Superintendent of  Banks, Dr. Luis 
Cantarero. Dr. Enrique Delgado, executive director of  the IMF who happened to be in 
Nicaragua at the time, also participated in the consultations. The IMF delegation included 
Luis Eduardo Laso, Chief  of  the Latin-American Division of  the IMF, and Messrs. Albert 
Mattera and Edison Zayas, both economists. 
A review was made of  Nicaragua's financial-economic  situation of  the year gone by, and it 
is understood that the following  conclusions emanated from  the discussions: 
1. The international reserves of  Nicaragua have experienced a satisfactory  rise during the 
past two years. If  the rate of  increase prevails, reserves soon will reach a level to assure the 
country a stable currency without resorting to a system of  preferential  exchange rates, exchange 
surcharges (recargos cambiarios), or prior deposit of  cordoba equivalents with import license 
applications. 
2. Nicaragua has been able to operate on a balanced budget despite increased payments 
for  an expanded public works program and other economic development projects. With 
planned fiscal  reform  measures and placing in effect  the new customs tariff  rates now under 
study, the current equilibrium of  the nation's receipts and payments should be maintained 
without the necessity of  resorting to a system of  preferential  exchange rates for  international 
payments nor the system of  exchange surcharges now in effect. 
3. With adequate international reserves and a balanced budget, the value of  the Nicaraguan 
cordoba in foreign  markets can be maintained through a continued and discreet credit policy 
in which the banks grant commercial credits within limits of  the country's possibilities. At 
the same time, an effort  should be made to channel savings for  purposes of  increased 
productivity. Only so long as commercial credit is maintained within adequate limits will it 
be possible to eliminate gradually the requirement of  prior deposit on payments for  imports. 
4. Plans which the Government of  Nicaragua has formulated  on foreign  exchange matters 
adequately consider the above-described situation. 
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In view of  the foregoing,  recommendations to the government relating to its exchange 
policies, in synthesis, were as follows: 
1) When drafting  the 1954/55 national budget, payments in foreign  currencies should be 
calculated at a uniform  rate. The uniform  rate should also apply to private, commercial, 
industrial, and agricultural transactions. 
2) Expedite completion of  the revision to the customs tariff  so that exchange surcharges 
(recargos cambiarlos) may be eliminated gradually. This will enable the calculation of  customs 
duties at a single exchange rate to be established. 
3) In accordance with this governmental program, the 1953/54 national budget shall be the 
last budget which contemplates a system of  preferential  exchange rates for  government 
transactions. 
4) The government, at the earliest possible date, shall draft  provisions for  the regulation of 
commercial credit towards maintaining an equilibrium in its balance of  payments, and the 
stabilization of  its exchange. 
Though it refers  to a "loss of  sovereignty over its financial  affairs",  the government 
newspaper "Novedades" in an editorial of  August 18,1953, lauds the work of  the IMF stating 
that an examination of  the country's financial  situation by impartial and technical persons 
completely disassociated with internal politics is highly beneficial.  The editorial adds that "the 
IMF in its conclusions, implicitly endorses the system of  exchange restrictions, surcharges, etc. 
heretofore  in effect".  A forecast  is made of  the "dawn of  a new era" in the nation's exchange 
policies. 
Reference  is made also to the fact  that the aloofness  of  local capital to develop the nation's 
productivity is not exclusively a Nicaraguan fault  but a Latin American problem in general. An 
ECLA report is cited as a basis for  the statement. 
For the Ambassador: 
James Maish, Jr. 
Economic Officer 
'There is considerable speculation in Nicaragua as to what the single exchange rate may be—ranging from  7 to 
8 cordobas to the dollar. The announced possible single rate has had a quieting effect  on curb market dollar vis-à-vis 
cordoba rates which on August 19,1953 was reported at 7.50/US$l.OO. 
70 
9. A SURVEY OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLICIES (1956) 
From: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Foreign Commerce, American Republics 
Division, Investment  in Central  America: Basic Information  for  United  States  Businessmen. 
Study prepared by firm  of  Albert O. Hirschman and George Kalmanoff,  Economic 
Consultants. (Bogotá, Colombia, December 1956), pp. 11-27 and 35-37. 
CHAPTER II The Land and the People 
GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE 
The five  countries of  Central America comprise an area of  170,258 miles, nearly one-tenth larger 
than the State of  California.  In length, this body of  land from  the northern corner of  Guatemala to 
the southern tip of  Costa Rica covers a distance of  almost 900 miles, but its width from  any point on 
the Pacific  coast to the Caribbean never exceeds 230 miles and narrows to as little as 70 miles in 
Costa Rica. Guatemala City is situated roughly due south from  New Orleans and St. Louis, and San 
José, Costa Rica, is due south from  Detroit. 
Nicaragua is the largest of  the five  countries and Honduras and Guatemala, which are about equal 
in size, rank next. The area of  each country is as follows,  in square miles: Nicaragua, 57 143; 
Honduras, 43 277; Guatemala, 42 085; Costa Rica, 19 695; and El Salvador, 8 058. 
Costa Rica is less than one-half  as large as Guatemala, and El Salvador, one of  the world's smallest 
countries, is less than one-half  as large as Costa Rica. El Salvador alone of  the five  countries does 
not have an outlet to both the Pacific  and the Atlantic Oceans. Guatemala's Caribbean coastline is 
very short and Honduras has only a narrow Pacific  outlet; Nicaragua and Costa Rica have long 
coastlines on both oceans. 
The entire area is traversed by rugged mountain chains descending from  Mexico. These 
mountains rise abruptly from  a relatively narrow Pacific  coastal plain, from  which they are set off  by 
a great number of  volcanoes -about 100 major ones, many of  which are active- extending the entire 
distance from  Guatemala to Costa Rica. Toward the Caribbean the mountains descend much more 
gradually and give way to large river valleys, particularly in the region extending from  eastern 
Honduras to Costa Rica. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica have broad plateaus, but in 
Honduras and Nicaragua the mountains are so rugged as to leave only small stretches of  level land, 
except for  the tropical plains bordering on the sea. 
Central America lies in the tropical zone at a latitude between 8 and 18 degrees north of  the 
Equator. Consequently, temperatures are determined primarily by elevation above sea level, and 
month-to-month variations in average daily temperatures are small. It is hot the year around in the 
low-lying coastal areas and river valleys; pleasantly warm during the day and cool at night at 
elevations between 3 000 and 6 000 feet,  the altitude at which Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, and San 
José are situated; and progressively colder at higher elevations. The zones in which these three types 
of  climate prevail are commonly known, respectively, as "tierra caliente" (warm lands), "tierra 
templada" (temperate lands), and "tierra fría"  (cold lands). 
Because of  the even temperatures throughout the year, the seasons are designated by variations 
in rainfall.  The dry season or "verano" (summer) extends from  November through April and the rainy 
season or "invierno" (winter) from  May through October. These seasons are quite pronounced on 
the Pacific  coastal plains and the adjoining mountain areas, where virtually no rains fall  during the 
summer months. Rainfall  is much heavier and much more evenly distributed throughout the year all 
along the Caribbean coast. 
As a result of  these climatic conditions, the principal centers of  economic activity and population 
are situated closer to the Pacific  Ocean than to the coastal plain itself,  but more generally they are 
found  on the high plateaus which lie immediately beyond this plain; as a matter of  fact,  the pleasant 
and healthful  climate of  these plateaus, often  referred  to as "eternal spring," has in some areas led 
to an excessive concentration of  population in limited areas and to a neglect of  opportunities in the 
warmer zones. 
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The potentialities of  the rich volcanic soils of  the Pacific  coastal plain for  large-scale mechanized 
agriculture have only recently been exploited in multiplying the output of  cotton, a crop that needs 
a long rain-free  growing season and is therefore  particularly suited to the climatic conditions found 
in that section. With irrigation a great number of  other tropical crops can be grown in the region, as 
is evidenced by the fact  that several successful  plantation ventures have been started by foreign 
capital. 
Because of  the heat, heavy rainfall,  and constant humidity, combined with generally poorer soils, 
prevailing along the Caribbean, it has been more difficult  to incorporate the Atlantic coastal plains 
and river valleys into the national economies, and over wide areas the only important activity is the 
exploitation of  tropical rain forests  for  their lumber resources. In several regions, however, banana 
and other plantations have been developed successfully.  For example, Honduras' economically most 
active area is located near the Caribbean Sea, in the Sula Valley. 
POPULATION 
The total population of  the five  Central American countries amounted to nearly 8 million people in 
1950, when a general population census was taken in all of  the Americas. Because of  the rapid natural 
increase in population, the five  countries registered an approximate total of  9.1 million people at the 
end of  1954 and are likely to have 10 million in 1957 (see table 1.9.1). 
Table 1.9.1 














Guatemala 2 788 3 191 3.0 66.2 
El Salvador 1 856 2158 3.4 230.3 
Honduras 1428 1605 2.9 33.0 
Nicaragua 1057 1223 3.3 18.5 
Costa Rica 801 933 3.5 40.7 
Total 7 930 9110 3.1 46.6 
* Estimated. 
b Average 1950-54. 
Growth 
An exceptionally rapid rate of  population increase is one of  the outstanding characteristics common 
to all five  countries of  Central America, with Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua having a slightly 
higher rate than Guatemala and Honduras. The average annual increase for  the area of  more than 
3 percent is one of  the highest in the world. The average rate for  Latin America as a whole is about 
2.5 percent and the rates are substantially lower in other underdeveloped areas, as well as in 
industrial countries. In the United States the rate has averaged about 1.5 percent in recent years. 
The rapid growth in population has been caused by a decline in mortality resulting from  better 
health and sanitation, and a continuing high birth rate. Thus far  no country has experienced a decline 
in the birthrate. For the immediate future,  it may be assumed that the rate of  increase will at least 
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be maintained at the present level, since there is still considerable room for  a reduction in mortality 
rates. This would mean that the population of  the area would double in 23 years and would total 
about 20 million people in 1980. 
Distribution and Density 
The population decreases from  country to country from  north to south. Guatemala is the most 
populous country, with more than 3 million people, followed  by El Salvador with about 2 million. 
Honduras has a population of  more than 1.5 million, Nicaragua about 1.25 million, and Costa Rica 
slightly less than 1 million. 
With respect to population density, El Salvador ranks first,  in 1950 having had 230 people per 
square mile of  territory, one of  the highest figures  in the world. The average density of  population 
of  the other four  countries is quite low, ranging from  66 inhabitants per square mile in Guatemala 
to 18.5 in Nicaragua. 
In evaluating these ratios, however, one must not forget  that large areas of  the countries are 
virtually uninhabited. For example, in Guatemala, the Province of  Petén, which comprises one-third 
of  the country's total area, has only about 20 000 people. Similarly, in Honduras, the northeastern 
departments comprising the region known as Mosquitia account for  more than 40 percent of  the 
national territory but have less than 10 percent of  the population. In Nicaragua, the whole eastern 
two-thirds of  the country is thinly populated; and in Costa Rica, large tracts of  territory along the 
Atlantic and the Pacific,  as well as along the country's northern border with Nicaragua, are sparsely 
populated. 
Most of  the uninhabited regions are low-lying and covered with tropical forest,  and boats and 
airplanes are the only means of  transportation. As in other tropical countries of  Latin America, the 
population has had a tendency to concentrate in the highlands, because of  the pleasant climate and 
the lower incidence of  disease. Heavy concentrations of  population are thus found  in the Guatemalan 
highlands, which range from  3 000 to 7 000 feet,  and on the central plateau of  Costa Rica, which 
averages about 4 000 feet  in altitude. In El Salvador, most of  the people live in areas some 2 000 feet 
above sea level. 
An important variation of  this tendency is found  in Nicaragua, where the highest concentration 
of  population is in the country's western plains, almost at sea level. Similarly, in Honduras, 
considerable agricultural and commercial, and some industrial, activity has developed in the 
low-lying Sula Valley in the country's northwest. This is a relatively recent development, however, 
and most of  the rural population still live at higher elevations; and the country's capital is also located 
at a higher altitude. 
In view of  the rapid population growth and the high densities in the highland areas, one of  the 
principal tasks of  the Central American countries is to pen up for  colonization and settlement some 
of  the large areas in the tropical lowlands. Experience already has proved that these regions are 
capable of  yielding rich crops, not only in bananas, but also in sugarcane, African  palm, cacao, abacá, 
and tropical fruits. 
Races, Language, and Literacy 
Racially, Central America offers  many interesting contrasts. In most of  the area, particularly in El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the native Indian population was absorbed by the Spanish 
conquerors through intermarriage, resulting in a fairly  homogenous "mestizo" population whose 
language is Spanish. In Guatemala, however, large native Indian groups have maintained themselves 
in isolation from  Western influences  and more than one-half  of  the country's population still follows 
its old customs, speaks a variety of  Indian dialects, dresses in colorful  tribal costumes, and has little 
contact with the outside world. Costa Rica's people have a relatively minor admixture of  Indian blood 
since the country was sparsely populated at the time of  the Spanish conquest. 
The racial picture is further  complicated by the presence on the Caribbean coast all along Central 
America of  many Negroes who were brought in from  the islands in the Caribbean during the early 
development of  the banana plantations and railroads. Their language is mostly English, partly 
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because they come from  the British West Indies and partly because of  the long domination by Great 
Britain of  long stretches of  Central America's Caribbean coastline. 
The native language of  the largest segment of  Central America's population is Spanish, but a 
considerable percentage of  this population cannot read or write. Illiteracy among persons over 10 
years of  age is 50 percent or higher in all of  the countries except Costa Rica, which has made primary 
education widely available and has been able to reduce illiteracy to the comparatively low figure  of 
20 percent. 
Costa Rica's efforts  to provide education have been aided materially by the fact  that it has a high 
concentration of  population in a small area with good communications. Illiteracy is particularly high 
in the remote mountainous areas where subsistence agriculture prevails. In these regions, illiteracy 
reflects  not only inadequate educational opportunities, but also poor transportation facilities  and 
depressed economic conditions in general. 
Urban Centers 
Among the capitals of  the five  countries, Guatemala City, with more than 300 000 inhabitants, is the 
largest. Tegucigalpa, the capital of  Honduras, is the smallest, with less than 100 000. Between these 
extremes are San Salvador with more than 200 000 people and Managua (Nicaragua) and greater 
San José (Costa Rica) with about 150 000 each. The capitals are the administrative, political, and 
cultural centers of  their respective countries. They are also the principal centers of  commerce, 
industry, and transportation, except for  Tegucigalpa, which competes with San Pedro Sula as an 
economic center in Honduras. 
In general, there are few  important towns other than the capitals. Since the economies of  all five 
countries are predominantly agricultural, the percentage of  the population living in cities and towns 
is low. If  we include all towns with more than 2 500 inhabitants we find  that both Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica are about 27 percent urban and that El Salvador and Guatemala have the next highest 
percentage of  urban population, followed  by Honduras with only 16 percent (see Table 1.9.2). The 
statistics for  towns with more than 10 000 inhabitants confirm  that Nicaragua and Costa Rica are 
relatively the most urbanized and Honduras the least urbanized of  the five  countries. 
Table 1.9.2 
URBAN POPULATION, BY COUNTRIES, 1950 
Towns with more Towns with more 
than 10 000 inhabitants than 2 500 inhabitants 
Country Number of Percent Number of Percent 
inhabitants of  total inhabitants of  total 
(thousands) population (thousands) population 
Guatemala 350 12.5 630 22.6 
El Salvador 321 17.3 478 25.8 
Honduras 135 9.5 224 15.7 
Nicaragua 201 19.0 289 27.4 
Costa Rica 150 18.8 220 27.5 
Guatemala's percentage is relatively high on the basis of  towns of  more than 2 500 inhabitants 
only because of  the agglomeration of  its Indian population in many small highland towns. The fact 
that urbanization in El Salvador is not higher than in the other countries, in spite of  its high population 
density, indicates considerable overpopulation in rural areas. 
OCCUPATIONS AND INCOME 
The occupational distribution of  the population shows a similar, but not identical, trend in all five 
countries. Everywhere agriculture occupies more than one-half  of  the economically active 
population, but the percentage varies from  barely more than one-half  in Costa Rica, to approximately 
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two-thirds in El Salvador and Nicaragua, almost 75 percent in Guatemala, and more than 80 percent 
in Honduras. Industry occupies about 12 percent of  the economically active population in all of  the 
countries except Honduras, where its share of  the total is only about 6 percent. 
The percentage of  persons occupied in other activities, such as building, commerce, 
transportation, Government, and services, varies considerably from  country to country. Here, Costa 
Rica appears to be far  in the lead, followed  by El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras, 
in that order. 
Occupational distribution of  the population and national income are presented, by principal 
economic sectors, in Table 1.9.3. These statistics show for  all countries a far  lower contribution of 
agriculture to the national income than might be expected on the basis of  the occupational statistics. 
This situation is due to the low productivity of  agriculture as compared with such pursuits as industry, 
commerce, and service. 
Table 1.9.3 
DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION8 AND NATIONAL INCOME,b 
BY COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIC SECTORS 
(In  percentages) 
Agriculture Manufac-turing Commerce 
Transport and 












































































" Population data are on basis of  1950 census except for  Guatemala for  which only 1940 data are available. 
b National income data are derived from  information  in the chapters on individual countries. 
The discrepancy is particularly high in Honduras, where the 83-percent sector of  the economically 
active population engaged in agriculture apparently produces only 53 percent of  the total product. 
It is much smaller in Costa Rica, where 55 percent of  the people are engaged in agriculture and 
account for  as much as 44 percent of  the national output. 
The national product figures  are not completely reliable because of  the inadequate statistical 
information  from  which they were computed. However, these large differences  permit the 
conclusion that in Honduras the productivity of  the farmer  is particularly low, whereas in Costa Rica 
the situation in this respect is far  better. Agricultural productivity in the other three countries is 
between these two extremes, but rather closer to that of  Honduras. 
A comparison of  total national income figures  country by country is even more hazardous since, 
in spite of  their proximity, substantial differences  exist in the purchasing power of  money in the 
respective countries. Table 1.9.4 presents the best available estimates of  the national income of  the 
five  countries. In spite of  their limitations the per capita figures  show the depressed average level of 
living characteristic of  the underdeveloped countries. They show that, in this respect also, Costa 
Rica is in the lead and Honduras last, with the other countries between the extremes, but rather 
closer to Honduras. In chapter III the comparative position of  the five  countries With respect to 
75 
standards of  living and purchasing power is more closely evaluated, with the help of  a series of 
consumption and import statistics, for  the purpose of  defining  as nearly as possible the size of  each 
country's market. 
Table 1.9.4 
































a Guatemala quetzal (1 quetzal equals $1); El Salvador colón (2.50 colones equal $1); Honduras lempira (2 lempiras equal $1); 




CHAPTER III Basic Economic Conditions 
TRANSPORTATION 
Adequate transportation is one of  the most important prerequisites for  the economic development 
of  any area. The Central American countries have faced  considerable natural and other obstacles 
in solving their transportation problems. Among the natural obstacles are the rugged topography of 
the area and the heavy rainfall  prevailing in many sections. Moreover, the whole process of  planning, 
building, and maintaining a modern highway, railway, or airport requires not only large outlays, but 
also a fairly  high level of  administrative efficiency  and stability. 
These factors  help to explain Central America's lag with respect to this basic segment of  the 
economy- in the entire area, for  example there are only about 6 500 miles of  all-weather roads and 
no more than 6 500 miles of  all-weather roads and no more than 75 000 automotive vehicles or about 
120 persons for  each vehicle. Nevertheless, substantial progress is being achieved in transportation. 
Existing highways are being improved and new ones are being built with the help of  international 
loans and technical assistance; railways are being rehabilitated; and better port facilities  are being 
constructed. Each of  the five  countries now has a first-class  international airport, domestic airlines 
have gained considerable importance as a means of  connecting previously inaccessible settlements 
with the Provincial or National capitals. The problems of  the area as a whole have been thoroughly 
analyzed by United Nations technical missions and joint action by the five  countries to solve some 
of  their common transportation problems may be anticipated. 
The transportation systems of  the individual Central American countries are dealt with in 
considerable detail in the country chapters. This part, therefore,  will deal only with the regional 
aspects and the principal comparative characteristics of  the transportation systems. 
Railroads 
The railroads consist of  a number of  purely national systems, the one exception being the 
International Railways of  Central America (IRCA), whose El Salvador and Guatemala divisions are 
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Table 1.9.5 
CENTRAL AMERICAN RAILROADS, 1953 
(Length  in miles) 
interconnected. By this means, El Salvador, which has no outlet on the Atlantic, gains access to the 
Guatemalan port of  Barrios on the Caribbean for  its import and export traffic. 
Most of  the railroads in Central 
America were built at the beginning of  the 
20th century by the fruit  companies 
themselves or by groups of  foreign 
investors closely connected with these 
companies. Table 1.9.5 shows that more 
than one-half  of  the total mileage serves 
exclusively banana and other plantations. 
Moreover, a substantial number of  the 
public-service railroads, such as the IRCA 
line in Guatemala, the Ferrocarril 
Nacional de Honduras, and the Northern 
Railway of  Costa Rica, are affiliated  with, 
or administered by, the fruit  companies 
through long-term concession contracts 
with the Governments. 
The nature of  the banana trade, with 
requires close and exact timing in bringing 
the fruit  to port and in loading it aboard 
ship, has led the fruit  companies also to 
build and operate the ports which are the 
terminals of  the rail lines. Railways other 
than those of  the fruit  companies have also 
constructed terminal ports, such as the 
British-owned El Salvador Railway Co., 
Ltd., which operates the port of  Acajutla, 
and the Government-owned Ferrocarril 
del Pacífico  of  Nicaragua, which operates 
the ports of  Corinto and Puerto Morazán. 
Consequently, the railroads have long been in a very strong position, since, with their exclusive 
access to the port areas, all foreign  trade had to move by rail. In recent years, however, this situation 
has tended to change. In Guatemala the port of  Santo Tomás, which is to be connected with the 
capital by a modern highway, was built by the Government specifically  to compete with the 
IRCA-controlled Puerto Barrios. Other countries are using, or are planning to use, less expensive 
means to achieve the same end by building highways toward existing ports, such as Acajutla in El 
Salvador, Puerto Cortés in Honduras, San Juan del Sur and Corinto in Nicaragua, and Puntarenas 
in Costa Rica. 
When these alternative means of  moving exports and imports will have been completed, the 
railroads may encounter heavy competition from  motor transport. Some of  them, such as the 
Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacífico  of  Costa Rica, have recently undertaken large-scale modernization 
programs, primarily through the purchase of  new locomotives and rolling stock. 
Because of  the mountainous terrain and the short hauls, rail transportation is probably 
uneconomic in comparison with motor transport, and no further  extension of  the railroad network 
is anticipated except for  plantation purposes. Nevertheless, the existing railroads are likely to remain 
for  many years an essential part of  Central America's transportation system, connecting as they do 
the principal economic regions of  each country and all capitals, except Tegucigalpa, with the Atlantic 
and Pacific  seaboards. 
Highways 
In 1953, Central America had approximately 13 000 miles of  roads, less than one-half  of  which 
could be considered as all-weather roads (see Table 1.9.6). The best road network is found  in El 
Salvador, which has by far  the highest density of  roads per square mile of  territory, a high proportion 
of  paved roads, and an excellent maintenance system. Honduras' highway system is the poorest, large 
and economically important parts of  the country being virtually inaccessible except by oxcart, mule, 






Five countries, total 1400 1506 
Guatemala, total 539 180 
IRCA, Guatemala Division 510 — Barrios and 
San José 
Ferrocarril Verapaz 29 — 
United Fruit . . . 180 
El Salvador, total 383 
IRCA, El Salvador Division 283 Cutuco 
El Salvador Railway Co., Ltd. 100 . . . Acajutla 
Honduras, total 63 725 
Ferrocarril Nacional de Honduras 63 
Tela Railroad Co. 389 Cortês and Tela 
Standard Fruit Co. . . . 336 La Ceiba 
Nicaragua, total 217 
Ferrocarril del Pacífico  de 
Nicaragua 217 — Corinto and 
Morazán 
Costa Rica, total 198 601 
Ferrocarril Eléctrico al Pacifico 82 — Puntarenas 
Northern Railway 116 209 Limón 
Compañía Bananera de Costa Rica — 392 Quepos and 
Golfito 
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or airplane. Costa Rica's highway network on the central plateau rivals that of  El Salvador in 
excellence, but little progress has been made in penetrating into other areas. 
Table 1.9.6 
CENTRAL AMERICAN HIGHWAYS, 1953 
(In  miles) 
Country 
All-weather roads 





Guatemala 205 2504 2709 1348 4 057 
El Salvador 373 559 932 3853 4 785 
Honduras — 976 976 99 1075 
Nicaragua 188 417 605 1019 1624 
Costa Rica 497 621 1118 436 1554 
Total 1263 5 077 6340 6 755 13 095 
a By 1955 Honduras was reported to have increased its total highway length to 1400 miles of  which 20 were paved. 
The most important artery for  Central America as a whole, as well as for  most of  the countries 
individually, is the Inter-American Highway, which is now completed as an all-weather road and, in 
addition, is paved to the extent of  34 percent of  its length of  1204 miles, between western Guatemala 
and southeastern Costa Rica. The two remaining gaps in the highway are between Mexico and 
Guatemala on one end and between Costa Rica and Panama on the other. The highway thus connects 
the five  Central American capitals, all of  which lie on it except Tegucigalpa, which, however, can be 
reached by a good connecting road. 
For the time being, the importance of  the highway as a route for  internal commerce outweighs 
its international significance.  In Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, the highway 
crosses the economically most active regions. This is not so in Honduras, however, where the 
principal highway route is the one connecting the Sula Valley in the north with Tegucigalpa and with 
the Inter-American Highway, which crosses the country at its narrow southern end. 
A substantial investment effort  is presently under way in most of  Central America to build new 
highway mileage. Both Guatemala and Nicaragua are building highways that will connect the capitals 
with points on the Caribbean (Santo Tomás in Guatemala and the river port of  Rama in Nicaragua). 
El Salvador and Guatemala have undertaken the construction of  a modern highway paralleling the 
Pacific  coast to open up their Pacific  coastal plain, whose economic potential is still largely untapped. 
Honduras also has been making progress and is planning considerable further  additions to its 
presently quite inadequate road network. Nicaragua has been building modern highways to connect 
the principal towns on its fertile  western plains. Costa Rica, after  having completed the 
Inter-American Highway up to the Nicaraguan border, is now undertaking to build the remaining 
134-mile stretch to the border with Panama. 
All of  these construction projects have been financed  to a large extent through loans from  the 
International Bank for  Reconstruction and Development, $40 million of  the total loans of  $64 million 
thus far  made available to Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua having been for 
highway construction.1 
The United States Government has been making a very important contribution by financing 
two-thirds of  the cost of  the Inter-American Highway, the Central American countries adding the 
remaining one-third as well as providing the required right of  way. In 1955, the United States 
Congress appropriated a total of  almost $65 million in accordance with a program to accelerate 
completion within a 3-year period of  the Inter-American Highway down to the Panama Canal. On 
several occasions, loans from  the Export-Import Bank of  Washington have enabled these countries 
to put up their share of  the cost, as in the case of  a recent 9.5 million credit to Costa Rica for  this 
purpose. 
'No International Bank loans have yet been made to Costa Rica. 
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The conditions of  motor transport reflect  those of  the highways. As can be seen from  Table 1.9.7, 
Costa Rica and El Salvador, which, relatively, have the best highway networks, also have more motor 
vehicles in relation to population than do the other countries; and in Honduras, where the road 
system is the least adequate, the number of  persons per motor vehicle is the largest. The table also 
shows that, with the good export earnings of  recent years, and the prospect for  more and improved 
highways, all countries have sharply increased their stocks of  motor vehicles. Total vehicle numbers 
may well be around 75 000 at present. 
Table 1.9.7 
AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES-REGISTRATION AT VARIOUS DATES AND IMPORTS 
IN 1953, BY COUNTRIES 
Automotive vehicles registered Imports 1953 
Country Total number 





per vehicle® Number 
Value 
(thousands 
of  dollars) 
Guatemala 16704 6 876 185 2494 4 965 
El Salvador 15 253 4 702 137 1668 4 298 
Honduras 7074 2358b 234 1669 3 331 
Nicaragua 8200° 2604 154 1433 2334 
Costa Rica 10585 4065 82 1969 3 932 
Total 57 816 20605 158 9 233 18860 
a 1953 data for  Guatemala and El Salvador, 1955 data for  Honduras and Nicaragua, and 1952 data for  Costa Rica. 
b Estimated. 
c Includes an estimated 1100 official  cars. 
Almost one-third of  all the vehicles are trucks, which are most commonly owner operated; only 
in Honduras and Nicaragua are there companies operating five  or more trucks on specific  routes. 
Most of  the motor vehicles are concentrated in the capitals, all of  which also have adequate bus 
and taxi services. 
Modern service stations are available in the capitals and in the larger towns, as well as at various 
points along the Inter-American Highway. 
Inland Water Transport 
Inland water transport is of  little importance in Central America. The only two significant  inland 
water routes are on Nicaragua's two big lakes, which are connected by the Tipitapa River, and in 
Guatemala, from  the Polochic River via Lake Izabal and the Dulce River to the Caribbean. However, 
in the Caribbean lowlands the rivers are the only means of  surface  transportation and often  can 
accommodate small steamers as well as the traditional dugout canoe. Once the road from 
Nicaragua's capital to the river port of  Rama is completed, traffic  on the Escondido River, which 
empties into the Atlantic, will be of  more than purely local importance. 
Seaports and Maritime Traffic 
The international seaborne traffic  of  the five  countries is serviced by 9 ports on the Pacific  Ocean 
and 8 on the Atlantic.2 
So many ports have developed not only because of  the long coastlines, but also because each 
country has built its own ports with little regard for  those of  its neighbors. For instance, the 
Salvadoran port of  Cutuco could efficiently  serve southern Honduras, but Honduras has preferred 
to build up its own port of  Amapala only 11 miles from  Cutuco. Furthermore, the fact  that the 
railroads have obtained exclusive rights to operate certain ports has led to the sponsoring of 
competing ports, such as Santo Tomás, in Guatemala, and La Libertad in El Salvador. 
2On the Pacific  are the following:  Champerico and San José in Guatemala; Acajutla, La Libertad, and Cutuco in 
El Salvador; Amapala in Honduras; Corinto and San Juan del Sur in Nicaragua; and Puntarenas in Costa Rica. On the Atlantic 
are Puerto Barrios and Santo Tomás in Guatemala; Puerto Cortés, Tela, and La Ceiba in Honduras; Puerto Cabezas and 
El Bluff  in Nicaragua; and Limón in Costa Rica. 
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In general, because of  the dispersal of  efforts  and lack of  forward  planning, facilities  are often 
inadequate in spite of  the large number of  ports. 
As shown by Table 1.9.8, the most important port of  the area is Puerto Barrios in Guatemala, 
which carries part of  El Salvador's import and export traffic.  All of  the other ports serve exclusively 
their own country, despite the fact  that Puerto Cortés, Acajutla, Cutuco, and San Juan del Sur could 
serve neighboring countries as well. Several shipping lines call regularly at the ports of  the area 
-particularly along the Pacific,  where the Grace, Independence, and United Fruit Lines operate-
and maintain interconnection among the various ports. 
Table 1.9.8 
TRAFFIC OF PRINCIPAL CENTRAL AMERICAN SEAPORTS8,1953 
(Quantity  in metric  tons; value in thousands  of  dollars) 
Imports Exports 
r u n Quantity Value Quantity Value 
All Pacific  ports 854 857 114 112 236 025 149482 
All Atlantic ports 630 475 126 147 737 762 165 656 
Total i 485 332 240 259 973 787 315 138 
Guatemala: 
Champerico (Pacific) 5 283 684 6 710 '1210 
San José (Pacific) 217635 15 483 11511 10 392 
Puerto Barrios (Atlantic) 190 351 44 367 241433 68 027 
El Salvador: 
Acajutla (Pacific) 46 988 2 719 22 873 24 828 
La Libertad (Pacific) 99 989 18 814 12 206 14 807 
Cutuco (Pacific) 140563 12100 44 568 40 242 
Honduras: 
Amapala (Pacific) 29 801 5 805 9 721 3 586 
Puerto Cortés (Atlantic) 113 306 22 069 178 342 28176 
Tela (Atlantic) 112229 11775 116 312 13 838 
La Ceiba (Atlantic) 60 025 6190 86 483 13 124 
Nicaragua: 
Corinto (Pacific) 128 904 27 295 80 622 22 345 
San Juan del Sur (Pacific) 19 275. 6 831 33 468 17494 
Puerto Cabezas (Atlantic) 12 837 2 393 45 287 2157 
El Bluff  (Atlantic) 4 993 869 19 753 1512 
Costa Rica: 
Puntarenas (Pacific) 166 419 24 381 14 346 8518 
Limón (Atlantic) 136 734 38494 50 152 38 822 
aExcept Costa Rica for  which 1954 figures  are given. 
There is little such connection among the Atlantic ports, which are visited principally by the boats 
of  the fruit  companies. Nicaragua alone has established its own shipping line, the Mamenic (Marina 
Mercante Nicaragüense), which maintains regular service between several Central American ports 
and the United States and Europe, offering  to the Pacific  ports of  the area the convenience of 
shipments via the Atlantic to the United States and Europe without transhipment at Panama. 
Airports and Airlines 
With the recent completion of  El Coco airport near San José, each Central American country now 
has an international airport close to its capital which can accommodate large international carriers. 
The most important international carrier of  passengers and cargo is Pan American Airways, 
followed  by Taca International Airways and Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM). Each country, except El 
Salvador, has one or several local companies engaged principally in local transport. Several of  these 
companies have been formed  with the help of  financial  and technical assistance from  Pan American 
Airways. The local companies have developed some international flights  to neighboring countries 
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or to the United States, but their principal service is to connect the capitals with the outlying 
Provinces within each country. 
In view of  poor surface  transportation facilities,  domestic air transport is of  great importance in 
spite of  generally short hauls. It is well developed in Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica, but in 
Nicaragua it serves principally the needs of  gold-mining companies established in the north-eastern 
part of  the country. Because of  El Salvador's smallness and good road transport conditions, this 
country has had no need to establish internal air transport services. 
ELECTRIC POWER 
Central America's power facilities  also have expanded slowly, largely owing to the same factors  which 
have handicapped development of  transportation. This lag is illustrated by the fact  that the area as 
a whole has only about 200 000 kilowatts of  generating capacity. 
Power shortages are being overcome, however, through the construction of  new hydroelectric or 
thermal stations with the aid of  foreign  private investment or international loans. As with 
transportation, technical missions of  the United Nations have thoroughly studied the power-shortage 
problems and the five  countries may be expected to take joint action with respect to certain of  their 
common difficulties. 
Electric power capacity installed throughout Central America amounted to 193,512 kilowatts at 
the end of  1954, which represented an availability of  only 21 watts per capita compared with about 
600 in the United States. If  only the capacity of  public-service facilities  is considered, the ratio is 
even lower -16 watts per capita. About one-fourth  of  the total capacity consists of  plants for  private 
use by the fruit  companies, manufacturing  establishments, and railroads. 
To alleviate this power shortage, all of  the countries are giving great emphasis in their 
development programs to the expansion of  power capacity and are taking active steps to this end. 
In 1954 alone, about 46 500 kilowatts were added to existing capacity in the area, which was an 
increase of  almost one-third. Projects planned, under construction, and to be completed within the 
next 2 to 3 years total at least another 86 800 kilowatts. Simultaneously, longer range planning for 
the utilization, for  electric power, of  the substantial hydraulic resources in the area is actively going 
forward. 
The comparative position of  the individual countries with respect to power supply is indicated in 
Tables 1.9.9 and 1.9.10. Of  the five  countries Costa Rica is the best endowed but, because of  rapidly 
increasing demand, it has been experiencing recurrent power shortages, only recently alleviated by 
the installation of  new capacity. Power rates are very low in Costa Rica, where most of  the facilities 
are hydroelectric. 
Table 1.9.9 
ESTIMATED ELECTRIC POWER CAPACITY INSTALLED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 


















































SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY IN THE 







during the year 
per capita 
Average rate 
(U.S. cents per 
kilowatt-hour) 
Guatemala City 53 252 3.6 
San Salvador 45 231 3.6 
Tegucigalpa 22 86 16.2 
Managua 47 170 4.4 
San José 90 447 1.3 
El Salvador is in second place as a result of  the addition of  a 30 000-kilowatt plant on the Lempa 
River in 1954. This plant more than doubled existing public-service facilities,  and made El Salvador 
the only country in the area with readily available power. The new facilities  have made possible a 
lowering of  power rates by about 10 percent, but rates are still not quite as low as those in Costa 
Rica. 
The remaining three countries, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras, all are poorly endowed 
with power, but Honduras clearly is in the worst position. Power is very expensive in Honduras, since 
it is all thermal and the costs of  imported fuel  are very high, particularly because of  transportation 
difficulties.  The situation in the urban centers in the northwestern part of  the country is much better 
than in Tegucigalpa, power availability per capita being considerably greater and the rates lower in 
those centers. 
With this notable exception of  Honduras, power facilities  in Central America generally are 
concentrated in and around the capital cities, which are the regions of  greatest economic 
development. A somewhat greater dispersion, however, is found  in the small country of  El Salvador, 
where there do not exist the vast stretches of  undeveloped terrain characteristic of  the other 
countries. 
Private foreign  investment in public power facilities  is important in three of  the 
countries-Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. The principal power companies in Guatemala 
and Costa Rica are subsidiaries of  the American and Foreign Power Co., and in El Salvador the 
principal company is a subsidiary of  the Canadian International Power Co. Following the recent 
decision of  the Guatemalan Government to leave power development in private hands, the American 
and Foreign Power Co. subsidiary in that country is planning a substantial investment program to 
expand generating capacity. 
In El Salvador and Costa Rica, the major expansions of  generating capacity are being carried out 
by public bodies, but the additional power is to be distributed through the existing private companies. 
In Nicaragua, the major power facilities  long have been owned and operated by the Government. 
This is true also of  public power facilities  in Honduras, where, however, such facilities  are much less 
important than the plants for  private use, which also sell some of  their power to the public. The 
presently planned expansion of  power production in Honduras well be undertaken by a public 
agency. 
Much foreign  financial  and technical assistance is being used by the Central American countries 
in carrying out their power development programs. In Guatemala, aside from  the investments 
planned by the American and Foreign Power Co., a United States consulting and engineering firm 
was employed to lay out a program of  development, and its report was presented in the latter part 
of  1955. The International Bank has loaned $12.5 million to El Salvador for  power and almost 
$8 million to Nicaragua, and it is studying the possibility of  assisting Honduras in this field.  In Costa 
Rica the Export-Import Bank has loaned a total of  $3.5 million for  power to the private power 
company and to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad of  the Costa Rican Government. 
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With respect to the power supply of  the individual countries, Guatemala is now suffering  from  a 
shortage, reflected  in plans announced by some of  the country's leading industries to install their 
own plants rather than await the additional power to be installed by the power company. 
In El Salvador, the installation of  30 000 kilowatts of  hydroelectric facilities  in 1954 is to be 
followed  by another 15 000-kilowatt unit in 1956. The consequent availability of  power is expected 
to lead to abandonment of  the large number of  private industrial power plants that were installed 
during periods of  shortage. 
In Honduras, the development of  public power facilities  is an important aspect of  the planning 
activities of  the newly created National Economic Council (Consejo Nacional de Economía). 
Most of  Nicaragua's present power capacity was installed in the past 10 years. The installation of 
a 3 000-kilowatt thermal plant in Managua in 1954 is to be followed  by a 30 000-kilowatt thermal 
plant, to be completed by the end of  1957, which will give an adequate supply to the capital and 
nearby region for  some years. The substantial hydroelectric potential of  the country is being explored 
for  longer range planning. 
In Costa Rica the private power company added 10 000 thermal kilowatts in 1954; the 
Government agency concerned with power is installing a unit of  11800 kilowatts, distribution of  the 
power to be effected  through the private company. Both projects were assisted by Export-Import 
Bank credits. Simultaneously, the public agency has been constructing since 1954 a 30 000-kilowatt 
hydroelectric plant financed  with Government revenues and local borrowing. 
AGRICULTURE 
Agriculture is of  basic importance in all five  of  the Central American countries, occupying from  55 
percent of  the economically active population in Costa Rica to 83 percent in Honduras and providing 
the livelihood of  about two-thirds of  the area's population. Moreover, the export of  agricultural 
commodities accounts for  almost all of  the foreign  exchange earnings of  the area and thereby makes 
an essential contribution to the financing  of  economic development, which could not proceed 
without large-scale imports of  raw materials, vehicles, machinery, and equipment. 
Knowledge about Central American agriculture has been increased by censuses which were 
conducted in all five  countries between 1950 and 1952. These censuses contain information  on land 
use, number and size of  farms,  and acreage and value of  principal crops. The censuses covered only 
the parts of  the national territories under well-defined  ownership, omitting large tracts of  land, such 
as the Peten in Guatemala and areas in northeastern Honduras and eastern Nicaragua and in the 
Costa Rican lowlands, which are still largely inaccessible and covered with jungle. 
Table 1.9.11 shows that only 6 percent of  the total area of  the five  countries is being cropped. 
Among the five  countries, El Salvador has the most intensively cultivated land and Nicaragua has 
the greatest reserve of  untapped land resources. 
Table 1.9.11 
BASIC PATTERNS OF LAND USE, BY COUNTRIES 






by agricultural censuses 
In annual or 
permanent crops 
Guatemala 26 934 9 052 2 670 
EI Salvador 5157 3 776 1345 
Honduras 27697 6195 1164 
Nicaragua 34 348 5 849 1025 
Costa Rica 12 605 4477 578 
Total 106 741 29349 6 782 
83 
With the exception of  Nicaragua, the Central American countries have a common agricultural 
pattern. The traditional regions of  settlement are the hills, high plateaus, and highlands at elevations 
of2  000 feet  and higher, and in these areas peasant (subsistence) farming,  based on corn and beans, 
has long been carried on. With the emergence of  coffee  as a valuable commercial crop, the most 
fertile  lands in the zones lying at an elevation of  2 000 to 5 000 feet  have been devoted to this crop 
and, because of  the investment required and the long waiting period until the trees bear fruit,  a large 
portion of  the coffee  crop is produced by medium-sized and large farms. 
Very large landholders predominate in the outlying areas close to the Pacific  Ocean and the 
Caribbean Sea. Important banana and other fruit  plantations have been developed here by foreign 
capital. Otherwise, to the extent that these lands are used at all, they are usually devoted to extensive 
cattle grazing. Recently, however, the pressure of  population has led to a more intensive utilization 
of  these areas, particularly along the Pacific  Ocean, where soils are excellent and rainfall  is not 
excessive. In this region, the cultivation of  cotton, sugarcane, and essential-oil grasses has been 
developed successfully  by El Salvador and Guatemala, and the raising of  cattle is becoming a more 
intensive operation in those countries, as well as in Costa Rica. 
Nicaragua differs  from  the other countries in that its principal agricultural zone and its centers 
of  population have always been on the country's large flatlands  along the Pacific  Ocean and around 
its two big lakes. However, full  utilization of  the potential wealth of  these fertile  lands is of  recent 
origin, beginning with the large-scale cultivation of  sugarcane, rice, sesame, and, principally, cotton. 
For purposes of  discussion, the principal crops of  Central America may be classified  by the three 
types of  agricultural activity mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, namely, peasant farming,  the 
raising of  commercial crops and livestock (particularly cattle), and the growing of  tropical fruits  on 
large plantations. 
Peasant Farming 
Throughout the settled regions of  Central America, corn and beans are grown on small plots and 
form  the basic diet of  the people other than the Costa Ricans, many of  whom prefer  wheat bread to 
corn tortillas. In dryer climates, sorghum replaces corn and, in the wetter and warmer areas, yucca 
and rice are important. Bananas and plantains also are staples in the domestic diet and are grown 
virtually everywhere except at altitudes above 5 000 feet.  Sugarcane is cultivated by small farmers 
for  making "panela," a brown sugar cake which is a popular food  staple. Cane for  refining  into white 
sugar and bananas for  export are grown on large farms  or plantations. 
The peasants customarily also grow some fruits  and vegetables, such as papaya and avocado, and 
raise some pigs and chickens. However, they give little attention to care or feeding,  with the result 
that egg and meat production is low and of  poor quality. 
On the whole, Central America is self-sufficient  with respect to its basic food  needs, except in 
periods of  severe drought, such as occurred in 1955. Wheat, which in the tropics can be cultivated 
economically only in high, level regions, such as the highlands of  Guatemala, represents the larger 
item among imported foodstuffs;  other imported items are numerous food  specialties and most of 
the canned foods  consumed. The popular diet is deficient  in meat, milk, eggs, and such protective 
foods  as fruit  and vegetables. 
El Salvador, with its large population relative to its size, and despite a more intensive agriculture, 
tends to experience shortages in some of  the dietary staples, such as corn and beans, which normally 
can be supplied from  surpluses available in Honduras and Nicaragua. In recent years Costa Rica 
has been able to increase substantially its output of  basic food  crops and it has been entering export 
markets to a small extent. 
Peasant farming  in Central American agriculture is, on the whole, markedly inefficient.  Erosion 
and lack of  communications are serious problems. Important needs, particularly in view of  the rapid 
population increase, are more efficient  land use, increased application of  fertilizer,  improved seeds 
and equipment, and better farm  management in general. Considerable efforts  are being made in all 
of  these fields  as a result of  technical assistance activities, among which those of  the cooperative 
"Servicios" established by the United States Government's International Cooperation 
Administration are outstanding. The Costa Rican example shows that much can be accomplished 
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by efficient  agricultural credit and extension systems and the provision of  storage facilities,  and by 
other policies designed to protect the peasant against undue fluctuations  in farm  prices. 
Commercial Crops and Livestock 
Coffee.  Coffee  is by far  the most important commercial crop of  Central America. The total 
production of  the five  countries amounts to more than 3 million bags, representing approximately 
10 percent of  world production. The area ranks third among the large producers, after  Brazil and 
Colombia; the latter account for  ¡some 45 percent and 20 percent of  world production, respectively. 
The Central American coffees  all belong to the mild variety, are of  generally excellent quality, and 
are used for  blending purposes. They command a premium in the international coffee  markets, Costa 
Rican grades being considered as particularly outstanding. 
As can be seen from  Table 1.9.12, Guatemala and El Salvador are the largest producers, with 
about 1 million bags each. Costa Rica follows,  with about 500 000 bags. Nicaraguan and Honduran 
coffee  production is less important, but has made exceptionally rapid strides in recent years under 
the stimulus of  high prices. Even in those countries proceeds from  coffee  exports accounted in 1953 
for  39 percent and 18 percent, respectively, of  total export earning. In Guatemala and El Salvador, 
coffee  is of  outstanding importance in foreign  trade since it constitutes 77 percent and 85 percent, 
respectively, of  exports. 
Table 1.9.12 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COFFEE PRODUCTION, 1944-1948 (AVERAGES), 
1949-1953 (AVERAGES), AND 1954-1955 
(In  thousands  of  bags) 
Annual Annual 
Country average average 1954 1955 
1944-48 1949-53 
Guatemala 969 1032 953a 892 a 
El Salvador 993 1248 920 1200 
Honduras 160 229 b b 
Nicaragua 232 316 360 410 
Costa Rica 380 358 390 563 
Note: Data correspond to crop years i.e. production shown for  1955 relates to crop year 1954-55. 
° Exports only. 
Data are not available. 
The volcanic soils of  Central America and the mild temperatures prevailing at altitudes between 
2 000 and 5 000 feet  provide excellent growing conditions for  coffee.  The principal areas of  cultivation 
are on the Pacific  slopes of  the mountain chain traversing Guatemala and El Salvador, on small 
highland areas between Lake Managua and Lake Nicaragua, and on the central plateau in Costa 
Rica. 
All five  countries have trade associations which are making efforts  to improve quality and raise 
output per acre by providing technical assistance to growers. These trade associations are members 
of  the FEDECAME (Federación Cafetalera  Centro América-México-El Caribe) which has its 
headquarters at San Salvador. In addition to the Central American countries, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, 
and the Dominican Republic are members of  this federation,  which represents the interests of  its 
members in the Pan-American Coffee  Bureau. 
Because of  the importance of  coffee  to the Central American economy, the rapid development 
of  the Central American countries in the past few  years can be traced in large part to the increase 
in the world price of  coffee  since 1949. The fluctuations  in the price of  this commodity since 1954 
have in turn caused serious problems, because of  the resulting uncertainties as to the availability of 
foreign  exchange. 
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Cotton. Some cotton has long been grown in Central America, but this crop has achieved real 
importance only in recent years, during which production has expanded rapidly, principally in 
Nicaragua but also in Guatemala and El Salvador. In Nicaragua, cotton replaced coffee  as the 
principal export in 1955, as ever larger tracts of  its Pacific  flatlands  were being sown to cotton. The 
Pacific  coast, with its excellent soils and complete absence of  rainfall  from  December through 
March, provides superior growing conditions. In all three countries, the rise in cotton prices during 
the Korean conflict  sparked the increase in cultivation. However, the expansion continued even after 
prices receded, since cultivation remained profitable,  particularly with the use of  modern methods 
of  insect control, such as air spraying. In El Salvador very high yields in cotton have been achieved 
through such methods and the intensive use of  fertilizer.  Machine picking was introduced in 
Nicaragua because of  labor shortage. Yields are high throughout Central America (see Table 1.9.13). 
Table 1.9.13 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COTTON PRODUCTION, 1949-1950,1953-1954 AND 1954-1955 
(In  thousands  of  bales of500pounds) 
Country 1949-1950 1953-1954 1954-1955 
Guatemala 3 26 39 
El Salvador 30 56 88 
Nicaragua 29 84 206 
Note: Production in Honduras and Costa Rica is not significant. 
The successful  growing of  cotton has demonstrated the great value of  the Pacific  lowlands, which 
previously had been left  largely uncultivated. As a by product of  the cotton boom, large quantities 
of  cottonseed have become available and have led to an expansion of  the vegetable oil industry, and 
cottonseed cake is used in the production of  animal feed  concentrates. 
Sugarcane. Sugarcane that is refined  into white sugar rather than into panela customarily is grown 
on relatively large farms  whose owners also control the refineries.  In general, production has kept 
up with rapidly rising consumption, and Nicaragua, whose San Antonio refinery  is the largest in 
Central America, has recently achieved exportable surpluses of  about $1 million a year. Many 
refineries  of  the area are handicapped by inadequate equipment and small size. 
Other crops. Commercial crops of  lesser importance include sesame and rice in Nicaragua, 
citronella and lemongrass in Guatemala, and hard fibers  on plantations in Guatemala, El 
Salvador,and Costa Rica. All of  these crops are largely exported either direct or as processed goods, 
such as essential oils (citronella and lemongrass) and coffee  bags (henequen). 
Livestock. Cattle raising is an important and 
traditional part of  the agricultural economy of  the 
five  countries and is done primarily by the large 
landowners. In Central America, as elsewhere in 
Latin America, large tracts of  fertile  level land are 
devoted to grazing while food  crops are raised by 
the peasants on eroded hillsides. This situation in 
itself  indicates a poor use of  resources, but the 
management of  the cattle herds customarily has 
been wasteful  and inefficient  also -calf  mortality 
has been high and the animals have been poorly 
fed  and infested  with ticks and disease. As a result, 
in spite of  relatively high cattle numbers, meat 
production has been low throughout the area and 
milk production inadequate. The total number of 
cattle and the number per capita in the five 
countries in specific  years are as follows: 
CENTRAL AMERICA: TOTAL AND PER 





Guatemala (1950) 903 0.32 
El Salvador (1950) 810 .43 
Honduras (1952) 1152 .76 
Nicaragua (1952) 1182 1.03 
Costa Rica (1954) 762 .83 
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In all five  countries considerable effort  has been made in recent years to correct this situation. 
Pedigreed animals have been imported, largely from  the United States, to be crossed with the local 
"criollo" breeds, and pastures and ranch management have been improved; animal feed  concentrates 
have been made available to the dairy farmer;  and both quantity and quality of  meat and milk for 
consumption are being improved by the construction of  modern slaughterhouses and pasteurizing 
plants. Costa Rica has been particularly successful  in developing an efficient  dairy industry on the 
high plateau surrounding San José; and Nicaragua is currently making a considerable effort  in the 
same field.  In all countries, the raising of  beef  cattle is being expanded in the tropical zones. 
Of  the five  countries, Guatemala and El Salvador have the smallest number of  cattle in relation 
to population, and both import animals, usually on the hoof,  from  Honduras and Nicaragua. Costa 
Rica, whose cattle population has shown important increases in recent years, has developed a surplus 
which it has been exporting by boat to South American and Caribbean countries. 
With respect to poultry, a recent venture in modern chicken farming,  for  which 1-day-old chicks 
are imported from  the United States, has met with great success in Costa Rica. 
The Fruit Plantations 
Aside from  coffee,  bananas are the principal export crop of  Central America. Bananas for  export 
are cultivated exclusively in the coastal areas on large plantations which have been established in 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica by United States capital. The principal grower is the United 
Fruit Co., which controls two plantations in Guatemala (one near the Pacific  and another near the 
Atlantic Ocean), three in Costa Rica (one on the Atlantic Ocean and two on the Pacific  coast), and 
a large one in Honduras near the Atlantic. The Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. has developed 
plantation areas in Guatemala and Honduras. No plantations have been established in El Salvador. 
In Nicaragua, banana plantations of  the Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. had to be abandoned 
because of  plant disease, and United Fruit Co. operations are of  minor importance. 
The fruit  companies play a vital role in the economies of  Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. 
They contribute importantly to foreign-exchange  earnings and Government revenue, employ and 
train large numbers of  workers, and have equipped previously undeveloped tropical areas with ports, 
railroads, schools, hospitals, and other community facilities. 
The impact of  the fruit  companies is most marked in Honduras, whose economically most active 
region, the Sula Valley, has developed around the plantations. In Guatemala and Costa Rica, on the 
other hand, the operations of  the companies have remained rather isolated, as the economies of  the 
two countries have maintained their center of  gravity in the highlands. However, in those countries, 
and particularly in Costa Rica, the pioneering efforts  of  the fruit  companies in the tropical lowlands 
are promoting the use of  these vast zones for  agriculture by local farmers. 
Because of  the complete lack of  facilities  in the regions where the plantations were established, 
the companies had to make substantial investments in communications, public utilities including 
transportation, and housing. 
The companies started their operations in Central America during the early part of  this century 
by means of  special long-term concession contracts with the National Governments involved. These 
contracts generally covered the subjects of  taxation, exemption from  import duties on equipment 
and supplies needed from  abroad, export duties, permission to operate internal communication 
systems and to establish police functions,  and similar matters. 
Recently a tendency has begun to replace these special concessions by general legislation, and 
the National Governments are gradually asserting their right to control basic functions,  such as 
police, schools, and hospitals. This process has gone farthest  in Costa Rica, which, in 1954, negotiated 
an increase, from  15 percent to 30, in the income-tax rate to which the United Fruit Co. is subject. 
The pattern set by this treaty has since been followed  in Honduras, and also in Guatemala after  a 
change in regime made possible an amicable settlement of  the many disputes that had been fostered, 
prior to 1954, by the Communist-influenced  governments then in power in that country. 
Plantation production of  bananas for  export has fluctuated  widely. Recent average annual 
production in Honduras has been 13 million stems, compared with 11 million in Costa Rica and 
7 million in Guatemala. The Honduran crop dropped sharply in 1954-1955, as a result of  the severe 
floods  which constitute only one of  the hazards to which banana production is exposed. Other even 
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more serious dangers are the sigatoka and Panama diseases, which have forced  the companies to 
undertake costly disease-control programs and, in exceptionally severe cases of  the Panama disease, 
to abandon whole areas already under cultivation. 
This latter development has contributed to a diversification  in the companies' activities which 
lately has become noticeable. As the Panama disease attacks only bananas, the companies have 
experimented on the abandoned lands with other plants, such as cacao and African  oil palm, with 
good success in both cases. Cacao growing has been particularly successful  in Costa Rica, where it 
has been taken up by many local farmers  with the help of  nursery stock and technical advice made 
available by the United Fruit Co. 
Since World War II, another activity of  the fruit  companies has been growing of  abacá, under 
contract with the United States Government, to provide an alternative source of  supply of  this raw 
material, which had been exclusively imported from  the Philippines. With the post-war recovery of 
the Philippines, the future  of  this crop is somewhat in doubt; however, acreage is being maintained. 
The fruit  companies also have pioneered in the raising of  large and high-quality cattle herds in the 
tropical lowlands. 
Opportunities in Agriculture 
The fruit  companies have proved that Central America presents numerous investment opportunities 
in agriculture. Still available are many areas in the tropical zones of  the Central American countries 
where fruit,  cacao, and oleaginous plants can be grown and where cattle can be raised. Such ventures 
require substantial outlays, much experience, and willingness to take considerable risk-although to 
a lesser extent than some decades ago. 
Each Central American country possesses vast areas that are at present largely unexploited and 
that appear promising for  future  agricultural development, particularly in view of  the highway 
development program. The Pacific  plains of  Guatemala and El Salvador have already been 
mentioned; in Guatemala, the huge territory of  the Petén and the Polochic Valley west of  Lake Izabal 
await development. 
In Honduras, the Aguán Valley in the northeast is considered by several observers to have great 
agricultural possibilities; in Nicaragua, the road that is being built from  Managua to Rama, a river 
port close to the Atlantic Ocean, will make it possible to test the large eastern part of  the country 
for  its agricultural potential. In Costa Rica, cattle raising and food  growing may be expanded 
considerably on the Nicoya Peninsula as well as in other sections of  the country outside of  the 
well-developed central plateau. 
Foreign capital might help also to develop certain types of  agricultural production which have 
been neglected in otherwise developed areas, for  example, the growing of  fruits  and vegetables of 
uniform  good quality for  both direct consumption and canning. A second investment possibility may 
well be the establishment of  efficient  dairy farming  for  the purpose of  producing quality butter and 
cheeses. 
United States has participated, to a very minor extent, in the Nicaraguan cotton boom. Possibly 
an opportunity exists for  the investment of  capital to expand cotton cultivation and finance  cotton 
gins, particularly in Costa Rica and Honduras, where cotton is not yet a significant  crop. There also 
appears to be a need for  modernization in the sugar industry. Finally, in spite of  the output of  the 
hard fiber  plantations of  Guatemala and El Salvador, Central America suffers  from  à deficit  of  hard 
fiber  for  its large requirements of  bags for  coffee,  sugar, and cotton. Probably the cultivation of  kenaf 
could be introduced successfully. 
In general, however, aside from  large-scale ventures in the undeveloped regions, the best 
possibilities in the agricultural field  appear to be in food  processing and food  marketing rather than 
in food  production. With respect to marketing, for  instance, the Central American capitals want to 
do away with the old-time public markets and adopt modern methods of  food  distribution, such as 
the supermarket. While developing ventures in food  processing and marketing, the foreign  investor 
may find  it necessary, of  course, to take a direct interest in growing the food  he is to process or 
market. 
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Finally, in spite of  its long coastlines on the Pacific  Ocean and Caribbean Sea, Central America 
has done little to exploit its fisheries.  This might be an excellent field  for  foreign  capital to enter with 
a view to establishing fish-freezing  and fish-canning  plants, particularly along the Pacific  Ocean. 
FORESTRY 
With the exception of  El Salvador, which is a net importer of  lumber, more than one-half  of  the 
territory of  the Central American countries is covered by forests.  In Honduras and Nicaragua 
lumbering, carried on mostly by foreign  companies, is of  considerable economic importance. The 
timber resources of  Central America are located principally on the slopes of  the mountains 
bordering the Caribbean Sea and in the valleys of  the rivers that flow  into the Atlantic Ocean. Many 
areas in this region are covered with tropical rain forests  which contain numerous valuable hardwood 
species but which are often  too heterogeneous and too difficult  of  access for  economic exploitation. 
Nevertheless, the mahogany and cedar trade has long been established in Nicaragua and Honduras. 
Customarily, operations are carried on beside the rivers, which are the only means of  communication 
and which are the only means of  communication and which are also used for  floating  the logs to the 
ports of  embarkation. 
Exports of  hardwood have become of  minor significance,  however, in comparison with the 
exploitation of  pine stands, which are found  in Honduras at elevations of  over 1 000 feet  and in 
northeastern Nicaragua at about sea level. This pine, which is of  a good, clean quality, is in great 
demand in the Caribbean region and the United States for  millwork. In Costa Rica, a tropical 
semihardwood tree, the cativo, has been exploited for  similar purposes. Data on Central America's 
lumber trade are shown in Table 1.9.15. 
Table 1.9.15 
CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE IN LUMBER, 1953 
(Quantity  in metric  tons; value in thousands  of  dollars) 
Exports Imports 
Country 
Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Guatemala 3 707 596 n.a. n.a. 
El Salvador 22 23 18 415 761 
Honduras 115 607 3 822 125 17 
Nicaragua 82372 3 942 159 59 
Costa Rica 17 488 234 2 296 299 
Total 219 196 8 617 20 995 1136 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of  the United Nations Informe  sobre los Recursos Forestales  y las Posibilidades 
de  Producción  de  Celulosa  y Papel  en Centroamérica,  1954 pages 216-223. 
n.a. Data not available. 
Forestry resources are subjected to serious waste in Central America because of  the practice of 
clearing lands for  cropping or pastures by means of  uncontrolled fires  and because of  the cutting 
practices of  many lumbering companies. All of  the countries have become aware of  the importance 
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of  preserving their forests  in the interest of  erosion and flood  control and have lately established 
forestry  legislation. A complete survey of  the five  countries' lumber resources was made under the 
auspices of  the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee. 
MINING 
The principal mineral products of  Central America are gold in Nicaragua, silver in Honduras, and 
small quantities of  lead in Guatemala. Substantial untapped deposits of  other minerals are believed 
to exist, however, and many mining claims are filed  by prospectors each year, particularly in 
Honduras and Nicaragua. 
A search for  petroleum deposits in Costa Rica by the Union Oil Co. of  California  was reported 
to have met with success in January of  1956. Geologists have been optimistic about the prospect of 
finding  oil in Guatemala, and after  that country issued in mid-1955 a petroleum law that was designed 
to attract foreign  capital, several oil companies started exploration activities. Explorations are also 
under way in Honduras. In view of  the large and steadily increasing amount of  foreign  exchange 
($21 million in 1953) which the five  countries spend for  gasoline and other petroleum products each 
year, the finding  of  petroleum deposits would be of  major economic significance  in the development 
of  Central America. 
MANUFACTURING 
On the whole, manufacturing  in Central America is little developed. According to the 1950 
population censuses, manufacturing  occupies only 11 to 12 percent Of  thé economically active 
population in the various countries, except in Honduras, where only 6 percent of  the people are 
employed in manufacturing.  The pattern of  industrialization has been similar in all five  countries, 
namely, manufacturing  has developed in connection with domestic output of  certain agricultural 
commodities which must be processed before  they can be marketed. For example, all of  the countries 
have coffee  mills and sugar refineries,  and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua have established 
a number of  cotton gins. Similarly, tanneries and sawmills have been established to process locally 
available hides and timber. 
Other industries have developed as a result of  high transportation costs for  the imported products. 
In this category are beer, soft  drinks, and construction materials, such as bricks and cement blocks 
and, in some countries, cement itself.  Consumer goods industries that have grown up because of  the 
protection afforded  by customs duties or because of  the low cost of  local labor and other factors 
include textiles, the garment and shoe industries, cigarettes and matches, furniture,  and 
pharmaceuticals. 
This is approximately the extent of  industrialization in Central America, manufacturing  having 
been handicapped by transportation difficulties  and electric power shortages and by the smallness 
of  the individual national markets. Moreover, all of  the countries, except Costa Rica, have suffered 
because of  the lack of  primary education for  their people, despite the fact  that, in general, the local 
workers have been found  to be intelligent and relatively easy to train for  industrial employment. 
Available information  about each country's industry has been increased considerably with the 
industrial censuses which have been conducted since 1950. Unfortunately  the definitions  and 
coverage of  the censuses have varied so widely from  country to country that comparisons would be 
hazardous.3 For this reason, no attempt is made here to compare or total the industrial 
establishments of  the five  countries according to such characteristics as number of  firms  or workers, 
or gross or net value of  production. 
3For instance, the Guatemalan census covered all industrial establishments with three or more workers; the 
Salvadoran covered all whose annual production exceeded the value of  1 000 colones; and the Honduran covered 
establishments with five  or more workers. Nicaragua conducts an annual survey of  its principal industrial establishments. 
The Costa Rican census attempted to cover all establishments irrespective of  the number of  their workers or the value of 
their productrion. 
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A few  generalizations may be made, however, with respect to the comparative development of 
industry in each of  the five  countries. There is little doubt, for  instance, that industry is least 
developed in Honduras, where the official  development institute had to promote the establishment 
of  such elementary facilities  as coffee  and rice mills, which, in the other countries, have long been 
financed  by private capital. El Salvador, on the other hand, has the most advanced industrialization, 
probably largely because of  population pressures. 
Costa Rica is most noteworthy for  its progress in food  processing, and Nicaragua for  the rapid 
strides made recently, particularly in various industries that process cotton and its byproducts. 
Guatemala's industrial development has been hampered by the reluctance of  investors to commit 
new funds  during the years prior to the change in regime in 1954, but it may now be expected to 
gather new impetus. 
The location of  industry is preponderantly in and around the capitals. There are exceptions, 
however. In Honduras some of  the larger factories  have been established in San Pedro Sula rather 
than in Tegucigalpa, primarily because of  the better transportation and electric power facilities  in 
the former  city. In Guatemala, the town of  Quezaltenango is important as a textile center. Santa Ana 
and San Miguel in El Salvador and León and Granada in Nicaragua are secondary industrial centers. 
Virtually all of  Costa Rica's industry is concentrated on the central plateau, but some firms  are 
located in the Provinces of  Alajuela, Cartago, and Heredia rather than in or immediately around 
the capital. 
Development of  Specific  Industries 
A basic area for  industrialization in any country is the processing of  locally grown foodstuffs  and 
agricultural raw materials. The traditional Central American industrial establishments in this field 
are coffee,  sugar, and rice mills, soap factories  using locally available fats  and oils, and bag factories 
using the henequen fiber.  Interesting advances have been made in recent years through the expansion 
or establishment of  vegetable oil and margarine factories. 
All five  capitals today have milk-pasteurizing plants, developed for  the most part as the result of 
cooperatives formed  by the dairy farmers.  Powdered-milk plants also have been established, often 
with the help of  the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The dairy 
industry is most highly developed in Costa Rica, and Nicaragua is currently making significant  efforts 
in the same field  under the auspices of  its National Development Institute (Instituto Nacional de 
Fomento). 
Food canning is almost nonexistent, except for  two small establishments in Costa Rica. However, 
the production of  concentrates for  the feeding  of  animals (mostly cattle and chickens) has made 
great progress in recent years, frequently  with help from  the official  development institutes. In El 
Salvador, a soluble coffee  plant is being established as a joint United States-Salvadoran venture. A 
similar plant is being planned in Guatemala. 
The beverage industry is probably the most fully  developed in Central America. Each country 
has one or several breweries which satisfy  domestic consumption, and many soft-drink  and bottling 
plants. All of  the countries also have a liquor industry which, in spite of  the generally poor quality 
of  the product, makes an important contribution to fiscal  revenues, either through heavy 
consumption taxes or because it is run as a Government monopoly. 
Another industry which virtually satisfies  domestic consumption is the cigarette and cigar 
industry. Cigars are produced in many small establishments, but each country has only one or at 
most two cigarette factories.  Firms controlled by the British-American Tobacco Co. account for 
most of  the output. 
In contrast with the beverage and tobacco industries, the growth of  the textile industry has been 
slow and the industry is far  from  covering the area's needs, as is shown by the high value of  piece 
goods imports in all five  countries. El Salvador has the largest capacity and the production of  its 
cotton mills covers a relatively wide range of  materials; nevertheless, its industry is in need of 
modernization. Nicaragua has recently acquired a large textile factory  through purchase of  a cotton 
textile mill, as a unit, in the United States. In general, the textile plants produce cotton cloth of  low 
91 
and medium quality, such as work cloth, bagging, and similar materials. Ample opportunities exist 
for  the production of  finer  materials and for  the introduction of  artificial  fibers,  such as rayon. 
The apparel and shoe industries are relatively well developed, but traditionally they have been 
operated on a small scale. This was particularly true of  the shoe industry, whose output was almost 
totally produced in artisan shops. Today, however, mechanized shoe factories  exist in several of  the 
countries, and a fairly  large one with a capacity of  up to 1,000 pairs of  shoes per day has recently 
been established in El Salvador with technical and some financial  assistance for  a United States shoe 
concern. There is a large future  market for  shoes in all of  the Central American countries, since a 
sizable percentage of  the people still go barefoot. 
Cement manufacture  is the heaviest industry thus far  introduced into Central America. 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua have their own cement factories  and all three have been 
expanding their capacities. In Honduras and Costa Rica the advisability of  establishing cement 
factories  has been under study. In the meantime, it appears probable that Nicaragua's plant, as a 
result of  its recent expansion, will have a capacity in excess of  its domestic market so that it may be 
able to supply part of  the needs of  its two neighbors. 
Among the woodworking industries, all of  the countries have a number of  sawmills of  varying 
sizes. Wooden furniture  is also produced throughout Central America, for  the most part in small 
establishments. Two plywood factories  were established recently, one in the Lake Izabal region in 
Guatemala and the other at Puerto Castilla in Honduras. The output of  these factories  is in part 
exported to Cuba and other Caribbean islands. 
The chemical industry is not highly developed. In addition to soap and candles, each country 
produces matches and several have mixing plants for  fertilizers.  Pharmaceutical laboratories have 
been established successfully  in several countries. 
An important industrial activity is the servicing and repairing of  tractors, trucks, cars, and other 
imported mechanical and electrical equipment. In addition, the shops engaged in this activity are 
regular training centers for  mechanics and electricians, and thereby fulfill  an important general need. 
Of  particular significance  in this field  is the aircraft  repair and maintenance enterprise, SALA, 
established in Costa Rica. 
Investment Opportunities 
Industrialization in an area such as Central America has many promising possibilities, but there are 
many pitfalls  which can be avoided only by careful  advance planning that takes into account all of 
the relevant technical, economic, and financial  factors.  Several recent unsuccessful,  or only partly 
successful,  ventures have emphasized the need for  such planning. 
The most promising investment opportunities in manufacturing  in Central America, under 
conditions of  independent industrial development of  each country, appear to be in food  processing, 
textiles, cement (in Honduras and Costa Rica), and simple chemicals, as well as in some of  the other 
industries which have been reviewed. Possibly also there is sufficient  demand in some of  the countries 
to warrant the initiation of  metalworking industries. Much progress can also be made in the 
construction materials industries. It maybe expected that the Central American Research Institute 
for  Industry, being established in Guatemala City, will develop a "shelf'  of  industrial projects suitable 
for  exploitation by private investors. 
A much greater scope for  industrialization exists if  the five  countries could be considered as one 
unit. In view of  the free  trade treaties presently in force  between El Salvador and the other four 
countries, some industries that would be set up in El Salvador would automatically enjoy free  access 
to all of  Central America. With freedom  from  customs duties and other artificial  obstacles, many 
industries could be established which at present are precluded because of  the small size of  each 
individual country's market. Among such industries are glass, tires, paints and varnishes, and various 
chemicals and the assembling of  cars, trucks, and appliances. The first  project for  a joint Central 
American venture in the industrial field  involves the setting up of  a pulp and paper factory  in 
Honduras. 
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CHAPTER IV National Economic Policies 
GENERAL ECONOMIC PLANNING 
In line with a worldwide trend, the Governments of  the Central American Republics have 
increasingly felt  that they have important responsibilities in promoting the economic development 
of  their countries. In addition to encouraging private investment, both domestic and foreign,  through 
fiscal  and monetary policies in general as well as through specific  incentive legislation, they have 
been undertaking or sponsoring investment in transportation, electric power, certain types of 
banking, low-cost housing, and other economic activities where private initiative is lagging. 
In the course of  undertaking these activities, some of  the Governments have become convinced 
that they needed a general economic planning committee which, at the highest governmental level, 
would see to it that official  programs and policies are properly coordinated, that appropriate 
priorities are assigned to the various public works and other investment projects, and that the total 
development program can be financed  without inflationary  consequences. 
The International Bank for  Reconstruction and Development has taken a particular interest in 
the establishment of  such general planning bodies and has stationed representatives -who also act 
as advisors to these committees-in the three countries in which they have been created, namely, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The committees are composed of  the Cabinet Ministers 
dealing most prominently with economic affairs  -the Ministers of  Finance, Economy, Public Works, 
and Agriculture. The presidents of  the central banks and the development ^ institutes or banks 
generally are members also. 
Costa Rica, where economic policy thus far  has been formulated  primarily in the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy, is also reported to be considering the establishment of  a general economic 
planning committee. In El Salvador important measures of  economic policy are customarily 
prepared by, or discussed with, the Minister of  Economy. Similarly, in Nicaragua the Minister of 
Economy exerts significant  influence  in the making of  economic policy, since the Planning 
Committee does not appear to be active. 
In several countries, the central banks exercise great influence  on economic polices, both because 
of  their specific  powers in the fields  of  money and credit and because they generally provide qualified 
personnel, as well as excellent information  about the national economy. 
SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTES 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua have created special agencies whose task is to promote and 
finance  agricultural and industrial development. These development institutes generally have a 
banking section which makes credit available in certain fields  inadequately covered by existing 
banking institutions; in addition, however, they are empowered to invest directly in agricultural and 
industrial projects of  particular interest to the national economy. 
The Guatemalan institute (Instituto de Fomento de la Producción, or INFOP) has confined  itself 
almost entirely to credit activities. The Honduran agency (Banco Nacional de Fomento) has financed 
small but important projects in the field  of  food  storage and processing, such as grain silos and coffee 
and rice mills. It has attempted to interest private capital in the establishment of  plants for 
pasteurizing milk and for  mixing animal feed.  Currently of  greatest interest to the Banco Nacional 
is a project involving the establishment of  a cement factory. 
The Nicaraguan institute (Instituto de Fomento Nacional), founded  in 1953, has been more active 
than either the Guatemalan or the Honduran agencies in the promotion of  agricultural and industrial 
projects. It has drawn up complete plans for  expansion and modernization of  the vegetable-oil, dairy, 
and soap industries, for  the construction of  a modern slaughterhouse, and for  the importation of 
quality cattle, and has been active in several other fields.  As a result of  detailed planning of  useful 
projects, it has been able to obtain for  some of  the projects the financial  assistance of  the 
International Bank for  Reconstruction and Development. 
In El Salvador, the establishment of  a development institute has long been under consideration, 
and in December 1955 the Congress passed a bill providing for  the organization of  such an institute 
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(Instituto Salvadoreño de Fomento de la Producción). Despite the lack of  such an agency, El 
Salvador has been fortunate  in having a group of  enterprising investors who are actively searching 
for,  and stand ready to finance,  new and promising ventures in agriculture and industry. 
The Costa Rican Government thus far  has found  it unnecessary to establish a development 
institute for  industry because of  the close cooperation that exists between the nationalized banking 
system and the Industry Section of  the Ministry of  Agriculture and Industry. In agriculture, Costa 
Rica has set up a very powerful  agency called the National Production Council (Consejo Nacional 
de la Producción). The original and still principal function  of  the Council is the prevention of  undue 
fluctuations  in farm  prices and, to fulfill  this function,  it has undertaken many activities in food 
storage, processing, and distribution. Operations of  the Council have contributed much to the 
increase in basic food  crops, which has been one of  the salient features  of  Costa Rican economic 
development in recent years. 
On the whole, the development institutes have served a useful  purpose. They have not interfered 
with private investment, but have supplemented and stimulated it. The principal criticism leveled at 
them is not that they have done too much, but rather that they have not fully  justified  the hopes 
placed in them. This inadequacy has been due in large part to the difficulty  of  assembling in each 
country a competent staff  of  engineers, agronomists,and economists able to develop and plan in 
detail individual investment projects. In this respect, the establishment in Guatemala of  a joint 
Central American Research Institute for  Industry may prove of  great usefulness  since, with its 
projected staff  of  United Nations experts, it may act as a common research center for  the national 
institutes. 
OTHER ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
The extent to which the Central American Governments operate directly in certain branches of  the 
economy has been increasing in recent years. In general, however, the Governments have confined 
such operations to well-defined  areas where private initiative was lacking, and have attempted to 
carry out their new responsibilities through specially created autonomous agencies whose 
management would be removed from  day-to-day politics. 
The Government's responsibility for  developing and maintaining an adequate transportation and 
communications system is recognized today throughout Central America. Construction and 
maintenance of  highways are placed under the authority of  the Ministries of  Public Works. Railways, 
on the other hand, are owned and operated to a large extent by the foreign  companies which built 
them. Guatemala's, El Salvador's, and Honduras' railway systems are almost entirely under private 
management. Of  Costa Rica's two railways, one is operated privately and the other by the 
Government. Only Nicaragua's railway system is entirely under Government control. Since the ports 
are generally operated by the railroads, a large number of  them are under private administration. 
Domestic air transport is another field  in which Government participation varies from  country 
to country. In Guatemala, the Government-owned Aviateca has a monopoly (as has the Nicaraguan 
line, La Nica, in Nicaragua) in which the Government has a 20-percent interest. In Costa Rica and 
Honduras, the Governments have an interest in one of  several existing companies providing domestic 
air transport. In all five  countries, postal and domestic telegraph and telephone facilities  are publicly 
owned and operated. 
An important field  in which the Governments have taken an increasingly active interest is electric 
power. The larger hydroelectric developments in El Salvador and Costa Rica are being carried out 
by public electric power development commissions, but distribution of  the power is handled by 
private firms.  The development of  the Río Lindo project in Honduras will probably also be 
undertaken by the Government, and in Nicaragua the principal power company has long been 
publicly owned. Guatemala is the only country in which the larger part of  power development 
continues to be handled by the dominant private power firm,  which is a subsidiary of  the American 
and Foreign Power Co. 
The important role played by all five  Governments in the banking structure has already been 
mentioned. In all of  the countries except El Salvador the central banks are public institutions, and 
in all except Honduras Government owned or sponsored commercial or mortgage banks have long 
been the most important single lenders. Costa Rica, however, took the most spectacular step in this 
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ñeld by nationalizing its entire banking system in 1948. This nationalization applied to three 
commercial banks whose stockholders were indemnified  through the issuance of  7-percent bonds 
in lieu of  their shares. The nationalized banks have separate boards of  directors whose members are 
appointed for  fixed  terms. Insurance also has been nationalized in Costa Rica since 1924. 
The increasing responsibilities of  the Governments for  social welfare  have resulted in the 
establishment of  low-cost housing institutes in two of  the countries-El Salvador, where the housing 
problem is particularly acute, and Costa Rica. In Guatemala, the INFOP has financed  one low-cost 
housing development. 
As a result of  the expropriation of  the property of  German nationals during World War II, the 
Guatemalan Government owns and operates extensive areas of  rich farmland  on which about 
one-third of  the country's coffee  and sugar crops are grown. 
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Chapter II 
UNITED STATES - CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMERCIAL 
RELATIONS 
Documents in this chapter recount the inception, maturation and termination of  trade agreements 
between the United States and Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
A. THE RISE OF RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
1. EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES WITH HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA (1934) 
From: Study of  the Foreign Commerce of  Honduras with Special Reference  to the Possibility of 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements; Memorandum, Department of  State; February 15, 1934; 
A/FU 611.1531/6; Central Decimal Files 1930-39, Record Group 59; National Archives and 
Records Administration. 
MEMORANDUM 
A careful  study has been made of  the foreign  commerce of  the Republics of  Honduras and 
Guatemala with special reference  to the possibility of  a reciprocal trade treaty between each 
of  those countries and the United States. 
Both Honduras and Guatemala are agricultural countries. They have had very little 
industrial development, and their population is to a great extent primitive in their needs and 
ways of  living. Both countries grow corn and other grains which are, with beans, the basic food 
of  the native population. Cattle raising is also engaged in on a fairly  large scale and supplies 
beef  for  food,  and from  the by-products are made shoes and various other leather goods, 
candles, etc. Because of  climatic conditions, however, the native does not engage as extensively 
in hog raising, and in the past there has been a substantial movement of  lard, nams and bacon 
from  the United States to these two countries. 
While the native production supplies the food  demands of  the lower class native for  the 
most part, this is not true of  the foreigners  and upper classes. For this reason, there is a 
substantial importation of  numerous American food  products, both manufactured  and 
unmanufactured.  See statement attached to this memorandum, showing the exports of  the 
United States to Guatemala and Honduras during the year 1932 (see Table II.l.l). 
An examination of  the exports of  the United States to Guatemala and Honduras also shows 
that these two countries import practically everything that they need of  a manufactured  nature. 
As indicated above, with the exception of  some shoe and textile manufacturing,  a couple of 
breweries and the mining and newspaper enterprises, there is next to no industrial 
developments in these two countries. Whatever is done is pursued on a small scale and the 
materials, such as machine parts and all sorts of  chemicals, are imported from  abroad. 
On the other hand, the economic structure of  these two countries is based practically on 
two agricultural products -bananas and coffee,  the former  being by far  the more important 
commodity in Honduras and coffee  occupying the same position in Guatemala. Both of  these 
commodities are admitted into the United States free  of  duty. Obviously, they cannot be grown 
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in this country and can be said to compete only very remotely with home grown products. In 
addition, Honduras and Guatemala have available for  export coconuts, cacao, mica, chicle, 
mahogany and other hard woods, and some castor oil and indigo. None of  these products is 
found  or can be grown in the United States, and therefore  admitting them freely  to the extent 
of  American needs would impose no burden on local industry. The two countries also produce 
a substantial amount of  gold and silver, the importation of  which it may or may not be desirable 
to foster  depending on future  monetary policies. 
The question arises as to what kind of  a reciprocal trade treaty these two countries could 
make with the United States in view of  the kind of  commerce above outlined. It seems that 
the treaty should provide for  the free  importation into the United States of  the coffee  and 
bananas of  these two countries without any restriction as to quantity, and if  possible, of  some 
of  the secondary products also. Probably Honduras and Guatemala would be satisfied  with 
the free  importation of  coffee  and bananas only. On the other hand, as regards the exports of 
the United States to Honduras and Guatemala, it would seem that for  the United States to be 
assured of  any benefit  from  the treaty it must be given a percentage based on the proportion 
of  the exports of  these two countries which are sent to the United States. Ordinarily, in recent 
years Honduras has imported more from  the United States than it exported to the same 
country. For instance, in 1932-33,73.88% of  the imports into Honduras came from  the United 
States whereas only 67.74% of  the exports went to that country. Total imports amounted to 
$5,957,931.99, of  which the United States secured $4,644,491.64. The total exports amounted 
to 23,409,494.61 lempiras,  of  which the United States accounted for  19 342 594.43. For 
Guatemala, the total exports in 1932 were $10,660,735, of  which $3,971,123, or less than 40%, 
went to the United States. The total imports amounted to $5,768,070, of  which $2,980,402, or 
over 50%, came from  the United States. A percentage arrangement would, therefore,  not 
disturb existing commercial arrangements to any extent but would rather preserve to the 
United States its hold in these two markets. In fact,  there is good reason to believe that the 
United States should be able to extend its markets in these two countries because they will 
need to import all kinds of  manufactured  and semi-manufactured  products as they gradually 
develop industrially, and there is no reason why all these demands cannot be satisfactorily 
taken care of  with United States products. 
Honduras and Guatemala are dependent for  financing  their Governments to a great extent 
on customs revenues. For this reason they cannot stand any general reduction in customs 
duties. This applies especially to all sorts of  manufactured  and semi-manufactured  industrial 
products. On the other hand, in recent years there has been some indiscriminate raising of 
customs duties on food  products, both manufactured  and unmanufactured,  which, in fact,  do 
not seem to have served their purpose of  increasing revenues. These indiscriminate duties 
might be levelled off  in the proposed trade treaty. To be specific,  some reduction should be 
sought in the customs duty for  importing such items as lard, ham, bacon, eggs (Honduras), 
flour,  corn and wheat breakfast  foods,  canned fruits  and vegetables, butter, condensed and 
evaporated milk, milk powders and other infants'  foods,  ana fresh  fruits  such as apples and 
grapes. It is certain that with lower duties the importation of  these products from  the 
United States would be increased considerably and that the revenues from  the Government 
from  these sources would be increased. On the other hand, these reductions in duty would 
mean a more comfortable  and less expensive living for  the foreign  and upper class portion of 
the population, and would thus constitute a factor  in encouraging further  development and 
investment by foreigners,  the effect  of  which can only be appreciated by those who have lived 
in these countries. 
Summarizing, it would seem feasible  and desirable to negotiate reciprocal trade treaties 
between the United States and the Republic of  Guatemala and Honduras respectively 
providing for: 
1. The free  importation into the United States of  bananas and coffee  from  these two countries, 
and such miscellaneous products as cacao, coconuts, gold, mica, mahogany and hard woods, 
chicle, castor oil, indigo, etc., as maybe agreed upon. 
2. The allocation to the United States of  a definite  percentage of  the total imports into these 
countries based on the percentage taken by the United States of  their exports. 
3. A reduction in the customs duties of  certain manufactured  and unmanufactured  food 
products as explained in the memorandum. 
4. A period of  ten years with right to either party to terminate on one year's notice. 
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Table II.l.l 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPAL ARTICLES EXPORTED BY UNITED STATES TO THE 
REPUBLICS OF GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1932 
Total domestic exports 
Total foreign  exports 
Exports According to Principal Classification 
00 - Animals & animal products, edible 
0 - Animals & animal products, inedible (except wool & hair) 
1 - Vegetable food  products & beverages 
2 - Other vegetable products, except fibres  & wood 
3 - Textiles 
4 - Wood & paper 
5 - Non-metallic minerals 
6 - Metals & manufactures,  except machinery & vehicles 
7 - Machinery & vehicles 
8 - Chemicals & related products 
9 - Miscellaneous 
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188 691. 444 502. 
276094. 484496. 
188 385. 432251. 





1 035 511. 
655 631. 







STATEMENT OF IMPORTS FROM REPUBLICS OF GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS 
DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1932 
Guatemala Honduras 
Free Dutiable Free Dutiable 
00 - Animals & animal products, edible - - - 6. 
0 - Animals & animal products, 
inedible (except wool & hair) 1819. 7135. 2 883, 295. 
1-Vegetable food  products & beverages 4417931. 598. 8 720484, 111855. 
2 - Other vegetable products, 
except fibres  & wood 470. 48. 9787. 1422. 
3-Textiles 160. 153. 
4 - Wood & paper 14410, 493. 40. 1866. 
5 - Non-metallic minerals - - - 70. 
6 - Metals & manufactures,  except machinery & vehicles - 22. - 48. 
7-Machinery & vehicles - 100. 200. 70. 
8 - Chemicals & related products - - - -
9-Miscellaneous 58 045. 15. 155 185. 50. 
Domestic Imports by Economic Classes 
Crude materials 11722. 7173. 12710. 1717. 
Crude foodstuffs  4 417931. - 8 720484. 102 246. 
Manufactured  foodstuffs  - 598. - 9 615. 
Semi-manufactures  4 667. 485. - 1887. 
Finished manufactures  58515. 308. 155 385. 217. 
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2. TARIFFS AND ORIGIN OF IMPORTS IN COSTA RICA (1934) 
From: Proposed Commercial Treaty; Despatch No. 348 from  Legation of  the United States of 
America, San José, Costa Rica to Secretary of  State, Washington; July 24,1934; 611.1831/22 
A/FU 
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
San José, Costa Rica 
July 24,1934 
PROPOSED COMMERCIAL TREATY 
The Honorable 
The Secretary of  State 
Washington 
Sir: 
Supplementing my Despatch No. 345 of  yesterday, I have the honor to transmit herewith a 
detailed 1/ memorandum prepared by the American Consulate in San José covering the 
principal products exported by the United States to Costa Rica, and from  it, it will be seen that 
the United States dominates the Costa Rican market in most important categories despite 
prevailing high duties. The products are classified  with a view of  determining the feasibility 
and desirability of  obtaining tariff  concessions thereon in the event a new commercial 
agreement between the two countries can be negotiated. 
It will be noted that a number of  the most important items in United States exports to Costa 
Rica conflict  with this Government's protection policy for  local agriculture and industry, 
whereas in the case of  other items reductions in existing tariffs  might conceivably benefit 
exportations from  other countries (with most-favored-nation  treaties with Costa Rica) more 
than those from  the United States. On a number of  other items, which the United States largely 
supplies to this country, existing import duties can scarcely with justice be qualified  as high 
enough to restrict their market in Costa Rica. There thus remains a fairly  narrow range of 
articles on which tariff  reductions might possibly result in expanded sales for  American 
exporters and which the Costa Rican Government might feel  disposed to grant. The most 
important of  these items have been indicated in the Consulate's memorandum attached hereto. 
In my opinion the prevailing tariffs  on flour,  canned foodstuffs  and fats  are too high and a 
reduction therein would stimulate United States exports with a corresponding increase in 
Costa Rican revenues, but such a reduction collides head-on with the traditional protective 
tariff  policy of  the Government. In this same connection, I am enclosing a copy of  a letter 
dated March 24,1934, prepared at my request by Mr. T. P. Jamieson, Manager of  the Agenda 
Unidas (Otis, McAllister & Company, of  San Francisco), and which embodies his ideas on 
possible tariff  reductions that might assist the United States in increasing sales in Costa Rica. 
In connection with Foreign Minister Gurdian's statement in his letter to me (enclosed with 
my despatch of  yesterday) regarding the heavy balance in favor  of  the United States on 
foreign  trade between Costa Rica and the United States during the five-year  period 1929-1933, 
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it is pointed out that most of  that balance in favor  of  the United States was the result of  one 
year, 1929, and that for  the past two calendar years, 1932 and 1933, the trade balance has been 
in favor  of  Costa Rica. In 1932, the United States purchased 014 750 640 (04.40) from  Costa 
Rica and sold 012 644 257, whereas in 1933, the figures  were 016 785 062 and 013 773 560 
(04.55), respectively. 
May I take this opportunity of  commending to the Department Consul Holler and Vice 
Consul Satterthwaite for  their rapid and excellent compliance with the Department's telegram 
No. 29 of  July 20,1934. 
Respectfully  yours, 
(signed) 
Leo R. Sackl 
Enclosure: 
1. Memorandum by Consulate 
631 
LRS-EGT/82 
•Letter not reproduced here, as it was not found  with the original document. 
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AMERICAN CONSULATE 
San José, Costa Rica, July 23,1934 
MEMORANDUM FOR LEGATION 
(In compliance with the Department's telegram of  July 20,1934, to the American Legation, 
San José.) 
In compiling the lists below, only articles were taken the imports of  which are supplied over 
50% by the United States and in quantities of  over 25,000 colones per annum, unless it is 
believed that the article could be imported in larger quantities if  the duties were lowered. 
The articles are divided into four  headings as follows:* 
1. Articles not produced in Costa Rica and imported largely from  the United States. 
2. Articles which are imported largely from  the United States, but which are produced in 
Costa Rica. 
3. Articles imported largely from  the United States which are not produced in Costa Rica and 
used in Costa Rican industry, as raw or semi-raw materials. (This is a sub-division of 
Section 1.) 
4. Articles imported largely from  the United States, some either produced in Costa Rica or 
competing with Costa Rican products, which on account of  high duties, increase the price 
of  the product to the consumer greatly. 
5. List of  articles taken from  the other lists, on which it is believed there is the greatest 
possibility of  securing reductions in the tariff. 
It should be remembered at the outset, that the Custom Revenues are about 50% of  the 
total revenues of  the Costa Rican Government, and should they be reduced, some other 
method of  securing revenue would have to be found. 
(signed) 
John E. Holler 
American Consul 
1. Original and four  copies sent to mission 
630. 
LS/ML 
*Thc material in Sections 1 and 2 of  this document was condensed into two tables, which are 
located in the Statistical Appendix. References  to import volume and import tariffs  have been excluded. 
Sections 3 and 4 follow,  and have also been abridged. 
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Section 3: ARTICLES WHICH ARE USED IN COSTA RICA INDUSTRY AND NOT 
MANUFACTURED LOCALLY 
(For  19314.00 colones equal $1.00; for  1932 4.40 colones equal $1.00; and for  1933 4.55 colones 
equal $1.00) 
Table II.2.1 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF BOTTLES, 1931 
















Total 20520.40 35 515 500 
The high duties on bottles of  all kinds, added to the high freight  rates, make them expensive to 
the bottlers, druggists, soft  drink manufacturers  and others. Since almost all of  the bottles imported 
into Costa Rica are used in local industries of  one kind or another, and since there is no local 
production, it is believed that the duty on them could be lowered to the benefit  of  Costa Rican 
Industry and exports from  the United States. 
Table II.2.2 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF PARAFFIN, 1933 










1 295 831 000 
223 000 
10 025 000 
Total 524 039.00 1 306 487 000 
Paraffin  is also used in local industries, principally soap and candle manufacturing,  both of  which 
are relatively important locally. It is the opinion of  this office  that the soap and candle manufacturing 
industries could expand considerably if  paraffin  were placed on the free  list. This would, of  course, 
mean larger imports of  this article from  the United States. 
Table II.2.3 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF ROSIN, 1932 



















Total 50239.00 191218 000 
Rosin is used in various local industries such as soap making, which could be expanded with lower 
or no import duties. 
Table II.2.4 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF TALLOW, 1931 



















The same remarks apply to tallow as to paraffin. 
Table II .2.5 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF MPORTS OF METAL BOTTLE TOPS, 1931 



















19 713 400 
7 200 
5000 
Total 31270.46 22 478 800 
The margin of  profit  in the soft  drink business is small. The Consulate believes that a reduction 
or abolition of  the duty on metal bottle tops would expand United States exports of  them to Costa 
Rica considerably. 
The Beer Industry also uses large quantities of  bottle tops. Both the soft  drink and beer industry 
is protected by high tariffs,  and it may be that the protection could extend to include a reduction of 
the duties in necessary materials and supplies. 
Table II.2.6 









Weight in kg 
10 691900 
700 
10 692 600 
The remarks made about bottle tops also apply to rubber heels and soles, which are used in the 
highly protected shoe industry. 
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Section 4: ARTICLES IMPORTED LARGELY FROM THE UNITED STATES, SOME 
EITHER PRODUCED IN COSTA RICA OR COMPETING WITH COSTA RICAN 
PRODUCTS, WHICH ON ACCOUNT OF HIGH DUTIES, INCREASE THE PRICE OF 
THE PRODUCT TO THE CONSUMER GREATLY 
(For  1931, 4.00 colones equal $1.00; for  1932, 4.40 colones equal $1.00; and for  1933, 4.55 colones 
equal $1.00) 
Table II.2.7 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF WHEAT FLOUR, 1933 
Origin Value in Colones Weight in kg 
Germany 124.00 185 000 
Canada 46 161.00 214 036 000 
Spain 36.00 65 000 
United States 1935317.00 8 364 688200 
Panama 9166.00 15274 700 
Peru 24.00 82000 
Total 1990828.00 8 594330 900 
Wheat is not grown in Costa Rica in spite of  the heavy duty on flour,  for  the simple reason that 
there is no land available for  the economical production of  it. Nevertheless, while the duties are 
admittedly of  a protective nature, they constitute such an important source of  revenue to the 
Government that in all probability it would be necessary to prove to the Government that a reduction 
in duties would increase the use of  wheat flour  to such an extent that the net revenue would not 
suffer.  It is the opinion of  the consulate that the Government by imposing high duties on wheat 
hopes to wean the people away from  wheat to various food  products grown in the country. The 
traditional food  of  the poor people has been rice, beans, and corn tortillas, all of  which are native. 
For these two reasons, it is doubted greatly whether the Costa Rica Government would be willing 
to lower the duty on wheat flour. 
Table II.2.8 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF LARD, 1933 
Origin Value in Colones Weight in kg 
Belgium 7 155.00 10 920 000 
United States 1083 759.00 1 473 369000 
Holland 61609.00 89254 000 
Panama 492.00 220 900 
Total 1153 015.00 1 573 763 900 
For years the Costa Rican Government has been attempting to foster  the production of  native 
lard, but even with the high duties now in force,  considerable quantities of  foreign,  (United States), 
lard are imported. While it is quite apparent that from  a purely economical point of  view, lard can 
be produced much more cheaply in other countries more suited to the growing of  hogs, where corn 
is cheaper and other conditions are more favorable,  it is doubted whether the Costa Rican 
Government could be persuaded to lower the duties on lard. 
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The high duties on evaporated and condensed milk, except those types which are for  babies which 
are free  of  duty, are to protect the native dairy industry, and quite probably the Costa Rica 
Government would not be willing to lower them. There are many sections of  the country, in fact 
most of  it, where fresh  milk is often  impossible to obtain. In these sections the children suffer  from 
the shortage, and the duties on canned milk are so high as to put it out of  reach of  most of  the 
population. It is quite possible that some arrangement could be made to admit canned milk free  of 
duty or at lower duties for  use in the sections where fresh  milk is difficult  or impossible to obtain. 
Table II.2.9 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF EVAPORATED AND CONDENSED MILK, 1932 
Origin Value in Colones Weight in kg 
Germany 1651.00 2036000 
Denmark 13 960.00 19927000 
United States 81 569.00 74112000 
Holland 6852.00 9316000 
England 1 742.00 2509000 
Norway 712.00 1022000 
Panama 6361.75 4888500 
Other countries 34.13 32000 
Total 112 827.88 113 842 500 
Table II.2 10 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF OATMEAL, 1932 
Origin Value in Colones Weight in kg 
Germany 2081.00 2 840 000 
United States 68 365.00 112255 900 
Holland 2147.00 3 105 000 
England 5 589.00 8341400 
Panama 522.83 398880 
Other countries 15.40 24000 
Total 78 720.23 126 965100 
Table II .2.11 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF CANNED FOODSTUFFS (No date given)* 
Origin Value in Colones Weight in kg 
854 000 
























China 3 363.00 
Denmark 1047.00 
Spain 1698,00 









Panama 5 016.11 
Switzerland 97.00 
Other countries 58.03 
Total 56 498.14 
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There is no canning industry in Costa Rica, but canned foodstuffs  are considered to compete with 
native fresh  foods,  for  which reason the tremendously high duties are assessed. In addition, there 
is a feeling  that only the rich use them, who can afford  the high prices the duties necessitate. This 
of  course, increases the revenue of  the Government. While a decrease in the duties would benefit 
both the Costa Rican consumer and the American exporter, for  the reasons mentioned, it is doubted 
whether the Government would be willing to lower the duties. The Consulate is preparing a list of 
canned goods which do not directly compete with native Costa Rican products, which will be 
forwarded  as soon as possible. It may be that a reduction could be affected  on some of  these. 
According to many, however, food  competes with other food,  even if  the particular kind does not 
compete with the same kind. That is, a can of  pickled onion, not produced here, competes with fresh 
onions which are grown here. 
Table II.2.12 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF CANDIES, 1932 
Origin Value in Colones Weight in kg 
Germany 1934.00 696.200 
Canada 1820.00 544 600 
Cuba 3.00 4200 






25 917 100 
France 1802.00 936 500 
Guatemala 6.00 5 500 
Holland 843.00 309 900 
Honduras 5.00 1000 
England 6 707.00 4292200 
Italy 3 683.00 1421400 
Jamaica 48.00 14800 
Nicaragua 3.00 1800 
Panama 468.41 88000 
Switzerland 625.00 140600 
Venezuela 13.00 3200 
Other countries 222.60 96250 
Total 91263.01 34 855 555 
In an effort  to foment  the local manufacture  of  cookies, candies, and other confections,  very high 
duties have been placed on these articles. The result has been, with a very few  exceptions, that the 
consumer suffers  through increased cost in imported articles without an adequate and high quality 
local production to offset  it. In spite of  continued agitation, which in the past has been successful 
in raising the duty from  time to time, there has recently been a swing to the point of  view that the 
desire to protect local industry, though laudable, should not be carried to the point of  strangling 
imports without supplying the commodity in question locally. Quite possibly, a reduction in the 
duties of  these articles could be obtained, though to be successful  it probably would have to be from 
the present one and two colones to fifty  céntimos per kilo. 
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Table II.2.13 
COSTA RICA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF TEXTILES, 1931,1932,1933 






























































DRILL: Imports for  1933 
104 700 
595000 











15 606.00 3 320000 
88370.00 21 449 000 
3 265.00 690 000 
54 643.00 13 199 400 
68037.00 15 024 600 
4 201.00 2062000 
841.00 127 000 
35.00 7 200 
244236.00 58 225 400 
BATTING: Imports for  1932 
1395.00 414 
4 323.00 1178 
322876.00 108806 
3 669.00 1348 
4 493.00 1418 
2815.00 816 
9179.00 4 401 
374.00 1182 
349124.00 119608 
[TON FLANNEL: Imports for  1931 
100.00 36000 
15 166.88 3 386000 
2083.72 478300 
12104.00 4 740000 
180.24 10 250 
34.92 25 500 
29669.76 8676 650 
SHEETING: Imports for  1931 
224.25 20 900 
1013.00 225 500 
4648.16 783 900 
1591.24 274800 
2518.58 229000 
2250.30 358 300 
307.50 19 200 
60.00 4 000 
1018.52 68 550 
13 631.55 1984 150 
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Table II.2.13 (continued 1) 


































































































173 718 050 























498.00 118 000 
126 912.00 7223 300 
77514.00 7 979 700 
373.00 29 300 
859.00 44 000 
4 713.00 181 600 
26 040.00 1216 700 
3.00 200 




45.00 10 500 
395 143.00 33 374000 
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Table II.2.13 (continued ) 
Origin Value in Colones Weight in kg 























































































































Table II.2.13 ( c o n u d ) 
Origin Value in Colones Weight in kg 
COTTON CLOTH: Imports for  1932 
Germany 3 244.00 198 400 
Cuba 10.00 3 000 
Ecuador 5.00 300 
Spain 9148.00 1724 000 
United States 251 295.00 40 471 700 
France 5 740.00 316000 
Holland 2288.00 746000 
Honduras 4.00 1000 
England 214466.00 39 203 700 
Italy 4690.00 949 500 
Jamaica 4.00 1 300 
Japan 1985.00 797000 
Nicaragua 4.00 300 
Panama 565.96 44 450 
Switzerland 8614.00 522300 
Other countries 1144.12 81 100 
Total 503 207.08 85 060650 
SILK CLOTH: Imports for  1932 
Germany 7457.00 242 500 
Cuba 9.00 500 
Ecuador 12.00 600 
Spain 10474.00 626 000 
United States 187315.00 10 429 000 
France 32477.00 2023 900 
Honduras 169.00 1200 
England 9 813.00 378000 
Italy 2551.00 116200 
Jamaica 27.00 2 700 
Japan 105 603.00 9 789 500 
Nicaragua 28.00 2200 
Panama 1 523.27 67600 
Switzerland 30 923.00 1386000 
Other countries 5 554.60 486400 
Total 393 935.87 25 522300 
Since there is a desire to protect the small but apparently prospering textile industry, and to help 
it grow to a point where it can produce all but fancy  textiles, it is believed that there is very little 
possibility at present of  securing a reduction in the duties on any textiles. 
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Section 5: POSSIBILITIES OF TARIFF REDUCTIONS 
a. SILK  GOODS:  Silk goods are assessed a very high rate of  duty, not to protect local industry, but 
as luxuries. Even a slight lowering of  the import duty would increase consumption in the country, 
and, since there is a general feeling  that the duty is too high, there is a possibility that a reduction 
of  from  25% to 40% could be effected. 
b. CANNED  ALIMENTARY  PRODUCTS:  Canned fruits  and vegetables, the majority of  which 
have origin in the United States pay, what appears to be a very high rate of  duty, i.e., Colones 0.75 
per gross kilogram, plus extra charges which bring the net duties to as high as $6.20 per case (U.S. 
Currency). Should the rate of  duty be reduced to approximately Colones 0.25 per gross kilogram, 
or $2.10 per case local consumption would undoubtedly increase. 
c. SUGAR:  The local sugar industry is so limited in production that it does not supply the entire 
needs of  the country. However, a high import tariff  is levied on sugar, tending to keep the price 
of  this article of  primary necessity at a high figure. 
d. FISH  OIL:  The Japanese appear to have got control of  this market in Costa Rica and the item in 
question pays a duty of  approximately $0.031/2 per pound. Japanese oil is lower than that in the 
United States and could the rate of  duty be reduced American firms  could possibly regain their 
lost market locally in this commodity. 
e. GASOLINE  AND  KEROSENE:  The high local price of  gasoline, controlled by the national 
monopoly on this product, makes the operation of  automobiles prohibitive except for  the very 
wealthy. The import duty of  Colones 0.17 per kilogram, however, is not excessive, and the 
reduction should come from  the monopoly and other taxing agencies. Should the price of  gasoline 
be reduced the motor car market in Costa Rica would take a decided impetus, and the sale of 
American automotive machinery and accessories would be on the increase. 
The Consulate is preparing a report on protection given to local Costa Rican industries, as well 
as complying with the second paragraph of  the Department's telegraph of  July 19,1934, which called 
for  a supplemental report on desirable changes in customs administration. Both of  these reports 
will be forwarded  at a subsequent date and as soon as the information  can be obtained. 
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3. INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION IN EL SALVADOR (1935) 
From: Salvadoran Protection of  Local Industries; Despatch No. 10 from  American Consulate 
General, San Salvador, El Salvador to Secretary of  State, Washington; February 6, 1935; 
611.1631/104 A-LS. 
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL 
San Salvador, El Salvador, February 6,1935 
SUBJECT: Salvadoran Protection of  Local Industries 
THE HONORABLE 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
WASHINGHTON 
SIR: 
I have the honor to refer  to the Department's airmail instruction to the American Legation 
at San Salvador No. 58 of  December 21,1934, without file  number, regarding the projected 
Salvadoran-American Trade Agreement, with special reference  to the phrase "Protection of 
Local Industries," which would list all industries that now enjoy tariff  protection, specifying 
the extent of  that protection both on the finished  products and on raw materials, the kind and 
classes of  commodities produced, effect  of  protection on importations, and giving figures  on 
annual output, capital investment, et cetera" and to submit the available data- largely a revision 
and amplification  of  the information  provided in the Consulate General's report dated March 
9, 1934, entitled "Manufacturing  Developments in El Salvador" (Consulate File No. 610.1) 
except that the local manufacturing  of  cotton yarn, cotton piece goods and certain cotton 
finished  articles (headshawls, bedspreads, and hosiery) was discussed in the Consulate 
General's despatch No. 663 of  December 28,1934, on the subject "Manufacture  of  textiles and 
hosiery in El Salvador" (Consulate File no. 868.11). 
The following  report covers all other Salvadoran manufacturing  industries so far  as data 
are available including some of  the household handicrafts.  It is thought that there maybe other 
handicrafts  in this area that may be protected by the Salvadoran tariff  rather accidentally 
through the imposition of  high import duties, principally for  revenue purposes, but that their 
operations are conducted on a petty, fluctuating  and only quasi-commercial scale so that for 
them information  is not procurable- nor necessarily of  much direct concern for  the projected 
Salvadoran-American trade negotiations. 
Attention is invited to the fact  that Vice Consul Joseph E. Maleady may be credited in maj or 
degree with the preparation of  4 commodity sections; namely those on Henequen Bags, Beer 
and Soft  Drinks, Matches, and Ironware, out of  the total of  18 commodity sections in the 
following  despatch. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rate of  Salvadoran Exchange 
The Commercial rate of  exchange today for  Salvadoran currency (the Colon) is 02.49 3/4 
per $1.00; that is $0.40 per 01.00. 
Salvadoran Import Duties 
Salvadoran import customs duties are levied in nominal American dollars but are payable 
in Salvadoran Colones at the officially-established  reduced exchange rate of  02.20 per $1.00 
($0.45 per 01.00) which in effect  gives a saving to local importers of  roughly 12% below today's 
commercial exchange rate. The rates quoted in the following  commodity sections of  this report 
do not include the 1% surcharge that has been imposed until December 31,1935, as a means 
to collect funds  for  the construction of  the Salvadoran Stadium which was cited in the 
Consulate General's despatch No. 678 of  January 15,1935, on the subject "Salvadoran taxes 
on imports in addition to import duty" (Consulate File No. 631). 
Salvadoran Import Statistics 
For the import data utilized in the succeeding sections of  this despatch reference  is made 
to the Consulate General's despatch No. 584 of  August 24,1934, on the subject "Salvadoran 
Foreign Trade Statistics for  1933" (Consulate File No. 600) while conversions into American 
dollar equivalents have been made at $0.34 per Colon which was the average exchange rate 
for  that year. 
Salvadoran Preferential  Trade Privileges and Burdens 
The Salvadoran Tariff  Book ("Tarifa  de Aforos"  a copy of  which was forwarded  to the 
Department for  the Department of  Commerce with the Consulate General's despatch No. 625 
of  October 16,1934, Consulate File No. 020) contains the text of  the several Salvadoran treaties 
or decrees granting special tariff  exemptions: 
1. The Salvadoran-Honduran Free Trade Treaty of  February 28,1918, on page 225. 
2. The Salvador an reduced tariff  schedule and notes (A, B and C) on pages 227-228 
applicable to the other Central American countries; i.e., those less favored  than 
Honduras. 
3. The Salvadoran-French Treaty of  January 15,1902, on pages 229-232, inclusive. 
4. The Salvadoran-Italian Treaty of  March 19,1934, on pages 233-235, inclusive. 
5. The application of  the French and Italian privileges to certain most-favored  nations 
including the United States under the Salvadoran-American Treaty of  September 5,1930 
(Treaty Series No. 827) on pages 237-241, inclusive. 
The special preferences  (Honduran, other Central American, French and Italian) 
commonly are not important to the Salvadoran protected industries but references  have been 
made to them in the following  commodity sections of  this despatch where of  any commercial 
importance. As regards the recent Salvadoran Preferential  Import Tariff  Law which went into 
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effect  by January 1,1935, and was last discussed in the Consulate General's despatch No. 3 of 
January 26,1935 (Consulate File No. 630) as well as in the Department's airmail instruction 
to the American Legation at San Salvador No. 66 of  January 29,1935, without file  number, no 
mention has been made in the following  commodity sections as they cover periods prior to its 
operation. 
Salvadoran Export Taxes 
None of  these Salvadoran protected industries, except coffee  -and recently sugar also-
produces for  export in any commercial volume so that the export tax schedules and notes from 
the Salvadoran Tariff  Book on pages 219-222, inclusive, have not been discussed in detail in 
the following  commodity sections for  the other commodities except where of  potential 
significance. 
•The material which follows  represents an edited version of  the original text. Detailed references 
to tariff  rates have been shortened to condense the document. 
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I. COFFEE 
Coffee-growing,  the principal industry of  El Salvador, has been the mainstay of  the country's 
economy since the middle of  the last century. The Salvadoran Tariff  prohibits the importation of 
coffee  seeds and protects the local cultivators both for  the raw products (coffee  beans whether 
unwashed or washed) and the finished  products (coffees  prepared for  table consumption). The 
industry furnishes  almost all of  the country's exports; it is practically the one "cash crop" producer. 
According to the Salvadoran Fiscal Agent Under the Loan Contract of  1922, the Salvadoran 
exports of  this one commodity during the calendar year 1934 amounted to 49 865 734 kilos or 
about 109 704 615 American pounds equal to roughly 722 000 "bags" of  about 152 American lbs. each 
and formed  about 90% of  the volume of  total exports for  the year. Its estimated value was around 
$8 600 000 or about 94% of  the estimated total export value. The coffee-producers  concentrate upon 
growth for  export; the domestic consumption usually takes more than a tenth of  the normal output. 
The crop must be sold in the world's competitive markets and has not been fostered  by subsidies 
although assisted by the general Salvadoran Moratoria ameliorations for  agricultural loans enacted 
since 1930; on the contrary, export customs taxes collected on it commonly supply about a fifth  of 
the national government revenue. 
A recent compilation of  the coffee  "beneficios"  (coffee  cleaning-washing-and preparing mills) in 
the republic made by the official  coffee  association showed 129 establishments. Most of  them are 
owned by coffee  planters but the number of  planters is considerably larger than the number of  mills, 
as many of  them have not constructed their own mills; preferring  to sell their crops to millers or to 
hire milling service. No definite  figures  for  the total capital invested in the coffee  industry in El 
Salvador are available but it may be estimated that milling investments have exceeded $3 500 000 
and may be valued today at perhaps half  that figure.  A substantial share of  the production is financed 
by short-term crop loans and land mortgages in which relatively large amounts of  American and 
some European capital have been placed. 
Locally-grown coffee  constitutes all of  the raw material consumed; the milling "plant capacity" 
may be expanded readily at low cost except for  power installations; and it is sufficient  to handle the 
largest crop yet produced as well as the largest that might be anticipated in the prospectively near 
future. 
It may be of  interest to The Country Committee on Trade Agreements with Central America to 
point out that the American market consumed about 24% of  the Salvadoran coffee  exports for  the 
1933/34 Season according to the Consulate General's invoice file  and that local coffee  brokers 
estimate that this percentage may be increased to 50/60% for  the current annual "season" (1934/35). 
Statistical Estimates for  Salvadoran Coffee  Industry 
Coffee  Mills: 
1. Estimated number of  coffee  mills 129 
2. Estimated total capital (mill structures and machinery alone; that 
is, excluding mill landsites and all plantation lands and buildings) $3 500 000 
3. Employees Strictly seasonal 
Production, Export, Consumption and Import of  Coffee 
4. Production statistics for  the Salvadoran coffee  industry may only be estimated from  the known 
exports but it may be calculated that the total export of  695 560 bags for  the 1933/34 "Season" 
(November 1, 1933, to October 31, 1934, inclusive. Reference:  Report from  the Consulate 
General dated November 7, 1934, entitled 'Salvadoran Coffee  Exports for  the Entire 1933/34 
Season", Consulate File No. 861.33) indicated a production of  perhaps 800 000 bags or about 
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60 000 short tons of  2 000 American lbs. each, as the total annual local consumption of  coffee  is 
estimated to be about 90 000/100 000 bags, while the value of  this output may have been around 
$10 000 000. The local coffee-preparing  industry does not import any coffee  beans nor was there 
any importation of  either raw or finished  coffee  for  domestic consumption in 1933 according to 
the Salvadoran customs statistics. 
Import Tariff  On Coffee 
[The] rate of  about $0.21 per American gross pound provides a substantial tariff  protection to 
Salvadoran coffee  growers as it amounts to about 200% of  the local retail market price for  the 
common grades of  00.25 ($0.10) per Spanish lb. (1.014 American lbs.) converted at 02.49 3/4 per 
$1.00. 
The importation of  coffee  plants and seeds into El Salvador is prohibited. 
Export Tariff  on Coffee 
The Salvadoran export tariff  on coffee  shown in the schedules on page 219 and the Notes on pages 
221-222 of  the Salvadoran tariff  book provides a basic export tax levy (unless shipped to Honduras 
under Note L) of  $3.27 per 100 gross kilos for  green milled coffee  which has been reduced under 
Note E to $2.57 for  the time during which the Salvadoran Mortgage Bank is keeping certain funds 
for  agricultural development in this country. In this connection reference  is made to the Consulate 
General's despatch No. 680 of  January 16,1935, on the subject "Text and translation of  Salvadoran 
mortgage bank Law". This export tax is not paid in the same manner as are the import levies; it is 
payable through dollar export drafts  for  conversion into Salvadoran Colon exchange at the current 
rate. For the other types of  coffee,  equalization weights have been established expressing them in 
terms of  green milled coffee;  namely: under Note D that 200 lbs. of  coffee  in dry bean and under 
Note F. 120 lbs. of  parchment coffee  shall be taxed aslOO lbs. of  green milled coffee,  while the 
exportation of  ground o r toasted coffee  from  El Salvador under Note H can be made only with the 
authorization of  the Salvadoran Coffee  Protection Commission discussed in the Consulate General's 
despatch No. 551 of  June 15,1934, on the subject "Revision of  Salvadoran coffee  control law". In 
addition to the export customs duty there is the schedule on page 219 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book 
of  petty export development taxes varying geographically but none as much as a tenth of  án American 
cent per American pound. 
This rate of  $2.57 per 100 kilos or about $1.18 per quintal of  100 Spanish lbs. or about 101.4 
American lbs. amounts to about 14% of  the minimum current Salvadoran coffee  export quotation 
of  $8.50 for  the "current unwashed" grade per quintal (based upon the recent export price range of 
$8.50 to $10.50 f.o.b.  ship at local port of  export, with export taxes and special taxes paid, per quintal 
or 2/3 of  a bag of  coffee  weighing 11/2 quintals or about 152 American lbs). 
II. SUGAR 
The sugar mills in El Salvador produce refined  cane sugar from  sugar cane cultivated in this country. 
They operate under a quota restriction scheme for  both production and sale which has been 
established and is supervised by the Salvadoran Government's Sugar Protection Board covering all 
of  the sugar refineries  in this republic and including import restrictions on sugar, sugar products, 
and sugar machinery. There is no local production of  beet sugar while the Salvadoran protective 
import tariff  rates exclude foreign  sugar -whether cane or beet and whether raw or refined.  A list 
of  the 28 sugar mills now operating in this country was provided in the Consulate General's report 
of  September 20,1934, entitled "Sugar - El Salvador" and the latest quota in the Consulate General's 
despatch No. 630 of  October 23,1934, on the subject "Revised Salvadoran sugar quota for  1934/35" 
(both Consulate File No. 861.35). There also is some local manufacture  of  sugar products in sweet 
shops conducted on a petty scale but the output is unimportant and has been excluded from  the 
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following  statistics except for  tariff  citation. In this connection reference  is made to the Consulate 
General's despatch No. 432 of  July 26,1933, on the subject "Practical modification  in sugar import 
restrictions" (Consulate File No. 861.35). The productive capacity of  the local sugar refineries  is 
about four  times their present rate of  output; a factor  of  interest to The Country Committee on Trade 
agreements with Central America because the Salvadoran sugar growers and refiners  would 
welcome an opportunity to share in the American import sugar quota sales plan through the 
exportation of  Salvadoran sugar. Attention is invited to the fact  that the Salvadoran import tariff  on 
sugar discussed later in this section might provide a convenient vehicle for  sugar export disposal 
under a foreign  quota grant at a price competitive with other sugar-producing countries but below 
Salvadoran sugar prices for  internal consumption; in effect,  at a dumping price. 
Statistical Estimates for  Salvadoran Sugar Manufacturing  Industry 
Sugar Mills 
1. Cane sugar refineries  now operating under the Salvadoran 
Sugar Quota Control 28 
2. Estimated mill investment (total capital investment in buildings, 
machinery, etc.., but excluding land sites) $4 000 000 
This investment largely was made during the war andpost-war boom 
periods; today the upset value may not equal one-fourth  of  the 
estimate. 
3. Employees Strictly seasonal 
Production, Consumption and Exports of  Sugar; 
4. Present established annual production and domestic sales quota (annual "Season" of  1934/35) 
which is subject to potential increase for  export by the Salvadoran Sugar Protection Board. 
(a) Volume (expressed in quintals of  100 Spanish lbs., or 
101.4 American lbs. each) 240 101 quintals 
The volume equals approximately 12 200 short tons of  2 000 
American lbs. each. 
(b) Estimated value calculated from  the refineries'  price to retailers 
for  the various grades for  the price range of  08.00 ($3.20) to 
010.00 ($4.00) per quintal, as converted at 02.49 3/4 per 
$1.00, to average around $0.031/2 per American lb. or $70 00 
per short ton for  12 000 short tons in the opinion 
of  the representative local refiners)  $840 000 
5. Estimated plant capacity (annual production) for  cane sugar: 
(a) Volume of  about 1000 000 quintals in short tons 50000 tons 
(b) Value $3500 000 
(c) Percentage of  plant capacity now being utilized 24% 
This plant capacity has been calculated from  the potential cane sugar cultivation in this country-
all of  which could be handled by the existing refineries  according to local refiners'  estimates. 
6. The estimated Salvadoran total annual consumption of  sugar until recently has been about the 
same as the local production of  refined  cane sugar -about 12 000 short tons valued at $840 000 
for  1934- as imports are negligible; in other words, the local production supplies almost 100% of 
the demand. This consumption because of  the low average income is equal to only about 16 
pounds of  sugar per capita per annum based upon the total Salvadoran population of  1493 826, 
according to the Census of  1931. However, during the past few  months export sales of  Salvadoran 
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sugar have been made -especially to adjacent Central American countries. According to the 
Salvadoran Fiscal Agency Under the Loan Contract of  1922, the total exports of  Salvadoran sugar 
during the calendar year 1934 amounted to 1024 855 kilos (2 254 681 American pounds or about 
1127 short tons). Value statistics for  these shipments are not available yet. It is apparent that the 
local sugar refiners  could produce from  30 000 to 35 000 tons of  refined  cane sugar for  the 
American market over and above their output for  (1) Salvadoran consumption and (2) for 
probably consumption of  Salvadoran sugar in the other Central American countries -but 
probably only on a protected quota basis for  sale in the United States. 
7. The Salvadoran supply of  raw material (sugar cane) for  refined  sugar is obtained entirely from 
locally-grown sugar. 
Imports of  Sugar and Sugar Products: 
8. The following  table (II.3.1) shows the imports of  raw and refined  sugar and sugar products (most 
confections)  for  the calendar year 1933 with Salvadoran Colones converted into American 
Dollars at the rate of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average value for  the year, and with weights in gross 
kilos and American pounds: 
Table H.3.1 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF REFINED SUGAR AND SUGAR PRODUCTS, 1933 
Finished products Gross weight Value 
(essentially noncompetitive) Kilos Pounds Colones Dollars 




















































































Import Tariff  on Sugar and Sugar Products, Including Restrictions 
9. According to the Salvadoran Tariff  Book there is no Salvadoran tariff  protection on raw sugar 
cane -obviously none is needed; the following  items show the Salvadoran tariff  protection on 
competitive finished  products (refined  sugar) and on the related sugar manufactures  levied in 
gross weights in nominal American dollars payable at 02.20 per $1.00; that is, at a discount of 
approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of  02.49 3/4 per $1.00). 
(a) Refined  sugar 
The actual rate of  $0.14 per American gross lb. is equal to about 400% of  the local refiners'  present 
coverage price to retailers of  around $0.03 1/2 per American lb.; the local production is classifiable 
for  reference  purposes under Item No. 212-7-01-003 for  sugar cane with polarization of96.40  degrees 
or more. 
Under the Salvadoran-French Treaty cited in the Introduction of  this despatch there is a special 
rate for  sugar shown on page 230 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book of  only $24.81 nominal per 100 gross 
kilos or actual $9.92 per 100 gross American pounds. 
(b) Import prohibitions on certain sugar products 
There are the following  related prohibitions on sugar importation into;,El Salvador shown on 
pages 215 and 216 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book: 
Caramel that may be employed in the fabrication  of  limitation wines. 
Centrifugated  sugar, loaf  sugar, unrefined  brown sugar and sugar in any other form  for  domestic 
(c) Import restrictions on sugar machinery 
Furthermore, the importation into El Salvador of  machinery for  the fabrication  of  brown sugar 
is prohibited while the importation into this country of  parts and accessories for  sugar manufacturing 
is restricted to the necessities of  the existing mills and then only with the previous permit of  the 
Salvadoran Sugar Protection Board- as provided in two related notes on pages 215 and 216 of  the 
Salvadoran Tariff  Book reading as follows: 
Machinery for  the fabrication  of  brown sugar except the parts necessary for  the existing mills with 
the previous permit of  the Protection Commission. 
Articles that can be imported only with a license from  the appropriate authorities. 
Parts and accessories for  sugar manufacturing  machinery. 
(d) Import restrictions on sugar products 
The Salvadoran tariff  protection for  the local petty sugar products is complicated by the following 
remaining item from  the list on page 216 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book: 
Articles that can be imported only with a license from  the appropriate authorities 
Honey, molasses, syrups, confectionery,  jam, bonbons, chewing gum or any other sugar products. 
However, this general semi-restriction has been discontinued in part by the exemptions shown 
on page 315 as follows: 
Articles that do not need a permit from  the Sugar Protection Commission for  its importation on 
page 315. In the following  schedule for  subsection (e) of  sugar products specific  references  have 
been made to the exemptions for  each item thereof  cited in the list on page 315 while the remaining 
exemptions follow  the schedule as subsection (f). 
Rate 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos 





(e) Sugar products: 
Rate: 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 
$51.40 
20.56 
Although it is not practicable to determine the rate of  protection enjoyed by the local petty 
fabricators  of  sugar products, it obviously is high. 
(f)  Additional exemption on other products containing sugar. 
There are the other exemptions shown on page 315 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book from  the import 
restrictions on sugar that relate to the possible sugar content of  articles not made principally from 
sugar; namely: 
Under the Salvadoran-French Treaty cited in the Introduction of  this despatch there is a special 
rate for  bonbons, drops, chocolate and other sugar sweets (bombones, pastillas, chocolate) shown 
on page 230 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book of  only $29.29 nominal per 100 gross kilos or actual $11.72 
per 100 gross American pounds. 
Sugar Export Charges: 
There is no Salvadoran export tax on sugar as provided in the schedule on page 219 other than 
the petty road taxes indicated by Note C on page 220 and Note L on page 222 of  the Salvadoran 
Tariff  Book; the local sugar industry is not penalized for  government revenue as is the coffee  one. 
There now are two wheat flour  mills in El Salvador; one opened in 1932, a second in 1933, and a 
third in 1934 which absorbed the first--  all operating under special government concessions. The 
Salvadoran tariff  protection under which they operate is complicated by the internal levies discussed 
in the Consulate General's despatches No. 662 of  December 28,1934, on the subject "Reduction of 
internal taxes on wheat flour  produced in El Salvador; establishment of  internal tax on wheat 
imported into El Salvador for  milling purposes as indirect tariff  protection" (Consulate File No. 
869.1) and no. 678 of  January 15,1935, on the subject "Salvadoran taxes on imports in addition to 
import duty" (Consulate File No. 631). There is a small local demand for  flour  from  other 
cereals, particularly from  locally-grown yuca, but it is not a significant  factor.  However, in the 
rural areas the sale of  wheat flour  is limited as the proletariat cannot afford  to purchase bread. 
The diet of  the lower class is restricted generally to corn, beans and coffee  -occasionally varied 
with meat. 
Statistical Estimates for  Salvadoran Wheat Flour Manufacturing  Industry: 
Wheat  Flour  Mills: 
1. Number of  wheat flour  milis 2 
2. Estimated mill investment (total capital investment in buildings, 
machinery, etc., but excluding land sites) $75 000 
3. Estimated employees 100 
III. WHEAT FLOUR 
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Production and Consumption of  Wheat Flour 
4. Estimated annual production of  wheat flour  (at recent operating schedules): 
(a) Volume (expressed in barrels calculated from  the actual finished 
product: a package ("bulto") of  wheat flour  of  150 Spanish lbs.; 
i.e., about 152 American lbs., composed of  3 sacks of  50 Spanish 
lbs. -equalling approximately 69 kilos and therefore  roughly 
equivalent tothree-fourths  of  a barrel of  90 kilos or 198 
American lbs.gross weight) 60 000 bbls. 
(b) Value (calculated from  the millers' present prices per package 
-to wholesalers 025.00; to bakers 026.00- converted at 02.49 
3/4 per $1.00 to an average around$13.50 per barrel) $810 000 
5. Estimated plant capacity (annual production) 
(a) Volume 5 000 bbls. 
(b) Value 1015 000 
(c) Percentage of  plant capacity now being utilized 80% 
6. Estimated Salvadoran total annual consumption of  wheat flour: 
(a) Volume 90 000 bbls. 
(b) Value $1215 000 
(c) Percentage of  total consumption supplied by local production 67% 
7. Estimated Salvadoran total annual consumption of  raw material (wheat) for  local wheat flour 
mills at recent operating schedules: 
(a) Volume in short tons of  2 000 American lbs 9 000 tons 
(b) Value at the present price of  around $40.00 pershort ton c.i.f. 
Salvadoran ports $360 000 
Imports of  Wheat and Wheat Flour 
8. The Salvadoran import data for  wheat and wheat flour  in 1933 may not be accepted as reliable 
supply indices as the local mills were not operating then on present schedules but are given for 
reference  in the following  table (II.3.2) for  the calendar year 1933 with Salvadoran Colones 
converted into American Dollars at the rate of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average value for  the 
year, and with weights in gross kilos and American pounds: 
Table II.3.2 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF WHEAT AND WHEAT FLOUR 1933 
Gross weight Value 
Kilos Pounds Colones Dollars 
(a) Raw Material (Wheat): 
Wheat in its natural state 
United States 420442 924972 50960 17300 
Total 420 442 924 972 50960 17300 
(b) Finished Product (Wheat Flour) 
Wheat flour 
United States 6 778102 14911824 798165 271400 
Germany 4623 10171 519 200 
Other countries 13 29 7 
Total 6 782 738 14 922 024 798 691 271600 
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Import Tariff  on Wheat and Wheat Flour 
9. The Salvadoran tariff  protection schedules on raw material (wheat) and finished  product (wheat 
flour)  levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars payable at 02.20 per $1.00; that is at a 
discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of  02.49 34 per $1.00, follow  with 
the exception of  the commercially negligible Central American preferences  shown on page 227 
of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book as discussed in the Introduction to this despatch. 
(a) Raw Material 
Wheat in its natural state 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $8.80 
This rate has been reduced to $2.50 nominal per 100 gross kilos for  the Salvadoran concessionaire 
wheat flour  millers, who handle all of  the local wheat flour  manufacturing,  but partial compensatory 
indirect tariff  protection has been provided to encourage the few  Salvadoran wheat growers who 
now can supply only a very small fraction  of  the local mills' demand, by the imposition of  an additional 
internal production tax upon the concessionaire millers of  04.40 per 100 gross kilos on imported 
wheat plus 07.50 per 100 gross kilos of  wheat flour  so that the millers' tariff  charges if  they utilize 
imported raw material (wheat) may be estimated as (on the basis of  300 pounds of  wheat consumed 
for  each barrel of  wheat flour  of  198 American lbs. gross weight each computed as follows:  $2.50 
payable at 02.20 plus 04.40 equalling 09.90 per 100 gross kilos of  wheat increased by 50% to provide 
100 gross kilos of  wheat flour  and supplemented by 07.50 to an estimated effective  total of  022.35 
per 100 gross kilos of  wheat flour)  roughly $8.05 per barrel which it must be emphasized amounts 
to about 60% of  the millers' selling prices. In other words, they actually are penalized in comparison 
with importers of  wheat flour  Unless they use Salvadoran wheat! 
(b) Finished Product (Wheat Flour) 
Wheat flour 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $9.00 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 3.60 
The actual rate is equivalent to about $7.20 per barrel, slightly over 50% of  the local millers' 
present prices, but the tariff  protection only is effective  in reality for  Salvadoran wheat flour 
produced from  Salvadoran wheat, as explained in the preceding section, which is not being grown 
at present in quantity to supply even a small part of  the millers' demand! The importation of  wheat 
flour  in used bags or sacks is prohibited as shown on page 215 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book. 
IV. HENEQUEN BAGS 
At the present time there are two concerns in El Salvador which manufacture  henequen bags for 
use in shipping Salvadoran coffee.  One of  the factories  is operating at full  capacity while the other, 
which on account of  certain difficulties  is not allowed to sell its product, is running at about 60% of 
capacity with the product being placed in storage awaiting a settlement of  the differences  with the 
Salvadoran Government. All raw material is obtained locally. 
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Statistical Estimates for  Salvadoran Henequen Bag Industry. 
Henequen  Bag Mills. 
1. Number of  henequen bag factories  2 
2. Estimated capital investment (including buildings,equipmentand 
farms)  $1500 000 




At full  capacity 
Factories 600 
Field 2 000 
Production and Consumption of  Henequen Bags 
4. Estimated annual production of  henequen bags: 
(a) Volume 1950 000 bags 
(b) Value (calculated from  the millers' present price to coffee  and 
other commodity shippers of  00.72 per bag- converted at 
02.493/4 per $1.00 to equal about $0.29) $565 000 
5. Estimated plant capacity: 
(a) Volume 2 500 000 bags 
(b) Value $725 000 
(c) Percentage of  plant capacity now being utilized 78% 
6. Estimated Salvadoran total consumption of  raw material (henequen) including that part of  the 
supply from  the millers' own plantations: 
(a) At present capacity 
(1) Volume in short tons of  2 000 American lbs 2150 tons 
(2) Value (calculated from  the henequen growers' price to the 
henequen bagmakers of  00.11 per Spanish lb. (1 014 
American lbs.) converted at 02.49 per $1.00 to roughly 
$87.00 per short ton of  2 000 American lbs 185 000 
(b) At full  capacity 
(1) Volume in short tons of  2 000 American lbs 2 750 000 tons 
(2) Value $240 000 
(c) The Salvadoran raw henequen cultivation industry may be 
expanded readily to produce all of  the henequen that may be 
required for  the local henequen bagmaking industry within any 
limits applicable to the prospectively near future  which are 
perceptible at present. 
7. In view of  the present legal battle between the two henequen bagmakers in this country, the 
production of  these bags is not in close relation to the actual consumption. Furthermore, the 
"normal" demand for  them depends largely upon the size of  the Salvadoran coffee  crop; the 
division of  that crop into "washed" and "unwashed" coffee;  the demand for  export sugar bags; and 
the secondary demands for  the sale of  bags for  coffee,  sugar and wheat flour  consumed in the 
country which have been placed on a different  tax basis as explained later in the tariff  division of 
this section. 
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It has been reported by the manager of  one of  the factories  under discussion that there are 
300 000 bags on hand in El Salvador resulting from  imports of  foodstuffs  from  Mexico due to the 
disastrous results of  the hurricane in this country of  June, 1934, while the operator of  the factory 
which is experiencing difficulties,  had about 180 000 coffee  bags stored for  futur  sales on February 
1,1935. 
Imports jof  Henequen and Bags: 
8. There;1 were no imports of  raw henequen into El Salvador during 1933 according to the 
Salvadoran customs statistics -comprehensible in view of  the local cultivation- while the 
Salvadoran import data for  bags for  that year may not be accepted as a complete consumption 
index as one of  the local mills was not then established while the other had not been equipped to 
operate on its present schedule but the data are given for  reference  in the following  table (11.3,3) 
for  the calendar year 1933 with Salvadoran Colones converted into American Dollars at the rate 
of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average value for  the year, and with weights in gross kilos and American 
pounds: 
Table II.3.3 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF HENEQUEN AND BAGS 1933 
Gross weight Value 
Kilos Pounds Colones Dollars 
Empty Bags of  Jute for  Coffee 










Netherlands 57725 126995 26389 9000 
Belgium 47132 103 690 20981 7100 
Austria 29047 63 903 11437 3 900 
United States 20654 45 439 9301 3 200 
India 932 2050 635 200 
Guatemala 78 172 73 
Other countries 5315 11693 2 558 900 
Total 588701 1295142 297 927 101300 
Empty Bags of  Jute for  Sugar 
Great Britain 40072 88158 29 737 10 100 
United States 12922 28428 11830 4 000 
India 3 528 7762 2905 1000 
Austria 5 600 12320 2 744 1000 
Germany 8 18 - -
Total 62130 136686 47 216 16100 
Import and Export Tariff's  on Henequen and Bags: 
9. The Salvadoran tariff  protection on raw material (henequen) and the finished  products (bags) 
levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars payable at 02.20 per $1.00; that is, at a 
discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of  02.49 3/4 per $1.00, follow: 
(a) Raw Material 
Jute, henequen, sisal and other primary fibers,  unmanufactured,  raw, or combed. 
All raw material is obtained locally as stated previously; the actual rate of  about $0.06 per 
American gross pound is equal to about 150% of  the local henequen growers' selling price 
of  about $0.04 per pound. 
(b) Finished Products 
The actual rates in the previous schedule ranging from  about $0.06 to $0.11 per American 
gross pound provide a range of  tariff  protection to the Salvadoran henequen bagmakers of 
about $0.13 to $0.24 per bag or around 45% to 80% of  the henequen bagmakers' selling 
price to coffee  and other commodity shippers of  about $0.29 per bag weighing about 1 kilo 
or 2.2 American pounds on the average. 
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Furthermore, as shown on page 216 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book the importation of  used 
sacks or bags into El Salvador is prohibited. On the other hand the local henequen bag 
makers have been penalized, so far  as production for  internal consumption is concerned by 
the provision on page 222 of  the Tariff  Book: Sacks or bags made of  jute or henequen, 
manufactured  in the country (El Salvador) for  any use pay an internal tax equal to the duty 
paid by imported bags when they are used in this republic (i.e., except for  bagging 
Salvadoran exports). The same tax is paid by the material for  making sacks. Those to be 
exported (sacks or material) are exempt from  the payment of  the tax. In addition to the 
import customs duty such domestically consumed henequen bags are assessed the petty 
export development taxes that vary geographically which are shown in the schedule on page 
220 and in Note LL on page 222 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book. 
V. BEER AND SOFT DRINKS 
There are three breweries in El Salvador, two of  which are controlled by the same interests. One 
organization also manufactures  drinks although beer is its principal product. In addition, there are 
some half-dozen  petty soft-drink  plants. The following  data are restricted to the beer production. 
The breweries purchase the greater part of  their raw materials from  Czechoslovakia. A small part 
was obtained formerly  from  Chicago but this supply has been out off  due to the recent drought in 
the United States and at the present time Chile and Canada are replacing the United States as 
sources of  raw materials. The local industry's brew materials are imported in entirety. The 
Salvadoran tariff  protection under which the industry operates is increased by the internal levy 
discussed in the Consulate General's despatch No. 678 of  January 15, 1935, on the subject 
"Salvadoran taxes on imports in addition to import duty" (Consulate File No. 631). 
Statistical Estimates for  Salvadoran Brewing Industry 
Breweries 
1. Number of  breweries 3 
2. Estimated mill investment (total capital investment in buildings, 
equipment, etc. but excluding land sites) $1200 000 
3. Estimated employees 500 
Production and Consumption of  Beer 
4. Estimated annual production of  beer: 
(a) Volume (expressed in liters calculated from  about 300 000 
cases, of  24 bottles each, totalling 7 200 000 bottles containing 
10-11 fluid  ounces and averaging 3 bottles per liter) 2 400 000 liters 
(b) Value calculated from  the brewers' price to retailers of  04.80 
per case of  24 bottles converted at 02.49 3/4 per $1.00 to $1.92 
per caseor $0.08 per bottle) $575 000 
5. Plant capacity (annual production): 
(a) Volume 4 800 000 liters 
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(b) Value $1150 000 
(c) Percentage of  plant capacity now being utilized 50% 
6. The estimated Salvadoran total annual consumption of  beer practically is the same as the local 
production -2 400 000 liters or 7 200 000 bottles value at $575 000- as imports are almost 
nothing; in other words the local production supplies 100% of  the local demand. This 
consumption, because of  the low average income in large degree and because of  the local sale of 
native rum discussed in a separate section of  this despatch, is equal to fractionally  less than 5 
bottles of  beer per capita per annum, based upon the total Salvadoran population of  1493 826, 
according to the Census of  1931 -a bottle every two months for  each adult inhabitant of  the 
country: 
7. Estimated Salvadoran total annual consumption of  raw materials (malt and hops) at present 
operating schedules: 
Malt: 
(a) Volume in short tons of  2 000 American lbs 400 tons 
(b) Value $30000 
Hops: 
(a) Volume in short tons of  2 000 American lbs 5 tons 
(b)Value $5 000 
Imports of  Malt, Hops and Beer: 
8. The Salvadoran import data for  raw materials (malt and hops) and the finished  product (beer) 
in the calendar year 1933 with Salvadoran Colones converted into American dollars at the rate 
of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average value for  the year, and with weights in gross kilos and American 
pounds follow: 
Table II.3.4 










































































Import and Export Tariff  on Malt, Hops and Beer 
9. The Salvadoran tariff  schedules on the raw materials (malt and hops) and the finished  product 
(beer) levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars payable at 02.20 per $1.00; that is, at 
a discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of  02.49 3/4 per $1.00, follow: 
(a) Raw Materials: 
Malt and grains germinated from  unspecified  cereals. 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $4.20 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 1.68 
Hops and unspecified  forms. 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $35.00 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 14.00 
(b) Finished product: 
Beers, made from  malt and hops, and unspecified  similar 
drinks. 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos 35.00 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 14.00 
In addition to the customs duty there is an internal tax levied on imported beer of  00.01 (2/5 of 
an American cent) per bottle. On the basis of  1 bottle weighing about 2.2 lbs., it may be estimated 
that the total Salvadoran tariff  protection of  about $0.14 per American gross pound plus the internal 
tax 2/5 of  an American cent totals about $0.31 per bottle and is equal to almost 400% of  the brewers' 
price to retail distributors of  $0.08. 
The Salvadoran export tax exemption for  beer shown on pages 220 and 221 of  the Salvadoran 
Tariff  Book is not commercially significant  at present. 
VI. SOAP AND CANDLES 
The soap-and-candle factories  in El Salvador produce low-grade articles which, however, are suited 
to the great bulk of  the local demand; a small quantity of  these products also is produced by petty 
handicraft  establishments in the rural areas. The tropical climate in this country and the consequent 
emphasis upon cotton fabrics  tend to increase laundry requirements despite the common paucity of 
clothing and household linens -due to the low average income; local laundresses rarely use hot water 
and are accustomed to rough soaps readily soluble in cold water. As for  candles, electric lighting in 
the principal urban areas is confined  to the middle and upper class residences because of  its high 
price while it is much more restricted in the rural zones so that the demand for  candles is substantial, 
although oil lamps and similar lighting equipment also are used. 
Statistical Estimates for  Salvadoran Soap-and-Candle Manufacturing  Industry (excluding 
household handicraft  operations): 
Soap-and-candle  factories 
1. Number of  soap-and-candle mills 4 
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2. Estimated mill investment (total capital investment in buildings, 
machinery, etc., but excluding land sites) $400 000 
Production and Consumption of  Soap and Candles: 
3. Estimated annual production of  soap and candles (calculated from  "cases" of  varying contents 
depending upon size of  soap bar or candle, upon grade, etc., and with varying prices but of  a fixed 
weight for  each commodity): 
(a) Volume (from:  (1) around 63 0000 cases of  soap of  30 Spanish lbs. each (approximately 30 
2/5 American lbs. or 66 cases per short ton of  2 000 American lbs. each) equal roughly to 950 
short tons; and (2) around 61000 cases of  candles of  18 Spanish lbs. each (approximately 18 
1/4 American lbs. or 110 cases per short ton) equal roughly to 550 short tons): 
Soap 950 tons 
Candles 550 tons 
Total 1500 tons 
(b) Value (calculated from  the millers' present prices to retailers depending upon grade etc., to 
average around 05.00 ($2.00) per case of  soap and 09.00 ($3.60) per case of  candles, as 
converted at 02.49 3/4 per $1.00, to equal (1) around $130.00 per short ton of  soap and (2) 
around $395.00 per short ton of  candles): 
Soap $125 000 
Candles 215 000 
Total $340 000 
4. It is impracticable to estimate the Salvadoran capacity for  the maximum production of  soap and 
candles from  the present plants because of  the limited necessity for  additional equipment to 
increase output except to state that it is sufficient  to supply all of  the local demand for  the cheaper 
grades of  these commodities -present or prospective in the near future-  so that the present total 
annual consumption of  these articles in this country maybe considered the same as its production 
of  them. 
Imports of  Soap and Candle Materials and Products: 
5. The local soap-and-candle factories  utilize chiefly  (1) beef  tallow (2) aluminum silicate (3) resin, 
and (4) soda ash (bicarbonate of  soda) as raw materials for  soap; and (1) stearin, (2) paraffin 
wax, and (3) candle wick for  candles. Of  these materials, tallow and resin are produced locally 
-the remainder are imported. The following  tables show the available Salvadoran import data for 
these raw materials and for  the quasi-competitive finished  products (soap and candles) although 
the latter actually are of  better grade than the local wares; the tables cover the calendar year 1933 
with Salvadoran Colones converted into American Dollars at the rate of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the 
average value for  the year, and with weights in gross kilos and American pounds: 
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Table II .3.5 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF SOAP AND CANDLE MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS 1933 
Gross weight Value 
Kilos Pounds Colones Dollars 
(a) Raw Materials: 
Resins Gums and Vegetable 
Wax 
United States 3485 7667 3497 1200 
Great Britain 3018 6640 1540 600 
India 1865 4103 1223 400 
Germany 1531 3368 1215 400 
Italy 58 128 51 -
Honduras 19 42 16 -
Spain 3 7 1 -
Total 9979 21955 7543 2 600 
Stearine 
United States 73521 161746 33875 11500 
Netherlands 39269 86392 18 845 6400 
Germany 1075 2365 591 200 
Other countries 2032 4470 1122 400 
Total 115897 254973 54433 18500 
Paraffin 
United States 413844 910457 106010 36000 
Germany 12897 28373 3 418 1200 
Great Britain 19 42 28 -
France 1 2 1 -
Other countries 10074 22163 2496 900 
Total 436 835 961037 111953 38100 
Bicarbonate of  Soda 
Great Britain 27780 61116 5367 1900 
United States 9345 20559 3308 1200 
Germany 2829 6224 680 200 
Italy 330 726 217 100 
Russia 1128 2482 166 -
Other countries 70 154 124 -
Total 41482 91261 9 862 3 400 
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Total 11 24 15 
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Import Tariff  on Soap-Candle Materials and Products: 
6. The Salvadoran tariff  protection schedules on the soap-and-candle raw materials and on finished 
products (soap and candles) levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars payable at 02.20 
per $1.00: that is, at a discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of  02.49 
3/4 per $1.00, follows: 
(a) Raw Materials: 
Tallow, beef 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $35 00 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 14.00 
The actual tariff  rate of  $0.14 per American gross lb. provides a protection of  around 175% to 
the Salvadoran cattle growers based upon an average of  $0.08 per American lb. for  their recent prices 
for  beef  tallow to the local soap-and-candle makers of  015.00 ($6.00) to 025.00 ($10.00) per 100 
Spanish lbs. or 1014 American lbs. varying seasonally and converted at 02.49 3/4 per $1.00. 
Aluminum silicate. 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $18.60 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 7.44 
Common tar. 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $7.20 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 2.88 
The Salvadoran Tariff  Book provides that imports of  resin from  (1) Honduras under the 
Salvadoran-Honduran treaty and (2) the other Central American countries (both cited in the 
Introduction to this despatch) as shown on page 228 are free;  therefore  the actual tariff  rate of  about 
$0.03 per American gross pound provides a protection of  around 100% to both Salvadoran and other 
Central American pine timber cutters based upon their present average price for  resin to the local 
soap-and-candle makers of  around $0.03 per American lb. calculated from  07.00 ($2.80) per 100 
Spanish lbs. or 101.4 American lbs. as converted at 02.49 3/4 per $1.00. 
(b) Finished Products; Soaps 
Rate: 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $26.80 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 10.72 
The actual rate for  ordinary soaps of  about $0.11 per American gross lb. or approximately $215.00 
per short ton of  2 000 American lbs. provides an average protection of  around 165% to the 
soapmaking activities of  the Salvadoran soap-and-candle makers based upon their present average 
price to retailers of  about $130.00 per short ton of  soap. 
(c) Finished Products Candles: 
Rates 
Nominal per 100 Actual per 100 
gross (kilos) gross (pounds) 
Candlesticks and candles, made of  unclassified 
materials $32.00 $12.80 
Candlesticks, candles and tapers of  natural wax $250.00 $100.00 
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The actual rate of  about $0.13 per American gross lb. or approximately $255.00 per short ton of 
2.0000 American lbs, provides an average protection of  around 65% to the candlemaking activities 
of  the Salvadoran soap-and-candle makers based upon their present average price to retailers of 
about $395.00 per short ton of  candles. 
VII. CIGARETTES 
Today there is only one cigarette mill manufacturing  machinemade cigarettes in El Salvador; it is 
called "La Cigarrería Morazán". 
CONFIDENTIAL: 
It is an American interest as it is controlled by the British-American Tobacco Co., Ltd., of 
Louisville, Kentucky. 
END CONFIDENTIAL: 
Through various corporate purchases and consolidations the former  competing factories  have 
been eliminated so that major expenditures for  "goodwill" represent the greatest part of  the present 
plant investment. However, two additional mills now are being constructed in this country by local 
firms;  it is expected that they may commence manufacturing  about March 1st of  this year. 
Furthermore, native vendors in the markets -mostly women operating independently as a sideline 
activity- roll cigarettes by hand for  direct-to-consumer sales; their output supplies about five-sixths 
of  the country's cigarette demand as the machinemade products are subject to heavy discriminatory 
internal taxes designed to favor  the manual fabricators.  The Salvadoran tariff  protection under which 
both groups operate is increased by the internal levy discussed in the Consulate General's despatch 
No. 678 of  January 15,1935, on the subject "Salvadoran taxes on imports in addition to import duty" 
(Consulate File No. 631). 
Statistical estimates for  Salvadoran cigarette manufacturing  industries. 
Cigarette  mills 
1. Number of  machinemade cigarette mills 
In operation 1 
Under construction 2 
Total after  construction 3 
2. Estimated mill investment (total capital investment in buildings, machinery, etc., but excluding 
land sites) for  machinemade cigarettes: 
In operation (including goodwill) $1000 000 
Under construction 25 000 
3. Estimated employees for  machinemade cigarettes: 
In operation 200 
For mills under construction after  completion 30 
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Production and consumption of  cigarettes. 
4. Estimated annual production: 
(a) Volume: 
Machinemade (in operation) 120 000 000 
Handmade 600 000 000 
Total Volume 720 000 000 
(b) Value (at <52.493/4 per $1.00): 
Machine made (in operation at an average price of  06.25 per 
thousand equal to $2.50 formanufacturer's  price to retail 
distributors for  the price range of  06.00 to 020.00 per thousand 
or the various grades although the lowest price 
covers almost all of  the sales) $300 000 
Handmade (at 3 cigarettes per 00.01 retail) 800 000 
Total Value $1100 000 
5. Estimated plant capacity for  the annual production of  machinemade cigarettes: 
(a) Volume: 
In operation 400 000000 
Under construction 120 000 000 
Total Plant Capacity Production Volume 
After  Construction 520 000 000 
(b) Value(atequivalentofpresentaverage  manufacturer's  price to 
retail distributors or $2.50 per thousand): 
In operation $1000 000 
Under construction 300 000 
Total Plant Capacity Production Value 
After  Construction $1300 000 
(c) Percentage of  plant capacity now being utilized: 
In operation 30% 
Under construction nil 
Ratio of  Percent Plant Capacity Utilization to 
Total Plant Capacity After  Construction 23% 
6. The estimated Salvadoran total annual consumption of  cigarettes (both machinemade and 
handmade) practically is the same as the local production -720 000 000 value at $1100 000-
as imports are negligible; in other words, the local production supplies 100% of  the local demand. 
This consumption because of  the low average income is equal to only about 482 cigarettes per 
capita per annum, based upon the total Salvadoran population of  1 493 826 according to the 
Census of  1931 -a package of  20 cigarettes every ten days for  each adult inhabitant of  this country-
which in part may be ascribed to the quasi-competitive consumption here in substantial quantity 
of  cheap hand-rolled, poor-grade cigars from  Central American tobacco fabricated  and 
distributed by native market vendors in the same manner as handmade cigarettes. 
7. Estimated Salvadoran total annual consumption of  raw material (tobacco) for  local machinemade 
cigarette mill at present stock values based on c.i.f.  mill prices (including duty for  American 
tobacco): 
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Source Volume in American lbs. Value in 
Dollars 
United States 20 000 lbs. at $0.70 $14000 
Honduras 200 000 lbs. at 0.17 1/2 ($0.07) 14000 
El Salvador 20 000 lbs. at 00.50 ($0.20) 4 000 
Total 240 000 lbs. $32 000 
It has been estimated that the local handmade cigarette makers consume annually almost 900 000 
American lbs. of  low-grade tobacco and inferior  substitutes valued around $90 000 -mostly 
obtained from  Honduras but partly grown in El Salvador. 
Imports of  Tobacco and Cigarettes: 
8. The Salvadoran imports of  tobacco and cigarettes for  the calendar year 1933 with Salvadoran 
Colones converted into American Dollars at the rate of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average value 
for  the year, and with weights in gross kilos and American pounds follow. 
CONFIDENTIAL 
The Salvadoran import data for  tobacco may not be accepted as a reliable supply index as there 
is excellent reason to believe that the bulk of  the Honduran tobacco consumed locally -which is 
entered free  of  Salvadoran duty under the Salvadoran-Honduran Treaty discussed in the 
Introduction to this despatch- was not reported in the Salvadoran customs statistics largely because 
it was brought by native vendors across the mountainous border on mules. However, the available 
data follow  for  reference. 
END CONFIDENTIAL 
Table II.3.6 


























































Import Tariff on Tobacco, Cigarette Paper and Cigarettes: 
9. The Salvadoran tariff  protection schedules on the principal raw material (tobacco) and the 
finished  product (cigarettes) as well as the restrictions on the secondary material (cigarette 
paper) levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars payable at 02.20 per $1.00; that is, at 
a discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of  02.49 3/4 per $1.00, follow: 
(a) Raw Material: 
Raw Tobacco. 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $85.00 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 34.00 
This tariff  protection of  $0.34 per gross American pound amounts to approximately 170% of  the 
Salvadoran tobacco growers' average price today of  00.50 ($0.20) c.i.f.  mill of  the grades suitable for 
machinemade cigarettes; and about 485% for  the corresponding quotation for  Honduran tobacco 
of  00.171/2 ($0.07) which it must be emphasized is imported duty-free. 
(b) Finished Products: 
Manufactured  tobacco in form  of  cigarettes. 
Nominal per gross kilo $5.50 
Theoretical per gross pound 2.20 
In addition to the custom duty there is the internal tax levied upon imported cigarettes of  00.05 
($0.02) per pack of  20 cigarettes. On the basis of  1000 cigarettes (50 packs) weighing about 2.8 pound 
it may be estimated that the total Salvadoran tariff  protection of  $7.15 ($6.15 plus 02.50 or $1.00) 
amounts to about 285% of  the manufacturers'  average price equivalent to retail distributors of  $2.50. 
The handrollers provide one factor  in this country tending to keep the mill's prices from  rising any 
further;  the other is the low income which probably would tend to curtail volume at any higher prices. 
(c) Cigarette Paper Restrictions: 
Paper for  cigarettes, white or colored, with or without printing, in sheets, rolls or in coils and 
small books of  cigarette paper or in small tubes. 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos $40.00 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 16.00 
The Salvadoran Government through an import prohibition has provided that all imports into El 
Salvador of  cigarette paper (whether for  machinemade cigarettes or for  handmade ones) may be 
made only by the government as it supplies the local factories  and hand-operators with the specially 
stamped paper bearing the Salvadoran Government seal that they must use as evidence of  the 
payment of  the respective internal consumption taxes. A translation of  these import restrictions was 
enclosed with the Consulate General's report of  November 16, 1932, entitled "New Salvadoran 
Cigarette Tax and Import Restrictions on Cigarette Paper" (Consulate File No. 851.2). The 
shipments of  cigarette paper in transit through ElSalvador is prohibited as shown under Note A on 
page 223 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book. 
VIII. MATCHES 
There is only one match factory  in El Salvador; it operates under a Salvadoran government 
concession. Stocks on hand of  foreign-made  matches -which cannot compete in price now with the 
locally manufactured  ones- are being depleted gradually although selling for  almost twice the price 
of  the local product since they are better quality. The Salvadoran tariff  protection under which the 
factory  operates is not increased by the internal levy discussed in the Consulate General's despatch 
No. 678 of  January 15,1935, on the subject "Salvadoran taxes on imports in addition to import duty" 
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(Consulate File No. 631) and explained on page 2 of  the Consulate General's despatch No. 465 of 
November 8,1933, on the subject "Further developments in Salvadoran government bank project; 
and related new bank and corporation control law" (Consulate File No. 851.6) under the heading 
"Decree No. 198; Match Tax for  the Bank" regarding the then-projected but since-established 
Salvadoran Central Reserve Bank. 
Statistical Estimates for Salvadoran Match Industry 
Match  Mill: 
1. Number of  match mills 1 
2. Estimated mill investment (total capital investment in buildings, 
machinery, etc. but excluding land site) $100 000 
3. Estimated employees 200 
Production and Consumption of Matches: 
4. Estimated annual production: 
(a) Volume (in cases of  1200 packages per case containing 10 boxes 
of  30 matches, more or less, per box; i.e., about 300 
matches per package or 360 000 matches per case) 15 000 cases 
(b) Value (calculated from  the millers' price to whole- salers of 
028.00 equal to $11.20 per case convertedat 02.49 3/4 per $1.00) $170 000 
The wholesalers' price range to retailers is 029.00 to 030.00 per case equal to $11.60 to $12.00; 
the common retail price is 00.03 per box or 00.25 per package of  10 boxes equivalent to $0.01 and 
$0.10, respectively, and up. 
5. Estimated plant capacity for  the annual production of  matches: 
(a) Volume 30 000 cases 
(b) Value $340 000 
(c) Percentage of  plant capacity now being utilized 50% 
6. Estimated Salvadoran total annual consumption of  matches: 
(a) Volume 18 000 cases 
(b) Value $200 000 
7. The matchmaker has estimated that his mill consumes annually on the present schedule about 40 
tons of  imported raw materials -chemicals and paper chiefly-  expressed in short tons of  2 000 
American lbs. each and value at present prices around $18 000. He has informed  the Consulate 
General that he buys all of  his paper supplies in the United States. His wood requirements are 
purchased locally. 
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Imports of Raw Materials and Matches: 
In view of  the diversity of  the match mill's raw material requirements and the complexity of  the 
related Salvadoran import statistics, it has not been practicable to obtain accurate import data for 
these commodities -chemicals, wood, paper, etc.- but the manufacturer  has reported that his 
imports of  chemicals and paper for  the calendar year 1934 amounted to about 23 short tons of  2 000 
American lbs. each valued around $11000. The import data for  the finished  product (matches) for 
the calendar year 1933 afford  only a partial supply index as the local match mill did not operate then 
under the same schedule as at present, but follow  for  reference  with Salvadoran Colones converted 
into American dollars at the rate of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average value for  the year, and with 
weights in gross kilos and American pounds, together with the Salvadoran import class number. 
Table II.3.7 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF MATCHES 1933 
Gross Weight 
Kilos 
Wax Matches and Matches 



















Import Tariff on Raw Materials and Matches;. 
On account of  the complicated nature of  the match mills' raw material requirements for 
chemicals, wood, paper, etc., which are classified  under such a wide range of  customs items in the 
Salvadoran import tariff,  it is practicable to determine only the rate applicable to a single raw 
material (i.e., sulphur) and the rate of  the finished  product (matches) which obviously is of  far  greater 
importance commercially; the schedule levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars payable 
at 02.20 per $1.00; that is, at a discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of 
02.49 3/4 per $1.00, follows: 
(a) A Leading Raw Material: 
Sulphur in unspecified  form 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 
(b) Finished Product: 
Wax matches and wooden matches in bulk or in containers, unspecified. 
Nommai per 100 gross kilos 





In addition to the customs duty there is the internal tax levied upon imported matches of  015.00 
per case (of  1200 boxes). On the basis of  1 case of  matches weighing about 24 American lbs., it may 
be estimated that the Salvadoran tariff  totals about $9.36 per case (24 gross American lbs. at $0.14 
each equalling $3.36 plus 015.00 converted to $6.00 at 02.49 3/4 per $1.00). However, as the special 
tax of  015.00 likewise is applicable to the matches manufactured  in El Salvador, the match 
manufacturers'  tariff  protection is restricted to the import duty of  about $3.36 per case which is 
equivalent to 30% of  his wholesale price equivalent to retail distributors of  $11.20 per case. 
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IX. LEATHER AND SHOES 
There are some fifteen  leather tanneries above the grade of  household establishment in El Salvador 
-three are fairly  large for  this country. In addition there are about a score of  petty shops. Their chief 
product (sole leather) supplies the many little shoe factories  -household or bookstore cobblers' 
shops- in the country while they also make most of  the leather that is fabricated  into saddles, harness, 
belts, scabbards, holsters, bags and like leather goods in the many small handicraft  production units 
in the republic. These tanneries, cobblers' shops, and sundry leather goods "factories"  are scattered 
throughout El Salvador so that accurate statistical data are not securable. 
CONFIDENTIAL 
It is suggested that if  the Department desires more comprehensive information  regarding 
Salvadoran shoemaking -particularly for  such items as number of  shops, machinery investment, 
maximum potential output, etc.- it may be able to obtain it from  the United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation, 140 Federal Street, Boston, Massachusetts, as it is understood that practically all of 
the Salvadoran shoe "factories"  operate with machinery from  that company. Their volumes are too 
small or their reputations too unsatisfactory,  or both, to permit of  their being included in World 
Trade Directory lists under the controlling regulations. 
END CONFIDENTIAL 
For a rough indicator of  the volume of  shoes consumed in this area reference  is made to page 39 
of  the Consulate General's despatch No. 663 of  December 28,1934, on the subject "Manufacture  of 
textiles and hosiery in El Salvador" (Consulate File No. 868.11) in which it was stated that the 
estimated total Salvadoran annual consumption of  hosiery of  about 125 000 dozen pairs amounted 
to "about one pair of  hose per capita per annum based upon the total Salvadoran population of 
1493 826, according to the Census of  1931" and that "the bulk of  the local population wears neither 
hosiery nor shoês while a substantial portion of  the shod fraction  does not possess hosiery -using 
shoes for  festive  occasions as a rule. Obviously these social practices reduce the demand". As regards 
the demand for  the sundry leather goods, two accelerating features  may be noted: (1) the need for 
holsters, scabbards and belts because of  the wellnigh universal habit of  the local adult male 
population of  carrying weapons- pistols or machete-swords and (2) the current use of  riding horses 
and pack-animals requiring saddles, harness, etc., because of  the scarcity of  motor transport. 
Statistical Estimates for Salvadoran Leather Tanning Industry; i.e., Excluding Shoes and Other 
Leather Manufactures: 
1. Number of  "commercial" leather tanneries; i.e., operating on a 
commercial factory  scale thus excluding household shops about 15 
2. Estimated "commercial" mill investment (total capital investment 
in buildings, machinery, etc., but excluding land sitesi) $450 000 
3. Estimated employees 500 
Production and Consumption of Leather and Leather Products: 
4. Estimated value of  annual production of  sole leather perhaps $700 000 
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5. Percentage of  total capacity for  the production of  sole leather 
now being utilized possibly 50% 
6. The output of  the local tanneries supplies practically the entire local shoemakers' demand for 
sole leather but they commonly import their shoe upper leathers while the tanners also satisfy  the 
leather requirements of  the sundry leather goods makers. Furthermore the local demand for  shoe 
and for  the miscellaneous leather goods items is supplied by the petty local factors.  It is 
impracticable to estimate the Salvadoran consumption of  (1) leather or (2) leather goods but a 
rough estimate for  the annual shoe output (based upon the estimated annual hosiery consumption 
of  125 000 dozen pairs) might be half-a-million  pairs. A substantial number of  people in this 
country wears shoes without wearing hosiery while a pair of  shoes usually lasts considerably longer 
than a pair of  hose. A correspondingly rough estimate for  the annual value of  this shoe 
consumption (based upon an approximate adjusted average for  current local shoe retailers' price 
for  the better grades of  (1) men's shoes <215.00 ($6.00), (2) women's shoes 012.00 ($4.80) and 
(3) children's shoes 06.00 ($2.40) as converted at 02.49 3/4 per $1.00) might be around 
$2500000. 
Imports of Leather and Leather Products: 
7. The raw material (hides and skins) for  the leather tanning industry constitutes a base for  the 
leather products industries; the leather tanners' finished  product (sole leather) forms  a chief  raw 
material for  the shoemaking industry. There follow  the Salvadoran import data for  the related 
leather materials and products for  the calendar year 1933 with Salvadoran Colones converted 
into American Dollars at the rate of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average value for  the year, and with 
Salvadoran import class numbers: 
Table II.3.8 





(a) Raw Material: 
Raw Hides and Skins 
Norway 
Total 
(b) Semi-Prepared Material: 









United States 53103 116827 310 763 105 600 
Germany 4899 10778 25452 8 700 
France 2732 6010 16 937 5 800 
Hungary 216 475 2 032 700 
Netherlands 255 561 1824 600 
Mexico 267 587 1800 600 
Great Britain 122 268 1236 400 
Guatemala 18 40 19 
China 1 2 6 __ 
Other countries 718 1580 6656 2300 
Total 62 331 137128 366725 124700 
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Table II.3.8: (concluded) 
Gross weight Value 
Kilos Pounds Colones Dollars 
(c) Finished Products: 
Leather Shoes 
France 5 11 53 -
Germany 1 2 42 -
Japan 8 18 30 -
Guatemala 3 7 14 -
United States 2 4 9 -
Chile 1 2 9 -
Honduras 1 2 5 -
China 3 7 4 -
Mexico 4 10 2 -
Other countries 3 7 18 -
Total 31 70 186 100 
Leather Goods Not Specified 
United States 1606 3 533 10 549 3 700 
Germany 295 649 1 575 600 
Great Britain 170 374 897 300 
France 60 132 376 100 
Spain 33 73 147 
Czechoslovakia 17 37 146 
Mexico 10 22 136 
Japan 51 112 75 
Guatemala 7 15 50 
Honduras 12 26 37 
Chile 30 66 20 
China 14 31 15 
India 1 2 11 
Italy 1 2 1 
Other countries 147 326 403 200 
Total 2 454 5 399 14 438 4 900 
Import Tariff on Leather and Leather Products: 
8. In view of  the diversity in the local production of  various types of  sole leather, shoes and sundry 
leather goods made in this country, it is not practicable to determine with any degree of  accuracy 
the extent of  tariff  protection which the local tanners, cobblers or sundry leather goods makers 
enjoy but there follow  the principal appropriate Salvadoran tariff  schedules for  the related 
leather materials and products levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars payable at 
02.20 per $1.00; that is, at a discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of 
02.49 3/4 per $1.00. 
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X . RUM AND ALCOHOL 
There are 27 distilleries in El Salvador now producing under government territorial concessions 
protected by positive prohibitions against the import of  competitive articles but penalized by the 
assessment against them of  heavy internal liquor taxes as they collectively supply a substantial share 
of  the national government revenue. They produce three liquids; namely: (1) native liquor called 
"aguardiente" -really rum although sometimes called whiskey- (2) pure alcohol, and (3) denatured 
alcohol; all from  locally-grown sugar -the commodity discussed in the Sugar Section of  this despatch. 
A list of  these distilleries was provided in the Consulate General's report of  October 24,1934, on 
the subject "Alcoholic Beverage - Manufacturers  and Dealers in El Salvador" consulate File No. 
869.17). In view of  the dispersion of  the industry, statistical data regarding investment are unavailable 
-particularly as the cash values of  the several geographical operating franchises  issued by the 
government represent much the greater part of  their capitalizations. 
The distillers' output is restricted to the domestic demand; the rum supplies most of  the liquor 
requirements of  the native laborers. The quality of  this rum is very poor but the retail prices are low 
as they must be to meet the income limitations of  the consumers. 
For several years a project to consolidate these distilleries into a single central plant in the city 
of  San Salvador for  the production of  both beverage and fuel  alcoholic products from  local sugar 
-the latter designed to displace wholly or partially the relatively heavy Salvadoran consumption of 
petroleum products in motor and rail transport has been under consideration by the Salvadoran 
Government but without definite  results. In this connection reference  is made to the Consulate 
General's despatch No. 409 of  April 27, 1933, on the subject "The Alcohol Plant Project for  El 
Salvador indefinitely  postponed" (Consulate File No. 869.2). 
Statistical Estimates for  the Salvadoran Rum and Alcohol Distilling Industry: 
1. Number of  licenced rum and alcohol distilleries 27 
2. Production and sale of  rum and alcohol during the calendar year 
1934 according to the Salvadoran National Liquor Tax Collection 
Office: 
(a) Volume in liters: 
Production Sale 
Rum 1417319 1 347016 
Alcohol: 
Pure 103859 69430 
Denatured 114381 95969 
Total 1635559 1 512 415 
(b) Estimated value calculated from  the distillers' prices to the licenced liquor distributors and 
alcohol distributors or consumers -handled through the government taxing agencies- averaging 
about 00.35 per liter for  rum and 00.70 per liter for  alcohol: 
Production Sale 
(Colones) , (Colones) 
Rum 496000 471000 
Alcohol: 
Pure 73000 49 000 
Denatured 80000 67 000 
Total 649000 587000 
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The preceding table does not include the government taxes; to wit: 02.06 on rum, 04.12 on pure 
alcohol, and 00.40 on denatured alcohol -all per liter. There is a special reduction in the rate on 
rum to 01.06 on the excess monthly production of  a distillery exceeding 310 liters, but not exceeding 
1240 liters, with a further  reduction to 00.21 for  such production exceeding 1240 liters, but not 
exceeding 1550 liters -however, the distilleries hardly ever produce in sufficient  quantities to enjoy 
the reduced monthly-rates. 
On the basis of  retail distributors' cost prices computed from  the distillers' prices plus the 
government taxes as follows:  (1) C0.35 plus 02.06 totalling 02.41 equal to $0.92 for  rum, (2) 00.70 
plus 04.12 totalling04.82 equal to $1.83 for  pure alcohol, and (3) 00.70 plus 0.40 totalling 01.10 equal 
to $0.42 for  denaturealcohol -all per liter and converted at $0.38 per 01.00, the average rate of 
exchange for  the calendar year 1934- it may be estimated that the total wholesale value (tax-paid) 
with approximatge dollar equivalents of  the distillers' sales for  the year was as follows: 
Wholesale Value 
Colones Dollars 
Rum 3246300 1 234000 
Alcohol: 
Pure 286100 109000 
Denatured 105 600 40 000 
Total 3638000 1 382 000 
Imports and Import and Export Tariffs,  Including Import Restrictions for  Rum and Alcohol: 
3. The Salvadoran import statistics show no imports of  raw materials for  the local distilling industry 
-it operates on local materials almost entirely- nor do they show any imports of  competitive 
finished  products as the importation of  the following  articles into El Salvador is prohibited: 
(1) Rum, crude 
(2) Chemical materials and preparations of  any type designed to imitate the savour of  grape 
wines. i 
(3) Materials which may be employed in the manufacture  of  wine imitations. 
(4) Must which may be employed in the manufacture  of  wine imitations. 
(5) Pastes and powders which result from  the condensation of  wine and which may serve to 
remake it. 
(6) Preparations similar to grape wine which are not the result of  the fermentation  of  the grape 
juice. 
(7) Thick and dense wines which may be weakened in the country and sold as foreign  articles; 
and 
(8) Juices which may be employed in the manufacture  of  imitation wines. 
Furthermore, the following  articles shown on page 216 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book regarding 
distilling machinery and liquor materials may be imported only under licence from  the government 
authority: 
(1) Stills, worm coils and rectifiers;  materials and accessories for  them; and 
(2) Essences to make liquors 
Note A of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book on page 220 provides that Salvadoran rum may be exported 
form  El Salvador free  of  export duty; but it is not free  of  the various petty Salvadoran export 
development taxes therein specified  unless shipped to Honduras under Note L on page 222. 
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XI. FURNITURE 
Statistical data regarding the manufacture  of  wooden and metal furniture  and related articles in El 
Salvador are not available. Only a small proportion of  the country's population of1493  826 according 
to the Census of  1931 -perhaps a tenth- occupy residences above the mud-hut level. Patently the 
demand for  furniture  or furnishings  suitable for  civilized consumption -whether for  residential or 
commercial use- is limited although there is a small sale of  wooden furniture  which is made by 
carpenters and of  metal furniture  by metal workers in numerous petty household establishments 
scattered throughout the republic. A great deal of  this work is done only for  special orders. The high 
Salvadoran tariff  rates almost exclude imported furniture. 
Imports of Furniture: 
The Salvadoran imports of  all types of  furniture  separately listed for  the calendar year 1933 with 
Salvadoran Colones converted into American Dollars at the rate of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average 
value for  the year, and with weights in gross kilos and American pounds follow: 
Table II.3.9 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF FURNITURE 1933 
Gross weight Value 
Kilos Pounds Colones Dollars 
Wooden Furniture 







Total 23 702 
49 342 18 134 6 200 
1054 529 200 
524 386 100 
620 352 100 
167 221 100 
253 96 -
185 85 -
52 145 19 803 6 700 
Iron and Steel Furniture 
United States 5 482 
Germany 1378 
France 384 
Great Britain 109 
Mexico 259 
Guatemala 5 
Other countries 28 
Total 17 645 
Iron and Steel Beds 
United States 8 318 
Guatemala 133 
Honduras 30 
Total 8 481 
12 060 11 118 3 900 
3 032 1 299 400 
845 923 300 




16 820 13 697 4 700 
18 300 8 963 3 100 
293 57 
66 61 
18 659 9 081 3 100 
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Imports Tariff on Furniture: 
In view of  the great diversity in prices, sizes, styles et cetera of  both wooden and metal furniture 
made in this country and in further  view of  the dispersed small-scale status of  the furniture  industry, 
it is not possible to determine with any degree of  accuracy the extent of  tariff  protection which the 
local furniture  manufacturers  may enjoy but there follow  the appropriate Salvadoran tariff  schedules 
on furniture  of  all kinds, so far  as it may be listed separately, levied in gross weights in nominal 
American dollars payable at 02.20 per $1.00; that is, at a discount of  approximately 12% below 
today's commercial rate of  02.49 3/4 per $1.00. 
XII. SALT 
Statistical data regarding the manufacture  of  salt in El Salvador are not available but it may be stated 
that the local production from  petty handicraft  establishments satisfies  practically all of  the local 
consumption; there is a petty importation of  the expensive grades of  refined  table salt purchased by 
a few  wealthy residents. 
Table 113.10 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF SALT 1933 
Gross Weight Value 
Kilos Pounds Colones Dollars 
Table Salt 
Honduras 27 372 60 218 2225 800 
United States 400 880 227 100 
Great Britain 373 821 106 -
Germany 35 77 14 -
Other countries 736 1619 68 -
Total 28 916 63 615 2 640 900 
In view of  the fact  that Honduran salt is about the same as the Salvadoran product and that it may 
be imported into El Salvador duty-free  under the Salvadoran-Honduran Treaty cited in the 
Introduction to this despatch, it may be noted that the receipts from  all countries except Honduras 
shown in the preceding table amounted to less than 2 tons of  salt for  1933. 
Import Tariff on Salt: 
The Salvadoran tariff  protection schedule on salt levied in gross weights in nominal American 
dollars payable at 02.20 per $1.00; that is, at a discount of  approximately 12% below today's 
commercial rate of  02.49 3/4 per $1.00, follow: 
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Marine salt and rock or mine salt 
The two rates are the same; namely: 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 
$10.40 
4.16 
This tariff  protection of  around $0.04 per American gross pound amounts to over 350% of  the 
recent local average wholesale price for  salt to retailers of  about 06.00 ($2.40) per 200 Spanish lbs. 
or about 203 American lbs. as converted at 02.49 3/4 per $1.00 or around $0.01 per American lb. 
Statistical data regarding the manufacture  of  tiles and bricks in El Salvador are not available. Only 
a small proportion of  the country's population of  1493 826 according to the Census of  1933 -perhaps 
a tenth- occupies residences above the mud-hut level. Most of  the bettergrade homes and offices 
are constructed with tile floors;  some are equipped with tile roofs  although corrugated iron is used 
more commonly while exterior walls ordinarily are made of  plaster and interior ones of  plaster or 
wood because of  the frequency  of  earthquakes in this country. The lower grade structures generally 
are built of  adobe and corrugated iron. Obviously the demand for  tiles, whether for  flooring  or for 
roofing,  is limited and the sale of  bricks even more limited; they are supplied principally by the 
produce of  numerous small shops scattered throughout the republic. One establishment in the city 
of  San Salvador with a reputed investment in building and equipment of  around $20 000 -the chief 
tile factory  in the country- boasts of  a fair-sized  production- estimated to be less than 1 000 000 
tiles per annum. Neither the raw material (clayey earth) for  tiles and bricks or the finished  products 
are listed separately in the Salvadoran import statistics so that it is impracticable to determine the 
quantity, if  any of  competitive products imported into this country; however, it is understood that 
the local tilemakers utilize the local raw materials almost exclusively so that the import interest in 
either raw material supply or in the sale of  competitive tiles potentially is very scant. Recently a local 
tile maker has experimented with hollow bricks intended to be earthquake-proof. 
In view of  the great diversity in prices, sizes, styles, et cetera of  floor  and roof  tiles and of  bricks 
made in this country, and in view of  the dispersed smallscale status of  the tile industry, it is not 
practicable to determine with any degree of  accuracy the extent of  tariff  protection which the local 
clay producers or local tile and/or brick manufacturers  may enjoy but there follow  the approximate 
Salvadoran tariff  schedules levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars payable at 02.20 per 
$1.00; that is at a discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial rate of  02.49 3/4 per 
$1.00: 
(a) Raw Material: 
Clayey earth, not specified. 
XIII. TILES AND BRICKS 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos 
Actual per 100 gross pounds 
$18.60 
7.44 
(b) Finished Products: 
Paying tiles of  porcelain. 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos 




XIV. PRINTED ARTICLES 
There are numerous small printing-shops -mostly semi-household or backstore establishments-
scattered throughout El Salvador but statistical data regarding them are unavailable. The low 
average income and high degree of  illiteracy of  the Salvadoran population necessarily limit the local 
demand for  printed articles. There is no local production of  paper materials. 
In view of  the diversified  and small-scale nature of  the local printing industry it is not practicable 
to determine the extent of  tariff  protection enjoyed by the local printers nor the relation of  their 
output to the total consumption of  such products in this country but it may be noted that the total 
Salvadoran imports of  paper manufacturers,  comprising 10 import statistical classes, amounted 
to 0528 302 ($179 600 at $0.34 per 01.00 in 1933) of  which the share obtained by American exporters 
was 0161393 ($54 900) or 31% while there are 150 different  import classifications  for  paper and 
paper products in the Salvadoran Tariff  at various rates. The Salvadoran import restrictions on one 
item of  local commercial importance; i.e., cigarette paper, have been discussed under the Cigarette 
Section of  this despatch, while the importation of  linotype and similar machines into El Salvador is 
prohibited as shown on page 215 of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book. 
CONFIDENTIAL 
It is suggested that if  the Department desires more comprehensive information  regarding 
Salvadoran printing establishments -particularly for  such items as number of  presses, machinery 
investment, etc.- it may be able to obtain it from  the National Paper and Type Company, 170 John 
Street, New York, as it is understood that most of  the Salvadoran printing shops utilize printing 
machinery from  that company. Their volumes are too small or their reputations too unsatisfactory, 




There are three foundries  of  some importance in El Salvador which are operating on very reduced 
schedules, while numerous other small foundries  (handicraft  establishments) are located in the 
country. In view of  the scattered and diversified  nature of  the local iron working industry it is hot 
practicable to obtain much reliable data regarding it although it does supply a small share of  the 
local demand for  some of  the numerous types of  metal products used here. For one item of  a little 
local commercial consequence; namely, metal furniture,  reference  is made to the Furniture Section 
of  this despatch. As regards tariff  protection on raw materials and finished  products, more or less 
competitive, it may be noted that the corresponding sections of  the Salvadoran Tariff  Book total 
over four  hundred items at various rates. 
The following  brief  summary is applicable to the three leading mills - the "commercial" foundries-
only but is indicative of  the entire "industry": 
1. Number of'commercial"  foundries  3 
2. Estimated mill investment for  "commercial" foundries  (buildings, 
equipment, etc., including stock on hand, but excluding land sites) $60 000 
3. Estimated employees in "commercial" foundries  150 
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4. Estimated annual production of  ironware in "commercial" foundries: 
(a)Volume in short tons of  2 000 American lbs. each 320 tons 
(b) Value $60 000 
5. "Commercial" foundry  plant capacity (annual production): 
Volume in short tons of  2 000 American lbs. each 1600 tons 
XVI. LARD 
There are no lard factories  in El Salvador; but there is a relatively substantial local handicraft 
production of  animal lard (hog lard) supplied by numerous farmers  and stock-raisers who raise a 
few  hogs each for  scavengers. There is no hog-raising industry, as such, in this country as the price 
of  corn is too high to permit of  profitable  breeding while the local corn supply commonly is 
insufficient  to feed  the human population even on its low standard of  diet. In addition to the local 
lard there is a small importation of  both hog and vegetable (cocoanut oil) lards obtained almost 
entirely from  the neighboring Republic of  Honduras as they are entered into El Salvador duty-free 
under the Salvadoran-honduran Treaty discussed in the Introduction to this despatch. Several years 
ago the Salvadoran import duty on lard was raised to the present prohibitive figure  thereby 
accelerating in some degree the local hog-growing activity. Statistical data regarding the production 
and consumption of  lard in this country are not available but the following  Salvadoran import 
statistics for  1929-1931 for  hog-lard (manteca de cerdo) for  the period prior to the imposition of  the 
present duty, provide rough indices: 
Table II.3.11 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF HOG LARD 1929-1931 
Calendar 
Year 
Amount in Kilos 




1929 792 675 800 594 
1930 571980 574 439 
1931 441706 711 729 a 
a Including 190 688 kilos of  "Dutch lard" from  the Netherlands. 
CONFIDENTIAL 
The Salvadoran import statistics for  1933 show hog lard but do not show vegetable lard, which is 
classified  under the heading of  other vegetable oils, edible or inedible. Furthermore, this data may 
not be accepted as reliable supply indices as there is fair  reason to believe that Honduran hog lard, 
plus a little vegetable lard from  that country and some "Dutch Lard" from  the Netherlands sent in 
transit through it, entered into this country were not reported in these statistics largely because they 
were brought by native vendors across the mountainous border on mules. However, the available 
data follow  for  reference. 
END CONFIDENTIAL 
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The Salvadoran imports of  hog lard for  the calendar year 1933 with Salvadoran Colones converted 
into American dollars at the rate of  01.00 equal to $0.34, the average value for  the year, and with 
weights in gross kilos and American pounds follow: 
Table II.3.12 
EL SALVADOR: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF HOG LARD 1933 
Gross Weight Value 
Kilos Pounds Colones Dollars 
Hog Lard 
Honduras 952 2094 267 100 
Total 952 2 094 267 100 
The total for  Class 42 (other vegetable oils, edible or inedible) amounted to only 040,684 
($13 800). 
Import Tariff  on Lard: 
The Salvadoran tariff  protection on hog lard levied in gross weights in nominal American dollars 
payable at 02.20 per $1.00; that is, at a discount of  approximately 12% below today's commercial 
rate of  02.49 3/4 per $1.00, follows: 
Note;  For the registration of  hog lard, from  any source, it is indispensable to present a certificate 
of  purity extended by the respective Health Authority and visaed by the Salvadoran Consul 
of  the respective consular jurisdiction. 
Note:  In the absence of  the certificate  of  purity, or when it is not in accordance with the prescribed 
rules, there will be sent samples of  the lard to the Laboratory of  the General Health 
Department, all charges for  analysis for  the account of  the importer, liquidating the permit 
with a charge of  20% more on the corresponding taxes. 
The actual rate of  about $0.11 per American gross pound amounts to about 45% of  the Salvadoran 
hog-growers' present prices to relailers of  around $0.25 per lb. for  hog lard calculated from  their 
price per tin of  023.50 ($9.40) which varies considerably but recently has averaged around 020.00 
($8.00) containing 37 American lbs. net weight or about 40 American lbs. 
Rate: 
Nominal per 100 gross kilos 





W. Quincy Stanton, Esquire, 
American Consul, 
San Salvador, El Salvador. 
Sir: 
In acknowledging the receipt of  the Consulate's report dated February 6, 1935, entitled 
SALVADORAN PROTECTION OF LOCAL INDUSTRIES, in the preparation of  which 
you were assisted by Mr. Joseph E. Maleady, I take pleasure in informing  you that the 
Department, in view of  its very satisfactory  character, has accorded to it the rating of 
EXCELLENT. 
The contents of  this instruction should be brought to the notice of  Mr. Maleady. 
Very truly yours, 





4. COFFEE IN EL SALVADOR (1935) 
From: Copy of  article in English entitled "Commercial Interchange with the United States" from 
the pamphlet "El Café  de El Salvador" published by the Coffee  Growers Association of  El 
Salvador; Legación de El Salvador, Washington to Mr. Henry S. Grady, Chief,  Trade 
Agreements Section, Department of  State; January 11,1935; 611.1631/94. 
LEGACION DE EL SALVADOR 
WASHINGTON 
January 11,1935 
My dear Mr. Grady: 
Enclosed herewith I have the honor to send you seven copies of  the pamphlet "El Café  de 
El Salvador" published by the Coffee  Growers Association of  El Salvador (Associación 
Cafetalera  de El Salvador), and ask you to kindly place these pamphlets in the hands of  the 
members of  the Trade Agreements Committee, according to a request that I received from 
the Associación. 
On page 20 of  the pamphlet there appears an article written in English, under the heading 
"Commercial Interchange with The United States", which is specially dedicated to the 
Committee on Reciprocal Trade of  the United States, and with this view in mind I have been 
requested by the Associación Cafetalera  de El Salvador to distribute the pamphlet among the 
members of  the Committee of  which you are the Chairman. 
Permit me to thank you for  your courtesy in this matter, and with renewed assurances of 
my consideration and esteem, I am, 
Sincerely yours, 
(signed) 
Hector David Castro 
Mr. Henry S. Grady, Chief 
Trade Agreements Section 




In reply refer  to 
A-S/T 611.1631/94 
My dear Mr. Minister: 
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of  your letter enclosing seven copies of  the 
pamphlet "El Café  de El Salvador", published by the Coffee  Growers Association of  El 
Salvador. 
In response to your request, I have had these copies distributed to members of  the 
Committee on Trade Agreements. 
Sincerely yours, 
Henry F. Grady, 
Chief,  Trade Agreements Section. 
The Honorable 
Dr. Don Hector David Castro, 





EL CAFE DE EL SALVADOR 
REVISTA DE LA ASOCIACION 
CAFETALERA DE EL SALVADOR 
SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR, C.A. 
NOVIEMBRE DE 1954 
VOLUMEN IV NUMERO 47 
COMMERCIAL INTERCHANGE WITH THE UNITED STATES 
We now reach the point where it is necessary to review the situation as regards the interchange of 
trade between El Salvador and the United States. 
From this point of  view the circumstances of  the problem which we have been discussing vary to 
a certain extent. 
The United States of  America is one of  the few  countries in the world that has not restricted 
imports of  coffee  by means of  maximum quotas or other artificial  devices. Salvadorean coffee,  in 
unlimited quantities, may enter North American markets without any hindrance whatsoever. The 
only limitations to its sale there, in actual practice, are those arising out of  competition or due to the 
lack of  an organized system of  marketing. 
Notwithstanding the absence of  restrictions, as aforesaid,  the balance of  trade between El 
Salvador and the United States has been unfavourable  to us. It is estimated that from  1922 to 1932 
the balance, adverse to El Salvador, amounted in the aggregate to.... $32.500.000. In addition to this 
outflow,  there must also be taken into account the payments made for  the service of  the national 
loan of  1922, which have absorbed large sums. 
However, the Government of  the United States is not responsible for  this state of  affairs.  It is the 
coffee  importer with whom the decision rests and his decision is dependent on the prices demanded 
and the qualities offered  him by us. Undoubtedly, our adverse trade balance is partly due to our 
having failed  to offer  the American importers large quantities of  uniformly  graded coffees,  and in 
part also to the fact  of  their markets being glutted with heavy stocks owning to world-wide 
overproduction. 
Many persons are of  the opinion that the Government of  El Salvador should restrict imports of 
American merchandise, as an effective  means of  increasing our exports to that country. We maintain 
that no forcible  measures should be adopted in dealing with the question of  our commercial relations 
with the United States. The matter is one which should be handled with cool judgment, patience and 
in a spirit of  good will. Furthermore, we must await the effect  which perforce  will be produced by 
the differential  tariffs  promulgated in June of  this year. 
These differential  tariffs  will not be productive of  sentimental effects  in the United States, but 
eventually they should be conducive to practical, positive and visible results. The closure of  the 
Salvadorean market to Japanese goods should undoubtedly redound to the benefit  of  other countries 
which sell to us, particularly the United States. 
Apart from  this, we are bound to the United States by means of  a commercial treaty which expires 
in 1940 and guarantees to us the right of  entry for  coffee,  duty free,  into American ports. If  for  any 
reason imports of  coffee  into the United States from  other sources should decline, and we 
standardize our brands, we should be in a position to increase our sales and to obtain better prices. 
According to our information,  the policy which has been adopted by the "Associación Cafetalera 
de El Salvador" is not by any means directed towards the favoring  of  certain countries at the expense 
of  others. Its scheme of  operation aims at securing for  the nation the greatest possible profit  from 
the annual liquidation of  its coffee  crop. The factors  which determine the policy of  their Association 
are numerical calculations and sound reasons. In short, the plan of  international trade ultimately 
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becomes reduced to the defense  of  the national currency as a means of  preventing grave 
disturbances. 
Other countries may have cause for  complaint against the tariff  policy of  the United States. Other 
people may have reason to bring charges against American commercial practice. But in this respect 
El Salvador can rest satisfied,  in a general sense, insomuch as the country has neither received nor 
given any offense  in its trade relations with the United States. They have always dealt with each other 
loyally, and these just relations cannot fail  to result in the establishment of  greater facilities  for  the 
development of  commercial interchange. 
We have already mentioned that the American Customs do not penalize the entry of  coffee  into 
the territory of  the Union. Neither do the restrictive measures of  the N. R. A. affect  coffee  imports. 
The coffee  roasting trade was made subject to the regulations of  the N. R. A. since the beginning 
of  the present year. Up to the present date, according to the information  at our disposal, no 
unfavorable  reaction has been observed in the United States as a result of  such regulations. On the 
contrary, it is evident that the effects  thereof  must be beneficial,  due to the avoidance of  cut-throat 
competition between the coffee  roasters. 
The Code for  coffee  was approved on the 6th February 1932. The schedule of  cost prices for  the 
coffee  roasting trade was drawn up by the Committee for  the Coffee  Industry, in accordance with 
Code rules. This schedule contains a list of  all the factors  which must be taken into account in 
calculating the cost of  coffee  ready for  consumption. Once this cost is established, no member of 
the industry who is enrolled under the N. R. A. may sell at lower prices without violating the Code 
and thus becoming liable to the penalties thereunder. 
It is seen that the regulation of  the coffee  industry by measures adopted by President Roosevelt 
tends to secure the future  of  the coffee  trade, since it prevents the undercutting of  the selling price 
of  roasted coffee.  We have emphasized this circumstances because there is a wide-spread belief  that 
the rules laid down by the N. R. A. are prejudicial to those countries that export coffee  to the United 
States. 
Discarding the notion that the N. R. A. has so far  hindered the free  marketing of  coffee,  we can 
now proceed to analyze the possibilities which this product can have in the markets of  that great 
country. 
In the report presented at the end of  last month to the Tariff  Commission at Washington by the 
Association of  American Transportation (Steamship) Lines, mention was made of  the commercial 
relations between the United States and the Central American Republics. 
The Association protests against Japanese competition in each of  the Central American 
Countries except El Salvador, and asks that the delegates who will negotiate with these countries 
should endeavour to secure preferential  custom duties for  American products over Japanese goods. 
With regard to El Salvador the report says: 
"Japanese competition yet exists, but it seems that the problem has been satisfactorily  solved by 
the disposition of  the Salvadorean Government to establish additional duties on importations from 
countries which purchase less than 50% of  what they sell to El Salvador. This places Japan in a 
disadvantageous position and gives American exporters a substantial preference  in tariff  duties". 
The report which we insert refers  to the differential  tariffs  decreed by the Executive Power on the 
23rd of  last June. 
Undoubtedly these tariffs  are beginning to take effect.  When an increase takes place in the sale 
of  American merchandise, we may expect to receive different  treatment from  the United States, 
failing  which we shall have a perfect  right to claim it. 
By reason of  the differential  tariffs  we have anticipated many arguments in our favor.  Besides this 
we rely on the prestige which we enjoy as a debtor nation that makes every possible effort  to meet 
its payments. 
We are optimistic with regard to our commercial interchange with the United States, because we 
have always given the best that could reasonably be expected of  a nation of  modest resources. We 
trust our expectations may not fail  us. 
It was once remarked that we maintain a topsy-turvy trade with the United States and Great 
Britain, since our trade balance with those two countries is unfavorable  to El Salvador. The truth of 
this assertion is illustrated by the following  official  figures  relating to our trade with the United States: 
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Table II.4.1: 
UNITED STATES-EL SALVADOR TRADE 1922-1931 
(Colones) 
Year Import Export Balance 
1922 9 756 274.54 7495586.96 2 260684.58 
1923 13 541 116.80 13036427.32 504589.48 
1924 13.527977.56 12.665051.85 862925.71 
1925 26180388.68 5613052.37 20 567336.31 
1926 34054362.00 9 123 062.00 24 931300.00 
1927 14979664.71 2 937 721.63 12041943.08 
1928 19888881.47 7429955.98 12458925.49 
1929 18101854.89 , 7922 234.46 10 179 620.43 
1930 11599 216.00 6396180.21 5 203 035.79 
1931 7399261.00 3 434 819.00 3 964 442.00 
Totals 169 028997.65 76054 094.78 92 974 902.87 
Note:  The Colon monetary unit of  El Salvador is equal to fifty  cents U. S. Cy. 
In ten years we have purchased merchandise from  the United States to the value of 
0169.028.997.65 and we have sold in return products of  a total value of  076.054.094.78, the balance 
of  092.974.902.87 having been paid in gold. As the major volume of  Salvadorean coffee  was 
exported to Germany and the Nordic nations of  Continental Europe, from  these countries we 
transferred  gold to cover our accounts with the United States. 
This situation was of  no importance and caused no inconvenience to El Salvador so long as 
Germany was in a position to purchase coffee  unconditionally. The adjustment of  accounts was 
effected  through natural economic channels. Prosperity took care of  arranging and closing the 
different  balances as simply as a magnet under a paper brings together iron filings  as if  by magic. 
Things have changed now. The crisis has disordered economics and each country protects its 
currency as jealously as girl takes care of  her complexion. Thus it has come about that Germany 
restricts her purchases of  coffee  to the value of  what we buy from  her. 
Under the circumstances this country will be unable to pay its debit trade balance to the United 
States. The problem could be met provisionally by any of  these procedures: 
(1) Exporting gold, that is to say, releasing our reserves; (2) obtaining new credits, or (3) exporting 
products. 
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The first  formula  is illogical and unpatriotic; the second method is impracticable. There remains 
only the third, for  which reason we have maintained that there is yet another possibility, and that is 
by the protection of  our export trade. 
To this end two methods of  procedure are at present employed: (1) by means of  quotas, and (2) 
by the fixing  of  higher import duties. The system of  applying maximum quotas is both complicated 
and expensive. The practice of  increasing the import tariff  is more convenient. Such was the method 
adopted by El Salvador in an original formula  by establishing maximum, medium and minimum 
tariffs. 
Trade relations with the United States constitute the most vital point in our defensive  action. 
Imports of  American products into our country are carried on without any restriction or delay. 
Unquestionably this fact  gives El Salvador the right to claim special consideration for  its efforts. 
There is also something still more significant  and worthy of  consideration and that is, that at a time 
when the majority of  other nations have suspended payment of  the service of  their foreign  loans, El 
Salvador has made unprecedented efforts  to meet its obligations, at least in part, in spite of  a social 
upheaval which shook the whole republic and of  a hurricane which ruined much of  our enterprise. 
It is not immodesty on our part which compels us to invoke the consistently honorable record 
which El Salvador has so deservedly earned for  itself  in the past, and for  which reason it is able at 
this present time to decorously request fair  consideration of  its claims without loss of  dignity. 
Just as we have given the United States the opportunity to increase the sale of  their merchandise 
in El Salvador by barring Japanese products, it is to be hoped that the United States will in turn 
allow us some reciprocal preference. 
Something on these lines is beginning to materialize, according to the laconic cable and radio 
information  received. It is to be trusted that an equitable solution will be found  to this delicate 
problem of  our commercial interchange with the United States. 
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5. A GUATEMALAN VIEWPOINT ON TRADE AGREEMENTS (1936) 
From: Editorial Regarding the New Trade Agreement between the United States and Guatemala; 
Unnumbered Despatch from  American Consulate General, Guatemala, Guatemala to 
Secretary of  State, Washington; June 8,1936; 611.1431/207 ADT. 
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL 
Guatemala, Guatemala, June 8,1936. 
SUBJECT: Editorial Regarding the New Trade Agreement 
Between the United States and Guatemala. 
THE HONORABLE 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
WASHINGTON 
SIR 
I have the honor to enclose herewith a hurried translation of  an editorial regarding the new 
commercial agreement between the United States and Guatemala, which appeared in the May, 
1936, issue of  the Monthly Review of  the Chamber of  Commerce and Industry of  Guatemala. 
Respectfully  yours, 
(signed) 
O. Gaylord Marsh, 
American Consul General. 
Enclosure: 




American Legation, Guatemala; 
Commercial Attaché, Guatemala. 
'This document is reproduced in its original form.  Since the Spanish version was not available, this 
translation was not edited. 
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Enclosure No. 1, 
Unnumber Despatch, 
Dated: June8,1936. 
The Treaty of  Commerce With the United States 
The economic policy of  the administration of  Mr. Roosevelt, as touching international commerce 
and in accordance with the belief  that the revival thereof  constitutes a most important condition in 
the restauration of  world economy and that of  individual countries, necessarily includes the making 
of  bilateral treaties between the United States and the other nations, with special attention to the 
nations of  the American continent. 
In order to realize this part of  the program of  the present American government, Mr. Roosevelt 
received ample powers from  the Congress and has not been slow in taking advantage thereof  in the 
initiating of  negotiations with those countries having trade with the United States and in the signing 
of  agreements, which under the circumstances seemed of  greatest practical advantage to the 
signatories. 
Under this aspect it is necessary to consider in effect  the different  treaties that have been signed 
by the United States and other countries, they being the product of  sober thought, practical, apart 
from  any Utopia, of  reality and of  maximum benefit  that may be received therefrom. 
The treaty of  commerce with Guatemala is one of  the latest entered into by the United States 
with nations of  the New World, and it is not the result of  having viewed our country with scorn or 
omission, but is the most eloquent revelation of  care taken on the part of  Guatemala in obtaining 
the greatest number of  benefits  for  the national interest. It is important to point out in this respect 
that contrary to that which was the case in the majority previously signed, the negotiations were 
conducted and the agreement signed in Guatemala and not in Washington. 
Making concrete reference  to the treaty which is dated April 24th. last past and which received 
approval by the Assembly before  that high body concluded its ordinary sessions of  the year, it will 
be pointed out in the first  instance that effectively  there prevails in it a spirit of  reciprocity. In spite 
of  the contrary impression which might for  the moment be caused, the appreciable difference  in the 
extent of  the lists of  products of  each of  the parties favored  in customs treatment, that which we have 
just remarked is reenforced  by a more careful  study of  the said lists and by taking into consideration, 
amongst other things, the American economy and that of  ourselves. 
The United States is an industrial nation and furthermore  one of  the greatest powers in the entire 
world with very great diversity in its production; at the same time, it possesses an agriculture of  the 
greatest possibilities. Guatemala, on the contrary, is closely bound in its life  to agriculture, until now 
its principal source of  wealth, under conditions that, appertaining to that which proceeds from  the 
commerce of  its products abroad, make it dependent upon a very limited number thereof  (its 
products). 
With these premises, it will be observed that the products that make up the catalogue of  those 
favored  in their importation into Guatemala are far  from  comprising the very great variety of 
American production, that practically as a whole they cause no fear  of  displacement or damage to 
similar national products, and although they are objects of  concessions they all pay duties. On the 
other hand it is striking that the specification  of  the Guatemalan articles chosen for  preferential 
treatment consist practically in their totality of  our principal articles of  exportation and that with the 
exception of  a few  that have not as yet appeared to be of  great importance, they will enter the United 
States free  of  duty. 
It could be argued that while the American articles of  the list that are given effective  concessions 
in the amount of  duties payable, in fact  the United States has not extended any real concession 
inasmuch as those Guatemalan products, given free  entry under the treaty, already enjoyed that 
exemption. Nevertheless, if  a calculation be made on the basis of  customs statistics, the probable 
sum of  the latter reductions in duties in favor  of  American products would not amount to much and 
in any case the fiscal  sacrifice  would no doubt be compensated with the greater possibilities of  taking 
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advantage of  American markets with Guatemalan products and with tangible guarantee that such 
of  our significant  articles as coffee  and bananas are guarded against the imposition of  import duties 
for  a future  term. The significance  of  the latter will be appreciated by recalling the great concern 
caused a few  years ago by the danger of  both articles being made subject to customs duties a result 
of  an active campaign in that sense made by important interests in American economy. In a certain 
sense the protection conceded in the commercial agreement to bananas offers  a complete 
opportunity for  the most effective  realization of  the benefits  that the national economy must derive 
from  the more intensive exploitation of  the Pacific  coast as a result of  the recent negotiations by the 
Government with the Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala (Guatemalan Agricultural Company). 
It is needless to say that the treaty is of  singular interest to the commerce of  the country, in its 
greatest practical part, its activity of  most importance, that of  importation, and that for  many years 
the most important source of  supply has been the United States. The greater part of  the American 
products of  the list annexed to the treaty form  also, a part of  the substantial object of  business of  a 
great number of  commercial houses, and the advantage for  sale made possible by customs reductions 
will result in the last extreme in favor  of  the public consumer. 
In regard to industry, it will be sufficient  to consider the possible effects  of  the treaty under two 
points of  view: That of  the undoubted benefit  to those industries working with raw materials from 
the United States and included in the list, and that of  the competition to be suffered  by Guatemalan 
manufacturers  similar to those of  the United States which enjoy a better customs treatment under 
the agreement. While the first  benefit  is well known, we shall allude only to the industries that use 
tobacco, hides, and cotton thread- the danger of  the second injury is more than illusory, even in the 
case of  textiles, of  shirts, and of  agricultural products. 
In conclusion, it is sufficient  to affirm  that the treaty of  commerce with the United States, the first 
of  its kind subscribed by Guatemala under the present administration, and in accordance with 
purposes of  a most scrupulous and circumspect commercial policy which was made apparent by the 
denunciation of  the agreements with Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, is satisfactory  and in any 
event represents, insofar  as it concerns the interests of  Guatemalan economy, the maximum of 
advantages to be obtained. 
Translated by: OGM 
Copied by: EP. 
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6. AGREEMENT BETWEEN COSTA RICA AND THE UNITED STATES (1936) 
From: Trade Agreement with Costa Rica; Memorandum, Division of  Latin American Affairs, 
Department of  State; September 11,1936; 611.1831/125 1/2 ADT. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
DIVISION OF LATIN-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 
MEMORANDUM 
September 11,1936 
TRADE AGREEMENT WITH COSTA RICA. 
Minister Sack plans to reach Washington next Tuesday, September 15, bringing with him a 
copy of  the text of  the trade agreement as it now stands. We understand that Schedule I as 
agreed on by Costa Rica contains duty reductions on steel office  furniture,  cotton shirts, silk 
hosiery, trunks, lumber, oatmeal, evaporated milk, cornstarch, canned fish,  dried fruit,  canned 
fruits  and vegetables, chewing gum, dried milk, paints and varnishes, certain medicines and 
pharmaceutical preparations, toilet and shaving soaps, and toothpastes. This is one of  the best 
lists of  concessions we have obtained in any of  the agreements with the smaller Latin American 
countries, despite the fact  that no duty reductions on lard and flour  have been obtained. Costa 
Rica, however, we understand is willing to bind the present tariff  treatment of  wheat flour 
(equivalent to about eighty-five  percent ad valorem) and to agree not to change the present 
legislation affecting  lard, which provides annual increases in the import duty until a maximum 
rate of  .80 céntimos per kilo is reached in 1938 (on present prices, that rate would equal an ad 
valorem of  about sixty percent). 
Practically no American lard is now being shipped to Costa Rica, although in 1929 we 
shipped a half  million dollars' worth. The loss of  this business is due in large part to Costa 
Rica's deliberate attempt to become self-sufficient  as regards lard and pork products, a policy 
which requires high protective duties. As the present duty (.60 céntimos) is practically 
prohibitive, the maximum rate of  .80 céntimos will make it quite certain that little or no 
American lard will be able to enter Costa Rica, barring exceptional price changes. Costa Rica's 
agreement to bind this treatment is thus worth little or nothing. 
The agreement to bind wheat flour  represents a definite  benefit  to American agriculture, 
since it holds open on present terms one of  our few  remaining markets for  flour.  This in itself, 
in these days of  closing markets, is a concession of  some value. During the first  seven months 
of  1936, the United States shipped over 50,000 barrels of  flour  valued at $235,000 to Costa 
Rica, showing that this trade is still continuing in a profitable  way. (It is true, however, that 
most of  the flour  we are shipping to Costa Rica is milled in this country from  Canadian wheat.) 
Agriculture feels  disappointed, of  course, that the situation in the Costa Rican agreement 
as regards lard and flour  is not more favorable,  and its representatives may object to the 
agreement in its present form  and move that further  effort  to get concessions be made by our 
negotiators. It is very much doubted whether any further  efforts  would be warranted and they 
might well prejudice the success of  the negotiations, since Costa Rica has very definite  reasons 
for  not agreeing with our desiderata on lard and flour.  In flour,  it is purely a case of  revenue, 
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while with lard, she has a protectionist program which may be objectionable to us, but is 
nonetheless something which she seems to be intent on pursuing for  the time being. 
Mr. Sack has expressed a desire to meet with the Trade Agreements Committee on his 
arrival in Washington to explain personally the circumstances surrounding the Costa Rican 
negotiations. The question before  that Committee will be whether to conclude the agreement 
on the bases now proposed or whether to make further  attempts to obtain some benefits  on 
lard and flour.  The Agriculture representative may favor  the latter alternative; perhaps Mr. 
Sack's exposition of  the local situation would help to convince them that no effort  has been 
spared to get such concessions, and that any further  efforts  are apt not only to be unsuccessful, 
but also to produce an effect  opposite to that intended. There is a body of  opinion in the 
Committee, I believe, which favors  the conclusion of  agreements such as that with Costa Rica, 
recognizing that while they are not as comprehensive as we might desire, still they carry benefits 
for  many different  United States interests and represent a genuine effort  on the part of  the 
Governments concerned to cooperate with the Untied States in promoting the broad aims of 
the program. This body of  opinion will doubtless be strong enough to have the agreement 
approved in its present form,  if  that course is recommended by this Department. 
LA:EGT:FES 
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7. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND COSTA RICA (1936) 
From: Status of  Trade Agreement Negotiations; Despatch No. 1286 from  Legation of  the United 
States of  America, San José, Costa Rica to Secretary of  State, Washington; November 10, 
1936; 611.1831/135 A-J. 
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
San José, Costa Rica 
November 10,1936 
No. 1286 
Subject: Status of  Trade Agreement Negotiation 
CONFIDENTIAL Declassified  NARA 5-4-87 
The Honorable 
The Secretary of  State, 
Washington. 
Sir: 
I have the honor to refer  to my telegram No. 69 of  November 10,12 noon, reporting the 
present status of  (1) the trade agreement negotiations, and to enclose copies of  the English 
and Spanish texts of  the memorandum outlined therein, that I delivered personally to the 
Acting Minister for  Foreign Affairs,  Mr. Fernandez, on November 9, pursuant to the 
Department's telegrams Nos. 42,44 and 45. 
It will be noted that the memorandum insists on a 50 céntimo rate for  pure hog lard; requests 
the restoration to Schedule I of  canned pork, which was eliminated in the print delivered to 
Minister Sack by the Ministry for  Foreign Affairs  on September 5,1936; accepts the binding 
of  vetegable oil lard compound (which includes, also mixtures vegetable and animal fats,  and 
compounds of  animal fats  other than pure lard) and hams and shoulders, in accordance with 
note 3 to Schedule I of  the print delivered to Mr. Sack; assents to the elimination of  corn starch 
from  Schedule I, in exchange for  the inclusion therein or rosin with a 50% reduction in the 
existing tariff  rate, and the binding of  the existing rate on typewriters, calculating machines 
and cash registers; and withdraws our request for  the deletion of  paragraph 3 of  section IX, 
while adhering to the request for  the deletion of  section XVI, while adhering to the request 
for  the deletion of  Section XVI, of  the text delivered to Mr. Sack. 
Thus, except in its inclusion of  cannedpork, and its exclusion of  soda crackers and 
automobiles, the memorandum adheres closely to the instructions conveyed in the 
Department's telegrams under reference. 
It did not seem necessary to waive canned pork inasmuch as this item is one the acceptance 
of  which should not be objectionable to Costa Rica. 
Soda crackers and automobiles were not included, as discreet conversations with the 
Minister of  Finance, Mr. Gurdián, through Vice Consul Satterthwaite as intermediary, had 
disclosed that these items would probably be strongly opposed -the former  because of  the 
existence of  a small but growing domestic cracker manufacturing  industry, which it is desired 
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to protect, and the latter because increase, for  revenue purposes, in the existing low duty on 
automobiles is contemplated as a part of  a complete revision of  the import tariff  that is now 
being planned. Increase in the duties on office  machines also is contemplated, but it was 
decided to include these notwithstanding, as they are potentially much less important as 
revenue producers than are automobiles, and it is probable that even if  Costa Rica will not 
agree to bind existing low duties on them it will undertake to limit increase to a specified 
maximum which, quite apart from  any practical effect  that it may have on the volume of  trade, 
would strengthen the Schedule quantitatively. 
The binding or the present dispositions on vegetable and other lard compounds has an 
interesting aspect. These substances are supplied largely by European countries, and compete 
with American pure hog lard. If  we can peg the duty on pure lard at 50 céntimos while 
permitting the duties on the compounds to progress to 80 céntimos under the provisions of 
Law No. 11 of  May 21, 1934, we shall obviously relieve our pure hog lard of  troublesome 
competition. It may be said in this connection that there would be little hope of  getting any 
concession on pure vegetable compounds, as the national vegetable oil extracting industry now 
in process of  establishment is to be highly protected. 
Our presentation was put in the form  of  a memorandum not only in order that it might have 
clear definition,  but also because I had received from  the Foreign Office  an intimation that it 
would be desirable to present a memorandum that could be considered in detail by the whole 
Cabinet. In this connection, it is to be observed that the Acting Minister for  Foreign Affairs 
is not familiar  with the details of  the trade agreement negotiations. Further, I desire to 
demonstrate clearly to the Cabinet that it had strong arguments for  the amendment of  Law 
No. 11 to present to Congress, the difficulty  of  getting Congress to amend the law having been 
heretofore,  as the Department is aware, the principal argument of  the Ministry for  Foreign 
Affairs  against the 50 céntimo rate on pure hog lard. 
In timing the presentation of  the memorandum, I was guided by indications that I had 
obtained in exploratory conversations at the Foreign Office,  and from  Mr. Gurdián, through 
Vice Consul Satterthwaite. I had regard also to the fact,  with which I had become acquainted 
through Mr. Satterthwaite, that Mr. G. P. Chittenden, Manager of  the United Fruit Company 
in Costa Rica, who recently returned from  the United States, was intimating to the President 
in conversation that his organization would feel  more secure in carrying out its development 
program in Costa Rica, if  Costa Rica had secured continuance of  the entry of  its products into 
the United States, under favorable  conditions by effecting  an agreement. 
In presenting the memorandum I was accompanied by Mr. Satterthwaite who acted as 
interpreter. He read the Spanish text to the Acting Minister, and I left  with the Minister one 
copy each of  the English and Spanish texts. 
Following the reading of  the memorandum, I emphasized orally the importance of  the 50 
céntimo rate to us; endeavored to head off  a demand from  Costa Rica for  a 60 céntimo rate 
by observing that to insert the 60 céntimo rate into the treaty would be to perpetuate a virtual 
embargo by an instrument designed to lower trade barriers; and pointed out the desirability 
from  Costa Rica's point of  view of  facilitating  the entry of  canned pork, an important item to 
mining and other organizations beyond the reach of  a regular fresh  meat supply. I also 
indicated briefly  to him our reason for  desiring the deletion of  Article XVI. 
The Acting Minister was, as always, friendly  and receptive. He observed that he was not 
familiar  with the trade agreement negotiations, but said that he was extremely desirous of 
terminating an "ambiguous" situation and reaching complete definition  before  the end of  this 
month. He said that he would lay the memorandum before  the Cabinet immediately, and 
would give us a reply within three or four  days. 
As I indicated in my telegram under reference,  the atmosphere at the moment is markedly 
cordial, and the attitude of  the Costa Rican Government is one of  receptiveness. Considering 
this and the elements at work, I believe that there is a promising prospect of  our getting 
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substantially what we have requested, although Gurdián in the exchanges that I have had with 
him has not definitely  committed himself  to supporting a rate on pure hog lard lower than 60 
céntimos. 
I shall make prompt report by telegraph of  developments as they occur. 
Respectfully  yours, 
(signed) 
Harold M. Collins, 
Chargé d'Affaires  ad interim 
Enclosure: 




Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 1286 of  November 10, 
from  the Legation at San José 
MEMORANDUM 
In his note verbale (No. 144) of  September 25,1936, the Chargé d'Affaires  ad interim of  the 
United States had the honor to advise His Excellency the Secretary of  State for  Foreign Affairs 
of  Costa Rica that the texts of  the proposed trade agreement between Costa Rica and the 
United States were being thoroughly checked by the Department of  State of  the United States, 
and that upon the completion of  this checking, and the resolution of  the pending question of 
a concession on lard, administrative consideration of  the agreement by the Government of  the 
United States would proceed. 
The action of  the Department of  State has not reached a point where it has been possible 
for  the Department to authorize the Chargé d'Affaires  ad interim to present to His Excellency 
the Acting Secretary of  State for  Foreign Affairs  the following,  which it is hoped may provide 
a basis upon which may be brought readily to a satisfactory  conclusion the prolonged 
negotiations through which the representatives of  Costa Rica and the United States have 
pursued with devotion and good will the high aims of  the agreement. 
The Government of  the United States has given careful  and sympathetic attention to the 
question, raised by His Excellency the Secretary of  State for  Foreign Affairs  in his note No. 
505-B of  August 22,1936, to His Excellency the Minister of  the United States at San José, and 
subsequently discussed orally by their Excellencies, of  the treatment to be accorded under 
Schedule I to pure hog lard, vegetable oil lard compound and pork hams and shoulders. Both 
before  and since His Excellency's note the Government of  the United States has been regardful 
of  the points emphasized by His Excellency, expressing repeatedly its desire that the trade 
agreement should be an instrument that would be acceptable to both the legislative and the 
executive branches of  the Government of  Costa Rica. It is, therefore,  with what is felt  to be 
comprehension and understanding, linked with the earnest desire that the agreement shall be 
in all its parts practicable, and beneficial  to Costa Rica to a degree consonant with its purposes, 
that the Government of  the United States invites the Government of  Costa Rica to reconsider 
its position on pure hog lard as indicated by the note under reference,  and grant the concession 
heretofore  requested, namely, a rate of  fifty  céntimos per kilogram on this item. 
The position of  the United States on pure hog lard is dictated by the circumstance that the 
concession asked on this product is the most beneficial  feature  of  the trade agreement for 
American agriculture. The United States enjoys as much natural advantage in producing lard 
as Costa Rica enjoys in growing coffee;  and tariff  concessions on lard in trade agreements are 
to the farmers  of  the United States comparable in relative importance of  benefits  to Costa 
Rican coffee  growers. In this connection the Government of  the United States would point 
out that the requests relative to agricultural products that it has made on the Government of 
Costa Rica are unusually moderate. Despite the desirability of  lowering the Costa Rican tariff 
on flour  the United States has agreed to the binding of  the present tariff  treatment. On lard, 
the United States originally requested a rate of  24 céntimos, receding to 40 céntimos and then 
to 50 céntimos, notwithstanding that the rate was only 40 céntimos when Costa Rica agreed to 
negotiate. 
In view of  the importance of  lard to the agriculture of  the United States it is felt  that a 
concession on this product is of  paramount importance, and that the fixing  of  a rate in excess 
of  50 céntimos would render highly uncertain the prospect for  obtaining necessary clearance 
for  the agreement in the United States. Agricultural interests in the United States are certain 
to withdraw their support of  the trade agreement program unless worthwhile concessions are 
obtained on key farm  products such as lard and flour,  and the failure  of  the program is almost 
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sure to entail a return to tariff  insularity - an eventuality that would not be of  more moment to 
any country than to Costa Rica, which has a vital stake in the development and the maintenance 
of  a liberalized world trade. 
The Government of  the United States believes that Costa Rica's import figures  relative to 
lard justify  the observation that a rate of  50 céntimos would strongly serve the protective 
purpose of  Law No. 11 of  May 21,1934. These figures  show that in 1935 with the 50 céntimo 
rate in effect  imports of  pure hog lard into Costa Rica were only 489,252 kilograms, against 
I,818,226 in 1934. That even the next higher rate, 60 céntimos, provided by the law would be 
reasonably regardable by American agricultural observers of  the trade agreement program as 
virtually an embargo is indicated by the figures  for  the first  eight months of  the current year, 
which show that imports during this period have amounted to only 133,600 kilograms. 
The desire that it has had to arrive at an agreement that would be practicable for  Costa 
Rica from  the legislative point of  view has led the Government of  the United States in its 
consideration of  note No. 505-B of  His Excellency the Minster for  Foreign Affairs  to give 
particular attention to other aspects of  the effect  of  Law No. 11 on the lard situation. 
A salient fact  that has been observed is that under the 60 céntimo rate actually in effect, 
which is 20 céntimos less than the maximum provided, the ratio of  the price of  pure lard to the 
daily wage of  the worker is very high in Costa Rica, higher indeed than in any of  several 
countries for  which data have been available. 
Assuming an average wage of  two colones, the laborer in Costa Rica pays approximately 
75% of  a day's earnings for  a pound of  pure hog lard. This corresponds to a price of  about 
$1.50 a pound in the United States, for  example, one implication of  this condition, as a 
newspaper in San José recently pointed out, is that the populace is forced  to consume inferior, 
and often  unwholesome, substitutes for  lard. It is significant  that while in 1934, 98% of  the 
lard and substitutes imported into Costa Rica was pure hog lard, in the first  eight months of 
1936 only 54% was pure hog lard. Other implications are a measure of  discontent among, and 
the lowering of  the efficiency  of,  workers, accompanied by an increasing pressure from  them 
for  higher wages. It is difficult  to visualize even the moderate amelioration implied by the 
effectuation  of  the rate of  duty on hog lard requested by the Government of  the United States 
as being otherwise than acceptable to the legislative representatives of  the several groups 
affected 
Another fact  that has been observed is that the protection enjoyed by domestic lard is at 
present, and promises to continue to be, much higher than was originally intended by Law No. 
II. It was evidently the intention of  the law to add to the C.I.F. price of  imported hog lard 10 
céntimos per kilogram in 1935 and 20 céntimos per kilogram in 1936. The depreciation of  the 
colon since the passage of  the law, from  4.25 to an actual rate of  5.60 has added about 23 
céntimos to the addition of  20 céntimos provided by the law for  this year. Thus, the return of 
the tariff  rate to 50 céntimos would be, essentially, a reversion to the law rather than a departure 
from  it. 
The Government of  the United States has not failed  to consider the effect  upon the revenue 
of  Costa Rica of  the concession that it seeks on lard. It is aware that some estimates have 
envisaged a loss of  as high as 378,000 colones. These estimates would appear to have been 
reached by multiplying the number of  kilograms of  lard imported in 1934 (1,818,226) by 25 
céntimos, the difference  between the 50 céntimo rate requested by the United States and an 
average of  the 70 céntimo rate attainable in 1937 and the 80 céntimo rate attainable in 1937 
and 80 céntimo rate attainable in 1938 under Law No. 11 of  May 21,1934. It is not believed 
that this is a just method of  calculating, since, as has been shown, imports, under the restrictive 
influence  of  Law No. 11, have already dwindled to only a fraction  of  the total for  1934; and the 
logical céntimo coefficient  to employ is the 10 difference  between the requested rate of  50 
céntimos and the actual rate of  60 céntimos. Calculated on the basis of  imports in 1936, the 
customs revenue derived from  lard during the first  eight months of  this year would have been 
only about 15,800 colones less under the 50 céntimo rate requested for  the agreement than it 
has been under the 60 céntimo rate in effect.  The Government of  the United States does not 
believe that there would be any decline in revenue under the agreement. On the contrary, it 
would expect a rise, as experience with the trade agreements hitherto effectuated  shows that 
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the lowering of  tariff  rates is more than compensated by an increase in volume of  trade, which 
provides an enlarged basis for  the collection of  duties. 
Having regard to the foregoing,  the Government of  the United States feels  justified  in 
expecting that the Government of  Costa Rica will see its way to granting the moderate 
concession on hog lard that is being requested. 
Regarding vegetable oil lard compound and pork hams and shoulders, the binding of  the 
existing provisions of  Law No. 11 of  May 21,1934 and the customs tariff  of  Costa Rica relative 
to these, in accordance with note 3 of  Schedule I of  the tentative print prepared by the 
Government of  Costa Rica, and delivered to Minister Sack on September 5,1936, is acceptable 
to the Government of  the United States. 
It has been noted that canned pork, which had been included in Schedule I under a rate of 
1.30 colones kilogram, does not appear in the tentative print delivered to Minister Sack. While 
this item is of  minor importance, the Government of  the United States would be pleased to 
have it retained in the Schedule at the rate previously agreed, and would suggest that from  the 
Costa Rican point of  view it might usefully  be retained. Canned pork, owing to its relatively 
high price, is not competitive with Costa Rican fresh  pork, and is understood that there is in 
Costa Rica no canning industry with the products of  which it would complete. At the same 
time, according to consular reports, it fills  a definite  need existing with mining, prospecting, 
exploring, construction and other operations remote from  a regular meat supply - operations 
that it is often  desirable to facilitate. 
The Government of  the United States has noted attentively the mention made by His 
Excellency the Secretary of  State for  Foreign Affairs  in his note no. 505-B of  corn starch as an 
item the elimination of  which from  Schedule I would be gratifying  to the Government of  Costa 
Rica. From the point of  view of  the United States, corn starch is one of  the more important 
of  the secondary items upon which Costa Rica has granted concessions. However, the 
Government of  the United States is willing to eliminate it, and asks in exchange, in order to 
preserve the quantitative value of  the Schedule, a reduction of  50% in the existing customs 
duty on rosin, and the binding of  existing rates on typewriters, calculating machines and cash 
registers. It is understood that none of  these items is competitive with any product of  Costa 
Rica, and that they all fill  definite,  if,  at present, relatively small, requirements of  Costa Rican 
industry and commerce. 
In his note verbale of  September 23,1936, the Chargé d'Affaires  ad interim had the honor 
to request, pursuant to the instructions of  the Department of  State, that His Excellency the 
Secretary of  State for  Foreign Affairs  agree to the deletion of  paragraph 3 of  Article IX and 
all of  Article XVI of  the text of  the proposed trade agreement as delivered to His Excellency 
the Minister of  the United States at San José on September 5,1936. The Government of  the 
United States appreciates the attention that this request has received, but now withdraws that 
part of  it relating to Article IX. It, however, adheres to that portion relating to Article XVI, 
the elimination of  which is desired for  technical reasons. 
Rounded out and completed on accordance with the foregoing,  the trade agreement will 
be a truly reciprocal instrument under which through fair  exchange of  concessions the United 
States and Costa Rica both obtain worth while benefits.  For the United States it will mean 
reasonable opportunity for  the moderate expansion or stabilization of  considerable parts of 
its export trade with Costa Rica. For Costa Rica it will guarantee continued free  entry into 
the largest single market actual or prospective in the world for  all of  Costa Rica's key products, 
and either continued free  entry or stimulating reduction in tariff  rates for  the secondary 
Eroducts that Costa Rica is prepared to supply in quantity. Beyond this, the agreement will e a joint contribution by two sister republics of  the Western Hemisphere to further  the 
liberalization of  world trade that is the high aim of  the trade agreements program. Hence the 
Government of  the United States feels  justified  in hoping for  the favorable  and early action of 
the Government of  Costa Rica. 




B. EVALUATION OF RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
8. REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT WITH COSTA RICA (1938) 
From: Review of  Developments Resulting from  the Costa Rican-American Trade Agreement. 
Required Report from  Consul Horatio Mooers, American Consulate, San José, Costa Rica; 
February 12,1938; 611.1831/216 AKFC. 
Required Report 
(Submitted in compliance with the Department's mimeographed instructions of  June 2, 1936, 
(File No. 611.0031/2844), and December 17,1937, (File No. 611.0031/3088A). 
REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM THE COSTA RICAN-AMERICAN 
TRADE AGREEMENT 
From: Consul (signed) 
Horatio Mooers 
American Consulate, San José, Costa Rica. 
Date of  completion: February 12,1938 
Date of  mailing: February 12,1938. 
FOREWORD: 
The trade agreement between the United States and Costa Rica, as the Department is aware, 
became effective  August 2, 1937. The Consulate on August 7, 1937, submitted a report of 
developments following  immediately thereafter,  a period necessarily limited to five  dây's time, and 
on November 21,1937, submitted a more detailed report covering developments for  the first  four 
months following  the treaty's inauguration1 Less than three months have elapsed since the date of 
that report during which almost no developments worthy of  discussion have come to the front.  The 
Consulate has interviewed prominent importers and business men, including the Secretary of  the 
San José Chamber of  Commerce, but has been unable to obtain any outstanding information  not 
already reported. It will, therefore,  be impracticable to attempt an exhaustive discussion of  the 
subject at this time. In compliance, however, with the Department's request that some direct 
comment be supplied applicable to each interrogation contained in the original questionnaire,2 the 
topical headings contained therein will be dealt with briefly  at this time. 
1 "Development Relating to Reciprocal Trade Agreements," dated November 19, 1937, (mailing date), by Consul 
John B. Ocheltree, File 631 
2 Attached to Departments Instruction of  June 2,1937, File 611.0031/2844. 
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1. (a) Effects  of  the Trade  Agreement,  to date,  on the competitive position of  American exporters,  in 
general,  in the market,  and  (b) on the trade  and  industry  of  the country: 
It has not been ascertained that the competitive position of  the American exporter has materially 
changed. To date, no trade enquiries verbal or written, addressed to the Consulate, have brought 
up the trade agreement in any way, with the exception of  one written protest received from  an 
importer of  canned tuna fish  (see page 5 of  the Consulate's report dated November 19, 1937, 
identified  on previous page, who held that, although canned tuna fish  was not mentioned by name 
under Ex. 118 of  the agreement, which provided a lower rate of  duty for  certain other kinds of  canned 
fish  identified,  the same and lower duty should obtain. The local customs officials,  however, stuck 
to the letter of  the agreement and assessed the regular and higher duty. 
The introduction of  canned tuna fish  into Costa Rica from  the United States is a relatively small 
item of  importation as compared with salmon and sardines for  example, which may account for  the 
fact  that it was not referred  to by name in the final  draft  of  the agreement. There is nothing new to 
report at this time in so far  as the agreement affects  the trade and industry of  the country from  a 
competitive point of  view. 
As previously reported, the agreement has, without doubt, stimulated the retail trade in certain 
classes of  goods, particularly sardines and other canned foods,  raisins, and dried miscellaneous 
fruits,  some preserved meats, lard, paints, hosiery, and pharmaceutical products. As already 
reported, from  15 to 20% more lard (estimate) is now being imported, and local retail prices for 
hosiery have dropped 30% in some cases, with about a 20% drop in the case of  retail prices for 
certain pharmaceutical products which naturally include tonics and household remedies, tooth paste 
and antiseptics. 
In a word, many of  the articles required daily by the average American family,  and long considered 
as necessities, have now been brought to the attention of  Costa Ricans at lower prices than were 
previously possible and, in consequence, are gradually emerging from  the "luxury" classification  to 
find  a place in the needs and within the means of  many local families  of  average means and 
better.3 At a later date when official  importation statistics covering the year 1937 are available it will 
then be possible to draw conclusions based on increase in imports shown as effected  during the last 
six months of  the year and as over a similar period for  1936. At the present time, the opinion of 
importers and business men must be used almost entirely in commenting. According to Uribe 
and Pages, San José, probably the largest wholesale importers of  general merchandise in Costa Rica, 
the effects  of  the agreement are particularly to be remarked, as stated, with reference  to canned 
foods  and dried fruits.  Of  the canned goods American-packed sardines, probably the best selling 
preserved food  of  any imported, have been introduced in ever increasing quantities, working toward 
the exclusion of  other foreign  brands, particularly those from  Norway and Japan. 
This does not generally apply, however, with regard to most canned foods,  which are still too high at current retail 
prices to be sold in any quantity, or even to the average resident foreigner  with larger earnings and favorable  exchange 
advantages. The following  are current retail prices quoted representative stores in San José for  goods that are inexpensively 
sold in the United States. 
Condensed Milk Sells here for  Colones 1.00 per can or $0.18. When three cans are 
purchased at once, some stores sell for  Colones 2.00 or $0.36 
Canne Soups, standard brands, 
(10 cents in the United States) 
Cornflakes 
All Bran breakfast  food 
Asparagus (medium sized tins) 
Salmon (mediocre brands) 
Anchovies 
Cocomalt, (1 lb. tins) 
Icing Sugar (per lb.) 
Canned peaches and pears, medium tins 
Sell here for  Colones 1.50 a can, or $0.27 
Sell here for  Colones 2.50, or $0.45, per 2 boxes 
Sells here for  Colones 1.50 a box or $0.257 
Sells 3 cans for  Colones 6.65 or $1.20 
Sells for  Colones 2.50 a can, or $0.50 
Three small tins for  Colones 2.75 or $0.50 
Sells here for  Colones 3.75 or $0.65 
Sells for  Colones 1.75 or $0.32 
Sells for  Colones 2.75 a can, or $0.50. 
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2. Attitude  and  comment in regard  to the operation of  the agreement: 
There is nothing in particular to record at this time applicable to comment on the part of 
government officials,  the press, business leaders and organizations or American commercial 
representatives. Practically no comment so far  has been registered for  or against the agreement. 
The Secretary of  the San José Chamber of  Commerce, for  example, when interviewed, avoided 
making any direct comment but gave the impression that he had no criticism to offer.  This, in effect, 
appears to be the sentiment prevailing generally in San José. The Consulate has received somewhat 
more calls from  American business men of  late than appears to have been the case a year ago this 
time. Again, it would also appear that American travelling salesmen are more definitely  taking 
notice of  the Costa Rican market than formerly  and in cases are writing advance letters to advise 
the Consulate of  the dates of  their projected arrivals. One large paint firm  on the Pacific  Coast is 
sending a representative here for  an extensive canvass, to be effected  in March. On the other hand, 
trade enquiries received during the past five  months have made no reference  whatever to the 
existence of  the trade agreement and the Consulate is not in a position to know whether these letters 
were written partly or wholly by reason of  the agreement now effective. 
3. Manner  in which the foreign  government  (  Costa  Rica) is carrying out the letter and spirit of  the trade 
agreement: 
There is, so far,  nothing to indicate that the Costa Rican Government is intentionally failing  to 
carry out the agreement. Both the Legation at this writing is in conversation with the Foreign Office 
over an apparent contravention of  Article 4 of  the agreement, since the Government of  Costa Rica 
is imposing a consumption tax on beer from  the United States, 100% more than the consumption 
tax levied on domestic beer. There is no reason to believe that this is anything more than an oversight 
or misinterpretation on the part of  the Costa Rican Government. As stated above, there have been 
no complaints received at the Consulate, apart from  one importer of  tuna fish. 
4. Important  developments  affecting  the operation of  the trade  agreement: 
There has been no new legislation authorized affecting  the trade agreement (not already carefully 
reported), and no establishment of  competing industries, although there is competition from  third 
countries inasmuch as Japan is persistently competing in the exportation to Costa Rica of  cheap 
textiles (including hosiery) and canned fish  particularly sardines. Germany, also, competes 
principally in pharmaceutical products. It will be remembered that sales of  many German-made 
products are materially assisted by the askimark compensation plan. In the case of  pharmaceutical 
goods, for  example, in which incidentally all glandular products of  German origin are well 
established on the local market, local retail prices in many cases are somewhat below those charged 
for  pharmaceutical products of  American manufacture.  Again, England competes with the trade 
agreement in the sale of  woolens, British woolens being generally preferred  here to American 
woolens, in spite of  the fact  that they are more expensive to the purchaser. As some apples and 
grape-fruit  are imported from  Chile, this country also may be said to compete slightly with the 
agreement, although in a minor degree. 
Immediately official  importation statistics are available for  1937, a more complete picture of  the 
situation will be possible. 
As far  as the matter of  exchange and financial  developments in Costa Rica are concerned, there 
is little new to report. Foreign exchange was plentiful  throughout 1937 and continues plentiful  at 
this writing. During 1937 the government materially simplified  the routine procedure followed  in 
applying for  foreign  drafts,  with the result that former  and reiterated complaints over the extended 
period required to obtain dollars for  the payment of  imports effected  are no longer heard. The 
Federal Government realized a very satisfactory  revenue return for  1937, taking in about Colones 
40 000 000 or Colones 4 000 000 more than during 1936. Increased importations, particularly those 
brought in toward the close of  the year and after  the entry into effect  of  the trade agreement, 
accounted materially for  the additional revenue received. In short, the Government is well satisfied 
with its state of  finance,  and annual reports from  the five  principal banks give proof  in turn that the 
banks are also in a sound condition. At the close of  January 1938, partly due to the unsettled and 
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falling  coffee  prices, collections were reported as slow and credits as easy for  bona fidé  parties. The 
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica early in the year set the rate for  dollars (on which the rates for  foreign 
currencies are established) at Colones 5.61 (buying) and Colones 5.62 (selling). This rate did not 
vary materially during the past 12 months. The established rate for  uncontrolled drafts  during the 
week ended February 12th 1938 was Colones 5.65 (buying) and Colones 5.68 (selling). During 1937 
quotations at times touched Colones 5.72 (buying) and dropped as low as Colones 5.60 (selling). 
The present quotation for  the askimark (German compensation plan) is Colones 1.63, or a 
discount from  the gold mark of  27.6%. 
The askimark did much to influence  Costa Rican exporters to purchase goods in Germany 
throughout 1937, and materially competed with the trade agreement in certain lines of  manufactured 
goods, and principally photographic supplies, cameras, chemicals, pharmaceutical products, 
cement, steel, iron, and other unprocessed construction materials. The future  of  the askimark in 
Costa Rica as a boon to the importer is open to speculation, and the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 
local clearing house for  the askimark, has recently decided to hold only enough askimarks on hand 
to meet demands already registered. In other words, there will evidently be no desire this year on 
the part of  the bank to stock up with millions of  askimarks as was the case during 1936. As Germany 
took 97,000 bags of  Costa Rican coffee  during last year under the quota system, and is one of  Costa 
Rica's best coffee-buying  customers, exporters feel  that this market must at any rate be protected 
and preserved. 
5. General Trend  of  the Government's  Commercial  Policy: 
There is nothing tangible to report under this item at the time, with the exception that, instead of 
receding from  the basic purposes and objectives of  the trade agreement with the United States, Costa 
Rica appears definitely  interested in eventually effecting  agreements with other countries of  which 
probably the first  to be considered will be Great Britain. It is recalled that Great Britain is a principal 
market for  Costa Rican coffee,  and that genuine anxiety is manifest  at this time on the part of  coffee 
shippers, concerned with the stability of  the English coffee  market now fluctuating  and classed as 
"very dull". Were an agreement to be drawn up with Great Britain, it is evident that the main purpose 
of  the local government would be to safeguard  the coffee  and banana markets in that country, since 
these products, with cacao, make up the principal exports of  the Republic and the basis upon which 
its economic stability rests. Nothing official  has been published or stated with regard to the proposed 
treaty with Great Britain, but rumors appear occasionally in the local press and on the street to the 
effect  that pressure is being brought upon the Government to consider the matter at an early date. 
6. Attitude  and  Comment  of  Government officials,  local  business leaders  and  organizations,  and  the 
press in regard  to the trade  agreements  program of  the United  States: 
There is nothing new to report under this heading, except to reiterate what has been stated under 
(2) above. 
Original and four  copies to Department. 
One copy to Mission, San José. 
One copy to Commercial Attaché, Panama. 
631 
HM/ml. 
Sources  of  Information: 
1. A review of  all preceding reports submitted and 
2. Informal  interviews with local business men, importers, officials,  Secretary of  Chamber 
of  Commerce, and others. 
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9. REPORT ON THE AGREEMENT WITH GUATEMALA (1938) 
From: Semi Annual Report on Reciprocal Trade Agreement; from  Consul General Walter F. 
Boyle, Guatemala, Guatemala; July 1,1938; 611.1431/220. 
REQUIRED 
(In compliance with the Department's mimeographed instruction of  December 17,1937, File No. 
611.0031/3088A) 
SEMI ANNUAL REPORT ON RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENT 
From Consul General Walter F. Boyle (signed) 
Guatemala, Guatemala Date of  Completion: July 1,1938. 
Date of  Mailing: July 1,1938. 
The trade agreement with Guatemala afforded  but little opportunity for  tariff  reductions. Coffee, 
bananas, and chicle, the three principal exports, were on the American free  list for  many years before 
the trade agreement programme was authorized. The value of  the agreement with Guatemala lies 
chiefly  in the good will evidenced in its making, and the stabilizing effect  of  its guarantees against 
practices likely to be unsettling to trade. 
Competitive  Position of  American Exporters. 
The extra favorable  competitive position temporarily accruing to the United States under the 
agreement to a large extent has been leveled out by most favored  nation treaties with such major 
commercial countries as Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands, and Sweden. The only major commercial countries appearing not to have a most 
favored  nation treaty are Great Britain and Japan. It should not be overlooked that the United States 
and the other countries enjoying most favored  nation treatment occupy a strong competitive position 
because of  those sections of  the agreement guaranteeing against inequitable concessions to third 
countries, exchange control, and other factors  unsettling to trade. 
Effect  on Trade  and  Industry  of  Guatemala. 
Guatemala naturally hopes for  benefit  by the increased taking of  Guatemalan products by the 
United States. But inasmuch as her outstanding products were on the American free  list long before 
the agreement, it would seem manifest  that any increase would represent a change in American taste, 
or some deficiency  in the normal supply usually bought from  other countries, rather than the effect 
of  the agreement. Normally coffee  represents about eighty per centum of  the exports of  Guatemala, 
and it is to be borne in mind that the United States has reciprocal arrangements with the other great 
American coffee  producing countries. Hence even though coffee  is bound on the free  list, the 
competitive position of  Guatemala for  American trade in its principal product holds the same 
relative position with its chief  competitors as before  the agreement was made. The good will, 
understanding, and security in trade relations springing from  the agreement undoubtedly have an 
effect  on trade and industry which cannot be measured statistically. Guatemala is not an industrial 
country. The great bulk of  the population live on a very simple and even primitive scale, and the 
per capita purchasing power is very small. The lesser towns and rural communities are 
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self-contained  to a surprising degree. It cannot be said that the trade agreement has aroused any 
tendency to change the industrial status of  the country. 
Attitude  of  Responsible Government Officials. 
As repeatedly noted in former  reports, the agreement has come to form  such a normal part of 
the commercial life  of  the country that it is no longer the subject of  comment or discussion by 
responsible government officials,  business men, or the community in general. It is not the wont of 
local business men or the community in general to express opinions contrary to those inspired by 
the Government. Healthy and normal trade conditions do not tend to evoke comment and 
discussion. 
Attitude  and  Comment  of  Local Business Leaders  and  Organizations. 
Business leaders, organizations, and the public in general are not prone to express opinions at 
variance with the pleasure of  the government, unless the provocation is acute. This will help to 
explain the absence of  unfavorable  comment. The absence of  all comment would seem to clearly 
indicate that the trade agreement has become an accepted part of  every day business life. 
Attitude  and  Comment  of  the Press. 
Close scrutiny has failed  to disclose any press comment whatever relative to the agreement. Press 
comment on the making of  trade agreements with other countries has been merely a relation of  the 
terms of  the treaty without comment thereon. As the press of  Guatemala conforms  strictly to the 
wishes of  the government, its utterance are usually taken as inspired. 
Attitude  and  Comment  of  American Commercial  Representatives. 
Commercial representatives of  the few  lines conceded an actual tariff  reduction seem to be 
particularly favorable.  The attitude of  other representatives of  American trade, though tinged with 
regret that their own liens were not favored  with a tariff  reduction, seem to be well pleased because 
of  the stabilizing features  of  the treaty applicable to trade in general. 
Manner  in Which  Local Government Is  Carrying  out Letter  and  Spirit  of  Agreement. 
Several presidential decrees revising and stiffening  the documentary requirements for  imports 
into Guatemala, with heavy fines  for  non-compliance, were mentioned in the last report by this office 
as giving rise to considerable misgiving as to the spirit with which the government intended to carry 
out the agreement. However, these decrees seem to be working chiefly  in securing the stricter 
documentation desired. On the whole importers seem to have arranged with their principals in the 
United States to comply with the letter of  the decrees. 
Arrangements  Contemplated  with Third  Countries. 
With most favored  nation treaties now in effect  with Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Sweden, but little room is left  for  promoting new agreements. 
It is to be noted that there is no agreement with Great Britain. 
Although coming more within the scope of  a political report, it may not be out of  order to mention 
that the old dispute with Great Britain relative to Guatemalan claims to ownership of  the Colony of 
Belize is receiving a great deal of  obviously government-inspired newspaper publicity. That this 
influences  the slowness to accord Great Britain most favored  nation trade treatment would seem 
plausible. 
The other outstanding commercial nation not having most favored  nation treatment is Japan. At 
present Japanese goods are subject to the surcharge imposed on countries whose exports to 
Guatemala increase abnormally without a corresponding increase in takings of  Guatemalan 
products. 
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New  Legislation. 
Although there has been considerable minor regulatory trade legislation by presidential decree, 
a close examination would indicate that none of  it has been influenced  by the agreement. 
Establishment  of  Competitive  Industries. 
Guatemala is not an industrial country in the sense of  factory  products. The scale of  living of  the 
masses is very simple and at times even primitive. Imports usually run at about five  dollars per capita 
per annum. The trade agreement does not seem to have influenced  the establishment of  any industry. 
The concession under the agreement to such things as mango and guava pastes and pulps and 
fresh  pineapples, etc., do not seem to have worked to the building up of  an export trade therein. It 
is to be recalled in this connection that a more liberal concession on these products is made to Cuba. 
Competition  from  Third  Countries. 
The failure  of  Guatemala to accord most favored  nation treaty to Great Britain, and the surcharge 
against Japanese goods because of  the unfavorable  balance of  trade, naturally give American goods 
a handicap over the manufactured  goods of  those countries. However, as the great group of  major 
commercial countries now have most favored  nation treatment, the United States enjoys no 
particular advantage in competition with such countries. Germany, with its so-called "aski" marks, 
amounting in effect  to an export bounty, occupies a very favorable  position. However, as long as the 
United States takes its usual share of  Guatemalan coffee,  bananas, and chicle, it would appear that 
directly or indirectly Guatemala must purchase the value thereof  in the United States. This, of 
course, is not without its unsettling features  as regards individual items. 
Exchange and  Finance. 
The heavy decline in world coffee  prices, said to have been brought about by the practical 
abandonment of  the Brazilian coffee  valorization policy, has placed a severe test on the financial 
and exchange policy of  the Guatemalan Government. With most of  the big coffee  "fincas"  carrying 
mortgages regarded as unpayable as regards principal, and with every prospect of  at least partial 
default  in interest payments, there has naturally been a great deal of  pressure for  currency inflation. 
However, the government has steadily maintained its stable financial  policy having as its basis a 
balanced budget and maintaining the exchange value of  the quetzal at par with the dollar. 
General Trend  of  Guatemalan Commercial  Policy. 
The immediate commercial policy of  Guatemala is based on finding  a market for  its coffee  which 
makes up about eighty per centum of  its exportable wealth. 
By virtue of  its railways, steamships, wide organization, and marketing facilities  in the United 
States, the banana business is in the hands of  one big American company. The overshadowing 
position of  this company therein necessarily relieves the government from  any particular primitive 
commercial policy with relation thereto. 
Chicle, the third but on the whole a rather minor export, is dominated very largely by a single 
American corporation. The government policy, therefore,  is chiefly  that of  making favorable 
contracts for  exploitation and the protection of  its revenues. 
The policy of  the government may be summed up as the extension of  the most favored  nation 
tariff  treatment to any and all countries offering  an actual market for  Guatemalan coffee,  particularly 
if  such country will agree to a minimum quota for  its own consumption. 
Official  and  Business Attitude  on Trade  Agreement. 
The reporting office  has talked with business leaders and has followed  the press. It is his opinion 
that both the press and the business world have but little interest in the general policy of  the American 
trade agreement programme save as it directly affects  the trade of  Guatemala. 
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Statistics. 
Following this caption are some import tables of  the principal articles on which there was an 
actual tariff  reduction on the part of  Guatemala. 
Notwithstanding the tariff  reduction, powdered milk and cream, varnishes prepared with oil, and 
prepared enamels and lacquers seem to show but little more than what might be called the normal 
fluctuation  of  trade. 
While prepared cereals showed a remarkable increase from  1936 to 1937, the 1937 level would 
appear to be only the normal growth of  trade as compared with 1934 and 1935. 
The increase in motor vehicle tires, notwithstanding the tariff  reduction of  practically fifty  per 
centum, has advanced in just about the same percentage as the imports of  motor vehicles, and it is 
to be noted that although the duty on motor vehicles was bound at the existing rate, there was no 
tariff  reduction thereon. 
As regards radio receiving sets, there seems to have been a very satisfactory  increase, though it 
is to be noted 1936 was greater than 1937. Also it is to be noted that while American imports dropped 
from  1936 to 1937, those from  Germany increased. 
The most favorable  increase appears to have been in that of  metal furniture.  Just how much of 
this increase is represented in Guatemalan Government purchases for  new buildings and for  newly 
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C. THE END OF SPECIAL TRADING RELATIONSHIPS 
10. RENEGOTIATION OF THE AGREEMENT WITH GUATEMALA (1954) 
From: Renegotiation of  Trade Agreement with Guatemala; Department of  State Instruction No. 
A-120 to Amembassy, Guatemala; December 7,1954; 411.1431/111854 CS/S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION 




No.:A-120, December 7,1954 
Subject: Renegotiation of  Trade Agreement with Guatemala 
Reference:  Embassy's Despatch No. 422 of  November 18,1954. 
To: Amembassy GUATEMALA 
In reply to the Guatemalan memorandum proposing renegotiation of  the bilateral 
agreement, the Embassy is requested to inform  officially  the appropriate Guatemalan 
representative that the U.S. Government would not be willing to undertake such renegotiation 
since it is this Government's general policy not to negotiate bilateral trade agreements outside 
the framework  of  the GATT. The Department believes that it would be in the overall interest 
of  Guatemala to negotiate for  accession to the GATT at such time as the Contracting Parties 
arrange a round of  negotiations or under such procedures for  accession of  new countries as 
the Contracting Parties shall determine. Guatemala would be assured in its won right of  the 
benefits  of  world-wide reductions in restrictions against its export trade in return for  trade 
concessions on its part, without sacrificing  the prospects of  achieving its desires for  economic 
development and higher living standards for  its inhabitants. Many underdeveloped countries, 
including such other Latin American countries as Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay are now participating in the GATT, which includes an 
article (Article XVIII) specifically  intended to enable protective measures to be used where 
necessary in conjunction with economic development programs. 
The Contracting Parties are, moreover, engaged in a revision of  GATT including 
consideration of  various proposals for  the liberalization of  the procedures under Article XVIII 
with the view toward further  facilitating  the adoption of  protective measures for  purposes of 
economic development by countries such as Guatemala. It would, therefore,  appear to be in 
the interest of  Guatemala to defer  making its decision concerning accession to the GATT until 
it has had an opportunity to consider the revised provisions of  the GATT. The Department 
will furnish  Guatemala the results of  the current GATT session as soon as they are available. 
In the meantime, trade relations between the U.S. and Guatemala would continue to be 
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governed by the bilateral agreement. While the agreement remains in effect,  however, the 
stated desire of  the Gu atemalan Government to comply with its international obligations 
would not be achieved unless it were to remove the existing violations. 
DULLES 
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11. HONDURAS SEEKS REVISION OF ITS AGREEMENT (1954) 
From: Desire of  Honduras for  Revision of  Trade Treaty with United States; Foreign Service 
Despatch No. 280 from  Amembassy, Tegucigalpa to Department of  State, Washington; 
December 28,1954; 411.1531/12-2854. 
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
Despatch No.: 280 
From: Amembassy, Tegucigalpa 
To: The Department of  State Washington December 28,1954 
Réf.:  Department's A-84, May 6,1954 
Subject: Desire of  Honduras for  Revisions of  Trade Treaty with U. S. 
Members of  the Honduran delegation to the recent Rio de Janeiro Conference  discussed 
with U. S. delegates the desire of  the Honduran Government for  a revision of  the trade 
agreement with the U. S., originally signed on December 18,1935. Somewhat to the surprise 
of  the Hondurans, the U. S. delegates appeared willing to discuss a revision and informal 
arrangements were made to explore this possibility in writing. The Honduran delegates 
mentioned that conversations with Embassy officials  on the subject indicated that the U. S. 
Government would be unwilling to undertake Bi-lateral Trade Agreement negotiations with 
Honduras (as stated in reference  instruction). To this the U. S. delegates are reported to have 
replied that this Embassy was apparently unaware of  the latest developments in United States 
policy and that renegotiation of  an existing treaty would be easier than the negotiation of  a new 
bi-lateral treaty. 
At the request of  the U. S. delegates a letter was prepared and signed by Honduran Under 
Secretary of  Finance, Pedro Pineda Madrid, indicating the reasons why the Honduran Govern-
ment is interested in renegotiation (see enclosure No. 1). The letter states that certain clauses 
of  the Trade Agreement are out-of-date  and that, because 80% of  Honduran trade is with the 
United States and over 90% with the Western Hemisphere, Honduras feels  that renegotiation 
should be on a bi-lateral basis rather than within the framework  of  the General Agreement on 
Tariffs  and Trade. Specifically,  Honduras desires to raise its tariffs  on certain imports from 
the U. S. considered to be non-essential. The Embassy was told that there would be 
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
178 
continued correspondence on this subject and that the Embassy would be kept informed  of 
the new developments. 
FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a. i. 
(signed) 
Edward V. Lindberg 
Second Secretary of  Embassy 
cc: MID 
Enclosure: 1) Copy letter dated Dec. 1,1954 from  Honduran Under Section of 
Finance Pineda 
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End. No. 1 
Desp. No. 280 
From Tegucigalpa 
Rio de Janeiro, Brasil 
1 December, 1954 
Mr. Isaiah Frank, Acting Deputy Director 
Office  of  Economic Defense  and Trade Policy 
Department of  State 
Washington, D.C. 
Dear Sir: 
The purpose of  this communication is to put in writing some of  the reasons why the 
Honduran Government is interested in renegotiating the trade agreement that has been in 
existence between our two countries for  more than eighteen years. 
Our most important objection is that certain clauses of  this agreement are out of  date. It 
has also proven to be on occasions contradictory to the basic principles of  sacrifice  that a 
country must make in order to achieve a higher rate of  development. Specifically,  this is 
applicable to the list of  certain U.S. non-essential products which Honduras imports, either 
free  of  duties or with lower tariffs  than those imported from  other countries, because of  this 
agreement. 
Our difficulties  do not end at this point. Because of  our deficient  tax administration; as well 
as to the low level of  income of  our general population, it has been found  necessary, at times, 
to levy duties on capital goods and other essential imports to attend to fiscal  necessities. 
Furthermore, our entire treaty program has been paralyzed, not wanting my Government to 
extend the most favored  nation treatment toother countries as long as these inconsistencies 
with our economic development policies have been resolved. The result, therefore,  has been 
that Honduras has only one other trade treaty, and that with the Republic of  El Salvador. Since 
in the U. S. trade agreement the Central American preference  is recognized therenegotiation 
of  the Salvadoran treaty was carried out in the early part of  this year without any difficulty. 
My Government has in the past three years been giving lot of  thought to this treaty matter. 
Although, practically all Honduran exports are on the U. S. free  import list, it was felt  by our 
authorities that denouncing this old agreement would constitute an unfriendly  gesture toward 
our great American brother, as well as to create an unfavorable  climate for  the flow  of  U. S. 
private capital to our country. 
Another course open to us was the acceptance of  the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs,  so that our difficulties  might be resolved within the framework  of  such instrument. In 
view of  the interest Honduras has in Central American economic integration, and given that 
efforts  were and are being given to form  a custom union it was thought desirable for  us to 
stay out of  such Agreement until this regional problem had been resolved. Furthermore, 
because approximately eighty per cent of  our total trade has been traditionally with the United 
States, and over ninety per cent with the Western Hemisphere, we felt  that our difficulties  were 
more of  a regional nature and consequently to be dealt in the interamerican sphere rather than 
in a world forum. 
Since Honduras does not have either trade or exchange controls and is loathe to establish 
them, other forms  of  traditional restrictions as well as these, are not available to it for  curtailing 
unnecessary imports. 
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Because of  all these considerations our government has thought that the best course 
available to it was to directly approach the U. S. Government on a possible renegotiation of 
our 1936 Agreement. 
Fundamentally, we are not interested in raising our average tariff  level; what we are 
interested in obtaining is a change in the list of  U. S. imports items, under the agreement, 
whereby non-essential articles would be substituted by capital goods or by general consumers 
goods which are now subject, as indicated above, to duties for  fiscal  reasons. 
Recognizing that it is impossible in such a short communication to cover the intricacies of 
such a problem, the Honduran Government would welcome the opportunity to meet 
informally  with representatives of  the U. S. Government to see whether our aspirations have 
merits and could be carried out. 
Respectfully, 
Pedro Pineda Madrid 
Under Secretary of  Finance, Public 
Credit and Commerce 
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12. TARIFFS INCREASE IN HONDURAS (1955) 
From: Letter, Russell B. Long, U.S. Senator to Secretary of  State John Foster Dulles with letter 
attached from  Mr. J. T. Connor, Attorney, New Orleans, Louisianna together with a chart 
comparing the old and new tariff  schedules on imports from  Honduras; May 12, 1955; 
411.116/5-1255. 
Russell B. Long 
Louisiana 
UNITED STATES SENATE 
Washington, D.C. 
May 12,1955 
Honorable John Foster Dulles 
The Secretary of  State 
Washington 25, D. C. 
My dear Mr. Secretary: 
There is attached hereto a copy of  the letter I received from  Mr. James Thomas Connor, 
Attorney, New Orleans, Louisiana, together with a chart comparing the old and new tariff 
schedules on imports from  the Republic of  Honduras. 
This appears to be an action which has very serious effects  upon our import trade with 
Honduras which could only be justified  by most serious and specific  economic difficulties 
within Honduras and in connection with its foreign  exchange position. 
I should appreciate it if  you would inquire into this matter and inform  me as to what your 
position is on the issue. Specifically  I should like to know whether or not an official  protest to 
the Honduran authorities has been made by our representatives. 
With assurances of  my highest esteem, I am 
Sincerely yours, 
(Signed) Russell Long 
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C O P Y 
James Thomas Connor 
Attorney at Law 
407 Richards Building 
New Orleans 12, La. 
May 9,1955 
Dear Senator Long: 
At my suggestion Mr. Remy Fransen, my father-in-law,  has prepared the enclosed 
comparison of  the old and new tariff  schedules on imports into the Republic of  Honduras with 
a view to placing this matter before  you for  your information  and whatever good offices  you 
may exert to ameliorate this condition. Bear in mind that Honduran products are admitted 
into this country duty free.  I am writing similar letters to your colleagues, Senator Ellender 
and Messrs. Hebert and Boggs. 
On all sides we read about and hear of  the vast trade opportunities that await the American 
producer and manufacturer  in Latin and South America. Yet, as you well know, there must 
be reciprocity of  one kind or another if  this program is to be effectual.  What hope is there for 
the development of  trade with the Republic of  Honduras if  in return for  free  access to our 
markets she elects to impose an almost prohibitive tariff  around hers? 
While it is true that Mr. Fransen is an exporter of  American goods to Honduras, his concern 
is not limited by his own selfish  interest in the effect  of  this drastic tariff  increase on his 
operations. He has had a long and thoughtful  association with Latin American countries and 
he recognizes (as do all those who have informed  themselves) that the improvement of  the lot 
of  the people of  those countries depends upon giving them access to the products of  our 
industrial genius and thus improve their living standards especially in the area of  food  stuffs 
which will enable these people to vary their diets and better their health. But this cannot be a 
one-way street and it seems to me that the officials  of  this country should recognize the 
short-sightedness of  this tariff  policy and make representations to the government of 
Honduras to the end that the high tariff  wall erected on April 15th last be lowered forthwith. 
Respectfully, 
(Signed) James Thomas Connor 
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Table II.12.1 
COMPARISON OF OLD AND NEW CUSTOMS TARIFF ON IMPORTS INTO THE REPUBLIC 
OF HONDURAS. THE NEW SCHEDULE WAS ENACTED ON APRIL 15,1955, AND 
DECLARED TO BE IN EFFECT IMMEDIATELY 
(Amounts  are stated  in American currency and the unit  is the kilo  usually) 
Commodity Old tariff New tariff % increase 
Soups cont. meat $0.30 $1.50 500 
Soups, vegetable .30 1.50 500 
Milk products .00 1.00 
Shrimp & oysters .60 2.00 333 
Macaroni .50 .70 
Olives .15 to.22 .80 400 
Marmalades .42 2.00 500-
Potatoes .20 .60 300 
Dry beans, etc. .15 .30 100 
Tomato & vegetable juices .15 1.00 667 
Candies .80 1.50 .871/2 
DOG FOOD .00 .00 none 
Margarine .00 .92 
Vinegar .20 .60 300 
Jellatines .42 .75 90-
Catsup, mayonnaise .42 .75 90-
Beer .75 2.30 306 
Vino de mesa .40 1.75 410 
Whiskies 1.42 4.00 280 
Table salt .22 .50 110 
Kleenex .00 .60 
Grocery bags .00 .25 
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June 20,1955 
In reply refer  to 
ARA: MID 415.116/5-1255 
Dear Senator Long: 
In your letter of  May 12,1955 you requested the position of  the Department of  State on the 
increased tariff  schedules of  Honduras which Mr. James Thomas Connor had brought to your 
attention. 
The new tariff,  effective  April 15,1955, is designed by the Honduran Government to achieve 
a number of  important objectives. 
(a) It will provide for  a uniform  tariff  nomenclature and simplify  the rate structure in 
accordance with a resolution adopted in September 1953 by the Minsters of  Economy of  the 
Central American nations. These changes should result in greater administrative efficiency.  It 
should be noted, however, that in view of  the consolidation of  the many charges into one rate 
of  duty, the actual increase in duty under the new Honduran tariff  is not as great as it would 
appear from  the chart which was forwarded  by Mr. Connor. 
(b) The new tariff  is expected to conserve the country's already limited foreign  exchange 
by discouraging some imports through the imposition of  higher duties on such products. 
Honduras considers the adoption of  this measure essential to the country's recovery from  the 
disastrous economic conditions in 1954. 
The American Embassy in Tegucigalpa has informed  us that banana exports, which 
constitute Honduras' chief  source of  foreign  exchange earnings (about 60% of  total) have been 
drastically reduced both as a result of  severe floods  which during the fall  of  1954 destroyed a 
large number of  banana trees and also as a result of  a prolonged labor strike in the middle of 
the same year. At present, banana exports are about 1/3 of  normal and are expected to continue 
at this level for  the balance of  the year. It is estimated that banana exports from  Honduras will, 
in 1955, total about 6 - 8 million stems compared to exports in 1953, the last normal year, of 
12.4 million stems valued at $41 million. The Embassy has also advised us that return of  banana 
exports to normal levels cannot be expected before  the end of  1956. 
The Honorable 
Russell B. Long 
United States Senate 
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In addition to the loss in receipts from  banana exports, Honduras has also suffered  a 
substantial reduction in foreign  exchange earnings from  exports of  coffee  and precious metals. 
The latest reports from  the American Embassy in Tegucigalpa indicate that coffee  shipments, 
which ordinarily account for  about 20% of  Honduras' foreign  exchange earnings, are 
substantially below normal in terms of  quantity and even less in terms of  value, since coffee 
prices have fallen  sharply during the early part of  this year. By March 1955, Honduras' foreign 
exchange holdings had declined to 44 million lempiras (one lempira is equivalent to US$.50) 
compared with a total of  56 million lempiras during July 1954. 
The Department, however, notes with satisfaction  that in its adoption of  the new tariff 
Honduras has not failed  to give full  recognition to its commitments to the United States under 
the United States-Honduras Trade Agreement of  1936. The items on which tariff  concessions 
were made to the United States under this agreement were included in a special annex to the 
regular tariff  and were not increased in duty. Furthermore, there is no discrimination against 
the United States with respect to the duty treatment accorded products not covered by the 
trade agreement. The new rates of  duty on these products are applicable to imports from  all 
other countries as well as from  the United States. 
In view of  the foregoing,  the Department of  State did not consider that representations in 
regard to the adoption of  the new Honduran tariff  were likely to be effective  and none were 
therefore  made. 
The Lozano administration is trying to carry out a Five-Year Program of  economic 
development, and this offers  hope for  an improvement in the standard of  living of  the 
Honduran people. 
The Department of  State appreciate your thoughtful  letter, and hopes that the information 
presented will meet your needs. 
Sincerely yours, 
For the Secretary of  State; 
Thruston B. Morton 
Assistant Secretary 
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13. INCREASING TARIFFS IN GUATEMALA (1956) 
From: Request for  Department of  State to prevent or postpone the application for  higher duties 
and work toward a lowering of  existing duties on certain products; U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service to Mr. Ben H. Thibodeaux, Office  of 
International Trade and Resources, Department of  State; February 9,1956; 414.114/2-956 
CS/E. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
Foreign Agricultural Service 
Washington 25, D.C. 
February 9,1956 
Mr. Ben H. Thibodeaux 
Office  of  International Trade and Resources 
Department of  State 
Washington 25, D.C. 
Dear Ben: 
During the first  11 months of  1955, United States exports of  pork and pork products to 
Guatemala declined sharply from  the levels of  the same months of  1954. Import duties on the 
meat products range from  3.2 to 13.6 cents per pound. A reduction in the duties on meat might 
stimulate increased trade in these items. 
The termination of  the bilateral trade agreement between the United States and Guatemala 
on October 15,1955 leaves the two countries without any contractual arrangement with respect 
to trade, and leaves the United States with no guarantee that duties on its products will not be 
increased sharply. In fact,  we understand that Guatemala will put into effect  a new tariff 
schedule on February 15, that will raise existing duties two and three-fold  on certain items. 
We would appreciate it if  the Department of  State could use its good offices:  (1) To prevent 
or postpone the application of  higher duties on agricultural products in the proposed new tariff 
schedule; and (2) work toward a lowering of  the existing duties on meat and meat products. 
May I have your comments or suggestions on these problems? 
Sincerely yours, 





I have your letter dated February 9,1956 requesting the department to use its influence  with 
the Guatemalan Government to obtain a reduction in the new tariff  of  higher duties on other 
agricultural products. I appreciate your bringing the problem to our attention. As you know, 
we have already taken some measures on it in cooperation with the Department of  Agriculture. 
Guatemala has repeatedly violated its bilateral trade agreement with the United States over 
a period of  years. Last year when the Guatemalan Government requested termination of  the 
agreement, the United States agreed. We have endeavored since then to encourage Guatemala 
to become a participant in the GATT, but without results as yet. 
We are informed  that the tariff  changes now contemplated by the Guatemalans would be 
for  the purpose generally of  furthering  economic development of  the country. Some duties 
would be increased for  protection of  local industries, while others, especially those on essential 
raw materials and consumer goods, would be reduced below existing levels. At this time, 
however, we have no firm  information  as to how agricultural products will fare,  either 
individually or in the aggregate, under the new tariff.  We understand that the revision of  the 
tariff  has not yet been completed and it will therefore  be some time before  the new tariff  is 
ready for  publication. 
The Department is sympathetic with and is endeavoring to assist our producers who fear 
that higher duties maybe imposed on imports of  their products with the resultant curtailment 
or complete loss of  markets built up over the years. Our Embassy at Guatemala City has already 
been instructed in DEPTEL #227 of  February 10,1956 to point out to the Guatemalans the 
excessive nature of  the protection to local industry contemplated by the proposed tariff 
increase on lard and the resulting increase in living costs for  Guatemalan consumers. 
Representations to the Guatemalan Government by local agents of  American producers and 
by importers of  American goods would also be helpful.  It is our hope that in these ways and 
through continuing consultation we may be able to induce the Guatemalans to consider the 
generally unfavorable  effects  on their economy that are bound to result from  unduly high duties 
on imports from  the United States. 
Mr. Gwynn Garnett, Administrator, 
Foreign Agricultural Service, 
United States Department of  Agriculture, 
Washington 25, D.C. 
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Since Guatemala apparently fears  that large quantities of  United States meat products may 
be sold there at subsidised prices that may injure their internal markets, any assurances that 
could be given to Guatemala concerning United States surplus disposal plans would also be 
helpful  in this regard. 
Sincerely yours, 
(signed) Ben H. Thibodeaux 
Director, Office  oflnternational  Trade and Resources 
Clearances: 
TAD - Mr. Weiss 




DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
Washington 25, D.C. 
March 21,1956 
The Honorable 
Herbert V. Prochnow 
Deputy Under Secretary for  Economic Affairs 
Department of  State 
Dear Herb: 
I wish to express my Department's sincere thanks for  the prompt and efficient  action taken 
by the Department of  State through the Embassy in Guatemala in the matter of  the proposed 
increase in the Guatemalan duty on lard, which we discussed with you recently. 
The Embassy has now reported the promulgation of  the new tariff  rates on fats  and oils by 
decree of  the Guatemalan Government of  February 28. We feel  that the Embassy's prompt 
approach to the Guatemalan Government to protest the proposed excessive increase in the 
duty on lard was effective  in limiting the action taken to a relatively small increase which, under 
present conditions, we believe will not adversely affect  our trade. 
It is indeed gratifying  to learn of  the successful  outcome of  this matter. We appreciate your 
splendid cooperation in preventing action which could have had serious consequences for  an 
important segment of  our export trade. 
Sincerely yours, 
(signed) 
Earl L. Butz 
Assistant Secretary 
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14. TRADE AND PAYMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1956) 
From: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Foreign Commerce, American Republics 
Division, Investment  in Central  America: Basic Information  for  United  States  Businessmen. 
Study prepared by firm  of  Albert O. Hirschman and George Kalmanoff,  Economic 
Consultants (Bogotá, Colombia, December 1956), pp. 27-30. 
The combined foreign  trade of  the five  Central American countries in 1954 amounted to about $775 
million and consisted of  some $400 million of  exports and $375 million of  imports. This level of 
imports represented a value of  about $40 per person. Exports are heavily weighted by a few  primary 
products, and three-fourths  of  the imports consist of  finished  manufactures,  many of  which are 
simple consumer goods, such as textiles. About two-thirds of  the trade of  the area is carried on with 
the United States; Western Europe has not regained its prewar share of  the Central American trade 
and accounts for  somewhat less than one-fifth  of  the total. 
The 1954 trade level represents a significant  advance over the earlier years of  the postwar period. 
This is particularly true of  the countries where coffee  is an important export, primarily as a result of 
the substantial increase in the price of  that commodity. However, the increased value of  exports has 
resulted in part from  the development and expansion of  other primary products for  foreign  markets, 
such as cotton, cacao, lumber, and certain staple foodstuffs.  The increase in export values in all of 
the countries has been followed  closely by greater imports, as a result both of  the immediate effect 
on import demand of  increase in incomes and the rapid rate of  economic development that has been 
characteristic of  recent years. 
As shown by Table 1, the greatest volume of  foreign  trade in relation to population is carried on 
by Costa Rica, and the smallest by Guatemala. Imports per capita into Costa Rica -$87 in 1954-
were more than double the average for  the area. Since Costa Rica has the smallest population of  the 
five  countries, the relative size of  the import volume reflects  in part the greater reliance on foreign 
sources that is characteristic of  small countries; but it is also in line with other economic indicators 
cited throughout this report that show a considerably higher level of  living in Costa Rica than in the 
other Central American countries. The low value of  imports per capita in Guatemala reflects  that 
country's more highly diversified  economy, but it also reflects  the fact  that more than one-half  of 
Guatemala's population consists of  indigenous peoples who, for  the most part, do not participate in 
the exchange economy. 
FOREIGN TRADE AND PAYMENTS 
Table II.14.1 
VALUE OF CENTRAL AMERICA'S FOREIGN TRADE, BY COUNTRIES, 1954 
(In  millions  of  dollars) 



































The principal items of  export from  Central America are agricultural. The only mineral items that 
have been of  some importance are gold, mainly from  Nicaragua, and silver, primarily from  Honduras. 
Coffee  and, in second place, bananas are by far  the leading exports of  the Central American 
countries, as shown in Table 2. Together they represent about four-fifths  of  the exports of  the area. 
This percentage varies among the individual countries. In El Salvador, coffee  accounts for  about 85 
percent of  exports and, in Guatemala, it represents almost 80 percent of  exports. 
Table II.14.2 
CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPORTS, BY COMMODITIES, 1953 
(Percentages) 
Commodity All countries Guatemala 
El 
Salvador Honduras Nicaragua 
Costa 
Rica 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coffee 56 77 86 17 39 44 
Bananas 23 , 14 a 60 1 42 
Cotton 4 a 7 a 15 a 
Gold 3 a 1 2 16 a 
Silver 2 a a 7 a a 
Lumber 2 i a 5 7 a 
Abacá 1 2 a 1 a 3 
Other 9 6 6 8 22 11 
" None or les than 1 percent. 
Coffee  has also been the leading export of  Costa Rica and Nicaragua. However, in Costa Rica 
banana exports are almost equally important, and in Nicaragua a number of  other commodities are 
exported in significant  quantities, particularly cotton, which has replaced coffee  as Nicaragua's 
leading export. Coffee  is of  secondary importance in Honduras, but it has recently been gaining 
ground. Bananas are by far  the leading export of  Honduras, and an important secondary export of 
Guatemala. 
Cotton exports have increased rapidly during the last few  years, particularly in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala. In the latter country a surplus has developed since 1953 as a result of 
official  promotion of  the crop. In all of  these countries, cultivation of  cotton has been expanded, 
particularly in the Pacific  coast plain area, where natural conditions are very favorable  for  this crop. 
Lumber exports also have shown progress, except in El Salvador, which has negligible forest 
resources. 
The items discussed in preceding paragraphs constitute about 90 percent of  Central American 
exports, but numerous other commodities are shipped in small quantities. Among agricultural 
products, Guatemala exports essential oils distilled from  citronella and lemongrass, and Costa Rica 
has been shipping increasing quantities of  cacao. Exports from  Nicaragua are particularly diversified 
compared with those of  the other countries of  the area. 
The items listed as "other" in Table 2 constituted more than one-fifth  of  Nicaragua's exports in 
1953, and consisted of  such products as cattle, sesame, sugar, corn, rice, and cottonseed. Staple food 
items, such as corn, sugar, beans, and rice, have been exported by Honduras and Costa Rica to 
neighboring Central American countries, and this trade can be expanded with the achievement of 
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greater agricultural development. El Salvador in particular has a food  deficit  because of  the large 
size of  its population in relation to land resources. Other minor exports of  Central America include 
textile handicrafts  from  Guatemala; textiles, straw hats, soap, and leather articles form  El Salvador; 
and processed foods  from  Costa Rica. 
The trade in basic foods  and manufactured  items offers  the greatest potential for  development 
under the area's program for  economic integration and freer  trade. 
Imports 
With respect to imports, three-fourths  of  the total consist of  manufactured  products and the rest are 
about equally divided between foodstuffs  and raw materials. The manufactured  products are, of 
course, heavily weighted by complex goods of  modern technology, such as machinery, vehicles, 
and consumer durable goods, but they also include a substantial volume of  textiles and apparel (see 
Table 3). 
Table II.14.3 
CENTRAL AMERICAN IMPORTS, BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITY GROUPS, 1953 
(Percentages) 
Country 






All countries 12 13 75 
Guatemala 13 12 75 
El Salvador 16 15 69 
Honduras 8 12 80 
Nicaragua 7 11 82 
Costa Rica 12 13 75 
Petroleum products rank high on the list of  raw material imports, and this situation will continue 
unless petroleum resources are discovered in quantity as a result of  current exploration activity in 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Honduras and Costa Rica still import their requirements 
of  cement, but these imports will diminish or be eliminated if  these countries develop cement 
industries, a possibility that has been given active consideration. All of  the countries are heavy 
importers of  wheat and wheat flour,  and there is a trend toward increased importation of  wheat as 
local milling industries are expanded. In addition, numerous food  items are imported, such as fats 
and oils, dairy products, fruits  and vegetable, fish,  and other processed and canned foods.  Volume 
may diminish, however, as local food-processing  industries are developed. 
Country Distribution 
The United States is by far  the leading trading partner of  the Central American countries. In 1953, 
the United States took 71 percent of  the area's exports and supplied 64 percent of  its imports. Most 
of  the dollars earned by these countries from  their exports to the United States are spent directly in 
this country, but some are spent elsewhere, particularly in Western European countries, which thus 
earn dollars needed for  their net purchases in the United States. In general, Europe has not regained 
its prewar share of  Central America's exports of  coffee  and other commodities. Moreover, in spite 
of  substantial gains in recent years, Europe is still well behind the United States as a supplier of  the 
Central American countries (see Table 4). 
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Table II.14.4 
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS, BY PRINCIPAL 
AREAS, 1953 
(In  millions  of  dollars) 
Exports Imports 
Country Value Percent of  total Value 
Percent 
of  total 
United States 267.7 71 206.2 64 
Canada 14.9 4 6.7 2 
Intra-Central America 11.0 3 11.0 3 
Other Latin American and 
Caribbean countries 14.9 4 26.8 8 
Europe 61.5 16 63.0 20 
Other areas 6.4 2 8.4 3 
Total 376.4 100 322.1 100 
Trade with areas other than the United States and Europe represents only about 15 percent of 
Central America's total trade. Canada takes a large volume of  bananas directly, aside from 
transshipments though the United States, and supplies some of  the area's imports. 
Trade among the Central American countries is still very limited, except for  certain minor 
products. However, intra-Central American trade has begun to expand as a result of  the free-trade 
treaties, and it may be expected to increase further  as progress is made in the integration program. 
Trade with other Latin American and Caribbean countries is relatively small, the Central American 
import surplus being accounted for  largely by petroleum imports from  Curazao and Aruba. 
As can be seen from  Table 5, there is some variation among the countries with respect to their 
trading partners. For example in 1953, the share of  total exports shipped to the United States ranged 
from  45 percent for  Nicaragua to about 80 percent each for  Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. 
Much less variation occurs with respect to imports, the United States supplying about two-thirds of 
the total imports of  most of  the countries. 
Table II.14.5 
VARIATIONS AMONG THE FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS WITH RESPECT TO 
DESTINATIONS OF EXPORTS AND SOURCES OF IMPORTS, 1953 
(Percentages) 









United States 76 81 79 45 65 
Canada 2 1 8 a 9 
Intra-Central America 2 3 6 3 1 
Other Latin American and Caribbean countries 1 2 4 12 
Europe 19 12 2 32 20 
Other areas a 1 1 8 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Imports 
United States 65 61 72 65 60 
Canada 3 2 /a 2 3 
Intra-Central America 1 9 4 3 1 
Other Latin American and Caribbean countries 12 4 8 10 7 
Europe 18 22 11 17 26 
Other areas 1 2 5 3 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
aLess than 1 percent. 
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Canada's purchases of  bananas are reflected  in the relatively high percentages of  Honduran and 
Costa Rican exports to that country. As regards intra-Central American transactions, El Salvador 
and Honduras have the largest volume of  such trade. The diversification  of  Nicaragua's exports is 
reflected  in a much greater distribution, by country, of  its trade compared with that of  the other 
Central American countries. Honduras has the greatest concentration of  trade with the United 
States. 
INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS AND EXCHANGE 
Table 6 indicates the level of  gold and foreign  exchange reserves in each Central American country 
at the end of  1954, the value of  imports during that year, and, by relating the reserves to the level of 
imports, the extent to which the reserves represent a cushion against any declines in exchange 
receipts. These date show why Nicaragua and Costa Rica consider it necessary to maintain control 
over transactions in foreign  exchange. The ratio of  reserves to imports was only about 25 percent in 
these two countries, compared With 45 percent or more in the other three. 
Tabic 11.14.6 
CENTRAL AMERICAN GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, AND THEIR RATIOS TO 
IMPORTS, 1954 
(In  millions  of  dollars) 
Country Gold and foreign exchange reserves a Imports
 b 
Ratio of  reserves 
to imports 
(percent) 
Guatemala 40 86 47 
El Salvador 50 87 57 
Honduras 26 58 45 
Nicaragua 15 63 24 
Costa Rica 20 81 25 
a End of  1954. 
Cost insurance and freight. 
Exchange reserves in all of  the countries have increased steadily in the postwar period as a result 
of  favorable  market conditions for  their exports, but in Nicaragua and Costa Rica imports paralleled 
exports so closely that these two countries had not achieved an easy exchange position by the end 
of  1954. In an attempt to keep import demand in check in relation to the exchange availabilities, 
Nicaragua has required advance deposits in local currency for  import order and made use of 
differential  exchange rates through a system of  exchange taxes, which were incorporated into import 
duties when exchange rates were unified  in mid-1955. Costa Rica controls import demand through 
the maintenance of  dual rates of  exchange, subjecting certain imports and other exchange payments 
to the higher free  market rate. Neither country has imposed quantitative import restrictions in recent 
years. 
The downward adjustment of  coffee  prices in the latter part of  1954 adversely affected  the trend 
of  exchange earnings in Central America. However, the total earnings prospects were not 
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unfavorable  since the price declines were being offset  by expansion in the volume of  coffee  exports 
and by increases in other exports, such as cotton and cacao. 
The traditional pattern of  current transactions in the balance of  international payments of  the 
Central American countries is one of  a surplus of  exports over imports, which is used to finance 
deficits  on "invisible" service transactions. These deficits  arise principally from  payments abroad 
made by these countries for  transportation and made by these countries for  transportation and 
insurance and in servicing foreign  investments. 
Generally, there is also a deficit  in the travel account, with Central Americans spending more on 
travel abroad than foreigners  spend on travel in Central America. This pattern has been true in 
recent years even for  Guatemala, noted as a tourist country, because travel to that country fell  off 
sharply as a result of  the political difficulties  there. With the elimination of  these difficulties  in 
Guatemala, with the completion of  the Inter-American Highway throughout the area, with the 
construction of  some new, modern hotels, and with official  tourist promotion programs, the travel 
account may be expected to yield considerably more foreign  exchange to Central America in the 
future. 
The inflow  of  capital into the Central American countries has been limited in recent years. As a 
matter of  fact,  Guatemala and El Salvador have experienced a considerable outflow  of  domestic 
capital - the former  because of  the political situation, and the latter because of  the tendency of  coffee 
growers and exporters to keep their profits  abroad. This capital may be expected to be repatriated 
as greater political stability is achieved, and as domestic investment opportunities are discovered. 
An increasing flow  of  foreign  direct investments, which appears to be under way, should have the 
effect  of  stimulating suchrepatriation of  domestic capital. The capital account of  the balance of 
payments of  these countries should also be favorably  affected  in the future  as the international 
lending institutions intensify  their activities in the area. 
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15. DECLINE IN EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EL SALVADOR (1959) 
From: American Exports to El Salvador Decline; Foreign Service Despatch No. 583 from 






FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
From: Amembassy, SAN SALVADORDesp. No. 583 
To: The Department of  State, WashingtonMay 28,1959 
Ref:  CERP D-l-A-5 
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During the past several years, the United States has been steadily losing its enormous share 
of  the Salvadoran market to more aggressive foreign  competition. United States and 
Salvadoran figures  appear to agree that although the maximum dollar volume of  United States 
exports came in 1957, the American share of  the growing local market declined from 
three-quarters to one half  in the ten-year span 1948-1957.1958 saw further  competitive inroads 
made in American exports, with the value of  such exports decreasing and the American market 
share declining as well. During the first  half  of  1959 this trend has shown no signs of  reversal. 
Commodities bearing the major brunt of  foreign  competition appear to be cotton textiles, 
machinery, and vehicles. Such signs in a hard currency market close to the United States shores 
may indicate some fundamental  problems for  U.S. trade. 
2. GENERAL 
El Salvador was a growing market 
for  U.S. exports until 1958. According 
to Salvadoran statistics, the CIF value 
of  U.S. exports doubled between 1948 
and 1957. During this period, 
however, the overwhelming American 
share of  the market, which had been 
74% in 1948, declined to 52% in 1957. 
1958 results apparently were less, both 
on a value and proportionate share 
basis. Table 1 presents the basic 
Salvadoran statistics on imports from 
the United States in the 20-year period 
1938-1957: 
Table II.15.1 
IMPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1938-1957 
(CJF  values in millions  of  colones; 1 colon = $0.40) 
Year Value (colones) 
% of  total 
imports 
1938 10.7 47 
1943 20.2 68 
1948 76.3 74 
1953 109.7 61 
1954 128.0 59 
1955 131.1 57 
1956 138.0 53 
1957 148.3 52 
Source: Dirección General de Estadística y Censos. In 1957, U. S. exports to El 
Salvador were larger than to seven 
other Latin American countries: Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Bolivia, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. El Salvador is closer to the United States than the last three named, and of  the 
seven only Honduras also had a stable currency without exchange controls. As noted in 
Table 1, American products became well-intrenched in El Salvador during World War II and 
the immediate postwar period. The composition of  American exports to El salvador in the five 
years 1954-1958 is shown in Table 2. 
Table II.15.2 
UNITED STATES EXPORTS TO EL SALVADOR, BY GROUPS 1954-1958 
(FOB  Values  in millions  of  dollars) 




groups a Totals 
1954 6.7 2.6 11.9 20.0 $41.2 
1955 5.5 3.1 13.2 25.0 b 46.8 
1956 5.4 4.0 16.3 23.6 49.3 
1957 5.4 4.8 16.0 23.7 49.9 
1958 4.3 3.5 13.7 22.7 44.2 
Source: U.S. Census Report No. FT 420 including 1958 monthly issues. 
a This category includes Groups 00-Animals edible; 0-Animals inedible; 1-Vegetables edible; 2-Vegetables 
inedible; 4-Wood and paper; 5-Minerals; 8-Chemicals; 9-Miscellaneous. b Most of  increased value due to large wheat shipments of  1955. 
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Preliminary Salvadoran estimates of  1958 imports show total CIF values off  about 7% from 
1957. A general drop of  this sort would not account for  the decrease of  $1.1 million (20%) in 
U.S. textile exports, $1.3 million (27%) in metals and metal manufactures,  or $2.3 million 
(14%) in machinery and vehicles. On the other hand the $1.0 million (4%) drop in other exports 
is well within the limits predictable in a year of  general import reduction. 
Analysis of  the local market shows quite varied reasons for  the more pronounced declines 
enumerated above. 1957 was peak period here in the construction industry, and imports 
connected with the building trades, new homes, and offices,  all were abnormally large. Much 
of  the decline in imports of  metals and metal manufactures  from  1957 to 1958 appears to be 
associated with a downward shift  in the construction cycle, rather than linked to particular 
failures  on the part of  American exporters. Market losses in the case of  textile, machinery and 
vehicle products, on the other hand, were more closely linked to problems within the control 
of  American producers. The market situation in textiles, agricultural equipment and 
automotive vehicles is discussed more fully  below. 
3. THE TEXTILE MARKET 
Table 3, shows relative market TABLE II.15.3 
performance  in three major EL SALVADOR TEXTILE IMPORTS, BY SOURCE 
categories for  the period 1955-7. The AND TYPE 1955-1957 
four  tabulated countries, Great (Values  in thousands  of  colones) 
Britain, Italy, Japan and the United 
States, accounted for  about 90% of 
all imported textiles in each of  those 
years. These results show that the 
United States achieved larger 
market penetration in the field  of 
threads and yarns, which is an 
expanding market closely tied with 
increased home sewing and small 
tailoring establishments. United 
States exports also achieved a larger 
portion of  the non-cotton textile 
market, but this market is declining 
due to cotton competition. In the 
vital cotton textile market, U. S. 
exports showed large declines in 
totals and percentage penetration, 
while the total market grew under 
intensive Japanese cultivation. 
In the field  of  cotton textiles 
exporters need to fear  local 
production as well as alternate 
foreign  suppliers. Cotton textile 
imports in 1957, for  example, 
weighed about 2585 metric tons, and 
had a CIF value of  015 788000. 
According to official  estimates of 
local production in 1957, mills here used about 2 650 metric tons of  cotton and produced 
products valued at 014 354 000 appears on the basis of  1957 results that about half  the local 
market was being filled  by local production. In 1958 and early 1959 El Salvador made extensive 
tariff  revisions which greatly added to the protection afforded  local producers. At the same 
time, the first  production began to flow  from  the new mill erected with joint Japanese and local 
capital. This new mill, if  it should offer  competitive prices and quality, could bring about 
increasing displacement in the local market of  imported and other domestic cotton textiles. 
1955 1956 1957 
Threads and Yarns 
Great Britain 647 643 720 
Italy 40 77 173 
Japan - 4 16 
United States 341 292 549 
World Totals 1318 1406 1745 
Cotton Textiles 
Great Britain 117 112 255 
Italy 7 5 23 
Japan 2406 5 511 9 897 
United States 5 701 4 788 4 239 
World Totals 9484 11626 15 788 
Other Fiber Textiles 
Great Britain 765 704 522 
Italy 191 216 289 
Japan 1444 957 774 
United States 3 024 2 773 2 650 
World Totals 5 790 4 883 4 502 
Total Three 
Categories 16592 17915 22 035 
U.S. Share 9066 7 853 7438 
Percent 54 44 34 
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In the postwar period the American textile market has been subject to increasingly severe 
competitive pressures. The loss of  another market for  cotton textiles would probably come as 
no surprise. Here in El Salvador American exporters are facing  the two major types of 
competitions in the textile field:  aggressive merchandising by foreign  competitors (chiefly 
Japanese) who are using modern, postwar machinery, and market erosion caused by the growth 
of  protected industries within the local market. Both foreign  and local producers enjoy cheaper 
wage levels in their plants than American mills. While reported January 1959 average wages 
in broadweave fabric  mills in the United States was $1.47 per hour (before  recent pay 
increases), the average wage here is $141 per month. In addition, foreign  and Salvadoran mills 
can use non-American cotton, which is considerably cheaper than the product sold American 
mills. With these inherent handicaps, the outlook for  American cotton textile sales in El 
Salvador is not particularly bright. 
4. AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 
Since El Salvador is largely an agricultural country, machinery sales here are largely tied to 
crops. In the postwar period a major market factor  has been the development of  an important 
cotton industry. Unlike the coffee  crop, which is planted, cultivated and picked by manual 
labor, cotton growing as practiced here involves large investment in mechanical equipment. 
Salvadoran tractor imports for  1957 and the first  10 months of  1958 are shown below in 
Table 4. 
Table II.15.4 
EL SALVADOR TRACTOR IMPORTS, BY SOURCES AND TYPE, 1957 AND 1958 
(Value  in thousands  of  colones) 
1957 10 months, 1958 
Units Value Units Value 
Germany 0 2 12 82 
Great Britain 25 135 58 313 
United States 171 3 050 83 1647 
Total 196 3185 153 2 042 
As these figures  show, in 1957 the United States supplied almost the entire tractor market, 
but by the first  10 months of  1958 was losing both dollar volume and unit sales. Between the 
two periods, British unit sales and value roughly doubled, while U.S. results were roughly cut 
in half. 
Most of  the shift  between sources of  supply was made between factories  of  the same parent 
organizations -that is, local distributors now order from  a British or German plant, rather 
than their old source in the United States. The tractors received from  the European plants 
appear to be very comparable in quality, but differ  markedly in the lower cost of  the similar 
European product. Table 5 gives some comparative prices on tractors of  similar design 
produced in competing plans of international producers. 
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Table II.15.5 
UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN TRACTORS, CIF EL SALVADOR 
(Values in U.S. Dollars) 
U.S. factory Foreign factory Saving 









Unit #2 16 483 6% 
Unit #3 2 202 29% 
Unit #4 
(This unit Diesel from 
2 750 26% 
Europe gasoline from  U.S.) 
With price differentials  of  this magnitude, local distributors are prepared to shift  their 
foreign  supply points as soon as competitive models become available. 
In addition to losing its proportionate share of  the tractor market, for  reasons outlined 
above, American applications for  planting permits are off  at 45 000 manzanas, compared with 
76 000 manzanas for  the 1958/9 crop. Plantings in other recent years were: 1957/8; 57 000 
manzanas, 1956/7; 55 0001955/6; 65 000 and 1954/5; 42 000. Less-efficient  producers are being 
driven out, leaving the field  to highly-mechanized operators. These latter producers are 
reportedly planning to retrench on equipment expenditures. Knowledgeable sources predict 
that the national tractor market, in which the cotton growers play such a part, maybe only 100 
units in 1959 - roughly half  the number of  units imported in 1957. It is difficult  to see how 
United States plants could supply more than fifty  units for  this reduced sales volume, in view 
of  the attractive products offered  by foreign  branches. 
Local distributors are convinced that the market for  U.S. tractors is being closed off  largely 
on a basis of  price. There is apparently no appreciable preference  for  the service provided by 
one branch of  an international producer against another of  that some producer's branches. 
There is no major difference  in the credit facilities  afforded  the distributor or final  purchaser. 
On a mechanical basis some criticize the slowness of  American plants to shift  to diesel units, 
but much of  this criticism appears directed toward past failures  rather than the present product 
line. Distributors suggest that the only way that U.S. plants can regain their former  volume is 
to sharply reduce prices vis-à-vis  their European branches, or offer  special credit facilities 
beyond those provided for  the European production. 
5. THE AUTOMOBILE MARKET 
The most striking erosion of  the American export market in El Salvador has been the rapid 
influx  of  foreign  cars in the past several years. Table 6 shown the import levels for  passenger 
cars in 1957 and the first  10 months of  1958, by country of  shipment. 
On the basis of  these figures,  it appears that in 1957 the United States provided 49% of  the 
automobiles worth 63% of  the CIF costs of  all cars, while in the first  10 months American 
participation slipped to 39% of  the units and 51% of  the value. 
As American producers have discovered in the home market, autobomile purchasers are 
very conscious of  differentials  in price, utility and style. For many years purchasers here bought 
American products without much thought to possible alternatives. It is likely that here, as in 
the United States, the first  purchases of  other imports were on a style basis, by individuals 
seeking to be slightly different  from  others in the market. A more cogent reason for  shifting 
away from  the American product has been a growing differential  in prices. The price factor 
might not be expected to operate well in a market where most of  those who can afford  cars 
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can afford  the most expensive types; but in the atmosphere of  retrenchment which has come 
with declining agricultural prices it has appeared to be "smart" to economize on conspicuous 
items. Thus there are known instances here of  people economizing on automobile purchases 
at a time when their income is still high. 
Table II.15.6 
EL SALVADOR AUTOMOBILE IMPORTS, 1957-1958 
(CIF Value in thousands of  colones) 
1957 10 months, 1958 
Units Value Units Value 
Belgium 32 117 9 35 
(transshipper) 
France 147 468 83 294 
Germany 305 1110 449 1685 
Great Britain 279 975 174 636 
Italy 52 185 40 145 
United States 786 4 827 482 2 880 
Totals 1601 7 682 1237 5 674 
Source: Departamento de Estadísticas y Censos. 
The 1958 market was obviously strongly shaped by the price differential  between alternate 
products, and in 1959 this will become even more of  a factor.  The new tariff  which went into 
effect  in 1959 increased the duties on car imports from  21% to 26% across the board, thereby 
invoking a greater unit cost on the more expensive (US) models. CIF prices and tariff  charges 
for  1958, and estimates for  1959, are provided in Table 7. 
Table II.15.7 
AVERAGE AUTOMOBILE UNIT COSTS, EL SALVADOR 
(Colones) 
Export source CIF 1958 Tariff Total 
1959 est. 
New Tariff Total 
France 3 540 745 4 285 920 4 460 
Germany 3 750 790 4 540 985 4 735 
Great Britain 3 660 770 4 430 950 4 610 
Italy 3 610 760 4 370 935 4 545 
United States 6 000 1260 7 260 1560 7 560 
Source: Data in Table II.15.6.1959 estimates assume same unit costs as 1958. 
While the average German car is not the cheapest available, it is furnishing  the major 
competition to U.S. products. As noted in Table 7, the "average" German car is 02250 cheaper 
on CIF costs, 0575 cheaper on tariffs,  and 02825 cheaper on both scores together. At retail 
the differential  gets even more striking: A Volkswagen retails for  roughly $2000, while a 
stripped model of  the big three* is sold for  $3 500. 
Competition with the German Volkswagen is particularly severe for  a number of  reasons 
besides initial cost. German products have long enjoyed prestige in this market for  efficiency 
'The "big there" refers  to General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, the three major United States auto 
manufacturing  companies. 
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and good design, and the Volkswagen has lived up to this reputation. The car has an 
advantageously low fuel  consumption per mile, in a country where the low test gasoline retails 
at $0.50 per gallon. The company is owned by the German Government, and hence gets full 
support from  other dependencies of  the German government, including the banking system. 
The financing  has its impact here because the Volkswagen dealer gets very advantageous terms 
from  the plant. While consumer terms are uniformly  no better than 20 months for  all cars, the 
Volkswagen dealer is able to carry a broader stock than most dealers. At the customs in La 
Libertad he appears to receive his shipments in fifties,  while importers of  different  American 
brands appear to order in threes and fours. 
Now that the style barrier has been broken and wealthy people are driving the more 
economical European cars, there appears little likelihood that American car sales can do 
better than retreat slowly in the months ahead. Most established dealers are scrambling for 
one or more European lines to add to their American offerings.  The prime competition 
appears to be coming from  the independent Volkswagen distributor. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Certain conclusions are suggested by the recent decline in U.S. exports to El Salvador. In 
the losses of  competitive position outlined above, currency controls or other monetary 
impediments have not been a factor.  Tariff  influences  affect  somewhat the sale of  American 
cotton textiles, but the protection of  local industry is not designed to discriminate against any 
particular foreign  supplier. The sumptuary tariff  levies on automobiles also will serve to shrink 
the sales of  American products, but in this instance the product is already priced well above 
normal competitive levels. Distributors here express some hope that the new proposed 
American small cars may help restore the American car market, but this will be possible only 
if  there is a major price differential  over current models. 
Foreign producers appear to have made their first  large inroads on the basis of  lower prices. 
In the case of  tractors (diesel motors) and automobiles (lower fuel  consumption) the foreign 
products may also have some design advantages for  the local market. 
Credit terms do not appear to have been a major factor  in the sliding sales of  the American 
products discussed, though the Volkswagen dealer does have the unusual credit facilities 
mentioned. Some American distributors however feel  that if  consumers here enjoyed longer 
terms from  local banks, the sales of  American products would be aided, since longer credit 
would obscure higher initial costs. 
American products have not been driven from  the market by superior servicing facilities 
on the part of  other foreign  suppliers - in fact,  on balance the American reputation for  service 
is still an important factor  operating in favor  of  American products. In cases where the same 
distributor handles the production of  American and foreign  factories  of  the same American 
parent firm,  however, the American reputation for  service appears to extend to the 
foreign-made  product. In the case of  head-on competition, such as between American car 
dealers and the Volkswagen distributors for  the American firms  feel  that brand loyalty is still 
operating in their favor  and could be assisted by improved credit terms, if  not direct price 
reductions. 
Over the next fewyears  the changing factors  likely to affect  the market of  El Salvador appear 
to be further  declines in the prices of  agricultural exports, growing industrialization, and 
possible enlargement of  the market through Central American integration. Declines in export 
earnings will put further  pressures on high-cost imports, and American products will probably 
receive the brunt of  any retrenchment campaign. Efforts  to industrialize may have to be 
pursued with European or Japanese equipment, if  American prices are too high in these 
individual lines as well. The efforts  of  El Salvador to achieve some sort of  economic integration 
with its neighbors will broaden many of  the competitive problems already felt  here, but not 
necessarily make any individual American products more saleable. Integration may, however, 
offer  Americancapital an opportunity to invest here and thus displace foreign  (and American) 
sources of  imports. 
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The recent failure  of  American exports in the free  market of  El Salvador may indicate some 
basic problems for  U.S. trade which extend beyond the loss of  prestige and commercial 
position so obvious here. Some possible methods of  maintaining the U.S. market position here 
are discussed in the following  despatch. 
For the Charge d'Affaires,  a.i., 
(signed) David R. Raynolds 




Documents in this chapter deal with indebtedness and external finance. 
1. LOANS TO NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR (1910-1925) 
From: Brown Brothers & Co. and J. and W. Seligman & Co., Loans to Nicaragua (1911) and Loan 
Contract Between the Republic of  El Salvador and Minor C. Keith (June 22, 1922), in 





Robert W. Dunn 
CONTRACTS AND CONCESSIONS EDITED BY 
ADRIAN RICHT 
LOANS TO NICARAGUA: A CLOSED EPISODE 
A. 1910-1914* 
Prior to 1910 Nicaragua's debt record was a clear one, nor had any of  its few  loans been placed 
in the United States. In 1909 a bond issue for  several millions had been made to the "Ethelburga 
Syndicate" of  London, interest payments on which defaulted  during the following  year owing to a 
revolution thatdeposed President Zelaya, dictator of  the Republic for  over a decade. The United 
States Government gave its recognition to the government set up by the Revolutionists, and a treaty 
was negotiated between both governments providing for  United States supervision of  the liquidation 
of  claims against the Republic which included several indemnity items besides interest on the 1909 
bonds. The treaty further  provided for  the establishment of  a new and stable currency, and approved 
the issue of  bonds to the amount of  fifteen  million dollars to an American banking group to finance 
these operations. The Republic negotiated this loan with the firms  of  Brown Bros. & Co., and J. and 
W. Seligman & Co., of  New York. 
"Subtitle added by the Eds. 
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The American Congress, however, adjourned without approving the treaty, which never, indeed, 
secured ratification.  The Republic and the bankers, nevertheless, in the expectation that the treaty 
would be ratified  in a subsequent session, and wishing to obtain an immediate loan for  the relief  of 
the pressing financial  situation of  the country, contracted the Agreement on Gold Treasury Bills. 
This provided for  the issue of  $1.5 million par value of  short-term Treasury Bills which the bankers 
would buy at a price considerably below par. The entire product of  the loan was to be kept by the 
Trustee as security, except as its expenditure was disposed in the contract. With part of  the product 
the Republic was to subscribe to the stock of  a National Bank and the shares bought by the Republic 
were to be kept and voted by the Trustee. The directors of  the Bank would be appointed by the 
bankers; all the expenses of  corporation were to be defrayed  by the Republic. The Bank contract 
also provided that a study of  the monetary conditions of  the country would be undertaken by a 
committee appointed by the bankers, at the Republic's expense, and that its recommendations for 
the establishment of  a currency would be followed  by the Republic through the National Bank. Part 
of  the product of  the Bills was assigned to a fund  for  this purpose until the Banking and Monetary 
Fund to be created out of  the larger loan was available. The Bank was to be sole depository of  the 
Republic, with the power to issue notes. 
Further security for  the loan was provided through the appointment by the bankers with the 
approval of  the Secretary of  State of  the United States of  a Collector General of  the Customs, and 
this Collector General was to remit all customs receipts to the Trustee, where the Minister of  Finance 
might draw on them. Finally, the bankers obtained an absolute option for  the $15 million loan, and 
might declare contracts for  the service and issuing of  this loan, into effect  at their will within thirty 
days of  the ratification  of  the treaty. If  the treaty were not ratified  within five  years, the bankers would 
have an option on all future  loans of  the Republic for  this period. The bankers were also irrevocably 
authorized to negotiate a settlement of  the Ethelburga claims, and the Republic was bound to their 
agreements with the foreign  bondholders. 
Although the treaty was never ratified  and consequently the loan for  $15 million was never made, 
it is interesting to examine under what terms it would have been issued. The bonds were to constitute 
a lien on all the customs revenues which would continue to be collected by the Collector General 
appointed by the bankers; the bonds were also a lien on the government-owned railway and on a 
new railway to be built out of  the Railway Fund, created out of  the loan. This latter security would 
be waived by the bankers if  they should exercise their option to build the new railway themselves. 
The government railway, however, would be managed by an Administrator General appointed by 
the fiscal  agent and this official  would remit all profits  of  the railway to the Trustee in case of  default 
of  the loan. 
The product of  the loan was to be divided into six funds.  Fund A was to settle the Ethelburga 
debt according to an agreement to be reached by the bankers and the bondholders. Fund B was to 
settle a claim of  the United States against Nicaragua, a claim which Brown Bros, was greatly 
interested in as a later contract of  1917 shows. Fund C provided means for  the settlement of  claims, 
according to judgments given by a Mixed Claims Commission, two of  whose three members were to 
be Americans. Fund D was the Banking and Monetary Fund, already referred  to, more or less under 
the management of  the bankers. Fund E was the Railway Fund, out of  which were to be paid any 
expenses incurred by the bankers in making surveys, etc., of  the projected new railway to determine 
whether or not they would exercise their option to build it themselves. Fund F was a General Fund 
which provided for  the payment of  the bankers' services, and any remainder of  which was to be 
expended in public works approved by the fiscal  agent. All the product of  the loan would remain 
with the Trustee as security, until called for  its specific  purpose. 
The Railroad Concessions conferred  an option to the bankers for  the construction of  the new 
extensive system on the basis of  a 99-year free  lease, and other auxiliary concessions such as electric 
power and telegraph. The Republic was to pay half  the cost of  construction, and unusual privileges 
were granted the Company to be formed.  Timber might be taken from  the national forests,  customs 
exemptions on any importations were allowed, and the Republic ceded, free,  a strip of  100 metres 
on either side of  the tracks. Further land grants of  335 acres were to be made for  each kilometer of 
railway constructed as well as for  each station and kindred works. One hundred acres were granted 
to the head of  every family  of  labor-colonists imported. Further grants and the full  details of  those 
given here will be found  in the contracted, which follows. 
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Agents of  the bankers negotiated settlements with the bondholders of  the Ethelburga issue during 
the following  year, dealing with them through the Corporation of  Foreign Bondholders in London. 
The Republic bound itself  to these settlements, and also entered into a Supplemental Loan 
Agreement with the bankers, binding itself  to sell 51 percent of  its shares in its own railway to the 
bankers at their option. The price agreed upon was $1 million. Eventually the railway was resold to 
the Republic at $1750 000, as specified  in the 1920 contracts. 
In 1913, five  contracts were entered into between the Republic and the bankers. The Principal 
Contract stipulated the sale of  51 percent of  the shares of  the Pacific  Railway and the National Bank, 
to the bankers, and the issue of  over $1 million par value of  Treasury Bills of  1913, both of  which the 
bankers were to secure for  $2 million. It was further  stipulated that the bankers would make the 
railway a loan at 85 per cent par value and 6 per cent interest. The product of  this contract was to 
be spent as follows:  for  the purchase by the Republic of  47 shares of  a new issue of  the National 
Bank stock; for  a payment to the bank to go toward establishing the new currency, and for  the 
retirement of  the outstanding Treasury Bills. The remainder, about $700 000, remained with the 
Trustee at the order of  the Republic. The bankers received a preferential  right for  the purchase of 
the remaining bank and railway stock should the Republic ever sell them, and in order to make this 
preferential  right effective,  the shares of  both bank and railway were to be kept by the Trustee. The 
contract further  provided for  the cancellation of  the Railroad Concessions of  1911. Six of  the Bank 
directors were to be the appointees of  the Bankers, one was to be appointed by the Secretary of  State 
of  the United States, and two were to be appointed by the Republic. Two offices  were created, Bank 
Examiner and Railway Examiner, which were to be held by the same person, a resident of  the United 
States, at a salary of  $400 monthly. This person would also be a director of  the bank and receive a 
director's salary. 
Schedule I, the Trust Contract, provided that the Bills would constitute a lien on all the customs 
receipts which were still to be collected by the Collector General. This lien should be subj ect to prior 
liens in favor  of  the 1909 bonds, by the terms of  the settlement, as also the payment of  an indemnity 
to the same bondholders, and the prior lien in favor  of  payments to the National Bank for  the fund 
for  the establishment of  the new currency. The loan constituted a first  lien on all the Republic's 
shares in the National Bank and the Pacific  Railway. 
Schedule 2 was a contract for  the sale of  the new issue of  Treasury Bills to the bankers at slightly 
more than 94 per cent of  their pay value. 
Schedule 3 was a contract with the National Bank, stipulating payments of  $350 000 for  the 
monetary fund  and $100 000 for  services and temporary loans made to the Republic. 
Schedule 4 was a contract with the Pacific  Railway, clearing up necessary details involved in the 
sale of  the majority of  its stock to the bankers. 
B. 1914-1925'" 
On August 5, 1914, the United States and Nicaragua contracted a Treaty which ceded to this 
country the rights to build a transcontinental canal through Nicaragua, and to establish naval stations 
in the Bay of  Fonseca. Nicaragua received $3 million for  these rights "to be applied to the payment 
of  its debt, or other purpose of  public interest to be agreed upon by the two High Contracting 
Powers." This payment was not made until 1917, but on December 22, 1914, the bankers and 
Nicaragua entered into two new contracts based on the contingency of  such payment. The effect  of 
the European War on the Republic's commerce and consequently on its customs receipts caused it 
to request that its customs be temporarily received by it, and that interest payments on its debt be 
deferred  four  months. If  the three million dollar payment should be made before  January 1, 1915, 
payments should be immediately resumed. The contract provided for  these two conditions, and the 
Treasury Bills another six months at 6 per cent. It also extended the Republic's option to repurchase 
its railway at the same price it had sold plus interest on the purchase price at 6 per cent. A contract 
was also entered into with the National Bank for  the extension of  loans made to the Republic at 12 
per cent per annum. This contract also contained details of  the moratorium to be enacted, and 
created a tax on lands to finance  the new note issue. 
The payment of  three million dollars by the Government of  the United States was held up until 
late in 1917. At this time three new contracts were covenanted between Bankers and Republic. The 
first  of  these was with Brown Bros, alone. On September 16, 1909, Nicaragua had entered into a 
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Treaty with the United States in settlement of  an international claim, for  the payment to this country 
of  $600 000 in installments. Only $50 000 had been paid to date, and the remaining principal and 
interest amounted to $748 986.12. Of  this sum Brown Bros, was interested to the extent of 
$589 656.33. It was agreed that $485 000 of  this debt should be paid immediately out of  the canal 
rights payment, and that Deferred  Treasury Bills, bearing interest at 6 per cent, should be issued for 
the remainder. These were to be secured by a lien on the çustoms, subject to five  prior liens 
mentioned in a Financial Plan of  the same date which the Republic bound itself  to adopt. The Bills 
would also be secured by a lien on the railway and bank stock still in the possession of  the Republic, 
subject only to a prior lien in favor  of  the 1909 bonds. 
Another contract was entered into with the bankers collectively, the preamble to which stated 
that the 1913 Treasury Bills had been extended from  time to time and were still outstanding with 
interest to the amount of  $1271181.14. According to the 1914 contracts, the bankers had the right 
to pay themselves from  the canal rights payment. This contract stipulated the payment of  a total of 
$767 693.80 for  the bankers' service to date, the interest on the entire amount outstanding, and half 
the principal. Half  the principal remained outstanding and was extended. The Bills were to be 
secured in the same manner as the Deferred  Treasury Bills except that their lien was poor. 
The third contract was with the National Bank and provided the payment to it of  $111 404.83 
which constituted its loans to the Republic. The United Sates was quoted as approving these three 
contracts and the disposition made by them of  nearly half  the sum due Nicaragua. 
The Financial Plan which the Republic obligated itself  to follow  provided for  a Collector General 
as before  who was to make his reports regularly to the Secretary of  State of  the United States, a High 
Commission created by the Plan to supervise the country's finances,  the Bankers, and the Republic. 
He was not to be interfered  with in the discharge of  his duties by the Republic unless the total 
expenses of  collection should exceed 6 per cent of  the receipts. Six liens were constituted on the 
customs, as follows: 
The expenses of  collection. 
The expenses incurred by the Bankers, with the provision that a surplus of  $10 000 was to remain 
at their disposal at all times. 
The bond issue of  1909. 
The exchange fund  managed by the National Bank. 
The Treasury Bills. 
The High Commission already referred  to was to consist of  three members, of  which two, 
including the chairman of  the Commission, were to be appointed by the Secretary of  State of  the 
United States. The Commission had as its mission, generally, to act as final  arbiter in all 
disagreements, and to supervise the working out of  the Financial Plan. The Plan further  restricted 
the national budget to an expenditure of  95 000 cordobas monthly. All taxes, except for  two minor 
revenues, were to be collected by the Republic and administered according to the Plan. If  less than 
180 000 cordobas was collected in a period of  three months, the collection of  the national revenues 
would pass into the hands of  the Collector General of  the Customs. The Plan finally  provided for 
the floating  of  an internal bond issue and its service, and disposed of  the possible surplus revenues 
of  the Republic for  the retirement of  outstanding obligations in a given proportion. 
The finances  of  the country were consequently put on a thoroughly sound basis within the next 
three years, and in 1920 the Republic made an effort  to obtain a large loan to build the Atlantic 
Railway originally projected in 1911. Its negotiations with the same group of  bankers were apparently 
successful,  for  four  contracts were entered into in this year. 
Although all these contracts were ratified  by the Nicaraguan Government, what actually 
happened was this: The Treasury Bills Series A were immediately issued to the Bankers in payment 
of  their stock in the Pacific  Railway, as well as divers fees.  When it came time, however, for  the 
negotiation of  a price for  the bonds, the bankers failed  to make one which the Republic felt  it could 
afford  to accept at 7 per cent interest on par. The bonds, consequently, were never issued, and 
Treasury Bills Series B remained unissued also. The Bills to the amount of  $1450 000 were therefore 
the only obligation of  the Republic beside the 1909 bonds. These Bills were paid off  in 1924. The 
Bonds remain outstanding. 
There has never been any question of  a military intervention in connection with the finances  of 
Nicaragua. American soldiers have been landed on several occasions, however, allegedly to quell 
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disturbances, guarantee elections, etc., and a small unit of  marines is still present in the country (July, 
1925). 
LOAN TO SALVADOR (June 24,1922)* 
(a) The contract for  this loan provides for  supervision of  customs collection by an American 
official  in an otherwise autonomous country. The official  recognition and approval of  the United 
States was sought and obtained for  the bond issue. Disputes between the contracting parties are 
referred  for  final  settlement to the Chief  Justice of  the Supreme Court of  the United States. The 
history of  the early negotiations of  this loan are interesting and of  possible significance. 
René Keilhauer, manager of  the International Railways of  Central America, of  which Minor C. 
Keith, head of  the United Fruit Co., is president, received the authorization of  the President of  the 
Republic to contract a loan in its favor  on June 25,1921. It was a three months authorization, but it 
was indefinitely  extended on August 21 of  the same year. 
The loan was occasioned by the necessity of  refunding  an earlier English issue, settling large and 
long-pending claims against the Government, mostly for  revoking monopolies, and to repay various 
small short-term loans lent variously by the International Railways and its bank in Salvador and other 
local banks. But the large subsidies granted to the International Railways were the second largest 
single item. 
On February 11,1922, Keilhauer purported to have concluded preliminary negotiations with the 
National City Bank, which submitted its proposition to the Republic for.  approval before  entering 
into further  proceedings. Minor Cooper Keith had meanwhile been made co-agent with Keilhauer, 
allegedly in case Keilhauer should have to be absent from  New York at a critical period in the 
negotiations. Both Keilhauer and Keith signed this document with the National City Co., and the 
National City Bank. This contract was disapproved by the President because of  the clause it 
contained depriving Salvador of  its financial  autonomy by the establishment of  American supervision 
and super-government, and the setting of  many limitations upon the fiscal  policy of  the country. In 
return, the Secretary of  the Treasury made a detailed suggestion, showing how the object of  security 
supposedly desired by the National City Co., could be obtained in a less drastic manner. Instead of 
a foreign  Administrator and Collector General of  Customs with full  appointive powers, he offered 
a guarantee in the form  of  fiscal  checks and balances. The National City Co., however withdrew from 
further  negotiations. 
Keilhauer and Keith supposedly proceeded to interest other banking groups in the proposed 
issue, but now Keilhauer wrote to the Secretary of  the Treasury that great difficulty  was being 
encountered. No banks, he said, cared to deal with a country that had already broken off  negotiations 
carried almost to their conclusion; there was too irresponsible an air about its projects. The earlier 
negotiations had "discredited" the Republic. He proposed that a definite  contract be drawn up and 
the bond sold to Minor Cooper Keith, whose standing was such that he could command respect as 
seller. A contract already approved, he said, would interest bankers. 
This was done. Keilhauer signed for  Salvador, Keith as party of  the second part, on June 24,1922, 
and the contract was approved by the Assembly on July 12, and by the President the following  day. 
The Diario Official  of  July 21,1922 (Number 163), carries a Spanish translation. This contract was 
modified  in certain minor respects October 16 of  the same year. All that need be said is that Keith 
bought the bonds on terms that the Republic would probably not have offered  another buyer. He 
bought them at 88 with an understanding that sale at a better price would be to the Republic's 
advantage. There was no resale. Keith kept the bonds and paid himself  as creditor the largest part 
of  the product at 88 that he had given for  Series A.1 
The following  was the disposition of  bonds as given in the message of  President Molina to the 
Salvador Assembly, 1924: 
"Representatives signed the loan contract on this date, as indicated in the text. 
1 Source: Memoria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico published in the Diario Oficial  of  El Salvador, Feb. 20,1923. 
Detailed information  of  the early stages of  the negotiations are in the preceding year's Memoria, published toward the end 
of  Feb. 1922. 
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"A" Bonds ($6 million) sold to Minor C. Keith at 88 per cent nominal value, and amount deposited 
in Metropolitan Trust Co., which deducted $153 333.33 commission; remainder paid to creditors as 
stipulated in contracts. 
"B" Bonds ($5 1/4 million) cancelled English debt of  £1.5 million. Remainder of  £1712. 
"C" Bonds ($6.5 million) paid to certain creditors as stipulated in contracts. $317 425.47 remainder 
in cash. 
Additional "C" Bonds ($2 million) paid to passive creditors. There was a remainder of  $612 500 
in cash. 
The most important item in the contract is the collection of  70 per cent of  the customs by an 
American collector. 
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2. COSTA RICA'S EXTERNAL DEBT (1932) 
From: Costa Riea: External Debt; Memorandum, Division of  Latin American Affairs,  Department 
of  State; June 2,1932; 818.51/510 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
DIVISION OF LATIN-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 
MEMORANDUM 
COSTA RICA 
External  Debt 
The principal loan from  American sources is that originally made in the amount of  $8 000 000 and 
for  which the Central Union Trust Company of  New York is trustee. This is called the external 
Secured Sinking Fund Gold Loan of  1926. 
There are two contracts covering this loan: the loan contract and the Trust Agreement. These 
two are along precisely the same lines, except that the Trust Agreement is in considerable more 
detail. The provisions of  the Trust Agreement, which may be of  particular interest at this time, are 
the following: 
"Article I. 
"Section I.... In case the revenues pledged as security for  the Bonds 
shall prove insufficient  to make any payments to be made as provided 
herein or in the Bonds it (the Republic) will make up such deficiency 
out of  its other revenues. 
"Section 2. The Republic as security for  the payment of  the principal, 
interest and sinking fund  of  the Bonds and for  the expense of  the service 
of  the Bonds, hereby specifically  pledges, and creates a direct lien and 
charge on. 
(1) the gross revenues of  the Republic from  customs duties, both 
import and export, subject only to the lien or charge thereon of  the 
Gold Refunding  Bonds of  1911 of  the Republic... 
(2) the gross revenues of  the Republic from  its monopoly of  alcohol 
and liquors, subject only to the lien or charge of  the Costa Rica Foreign 
Loan 5 Per Cent Gold 1911 bonds, and to the lien or charge of  the 
internal loan authorized March 1,1923.... 
"Section 3. The Republic covenants that it will not reduce, abolish* or 
in any manner impair its revenues existing at the date of  this Trust 
Agreement from  customs duties, both import and export or from  its 
monopoly of  alcohol and liquors.... 
"Article IV. 
"Section 1. Until all the bonds of  1926 shall have been retired or 
redeemed, the Republic shall pay semi-annually to the Trustee, who 
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shall pay over the same to the Fiscal Agents for  the Bonds of  1926 as 
hereinafter  provided, for  the semi-annual service of  interest and 
amortization of  the Bonds of  1926, the sum of  $341070 in gold coin of 
the United States of  America, (in monthly installments). 
"Section 2.... 
(c) ... In case the Republic shall fail  to make prompt payment of  any 
payment for  the service of  interest and amortization of  the Bonds of 
1926 as and when the same shall be due and payable the Fiscal Agents 
for  the Bonds of  1926, shall apply to the payment of  interest and sinking 
fund  as and when due all or such part of  the aggregate sum of  $170 535. 
"Article VII. 
"Section 2.... The trustee may and, upon the written request of  the 
holders of  not less than one-fourth  in principal amount of  the Bonds 
then outstanding, shall, by written notice to the Republic, appoint, and 
the Republic shall be obligated to consent to the appointment of,  and 
hereby does consent to the appointment of,  a Special Collections 
Agency... with the sole right to administer, at the Republic's expense, 
subject to the prior rights of  the holders of  the outstanding bonds of 
the Gold Refunding  Bonds of  1911, the collection of  all revenues from 
customs duties, ... and the collection of  all the revenues from  the 
monopoly of  alcohol and liquors, subject to the rights of  the holders of 
any prior lien or charge thereon.... 
"Article XII. 
"Section 1.... The "Special Collections Agency"... shall be construed to 
mean the individual, firm,  company or corporation designated for  the 
purposes ... by the Trustee in writing addressed to the Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of  the Republic at 
Washington or to the Secretary of  Finance and Commerce of  the 
Republic in Costa Rica.... 
"Section 3.... The Republic further  agrees to pay to the Special 
Collections Agency (if  any) reasonable compensation not exceeding 
$5 000 per annum for  its services and also to pay all reasonable 
expenses.... 
"Article XIV. 
In case any dispute or difference  shall arise ... any party to the dispute 
desiring to submit the same to arbitration shall serve written or cabled 
notice on the other party or parties to the dispute, of  its election to 
arbitrate it by submitting the question for  decision to the person who 
shall be at the time the Chief  Justice of  the Supreme Court of  the 
United States of  America, who is hereby appointed the sole arbitrator, 
or if  he shall refuse  or be unwilling to act, then the arbitrator shall be 
the Associate Justice or said Supreme Court, next in order of  seniority 
who shall be willing and able to act." 
In a despatch from  the American Consul at San José, prepared in September 1931, appears the 
following  statement: 
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"DEBT RECORD: Cósta Rica obtained its first  foreign  loans in 1871 
and 1872. In 1874 both loans went into default.  Under an agreement 
reached with the bondholders in 1885, principal on the old loans was 
reduced by 50 per cent. In 1895 interest was defaulted.  And in 1897 a 
new arrangement was made whereby interest was scaled down. But in 
1901 the government again defaulted.  A final  adjustment was made in 
1911, under which there was a further  reduction in principal. 
"A franc  loan was issued in connection with the adjustment of  1911 
(5 per cent external loan of  1911). After  the severe depreciation of  the 
franc  following  the war, there was considerable controversy regarding 
whether interest was to be paid in paper or gold francs.  In November 
1925 a settlement was made whereby Costa Rica agreed to pay at the 
rate of  10 cents (U.S. currency) per franc.  The agreement also provided 
for  the purchase of  Costa Rica of  bonds of  the franc  loan at the rate of 
$50 per bond of  500 francs  plus accrued interest. A large majority of 
the bonds were thus redeemed. A decision rendered by the Tribunal 
de la Seine in June, 1930, requires Costa Rica to meet the service on 
the outstanding bonds of  the five  per cent franc  loan of  1911 on a gold 
basis. The loan contract provided that French tribunals were to 
determine any questions arising out of  it. As a result of  the decision, 
Costa Rica will also be required to pay accrued interest on the 
outstanding bonds, representing what would have been paid as interest 
on a gold basis and what was actually paid on a paper basis. 
"Since the general revision of  the debt in 1911, with the exception of 
the franc  controversy which now appears to be finally  settled, there 
have been no defaults,  scaling down of  interest payments, or suspension 
of  sinking fund  payments in connection with any loan of  the Republic." 
I have included in the chart of  the external debt hereto attached, the items carried as such in the 
1931 budget of  the Government of  Costa Rica. 
The following  sums are set aside daily from  Government revenues by the Banco de Costa Rica 
to service the loans indicated: 
British 5 per cent 
English Construction 6 per cent 09 000 ($2 250) 
American 7 per cent 1900 
Pacific  Railway 7 per cent 500 
In the contract for  the French Franc Loan of  1911, appears the following: 
"If  the Government of  the Republic or the administrator of  the revenue 
of  the Republic should happen to let sixty days go by without making 
the weekly remittance, he should deliver immediately to the banker or 
the representative of  the administration, the revenues of  alcohol and 
liquors. 
"In this case the bankers will retain the amount for  payment of  the 
weekly interest and amortization of  the present loan and will deliver 
the balance to the Republic after  having deducted the expenses of  the 
administration of  these deliveries. In case the bankers should have to 
take charge of  the administration of  the liquor revenue, they will give 
a guarantee from  a European bank for  the sum of  500 000 francs  as a 
security for  the over-balance that they may collect." 
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The million dollar loan security by the Government of  Costa Rica originally from  the First 
National Bank or First National Corporation of  Boston and later transferred  to the National City 
Bank of  New York, apparently is treated by the Government of  Costa Rica as a credit rather than 
as a loan. Originally it was to have matured on September 2, 1930, but due to the inability of  the 
Government to pay, several extensions of  a few  months each have since been secured. In December 
1930 the Government was authorized to raise the annual interest rate from  8 per cent to 8-1/2 per 
cent and to pledge the customs and liquor revenues as security, subject to prior liens thereon. 
Table III.2.1 
COSTA RICA 
Internal  Debt 
(As of  July 1,1931) 
It is of  interest to note that provisions of  the 1931 budget for  the internal debt are shown as follows: 






1. Port Limon Sanitation Bonds 368 000 
2. A.E.G. Completion 7% Bonds 141825 
3. Banco de Costa Rica 
(Alajuela electric plant 8%) 380 700 
4. Banco Internacional (various loans) 
Total 







Public  Debt Service,  1931 










5 628 000 
1 225 578 
112,672 
68 750 
1 407 000 
It would appear that the total customs revenues for  the year 1931 will amount to more than 
12 000 000 colones (or $3 000 000), and liquor revenues to approximately $1000 000. 
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Table III.2.2 
COSTARICA: EXTERNAL DEBT (as of  June 30, 1931) 
Annual . . „ . Total service . Amortization Year of  . . . Amount Amount „ _ , Name of  issue interest . . appropriated . . „ . Security Bankers rate provision: maturity ¿ 3 l b \ , d g e t '««ed outstanding 
1. Costa Rica Refunding 
Gold Loan of  1911 
1% p.a. cumulative 1958 $372033 Pounds Sterling Pounds Sterling First lien on all 
2000000 1 542000 customs duties. 
Hambros Bank, London 
& National City 
Bank, N.Y. 
2. Costa Rica External 
Gold Loan of  1911 
1956 55 055 French francs  Gold francs 
35000000 5774000 
First lien on 
alcohol & liquor 
monopoly revenues. 
(Protective Committee 
of  French Bond Holders) 
3. Costa Rica Mortgage 
Bonds of  1912 
(English Construc-
tion Co.) 
2% per annum 1942 27 733 Pounds Sterling Pounds Sterling Direct obligation 
188720 97 370 of  Government. 
Hambros Bank and Guar-
anty Trust Co., N.Y. 
4. Costa Rica External 
Secured Sinking 
Fund Gold Loan of 
1926 
In accordance with 1951 
fixed  table 
516600 $8000000 $7367 000 Direct obligation 
of  Govt, and (sec-




Fiscal Agent: J. & W. 
Seligman, N.Y. 
Trustee: Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., N.Y. 
5. Costa Rica Pacific 
Railway Gold Bonds 
(1927) 
7% • per annum 1949 134156 1 800 000 1777 500 First lien on 
gross revenues of 
the Pacific  Rail-
way. 
National City Bank, 
N.Y. 





of  Govt, without 
specific  pledge. 
'This item apparently includes the National City loan of  $1,000,000. This loan originallywas to mature September 2,1930 but it has been extended for  periods of  several months. 
It originally bore 8% interest, but the rate has been increased to 8% and possibly it is now secured by a third lien on the customs and liquor revenues. 
Table III.2.3 
COSTA RICA 
(The  following  tables  are all  in colones.  4 colones equal $1.00) 
Comparison of  Public Debt of  Costa Rica for  Years 1925-1930 
External Internal Total 
Year debt debt debt 
1925 42368 177 40 348 239 82 716 416 
1926 39 087 784 39 919 512 79 007 296 
1927 65 740 721 13 287 064 80 047 942 
1928 68 604 249 15 001 209 83 605 458 
1929 69 916 379 ... 79 191 000 
1930 68 341 190 25 753 562 94 094 752 
Comparison of  Revenues and Expenditures, 1925-1930 
Year Revenue Expenditure Deficit 
1925 25 781 231 23 767 550 2 013 680 * 
1926 27 417 348 22 611499 4 805 899 * 
1927 30 584 123 23 319 189 7 264 934 * 
1928 33 318 699 28 406 000 4 912 699 * 
1929 35 395 988 36 220 066 824 078 
1930 27 468 500 32 513 820 5 045 320 
* Surplus. 
Comparison of  Customs and Liquor Revenues, 1925-1930 
Customs Liquor 
Year revenues revenues 
1925 12 951 953.40 4 971330.40 
1926 14 248 002.93 4 989 909.72 
1927 16 187155.22 5 478 810.44 
1928 18 149 490.10 5 665 478.65 
1929 19 201 514.00 5 514 314.76 
1930 12 579 324.00 4 384 725.00 
1931—1st six months 6 173 717.00 
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3. THE FOREIGN DEBT OF COSTA RICA (1932) 
From: The Foreign Debt of  Costa Rica; Department of  State, Office  of  the Economic Adviser; 
June 2,1932; 818.51/511. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER 
THE FOREIGN DEBT OF COSTA RICA 
In 1911 Costa Rica issued a refunding  loan of  £2 000 000 bearing interest at four  per cent for  the 
first  ten years and five  per cent per annum thereafter.  Of  this loan £617 800 was exchanged for  gold 
bonds and arrears of  interest in the settlement of  earlier debts and £382 000 was turned over to the 
Costa Rican Government. Of  the amount issued £322 000 are understood to have been deposited 
with the National City Company of  New York and £50 0000 were held by the International Banking 
Corporation of  New York at the order of  Costa Rica. It is understood that the amount outstanding 
of  this loan is £1507 740. 
Interest on this loan has been paid at the Hambros Bank, London, and at the National City Bank, 
New York. It has been reported that in September 1925 a bulk of  £300 000 of  these bonds was offered 
for  sale in New York by F. J. Lisman and Company. 
The sinking fund  provisions of  this loan specify  that not less than one per cent of  the nominal 
amount of  all the bonds issued under the loan agreement shall be paid annually to the bank in 
semiannual instalments beginning January 1,1921. The amounts which the bankers shall receive for 
the account of  the sinking fund  shall be used for  the purchase of  bonds in the open market at prices 
not exceeding par and accrued interest or for  the retirement of  bonds by drawing twice a year, if 
necessary, to exhaust the money in the sinking fund  (Loan Contract, Article VII). The entire loan 
was to be retired not later than January 1,1958. 
Two observations might be made on the sinking fund  provisions mentioned above: 
1. It should be noted that the contract specifically  states that no less than one per cent of  the 
nominal amount of  all bonds issued under the loan agreement shall be paid into the sinking fund 
annually beginning January 1, 1921. This wording would seem to permit the construction that the 
payments into the sinking fund  may be increased to any percentage higher than one. If  the Costa 
Rican Government should find  it possible to pay ten per cent or more of  the total amount of  the 
bonds issued into the sinking fund  annually that would appear to be entirely permissible. 
2. As long as the price paid for  the bonds purchased on the open market does not exceed par and 
accrued interest, the total amount available in the sinking fund  shall be used for  sinking fund 
purposes. The article further  provides that if  the number of  bonds necessary to exhaust the funds  in 
the sinking fund  are not available on the open market, additional bonds can be obtained by drawings 
at par. The fact  that the amount available in the sinking fund  must be exhausted would appear to 
permit the purchase of  a larger number of  bonds on the open market in case they could be obtained 
at the price lower than par or in case additional funds  are made available for  sinking fund  purposes. 
The provisions of  Article VII of  the Loan Contract, summarized above, would permit the 
retirement of  the total bond issue as quickly as the Costa Rican Government can find  the money to 
do so, but the retirement must take place prior to January 1,1958. 
A Costa Rican five  per cent external gold loan was also issued in 1911 in France in the amount 
35 000 000 French francs.  While this loan was issued in France and not directly of  interest to 
American bondholders, it throws light on the treatment Costa Rica has accorded its bondholders 
and, therefore,  might be usefully  considered at this point very briefly. 
Article VIII of  the French Loan provided that beginning on January 1, 1916, the interest and 
amortization on this loan should be paid by a constant annuity of  2 031 827 French francs  which, 
according to the statement of  the amortization attached to the Loan Contract, would be sufficient 
to pay the interest at the rate of  five  per cent and the amortization of  a sufficient  number of  obligations 
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to retire the total loan by January 1,1956. However, Costa Rica reserved the right to increase the 
rate of  retirement at per beginning on January 1,1921, or to increase by drawings the number of 
obligations amortized (Loan Contract, Article VIII). 
The Costa Rican Government paid interest and amortization on the bonds of  this issue in French 
paper francs  but the French bondholders refused  payment in depreciated francs  claiming that they 
were entitled to payment in gold francs.  In June 1923, a committee of  French bondholders filed  a 
suit in a French court requesting a judgment to the effect  that the holders of  the bonds were entitled 
to payment in any of  the currencies mentioned in the bonds and interest coupons. The bondholders 
could file  such a suit because of  Article XV of  the Loan Contract authorized the plaintiff  in case of 
any disagreement between the bankers and the Costa Rican Government in the interpretation of 
the contract to file  suit in a court in Paris or in Hamburg. 
On March 20,1925, the Costa Rican Minister in Paris, under instructions from  his Government, 
signed an agreement with the French Association of  Bondholders providing for  the redemption of 
the French loan at the rate of  ten francs  to the dollar if  the holders of  three-fourth  of  the outstanding 
portion of  the loan accepted the arrangement. While three-fourths  of  the outstanding bonds were 
not deposited in accordance with this agreement, more than one-half  of  the outstanding bonds were 
deposited and the Costa Rican Government decided to refund  these bonds on the basis provided 
by the agreement. For this purpose funds  were deposited in New York to retire the entire issue. It 
has been stated that on August 1,1926,23162 000 francs  of  this loan had been retired. The loan has 
now been further  reduced so that on December 31, 1929, there remained outstanding 5 639 000 
francs. 
While the controversy mentioned above was at its height, the Costa Rican Government entered 
into negotiations with an American banking group for  a loan. The French bondholders, supported 
by the French Government, protested against these negotiations claiming that the entire revenue of 
Costa Rica was pledged as a guarantee for  the French loan. In order to settle this controversy, the 
Costa Rican Government deposited in Paris and in New York and invested in what was called first 
class securities sufficient  funds,  in pursuance of  an agreement to that effect,  to redeem and pay the 
outstanding part of  the French loan. The French part of  this deposit, said to have amounted to 
5 000 000 colones, was placed with the banking house of  Benard Freres of  Paris. It has been reported 
that the Benard Freres went into bankruptcy in 1930 and the funds  deposited with this bank are, 
therefore,  tied up although the Costa Rican Government may eventually succeed in having its deposit 
returned. On October 13,1931, the French Chargé d'Affaires  in Costa Rica made representations 
to the Costa Rican Foreign Office  demanding immediate action respecting the French loan of  1911. 
The file  does not show what action, if  any, the Costa Rican Government took with respect to the 
French representation. 
In 1926, the Costa Rican Government obtained through the Central Union Trust Company of 
New York a seven per cent external gold loan in the amount of  $8 000 000, of  which $7 367 000 
remained outstanding on October 28,1931. Article IV of  the Loan Agreement covering this loan 
states that until November 1,1936, the bonds of  the 1926 issue shall not be subject to redemption 
except through the operation of  the sinking fund,  but that on November 1,1936, or on any interest 
date thereafter,  the bonds of  the 1926 issue may be redeemed in whole or in part at the option of 
Costa Rica. In the case of  total or partial retirement, the bondholders shall receive sixty-days notice 
and the bonds shall be redeemed in the principal amount with accrued interest at the dates of 
redemption. 
Article III of  the Loan Agreement states that from  and after  November 1,1936, Costa Rica may, 
at her option, increase the amount of  any semiannual instalment for  the service of  interest and 
amortization of  the bonds of  1926 in order to accelerate the rate of  retirement of  the bonds but that 
the amount of  such an increase shall not be considered as permitting a reduction in the amount 
subsequent payments below the requirement necessary for  normal interest and retirement payments. 
Under Article VIII the fiscal  agent is required to apply the amounts received by him to. the 
payment of  the interest on the bonds and the balance of  each instalment of  the semiannual payment 
shall be used as soon as practicable for  the purchase of  bonds for  the sinking fund  "at public or 
private sale or otherwise." The bonds shall be purchased at the best price obtainable, not exceeding 
their principal amount and accrued interest at the date of  purchase. 
The provisions of the Loan Agreement of the 1926 loan in the articles summarized above show: 
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1. That apparently no retirement beyond the regular sinking fund  requirements can be undertaken 
prior to November 1,1936; 
2. That after  November 1,1936, additional quantities of  bonds of  the 1926 issue may be retired 
on any interest date by purchase or otherwise without any limit being indicated on the total which 
might be so purchased; 
3. That the amount paid for  any bond shall not exceed par and accrued interest; 
4. That Costa Rica can, upon sixty-days published notice, retire after  November 1,1936, all or 
any portion of  the loan of  1926 at any time she should desire to do so. 
It should also be noted from  the general provisions of  the loan agreement that this loan matures 
on November 1,1951. 
In November 1927, the National City Company of  New York offered  at par the Costa Rican Pacific 
Railway 7 1/2 per cent gold loan in series A, B, C, D and E. The total amount of  this issue was 
$1800 000 and each series was $360 000. The loan is callable at par at any time and bonds may be 
purchased on the open market or called for  the sinking fund. 
Article IV of  the Loan Contract states that Costa Rica shall create a sinking fund  of  not less than 
two and one-half  per cent per annum of  the total nominal value of  all bonds issued. To the semiannual 
interest service of  the bonds shall be applied the amounts received from  the revenues mentioned in 
Article V. The banker shall apply these sums for  the payment of  accrued interest on the bonds in 
circulation and the balance remaining with the banker after  interest has been paid shall be used for 
the amortization of  the bonds. 
Article V of  the Loan Contract provides that until the complete repayment of  the debt and its 
interest, Costa Rica agreed to deposit daily from  the gross revenues of  the Railroad a proportional 
amount to yield monthly the sum of  $15 000. 
Another point which perhaps should be mentioned in this connection occurs in Article VIII, 
which reads: "Then banker cannot for  any reason recur to diplomatic channels for  the purpose of 
deciding by such means questions originating under the present contract." 
The sinking fund  provisions of  the Loan Contract for  the Pacific  Railway bonds can, therefore, 
be summarized as follows: 
1. Article IV of  the Loan Contract appears to warrant the conclusion that 2 1/2 per cent of  the 
total amount issued is the minimum to be applied for  sinking fund  purposes and that any additional 
amounts may be added for  the retirement of  bonds on any interest date; 
2. After  the interest of  the outstanding bonds has been paid any additional funds  in the hands of 
the banker shall be applied for  sinking fund  purposes until it is exhausted; 
3. The maximum price that may be paid for  the bonds upon retirement is par and accrued interest, 
but it would appear that if  bonds were available in the open market at less than par purchases can 
be made to the fullest  extent of  the funds  available in the sinking fund. 
I have omitted from  the summary of  the sinking fund  provision the British Public Works Loan of 
1912, of  which only £84 760 sterling remained outstanding on October 18,1931. 
It appears from  the foregoing  consideration of  the sinking fund  provisions of  Costa Rica's foreign 
debt agreement that the payments required by these agreements for  sinking funds  purposes 
represent minimum amounts and that increases can be made at any time with a view to accelerate 
the rate of  retirement of  all the loans except the loan for  1926 in which case no increases in retirement 
can take place prior to November 1,1936. Further, in case of  the loans to which increased amounts 
are applied for  sinking fund  purposes, the amount available in the sinking fund  shall be exhausted 
by purchases on the open market at not exceeding par and accrued interest and, if  bonds are not 
available on the market, additional bonds may be obtained by drawings at par. This would seem to 
show that the loans can be reduced as fast  as funds  are made available for  the purpose. 
In order to consider the burden of  the interest and amortization payments on the Costa Rican 
budget, I have gathered the following  information  regarding the external debt of  Costa Rica from 
La Gaceta of  Costa Rica, September 2,1931. This copy was transmitted to the Department by the 
American Legation at San José as enclosure to despatch No. 613 of  September 26,1931. 
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Table III.3.1 
FOREIGN DEBT OF COSTA RICA 









British loan of  1911 
5 per cent interest payment 
Amortization 
£1 542 000 
£76 550 
£43 450 
£1 480 000 
£73 250 
£46 750 
French loan of  1911 
5 per cent interest payment 
Amortization 





Loan of  1926 in United States 
7 per cent interest payment 
Amortization 
$7 447 500 
$516 600.00 
$163 500.00 
$7 284 000 
$506 870.00 
$175 270.00 
Pacific  Railway Loan of  1927 
71/2 per cent interest payment 
Amortization 
$1 800 000 
$134 156.25 
$45 843.75 
$1 754 156.25 
$130 653.50 
$49 346.50 
English Construction Loan 








Source: Despatch No. 613 of  September 26 1931 from  Legation at San José and La Gaceta San José de Costa Rica of  September 2 1931. 
Besides the loan listed in the table above, the Legation lists for  the year 1931 a loan of  $1500 000 
at 8 per cent for  public works, but that loan is not mentioned in the part dealing with the year 1932. 
I have, therefore,  omitted this loan from  my table as it probably has been paid. 
In the table above, I have retained the original currency in which the loans were listed both with 
respect to capital and interest except the French loan of  1911. In that case, the source mentioned 
the interest on the French loan in United States dollars and I have retained that figure,  but I have 
converted the amount for  amortization for  that year also into dollars. It should be noted that in the 
case of  the French loan of  1911, the Costa Rican Government had deposited securities in Paris and 
New York and that the interest on these securities is said by the Costa Rican authorities to be ample 
to meet the carrying charges of  this loan. This loan is, therefore,  not carried in the list for  1932 as a 
charge against the budget. 
In order to arrive at an approximate figure  indicating the burden on the Costa Rican budget 
resulting from  the interest and amortization payments on the loans listed in the table above. I have 
converted the figures  for  interest and amortization into dollars omitting the figures  for  the French 
loan as being cared for  in another way. On this basis find  that the burden on the budget for  the year 
1931 was $1498 965.75 for  the four  loans listed. It should be noted that this amount includes interest 
and amortization. The credits proposed for  interest and amortization payments for  these four  loans 
for  1932 amount to $1 517 675.68 according to the conversion figures  given in La Gaceta for 
September 2,1931. 
It should be noted that in certain instances the reduction of  the loans from  one year to another 
has been greater than the total amount of  the funds  set aside as amortization. In these cases I have 
assumed that the authorities have applied the sinking fund  by purchasing bonds in the open market 
at less than par value. The par value of  the bonds so purchased has then been subtracted from  the 
amount of  the loan reported as outstanding. It is, of  course, possible, although perhaps less probably, 
that the Costa Rican Government has been using funds  not provided by the sinking fund  for  the 
purpose of  purchasing bonds for  retirement on the open market. If  such transactions have been 
carried on, the amounts of  the bonds so purchased should, of  course, also be subtracted from  the 
total amount outstanding. 
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In order to show the position of  the Costa Rican Treasury, I have prepared the following  table 
(III.3.2) on the receipts and expenditures of  the Government for  the years from  1928 to 1932, 
inclusive. It should be noted that the material for  the years 1928,1929 and 1930 has been taken from 
Moody's, Governments, page 571, and the material for  1931 and 1932 has been obtained from 
despatch No. 613 of  September 26,1931, from  the American Legation in Costa Rica. 
Table III.3.2 
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT IN COLONES 
Years Receipts Expenditures Excess + Deficit  -
1928 33 318 699 28 406 000 +4 912 699 
1929 35 395 988 36 220 066 -824 078 
1930 27 468 499 32 513 819 -5 045 320 
1931 26 906 000 27 268 379 -362 379 
1932 (proposed budget) 28 290 000 28 274 663.23 + 15 336.77 
Taking the colones as equal to twenty-five  cents, the estimated receipt of  the Costa Rican 
Government for  the budget year 1932 will be approximately $7 072 500. If  the interest and 
amortization of  the foreign  debt will amount to approximately $1 500 000 for  the year 1932, nearly 
21.2 per cent of  the total estimated revenue will be required to meet the interest and amortization 
of  the foreign  debt. 
It has been felt  by some persons that the service of  the foreign  debt is heavier than Costa Rica 
can bear at the present time, and that it would be desirable that a reduction be arranged in some 
way. With this thought in mind, it may be of  interest to compare the percentage of  the estimated 
budget receipts of  Costa Rica required for  the foreign  debt service with the percentages of  the budget 
of  Great Britain for  the payment of  its public debt. According to the Statesmen' Year Book, 1931, 
pages 34 to 35, the estimate for  the interest and sinking fund  in the British budget for  the fiscal  year 
1931-32 was £355 000 000 out of  a total estimated receipt £884 948 000. These figures  show that in 
the case of  Great Britain just over 40 per cent of  the estimated receipts are required for  the debt 
service. It should, of  course, be noted that the figures  for  Great Britain cover presumably both the 
domestic and foreign  debts while those mentioned for  Costa Rica pertain only to the foreign  debts 
of  that country. It might be mentioned also that for  the fiscal  year ending June 30,1931, the United 
States Government paid approximately 12.9 per cent of  the total ordinary receipts as interest on its 
public debt. 
In the case of  Costa Rica, it should be noted that the estimates for  the service of  the foreign  debt 
in its official  publication gave the conversion value of  the pounds sterling as $4.86 in the United 
States currency, while the present exchange value of  the pound is more nearly $3.50. By taking 
advantage of  this reduction in the present value of  the pound, the burden on the Costa Rican 
Treasury would be somewhat reduced. Should, after  this reduction is availed of,  the Costa Rican 
Government find  that the debt service is still too heavy to carry it would appear to be preferable  for 
Costa Rica to approach the fiscal  agents for  the various loans with the proposition for  the suspension 
of  the sinking fund  operations for  a year or two. In this way a further  relief  for  the treasury might be 
obtained during this period of  depression and at the same time the credit standing of  the Government 
would be maintained much better than if  a default  should occur. 
In order to show what this suggestion would mean in actual practice, I have prepared the following 
table (III.3.3) in which I have converted the outstanding foreign  indebtedness of  Costa Rica into 
dollars at the rate of  $3.50 for  the pounds sterling and 0.0392 dollars for  the French franc  omitting 
the amounts required for  sinking fund  payments. 
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Table III.3.3 









of  present 
Interest 
charges 
British Loan 1911 5% £1507 740 
French Loan 1911 5% Frs.5 639 000 
Mortgage debt 1912 6% £84 760 
Gold Loan of  1926 7% $7 367 000 
Pacific  Railway 




7 367 000 






Total 14 907 799 $939 326.55 
This table shows that if  only the interest of  Costa Rica's foreign  debt is considered, even including 
the French loan of  1911, the total charge on the budget at the conversion rates I have been using 
would be less than $1000 000 or approximately 13.27 per cent of  the total estimated receipts for  the 
year 1932. This charge on the budget would be even less than the interest burden of  the public debt 
of  the United States on its budget. 
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4. COSTA RICA'S DEBT-SERVICING CAPACITY (1938) 
From: Comments on the Costa Rican Minister's Memorandum of  October 15,1938 Concerning 
the Capacity of  Costa Rica to Service its external Debt; Memorandum Adviser on 
International Economic Affairs,  Department of  State; November 22,1938; FW 818.51/783 
LM. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
ADVISER ON 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
November 30,1938. 
Mr. Welles: 
On October 18 you asked Mr. Feis to study the Costa Rican Minister's memorandum of 
October 15 himself  and let you have his views. 
Mr. Luthringer has since made the attached very careful  study dated November 22 and Mr. 
Feis appears to have initialed the conclusions in its first  four  pages as his requested report to 
you. 
Mr. Francis White told me a week or so ago that the Costa Rican Minister, about to visit 
his country, told him he was convinced by Mr. White on the one point that Costa Rica should 
avoid giving any preference  on sterling bonds. Apparently that is as near as the two men have 
come to an agreement. 
EA:FL:LWW 
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
ADVISER ON 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
MEMORANDUM 
November 22,1938 
COMMENTS ON THE COSTA RICAN MINISTER'S MEMORANDUM OF 
OCTOBER IS, 1938 CONCERNING THE CAPACITY OF 
COSTA RICA TO SERVICE ITS EXTERNAL DEBT 
Parti 
Conclusions 
1. The Costa Rican Minister greatly underestimates the capacity of  his country to provide 
revenues for  payments on its external indebtedness, and to convert these revenues into foreign 
currencies. 
2. The available economic information  indicates that Mr. White's minimum demands of 
approximately 50 percent of  the contractual rate of  interest and 1 percent amortization 
payments correspond much more closely to Costa Rica's capacity to pay than does the offer 
of  the Government of  Costa Rica to pay 1 percent interest and 1/2 percent amortization for  a 
first  three-year period and 1 1/2 percent interest and 1 percent amortization for  a second 
three-year period. 
3. Neither the present nor prospective economic conditions of  Costa Rica justify  such a 
large reduction in debt payments in comparison with those offered  by the Government of  Costa 
Rica on March 10,1937. 
4. The arguments advanced to justify  the more favorable  treatment of  holders of  the internal 
debt and sterling debt are not very convincing; the plan does appear to discriminate against 
the holders of  dollar bonds. 
5. The capacity of  the Government of  Costa Rica to service its external debt apparently 
greatly exceeds its willingness to pay. In my opinion the treatment accorded holders of  dollar 
bonds in the last offer  of  the Government of  Costa Rica is so out of  proportion to the true 
economic capacity of  Costa Rica that the Department should at least use its good offices  in 
obtaining a more equitable settlement. 
The chief  arguments in support of  these conclusions may be summarized as follows: 
1. In spite of  the fact  that Brazil abandoned its control of  coffee  exports in November of 
1937, Costa Rican coffee  exports for  the first  nine months of  the 1937-1938 crop-year amounted 
to 5.4 million dollars as compared to 6.1 million dollars for  the entire previous crop-year 
(Sept. 1,1936 to August 31,1937), which was regarded as an exceptionally prosperous year. 
2. The Costa Rican Minister ignores both the present importance of  the banana industry as 
a source of  dollar exchange, and the increasing importance of  that industry in the future  as a 
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result of  the plans of  the United Fruit Company to double the present banana production of 
approximately 5.5 million stems valued at $3 000 000. 
3. The transfer  of  debt payments should be greatly facilitated  by the recently-signed United 
Fruit Company contracts. The United Fruit Company has already advanced the Government 
of  Costa Rica $1 000 000 against future  banana taxes. Moreover, the United Fruit Company 
has contracted to undertake extensive construction works. It has been estimated that the 
immediate obligations under these contracts will require the expenditure within five  years of 
between four  and five  million dollars. In view of  the dollar exchange that will be provided by 
these expenditures, and in view of  the present strength of  the colon, as evidenced by its stability 
for  the past several years, there is little reason to believe that there will be any difficulty  in 
transferring  debt payments. 
4. Costa Rican revenues for  1937 were 38 million colones, the largest on record. In spite of 
the reduction in the coffee  export tax at the end of  1937 revenues for  the first  months of  1938 
were 19.6 million colones as compared to 19 million colones for  the first  six months of  1937. 
With revenues at this level the payments suggested by the Government of  Costa Rica for  service 
on its total debt, both external and internal, would require 12.7 percent of  revenues during the 
first  three-year period and 15.8 percent during the second. To meet the minimum demands 
suggested by Mr. White would require total debt payments of  somewhat less than 15.7 percent 
of  revenues for  the first  three-year period and 16.9 percent for  the second. Payments of  this 
magnitude would not appear to impose an impossible fiscal  burden on Costa Rica. 
5. Moreover, in view of  the large outlays for  construction to be made by the United Fruit 
Company it would appear that a reduction could be made in outlays for  public works without 
economic detriment to the country. Indeed, since there already seems to be nearly fully 
employment in Costa Rica it might in any event be advisable to reduce outlays for  public works 
in order to offset  the tendency toward higher wages and costs that may be anticipated as a 
result of  the construction activities of  the United Fruit Company, and which may increase the 
difficulties  of  the low-wage coffee  industry. 
6. According to memoranda prepared by the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council only 
a very small part of  Costa Rica's internal debt was converted into colones at 4 colones to the 
dollar, and in addition suffered  a reduction in rate of  interest from  10 percent to 6 percent. 
Even these bondholders, however, are receiving sums equivalent to 43 percent of  the original 
contractual interest to a high of  30 percent. The extent to which internal creditors are favored 
is indicated by the fact  that although the internal debt of  Costa Rica is only approximately 23 
percent Costa Rican governmental debt, holders of  the internal debt would receive 
approximately 54 percent of  the total payments for  debt service during the first  three-year 
period and 45 percent during the second. 
7. Finally, while the Costa Rican Government might feel  compelled by reasons of 
expediency to treat British creditors relatively more favorably  than American, this is no 
justification  for  offering  the latter a settlement which, even taking into consideration the more 
generous treatment of  British creditors, is far  below Costa Rica's capacity to pay. 
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ADVISER ON 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
PART II 
COSTA RICA'S CAPACITY TO PAY 
I. Foreign Indebtedness of Costa Rica. 
The annual report for  1937 of  the Council of  the Corporation of  Foreign Bondholders 
contains the following  statement of  the Governmental debt of  Costa Rica: 
External  Debt-
Gold  Refunding  Bonds, 1911 (English Debt), 
Supplementary Bonds and Unpaid Coupons £ 1723 584 
French Loan, 1911 (Gd. Fr. 5 811000) 
and Unpaid Coupons $ 1317 189 
United States Loan, 1926, Supplementary 
Bonds and Unpaid Coupons $ 7 319 696 
English Construction Company Bonds 
and Unpaid Coupons £ 43 330 
7% Pacific  Railway Bonds, 1927, 
Supplementary Bonds and Unpaid Coupons $ 1887 031 
National City Bank . . $369117 
Summary of  External Debt-- £ 1766 914 
US$ 10 893 033 
Internal Debt-
Bonds Issues Colones 13 232302 
Other Liabilities Colones 20 460 027 
Colones 33 692 329 
In 1932 and 1933 holders of  dollar bonds were offered  5-percent funding  bonds for  coupons 
falling  due for  the three-year period immediately following  the default  that occurred at that 
time. Subsequently Costa Rica, on July 10,1935, made an offer  to pay for  three years 50 percent 
of  the interest and 50 percent of  the sinking fund  on the two original dollar issues and full 
service on the funding  bonds, but all these bonds went into default  as to interest and sinking 
fund  payments in September and December of  1936. 
II. Offer of Settlement by the Government of Costa Rica. 
Since that time the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council has received a number of 
offers  of  settlement from  the Costa Rican Government. The last offer,  under date of  October 
31,1937, proposes a temporary settlement under which the Costa Rican Government would 
pay 1 percent interest in lieu of  the contractual rates of  interest for  a period of  three years, and 
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11/2 percent interest during the following  three years. The Government of  Costa Rica also 
proposes to set aside annually 1/2 percent of  the outstanding debt during the first  three-year 
period and 1 percent during the second three-year period for  amortization by means of 
purchase of  bonds in the open market, the sums set aside for  amortization being at first 
dedicated in their entirety, for  such time as may be necessary, to the redemption of  unpaid 
interest coupons paying 1 percent in place of  the nominal interest until overdue interest 
coupons are cancelled. The Costa Rican Government further  agrees to negotiate a definitive 
settlement before  the foregoing  provisional agreement expires. 
III. Mr. White's Objections to the Costa Rican Proposals. 
In an interview with the Costa Rican Minister on October 7,1938, Mr. Francis White, the 
president of  the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council, objected strongly to the temporary 
settlement proposed by the Government of  Costa Rica. Mr. White pointed out that the offer 
under discussion was far  below the previous offers  of  the Costa Rican Government and, in his 
opinion, so much below Costa Rica's capacity to pay that it would make a very unsatisfactory 
impression on the bondholders. For example, the offer  of  March 10,1937, to which the Foreign 
Bondholders' Protective Council had agreed (and which the Costa Rican Congress had 
rejected when the proposal was submitted "informally"  to them), provided for  interest ranging 
from  a minimum of  50 percent of  the contractual rate to a maximum of  70 percent and 
cumulative amortization of  1 percent. In contrast, the offer  under discussion authorized the 
payment of  only 13.3 percent of  the interest on the 7 1/2 percent bonds, 14.3 percent on the 
7's, and 20 percent on the 5's. Furthermore, the Costa Rican Government had agreed to 
allocate a percentage of  its revenues for  external debt service ranging from  16 percent when 
revenues did not exceed 33 million colones to 20 percent when revenues were in excess of  36 
million colones. Later in the interview Mr. White pointed out that under its most recent offer 
the Costa Rican Government, on the basis of  its 1937 revenues, would pay only 12.4 percent 
of  its budget for  debt service, including the payments on the National City Bank short-term 
debt. Mr. White pointed out further  that the holders of  Costa Rican internal debt, British 
creditors, and the National City Bank, were treated much more favorably  than the holders of 
dollar bonds. Mr. White finally  stated that the utmost concession he would be inclined to 
suggest to the executive Committee of  the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council was 50 
percent of  the contractual interest. 
IV. Reply of the Costa Rican Minister to Mr. White's Arguments. 
In the attached memorandum the Costa Rican Minister has attempted to refute  the 
arguments advanced by Mr. White in criticism of  the last proposal of  the Costa Rican 
Government for  settlement of  its dollar debt. One of  the Costa Rican Minister's principal 
arguments is that the Costa Rican Congress has not been willing, and is not willing, to approve 
an offer  along the liens of  the two previous offers.  His second principal argument is that the 
economic situation of  Costa Rica has changed entirely during the last year. The leading 
arguments of  the Costa Rican Minister may be summarized as follows: 
1. The Government of  Costa Rica cannot make payments in excess of  those offered  because 
of  transfer  difficulties;  that is, because of  the low prices of  Costa Rican exports, particularly 
coffee,  compared to prices prevailing at the time the debt was contracted, it is impossible to 
obtain an excess of  exports sufficient  to provide the foreign  exchange requisite for  larger 
payments. The Costa Rican Minister apparently bases this argument very largely on an 
assumption that coffee  is the only source of  exchange and that the outlook for  the coffee 
industry of  Costa Rica is very dark since Brazil has discontinued its export control. The Costa 
Rican Minister suggests several times that if  the debt were payable in colones instead of  foreign 
currencies larger payments would be possible. 
2. The Costa Rican Minister also states that an examination of  the import statistics shows 
that the only "luxury imports" are radios, automobiles, and automotive accessories. This, he 
believes, is evidence that imports have not been excessive. Moreover, Costa Rica enjoyed a 
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large active trade balance prior to 1933, but since that time there has been a passive balance. 
Consequently the only way that large debt payments could be transferred  would be for  Costa 
Rica to increase its tariff  duties in order to restrict imports relative to exports. This would be 
undesirable because an increase in trade barriers would retard world recovery. 
3. Larger debt payments would be extremely difficult  because of  the reduction in, and 
possible complete abolition of,  the coffee  export tax. Hence, from  a budgetary point of  view 
there is adequate justification  for  a material reduction in debt payments as compared to the 
preceding offers  of  settlement. 
4. There is no discrimination against holders of  dollar bonds in favor  of  the National City 
Bank, holders of  sterling bonds, or the internal debt. 
5. The proposals under discussion require in excess of  16 percent of  total revenues, although 
Mr. White states that less would be required. 
V. Inability of Costa Rica to Pay the Full Service on its External Debt. 
There is no doubt that the Government of  Costa Rica would find  it difficult  if  not impossible 
to meet the full  service on its foreign  debt. In 1937, the most prosperous year that Costa Rica 
has enjoyed during recent years, exports were 63 percent in value of  exports in 1929. The three 
principal exports of  Costa Rica are coffee,  bananas, and cacao. In 1937 the value of  coffee 
exports was 53 percent of  the value of  total exports, and the corresponding ratios for  bananas 
and cacao were respectively 26 percent and 12 percent. In volume, coffee  exports were 35 
percent greater than in 1929, but in value, they were 50 percent less. Banana exports were only 
10 percent less in volume, but were 33 percent less in value. In contrast, cacao exports were 
24 percent greater in volume and 56 percent greater in value than in 1929. As mentioned below, 
however, the cacao industry suffered  a large decrease in both volume and value of  exports in 
1938. Moreover, in 1937 approximately 20 percent of  the total exports of  Costa Rica were sent 
to Germany as against 11 percent in 1929. German trade policies narrow the world market 
area from  which free  exchange can be realized and hence make it more difficult  for  Costa Rica 
to obtain exchange for  debt service by an expansion of  exports. 
Mr. White, of  course, has not denied that there should be a material reduction in the 
contractual rate of  interest. Indeed, he informed  the Costa Rican Minister that the minimum 
terms which he might be willing to suggest to the Executive Committee of  the Foreign 
Bondholders' Protective Council would be a reduction of  50 percent in the interest on the 6 
percent bonds and 60 percent in the interest on the 7 percent and 7 1/2 percent bonds; that is 
21/2 percent interest on the 5 percent bonds, 2.8 percent interest on the 7's and 3 percent on 
the 7 1/2's. Although these were the minimum terms that he would suggest, they evidence a 
willingness on his part to accept a substantial reduction in the Costa Rican debt service. 
From the information  available to the Department at the present time it would appear that 
the terms suggested by Mr. White conform  much more closely to Costa Rica's capacity to pay 
than does the Costa Rican Government's proposal of  a flat  1 percent on all issues. The main 
thesis of  the Costa Rican Minister is that economic developments during the last year justify 
the great reduction in the offer  of  the Costa Rican Government as compared to the offer  of 
March 10,1937. 
VI. The Transfer Question. 
In my opinion the Costa Rican minister greatly underestimates the ability of  Costa Rica to 
pay debt service in foreign  currencies. There is reason to believe that he exaggerates the 
distressed condition of  the coffee  industry. Moreover, he completely ignores the present and 
prospective importance of  banana exports as a source of  foreign  exchange. 
A. Coffee Exports 
In a despatch from  Costa Rica under date of  July 9,1938 it is reported that from  September 
1,1937 to May 30,1938 (the coffee  statistical year is September 1, to August 31) exports of 
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coffee  were 344,516 bags, valued at 5.4 million dollars, while exports for  the whole year from 
September 1,1936 to August 31,1937 were 395 924 bags, valued at 6.1 million dollars. Thus, 
even with some of  the 1937-38 crop remaining to be sold, the decrease in the value of  coffee 
exports is only some $700 000 in comparison with the preceding year, which was regarded as 
an exceptionally prosperous one. The despatch then proceeds to point out that by no means 
all of  the return from  coffee  exports can be converted into dollar exchange, nor has been so 
convertible for  three years. After  deducting exports of  coffee  to Germany it is estimated that, 
assuming that all other coffee  exports went to free-currency  countries, the dollar values of 
coffee  exli convertible into dollar exchange were 3.5 million dollars and 4.4 million dollars for 
the coffee  years 1935-36 and 1936-37, respectively, as against 4 million dollars for  September 
1,1937 to May 31,1938. The despatch then states that the decrease in the ability of  Costa Rica 
to procure dollar exchange, owing to the coffee  situation, that might have occurred during the 
present statistical year in comparison with 1936-37 could not be more than $374 000 if  it is 
assumed that returns from  coffee  exports other than those to Germany were convertible into 
dollar exchange; and further,  that for  the first  nine months of  the statistical year 1937-38 there 
has been a gain of  $479 000 over 1935-36. Moreover, other despatches from  Costa Rica indicate 
that some experts anticipate that the current coffee  crop will yield a cash return in excess of 
that for  1937-38. 
B. The Banana Industry 
An even more serious weakness in the argument of  the Costa Rican Minister is his failure 
to mention the banana industry as a present and prospective source of  dollar exchange. 
Reports from  Costa Rica indicate that the banana industry is reviving after  a period of 
depression and that the contracts between the United Fruit Company and the Government of 
Costa Rica, recently approved by the Costa Rican Congress, promise a great expansion of  the 
industry. In 1936,3.9 million stems of  bananas were exported, the value of  which was $2 000.000. 
In 1937 exports were 5.5 million stems, the value of  which was $3 000 000. The quantity of 
bananas exported from  January 1, to September 15,1938 was approximately the same as for 
the comparable period in the preceding year. For the first  half  of  1938 banana exports were 
1.5 million dollars in value as compared to 1.4 million dollars for  the first  half  of  1937. 
It should also be noted that according to the estimates of  the United Fruit Company, the 
development of  new areas of  banana production on the Pacific  Coast will raise the total banana 
production of  Costa Rica to 10 or 11 million stems by the end of  five  years, or nearly double 
the present production. It is unlikely that the liquidation of  marginal coffee  production will 
not be more than compensated by the expansion of  the banana industry. 
C. Balance of Trade of Costa Rica 
The cacao industry was the only major industry in which exports were less in value during 
the first  half  of  1938 as compared to the first  half  of  1937. During the first  eight months of  the 
year the cacao exports aggregated 3.8 million kilos, valued at $567 000 as compared to exports 
of  5.3 million kilos, valued at $ 1066 000 for  the comparable period in the preceding yer. This, 
of  course, offsets  to some degree the favorable  position of  the banana industry. Nevertheless, 
the decline in the value of  cacao exports did not prevent exports for  the first  half  of  1938 from 
exceeding in value exports for  the first  half  of  1937. Thus, during the first  half  of  1938, total 
exports were valued at 7.7 million dollars as compared to 7.5 million dollars for  the first  half 
of  1937, which was a very prosperous year. 
Total imports for  the first  half  of  1938 were also greater than for  the first  half  of  1937, with 
the result that Costa Rica, which had an active trade balance of  $2 000 000 in the first  half  of 
1937, had an active trade balance of  1.6 million dollars for  the first  half  of  1938.1 
So far  as servicing its external debt is concerned, however, Costa Rica was as favorably 
situated in 1938 as in 1937. This follows  from  the fact  that the larger active trade balance of 
'See Table 1. 
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1937 was largely the resultant of  exports to Germany considerably in excess of  imports from 
that country. Since this trade was conducted in "ASKI" marks, the active balance with Germany 
would tend to impair rather than improve the ability of  Costa Rica to service its foreign  debts.* 
During the first  half  of  1938 exports to Germany were reduced considerably, while imports 
increased slightly as compared to the first  half  of  1937. As a result, the trade with Germany 
was more nearly in balance. If  German " ASKI"-mark trade is deducted from  Costa Rica's total 
trade for  the first  half  of  1937 and 1938, it will be found  that Costa Rican trade with other 
countries showed an active balance of,  respectively, 1.3 million dollars and 1.4 million dollars. 
It may also be noted that the active balance of  Costa Rica with the United States was 
$112 000 000 for  the first  half  of  1938 as compared to $65 000 000 for  the first  half  of  1937. 
One is thus led to the conclusion that so far  as the ability of  Costa Rica to pay can be 
ascertained from  the Costa Rican balance of  trade, the situation at the present time is about 
as good as it was prior to Brazil's announcement of  the abandonment of  its coffee  control, and 
when the Government of  Costa Rica offered  terms of  settlement much more favorable  than 
those contained in its last offer. 
VII. The Relation of Debt Payments to Imports 
A. "Luxury Imports" 
Very little weight can be given to the argument that Costa Rica's only "luxury" imports are 
automotive products and radios and, hence, that Costa Rica's imports are not excessive. 
Imports of  these goods may more nearly represent necessities than imports of  certain textiles 
and food  products. Moreover, it is often  the nature of  the use, rather than the character of 
good itself,  which determines whether or not an import may be properly regarded as a "luxury". 
For example, a public works program might cause the importation of  certain goods and 
materials which per se would not be considered "luxuries". Under certain conditions, however, 
the public works program might itself,  in whole or in part, be considered a "luxury". Again, in 
despatches from  Costa Rica it is reported that the Government is contemplating the purchase 
of  electric locomotives from  Germany, although the existing locomotives are said not to be in 
need of  replacement. Such an import might more truly represent the importation of  a "luxury" 
than the importation of  radios or automobiles. 
B. Alleged Necessity for an Increase in Tariffs 
It does not follow  that in order to obtain an active trade balance which would permit the 
transfer  of  larger debt payments it would be necessary for  Costa Rica to increase its customs 
duties. The diversion of  Costa Rican revenues formerly  spent for  public works, for  example, 
to the payment of  debt services would reduce the purchasing power available to Costa Ricans 
for  the purchase of  imports and would increase foreign  purchasing power available for  the 
purchase of  Costa Rican exports. The resumption of  debt payments would thus automatically 
tend to promote the requisite re-adjustments of  the Costa Rican balance of  payments without 
intervention in the form  of  tariff  increases. Again, to the extent that public works had 
necessitated the importation of  foreign  materials, a reduction in the volume of  public works 
would directly reduce imports. 
It does not follow,  of  course, that the payment of  foreign  debt service would be accompanied 
wholly by an absolute decrease in imports. If  Costa Rica increased the proportion of  the 
revenues it transmits to foreigners  to pay debt service, the resulting redistribution of 
purchasing power, and price and exchange rate adjustments, would tend to increase exports 
The Aski-mark was a partially convertible currency used in payment for  exports to Germany that could be 
used to cover one-third of  the value of  goods purchased in Germany, on the condition that the balance was paid 
in freely  convertible currency. [League of  Nations, Secretariat, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, Money 
and Banking 1936/37, Vol. II Commercial Banks (Geneva: 1937), p. 73.] 
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as well as to reduce imports. How much the adjustment would be accompanied by the one, 
and how much by the other, cannot be foreseen.  It is also possible that because of  other 
economic factors  that might become operative, there might not be any serious decrease in 
imports at all. In this connection the economic effects  of  the United Fruit Company contracts 
must not be overlooked. 
VIII. The Probable Economic Effects of the United Fruit Company Contracts 
These contracts, which have recently been approved by the Costa Rican Congress, should 
not only increase banana production and exports over a period of  years but should greatly 
increase the ability of  Costa Rica to transfer  debt payments during the developmental period. 
The supplemental contract signed on May 3,1938 provides for  the immediate advance of 
$1000 000 to the Costa Rican Government in anticipation of  future  banana export taxes. The 
developmental contract, signed on April 2,1938, provides for  the planting of  a minimum of 
4 0000 hectares of  bananas within five  years of  the implementing of  the contract (July 23,1938), 
the construction of  a port on the Pacific  Coast at Quepos Point within two years and a half, 
and another on the Golfe  Dulce within five  years. The contract also provides for  the completion 
within eight years, depending upon approval of  plans by the Ministry of  Public Works and the 
settlement of  the boundary dispute between Costa Rica and Panama, of  a railway from  the 
Golfe  Dulce to the Panama boundary by way of  Puerto Cortes. A report from  Costa Rica states 
that this will mean the "carrying out within the next five  years of  construction works on a scale 
nothing comparable with which has occurred in this country in the present generation". The 
report states further  that the manager of  the United Fruit Company in Costa Rica estimates 
that the company will probably spend between 4 and 5 million dollars in discharge of  its 
immediate obligations under the contract. Even assuming that the greater part of  these 
expenditures are for  imported materials it is apparent that there will be a large demand for 
colones in exchange for  dollars to pay labor and other local expenditures, and that "transfer 
difficulties"  on debt account will correspondingly be alleviated. The report from  Costa Rica 
remarks that there should be an abundance of  dollar exchange available for  payments to 
American holders of  Costa Rican bonds now in default,  as well as for  meeting expanded 
commercial obligations. It is also estimated that the increased banana production should add 
about $3 000 000 to the national income and should increase by 25 percent the capacity of 
Costa Rica to purchase imports and meet its foreign  obligations. It is believed, indeed, that 
the influx  of  dollars will be so great as to appreciate the colon and cause a rise in internal prices, 
wages, and costs that will seriously handicap the coffee  industry, which depends on low wages 
and a low colon. It would seem quite certain that the National Bank will be forced  to offer 
colones freely  against dollars in order to prevent an appreciation of  the colon above its present 
value of  5.61 - 5.62 colones to the dollar. 
In this connection it may be noted that even without the anticipated influence  of  the United 
Fruit Company contracts the colon has been remarkably stable for  the past two years, as 
evidenced by the comparatively narrow fluctuations  of  both the controlled and free  rates. 
Indeed, the Costa Rican colon has appreciated relative to the dollar since 1936. The average 
controlled rate was 6.15 colones to the dollar in 1936, and 5.62 in 1937, at which rate it has 
remained throughout 1938. The uncontrolled rate for  these periods was, respectively, 6.18, 
5.65, and 5.64. 
IX. The Fiscal Position of the Costa Rican Government 
The Costa Rican Minister states that the total service of  the external debt required by the 
first  provisional offer  was $950 000 per annum, and by the second offer,  $875 000 to over 
$1000 000, according to the revenues received. He then points out that to take care of  those 
payments the Government would have had "as a base" the product of  the coffee  tax, collected 
in American gold and amounting to an average of  $630 000 year. The Costa Rican Minister 
states that this tax was subsequently reduced and provided only $427 967 for  this year's coffee 
crop. Further, if  market conditions continue to be adverse this tax will be abolished altogether. 
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This situation, together with the unfavorable  coffee  market and the deficit  in the balance of 
payments will, he states, make any payment on the foreign  debt an extremely heavy sacrifice. 
A. Costa Rican Revenues and Expenditures 
While the loss of  revenue from  the reduction of  the coffee  tax is serious, it by no means 
destroys the ability of  Costa Rica to service its debt. Revenues in 1937 were reported to be 38 
million colones, the largest on record. Moreover, statistics for  the first  half  of  1938 show 
revenues of  19.6 million colones as against 19 million colones for  the first  half  of  1937, in spite 
of  the reduction in the coffee  export tax at the end of  1937.2 
Although the Costa Rican budget figures  are incomplete in that non-budgetary receipts 
and expenditures are not fully  reported, available statistics show that the financial  position of 
the Government has enjoyed a steady improvement in recent years. Reported expenditures 
exceeded receipts by 3 685 000 colones in 1935. In 1936 the deficit  was only 556 000 colones; 
in 1937 there was a surplus of  3 000 000 colones; and for  the first  six months of  1938 reported 
receipts exceeded expenditures by 4 232 000 colones, as compared with 1751 000 colones for 
the comparable period in the preceding year. 
B. Expenditure for Public Works 
In view of  the prospective construction work of  the United Fruit Company, it would appear 
both economically feasible  and desirable for  the Government to reduce considerably the 
comparatively large expenditures for  public works that have distinguished expenditures in 
recent years. Reports from  Costa Rica indicate that there is so little unemployment in that 
country that a considerable amount of  foreign  labor will have to be imported for  use on the 
construction projects planned by the United Fruit Company. It would appear, therefore,  that 
continuance of  public works on their present scale would accentuate the tendency of  the 
United Fruit Company projects to raise prices and wages and increase the difficulties  of  the 
coffee  industry. In other words, a reduction in public works expenditures to balance the 
expanding construction activities of  the United Fruit Company would probably be an 
advantage rather than a detriment to the economic stability of  Costa Rica. 
X. Discrimination Against Holders of Dollar Bonds 
A. Alleged Discrimination in Favor of the National City Bank 
The Costa Rican Minister states that the debt due the National City Bank is a "commercial 
loan" and therefore  has priority, and furthermore,  that the Foreign Bondholders' Protective 
Council was aware of  the settlement of  this claim at the time it was made. Mr. White, on the 
other hand, argues that the National City Bank loan was originally made on the understanding 
that it would be refunded  into long-term bonds, and that in any event it is no more sacred than 
bonded indebtedness. Whether the plan of  the Costa Rican Government does or does not 
discriminate against the holders of  dollar bonds in favor  of  an American short-term creditor, 
the National City Bank, is a matter on which the Department would presumably not express 
an opinion since two conflicting  American interests are involved. 
B. Alleged Discrimination in favor of British Creditors 
The offer  of  settlement of  the Costa Rican Government is much less favorable  to American 
bondholders than to British creditors. The Costa Rican Minister attempts to justify  the more 
favorable  treatment of  holders of  English Construction Company bonds on the ground that 
this is a small issue (£43 330) which the Government of  Costa Rica was anxious to clean up, 
and further,  that the bondholders had agreed to the cancellation of  three years of  interest 
2See Table 2. 
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arrears when a settlement was made several years ago. Mr. White, on the other hand, argues 
that a small debt is no more sacred than a large one, and points out that these particular 
creditors are receiving 3 percent interest or 50 percent service on their debt as compared to 
the 1 percent and 11/2 percent interest payments offered  to American bondholders. 
The other two sterling issues involved are a small 5 percent refunding  issue (analogous to 
the dollar 5 percent refunding  issues given to foreign  bondholders in lieu of  interest payments 
accruing during the years 1932-1935), and a 5 percent refunding  issue of  1911. The Costa Rican 
Minister argues that the holders of  this issue sacrificed  a good part of  their principal in 1911. 
Moreover, he contends that while a great part of  the proceeds of  the original loan (1870) never 
reached Costa Rica, this was not the fault  of  the subscribers who paid the full  price for  the 
bonds. Mr. White, on the other hand, argues that while the Foreign Bondholders' Protective 
Council had agreed that the British demand for  a minimum of  3 percent on their 5 percent 
bonds instead of  2 1/2 percent should be met, the Government of  Costa Rica had agreed to 
increase its payments on these bonds to 4 percent, or 80 percent of  the contractual interest. 
Mr. White further  contends that the circumstances of  the original issue were such that the 
holders of  the refunding  issue did not merit special consideration. 
The British creditors are clearly treated more generously than American bondholders. 
Whether or not this can be regarded as an unjustifiable  discrimination depends largely upon 
the weight given to the fact  that the 1911 issue represented a scaling down of  previous 
obligations. In my opinion this factor  can easily be given too much weight since the earlier 
British obligations were refunded  as long ago as 1911. It is dubious how far  the sacrifices  that 
one group of  British investors may have endured at that time should be regarded as a 
justification  for  discriminating in favor  of  a probably largely different  group of  British investors 
twenty-five  years later. 
It is not unlikely that the more urgent reason for  discriminating in favor  of  British creditors 
is the vulnerability of  Costa Rica to British pressure. In his conversation with Mr. White the 
Costa Rican Minister pointed out that Costa Rica sells 60 percent of  its coffee  to the United 
Kingdom, that the only coffee  imported and sold in the English market comes either from 
British colonies or Costa Rica, and that should the British put a duty on foreign  coffee  it would 
hit Costa Rica alone. In reply Mr. White pointed out that the United States purchased a large 
amount of  Costa Rican exports. (It may be noted that in 1937 the United States purchased 45 
percent and the United Kingdom 20 percent of  Costa Rican exports.) In reply to this the Costa 
Rican Minister pointed out that Costa Rica sold a great deal to the United Kingdom but 
purchased a very little from  that country, whereas they bought a large amount of  goods from 
the United States. 
It is not unlikely, therefore,  that the Costa Rican Government fears  economic pressure by 
the United Kingdom, and consequently deems it expedient to treat British investors very 
favorably.  In my opinion, however, the question of  discrimination is a secondary one; the 
primary consideration is that even assuming that relatively larger payments are made to British 
creditors, the payments offered  American bondholders are still materially below Costa Rica's 
capacity to pay. 
C. Alleged Discrimination in favor of Domestic Creditors 
Holders of  the internal indebtedness of  the Government of  Costa Rica are unquestionably 
treated more favorably  than American bondholders. This is evidenced by the fact  that while 
the capital value of  the internal debt of  Costa Rica is 33.7 million colones, or only 23 percent 
of  the total governmental indebtedness of  144.4 million colones, under the proposal of  the 
Government of  Costa Rica holders of  the internal debt would receive 54 percent of  the total 
expenditure for  debt service during the first  three-year period and 45 percent during the 
second. 
The Costa Rican Minister, however, attempts to deny discrimination on the ground that 
part of  the internal debt was originally in dollars, that this was refunded  into colones at the 
rate of  4 colones to the dollar at a time when the rate of  exchange was 5.6 colones to the dollar, 
and that the interest was reduced to 6 percent. 
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Granting that this was done, the holders of  this debt would still receive approximately 43 
percent of  the original contractual interest, assuming that the original interest was 10 percent, 
and correspondingly more if  the original rate of  interest was less than 10 percent. American 
bondholders, in contrast, are offered  from  a low of  13.3 percent of  the contractual rate of 
interest to a high of  30 percent, depending upon the original coupon rate of  interest of  the 
various issues. In addition, Mr. White has stated that only a very small amount of  the internal 
debt of  Costa Rica was refunded  in this manner. 
Although the proposals of  the Government of  Costa Rica demand a far  heavier sacrifice 
from  American bondholders than from  holders of  the internal debt, it would probably be 
politically difficult  for  the Government of  Costa Rica to reduce payments on its internal debt 
in order to pay American bondholders more, and in my opinion the interests of  the American 
bondholders will not be greatly aided by an insistence upon this lien of  argument. It would 
appear that the more important argument to press is that in spite of  the relatively generous 
treatment of  the holders of  the internal debt and sterling obligations, the settlement offered 
American bondholders is nevertheless well below the capacity of  Costa Rica to pay, and that 
to meet Mr. White's minimum demands for  American bondholders would not appear to 
impose upon Costa Rica and additional burden that it would find  it impossible to carry. 
XI. Relation of Debt Payments to Costa Rican Revenues 
The memorandum of  the Costa Rican Minister contains statistics showing that the proposal 
of  his Government would require payments on the foreign  debt of  $398 512, or 2 332 000 
colones during the first  three-year period, and $562 828, or 3 352 000 colones during the second 
three-year period. Service on the internal debt is estimated at 2 594 000 colones. Hence total 
debt service may be estimated at 4 926 000 colones during the first  three-year period and 
5 946 000 colones during the second. The Costa Rican Minister then states that these payments 
would represent, respectively, 16.5 percent and 20 percent of  the average annual revenues of 
the Costa Rican Government during the five-year  period 1933-37, inclusive. If  the revenues 
for  1937 are taken, the ratios are 13 percent and 16 percent. 
There is a small error in the calculations of  the Costa Rican Minister, arising from  a mistake 
in calculating the colon equivalent of  the dollar payments. Thus the colon equivalent of 
$398 512, at the rate of  5.6 colones to the dollar, the rate used by the Costa Rican Minister, 
should be 2 232 000 colones instead of  2 332 000 colones. Similarly, the colon equivalent of 
$562 828 should be 3 152000 colones instead of  3 352000 colones. On the basis of  these 
corrections the total annual debt payment during the first  three-year period would amount to 
16 percent of  the average revenues for  the past five  years instead of  16 1/2 percent as stated 
by the Costa Rican Minister. Similarly, during the second three-year period the ratio would 
be 19.1 percent instead of  20 percent as stated by the Costa Rican Minister. If  revenues for 
1937 are used the ratio would be 12.7 percent instead of  13 percent for  the first  three-year 
period, and 15.8 instead of  16 percent for  the second. 
The corrected estimated of  12.7 percent corresponds very closely to Mr. White's estimate 
that under the plan only 12.4 percent of  Costa Rican revenues would be devoted to debt service. 
The only basis of  disagreement between the Costa Rican Minister and Mr. White is not 
whether the plan calls for  the expenditure of  less than 16 percent for  total debt service, both 
external and internal; an equally important issue is whether the Government of  Costa Rica 
should dedicate a larger percentage of  its revenues to the service of  its external debt, even if 
this should require the expenditure of  more than 16 percent for  total debt service, both external 
and internal. Mr. White refused  to admit the contention that the Government of  Costa Rica 
should not devote in excess of  16 percent of  its revenues to debt service. 
The Costa Rican offer  of  March 10,1936, which was acceptable to the Foreign Bondholders' 
Protective Council, called for  the allocation of  20 percent of  revenues to service on the external 
debt when revenues exceeded 36 million colones a year, and 16 percent if  revenues did not 
exceed 33 million colones. Under the present proposal of  the Government of  Costa Rica the 
holders of  external debt would receive, on the basis of  1937 revenues, approximately 5.9 
percent of  total revenues during the first  three-year period, and 8.3 percent during the second. 
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Because a detailed statement of  the debt of  Costa Rica at the present time is not available 
it is impossible to determine exactly the sum required to meet Mr. White's minimum proposal 
of  21/2 percent interest on the 5's,2.8 percent on the 7's, and 3 percent on the 71/2's. However, 
if  it is assumed that the Government of  Costa Rica paid 3 percent interest on its dollar bonds 
and 1 percent amortization, the annual service required for  dollar bonds would be increased 
form  $124 307 and $207 178, as estimated by the Costa Rican Minister for,  respectively, the 
first  and second three-year periods, to $331485. Total service for  the external debt would be 
$605 688 as compared to $393 512 for  the first  period, and $687 135 as compared to 562 828 
for  the second. The sum of  $605 688 represents approximately 8.9 percent of  revenues for 
1937 and 11.3 percent of  average revenues for  the past five  years. Similarly, the sum of 
$687 135 represents 10.1 percent of  the revenues for  Costa Rica in 1937 and 12.8 percent of 
the average revenues during the past five  years. 
According to the estimates of  the Costa Rican Minister service on the internal debt amounts 
to approximately 6.8 percent of  revenues in 1936 and 8.6 percent of  the average revenues for 
the past five  years. Consequently, the external debt service of  $605 688 during the first 
three-year period, plus service on the internal debt, may be estimated as 15.7 percent of 
revenues in 1937 and 19.9 of  average revenues for  the past five  years. Similarly, during the 
second three-year period the external debt service of  $687135, plus the service on the internal 
debt, may be estimated as 16.9 percent of  the revenues of  the Costa Rican Government for 
1937 and 21.4 percent of  the average revenues for  the past five  years. 
In as much as the foregoing  estimate assumes service on dollar bonds somewhat in excess 
of  Mr. White's suggested minimum it is probable that settlement on those terms would require 
a total debt service, even during the second three-year period, not in excess of  16 percent of 
the revenues for  1937 and 20 percent of  the average revenues for  the past five  years. There is 
little reason to believe that the dedication of16  to 20 percent of  the revenues of  the Costa 
Rican Government to debt service would impose an unreasonable and unbearable burden on 
that country. 
The additional revenues required to increase the service on the dollar debt according to 
the estimate given above would amount to $207 177, or approximately 1160 000 colones. It 
maybe noted that a reduction in public works expenditures of  approximately 11 percent of  the 
amount expended in 1937 would provide the necessary funds.  The large construction activities 
soon to be begun by the United Fruit Company should more than offset  such a reduction in 
public works expenditures. 
The available evidence indicates that during the past year there has been no change in 
economic conditions that would justify  a settlement in which foreign  creditors would receive 
only 6 to 8 percent of  current revenues in contrast to the offer  of  March 10,1937, in which the 
Government of  Costa Rica offered  to pay foreign  creditors 20 percent of  the revenues when 
they were as large as at the present time. Finally, it may be noted that in 1937 expenditures 
for  public debt amounted to 6 755 0000 colones, or 18 percent of  the revenues for  that year. 
This is approximately 769 000 colones in excess of  the 5 986 000 colones per annum which 
would be required for  total debt service during the first  three-year period if  the service on 
dollar bonds was increased to approximately the level suggested by Mr. White, and 314 000 
colones in excess of  the 6 441000 colones per annum whicnwould be required for  the second 
three-year period. 
It is true that dollar bondholders did not receive any debt service during 1937, since the 
funds  that should have been used for  that purpose were used to purchase form  citizens of  Costa 
Rica dollar bonds that they had purchased at low prices in the United States as a speculation. 
Nevertheless, the fact  remains that in 1937 the Government of  Costa Rica was able to devote 
to expenditures for  the public debt a sum substantially in excess of  what would be required if 
Mr. White's minimum terms were met. There can be no doubt that from  the budgetary point 
of  view Mr. White's terms more closely approximate Costa Rica's capacity to pay than do the 
terms suggested by the Government of  Costa Rica. 
(Signed) 
G.F. Luthringer 
3 The difference  between $687 135 and $605 688 results from  the fact  that according to the estimates of  the 
Costa Rican Minister British bondholders will receive $122165 during the first  period and $203 610 during the second. 
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Table III.4.1 
COSTA RICAN FOREIGN TRADE 
















+ 5 598 
































































1936 1937 1937 (1st 6 mos.) 
1938 
(1st 6 mos.) 
Total Trade 
Imports 8 397 11878 5 237 6 092 
Exports 8 309 11512 7 462 7 722 
Balance -88 -366 + 2 225 +1630 
Trade With U.S. 
Imports 3 663 5 048 2 323 2 932 
Exports 3 681 5 188 2 388 3 044 
Balance +18 +140 +65 +112 
Trade With Germany 
Imports 1982 2 748 1 150 1 265 
Exports 1355 2 241 2 069 1 460 
Balance -627 -507 + 919 +195 
"Adjusted" refers  to correction for  overvaluation of  German trade with Costa Rica arising from  the original valuation 
of  this trade in Reichsmarks instead of  Aski marks. The figures  since 1936 have presumably correctly valued German marks. 
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Table I I . . 2 
RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES AND DEBT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF COSTARICA, 1929-1938 








Amount % Amount 
1837 
1st 6»t 
6 mos. 6 moa. 
1937 1938 




Pacific  Railway (gross) 
Fixed export taxes 
Direct taxes 
Conversion tax 
Banana export tax 
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Source Foreign Commerce Year Books 1929-1937; Annual Report of  the Foreign Bondholders'Protective Council, Consular Reporte from  San José. 
* Coffee  Export tax Property tax c tnt<.r«,«t and Commissions oolv. Conversion rate - one dollar equals four  colones. 
to 
3 
I terestand issi s nly. " rsi  r t  -  ll r ls f r  colones. * Does not include credits of  colones 420 015 
transferred  to budgetary accounts foi  -various reasons" nor receipts from  loans. f  Does not include amortization service of  colones 2 721 260 and nonbudgetary expenditures of  approximately 
colones 1400000. «Does not include credit operations or extra-budgetary receipts. h Does not include expenditures of  colones 2645000outsideofthe  budget. Does not include expenditures 
of  colones 2 233 000 outside of  the budget. > Does not include expenditures of  colones 4 744 000 outside of  the budget. Nonbudgetary expenditures not available. Estimated. The latest 
figures  available state that at the end of  1937 the external debt of  Costa Rica amounted to colones 110 747 404 of  which colones 8 311862 represented interest arrears. The external debt was converted 
at a rate of  5.62, however, whereas previous conversions w e r e at a rate of  4 colones to the dollar 
5. FINANCING HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION IN NICARAGUA (1943) 
From: Synopsis of  Export-Import Bank Credit No. 227 (with 227 A) granted to Republic of 
Nicaragua November 10,1943; and Suggested Procedure on Carrying out the Nicaraguan 
Construction and Development Program; Files of  the Export-Import Bank, Record Group 
275, Records of  case files  relating to grants of  credit to foreign  nations or domestic and 
foreign  private firms  to aid the foreign  trade of  the United States, 1934-51; National 
Archives and Records Administration, Washington. 
MEMORANDUM 
May 9,1939 
Re: Nicaragua - Conference  in office  of  Mr. Jesse H. Jones, Chairman, Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, Monday, May 8,1939, at 3:45 p.m. 
Present: President of  Nicaragua, General Anastasio Somoza; The Minister of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  Nicaragua, Dr. Manuel Cordero Reyes; Minister to United States from 
Nicaragua, Dr. Don Leon De Bayle; Mr. Jesse H. Jones, Chairman, 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation; Mr. Warren Lee Pierson, President, 
Export-Import Bank of  Washington; Mr. Archie Lochhead, Technical Assistant 
to the Secretary of  the Treasury; Mr. Laurence Duggan, Chief,  Division of  the 
American Republics, Department of  State; Mr. E. G. Collado, Division of  the 
American Republics, Department of  State; and Mr. Hawthorne Arey, Secretary, 
Export-Import Bank of  Washington. 
The President explained to Mr. Jones the general situation existing in his country, pointing 
out recent evidence of  improvement and future  expectations. He stated the need for  financial 
assistance in connection with the further  development of  the country, requesting specific  aid 
in connection with the following  projects: 
1. Improvement of  the status of  the National Bank so as to enable this institution to meet 
obligations which would be incurred from  time to time if  a program of  improving the country 
was initiated. 
2. Construction of  adequate roads in order that products produced by the Nicaraguan people 
could be exported. 
3. Development of  electric energy by means of  diverting waters from  Lake Managua during 
the rainy season to a river flowing  into the Pacific  Ocean. According to the President, 
engineering studies already completed indicated that sufficient  energy could be produced 
not only to permit electrification  of  Nicaraguan railways but to provide the necessary power 
for  the larger cities of  the country. 
After  a number of  specific  questions relating to each of  the proposals, Mr. Jones explained 
to the President that prior to any decision it might be desirable to send engineers or other 
representatives of  the Bank to Nicaragua to study the several projects. The President agreed. 
Following the departure of  President Somoza, Dr. Reyes and Dr. De Bayle, the problems 
presented were discussed briefly  by those named above and by Dr. Herbert Feis, who joined 
the conference.  Mr. Jones was of  the opinion that the electrification  project was not practical 
and that consideration should be given only to the requested loan to the National Bank and 
possible financial  assistance in connection with the road-building program. Mr. Duggan 




SYNOPSIS OF CREDIT NO. 227 (with No. 227A) 
NAME Republic of  Nicaragua AMOUNT $2500 000 
(as per Resolution) 
1. Background: In May 1939, when this commitment was entered into, there existed a shortage 
of  dollar exchange in Nicaragua which rendered it difficult  for  Nicaraguan commercial 
debtors to meet their obligations to their creditors in the United States. At the same time 
there was an acute need for  modern highways in Nicaragua. 
2. Purpose:This Credit had the dual purpose of  relieving the stringency in dollar exchange, 
and of  financing  the most urgent highway projects. 
(a) A credit for  $500 000 (No. 227) was set up for  the Banco Nacional de Nicaragua for 
exchange purposes; and $2 000 000 (No. 227A) was provided for  public works. Of  this 
latter amount $1 815 000 was allocated to highways - mostly on the route of  the 
Inter-American Highway in Nicaragua - and $185 000 was allocated to the importation 
of  agricultural machinery from  the United States. 
3. Credit Arrangements: 
(a) Parties: No.. 227: Letter Agreement of  August 31,1939 with the Bank of  Manhattan 
Company, New York, covering purchase by them of  drafts  of  the Banco National de 
Nicaragua, (the official  bank of  issue of  Nicaragua). 
No. 227A: Agreement of  Eximbank with Thomas A. Jones of  November 15,1939, as 
amended January 23, 1940. This Agreement is predicated upon Contract of  the 
Republic of  Nicaragua with Thomas A. Jones, as "Chief  Engineer in charge of  the 
execution of  a program of  highway construction and other projects in Nicaragua". That 
Contract is dated November 13,1939 and was amended January 8,1940. The Contract 
is dated November 13, 1939 and was amended January 8, 1940. The Contract 
stipulated, inter alia, the form  of  notes to be given by the Republic under the 
Agreement. Mr. Jones is an engineer of  the U.S. Public Roads Administration, on 
leave from  that service. 
These arrangements were based upon the exchange of  letters between the President 
of  the United States and Nicaragua on May 22,1939. 
(b) Dates: No.. 227: August 31,1939 
No. 227A: November 
No. 227A: November 15,1939 
(c) Amendment dates: No. 227: Amended July 1,1941 to extend availability and final 
repayment dates. 
No. 227A: Amended January 23,1940, (administrative changes). 
(d) Available until: June 30,1943, by amendment. 
(e) Amount: No. 227: $500 000 (outstanding at any one time). 
No. 227A: $2000000. 
(f)  Amended amount: Amounts unchanged. 
(g) Guarantor: Not guaranteed. 
(h) Other guarantees or collateral: None. 
(i) Interest: No. 227: 3.6% 
No. 227A: 5% up to December 15,1940 
4% after  December 15,1940. 
(j) Term: Advances under No. 227 are repayable in 12 approximately equal quarterly 
instalments, commencing from  date of  the advance, the final  payment to be made on 
or before  June 30,1946. 
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Advances under No. 227A are repayable in 10 equal semi-annual instalments, 
commencing 21/2 years from  the date of  the advance, the final  payment is to be made 
7 years from  such date. The final  maturity date is March 31,1949. 
(k) Form of  obligation: No. 227: The clean 3 months sight drafts  of  the Banco Nacional 
de Nicaragua are discounted by the U.S. commercial agent bank; new drafts  for  the 
balance after  the respective quarterly instalment payment are then substituted. 
No. 227A: The obligations are the Promissory Notes of  the Republic of  Nicaragua, to 
the order of  Thomas A. Jones and endorsed by him without recourse to Eximbank. 
(1) Special features:  Most of  the Highway construction financed  under Credit 227A 
relates to the Inter-American Highway. Therefore,  with respect to that project, for 
each dollar of  costs finance  under this credit, two dollars were contributed by the 
UnitedStates Government under authority of  Act of  Congress (No. 375,77th Congress, 
1st Session). 
(m) Equipment and materials purchased under No. 227A were purchased entirely in the 
United States. The amounts drawn under No. 227 were to provide funds  for  payments 
to U.S. commercial creditors, typically for  goods exported to Nicaragua. No funds  for 
local labor or materials are provided under this Credit. 
4. Operational Arrangements: 
(a) No. 227: Funds were supplied by a U.S. commercial bank, as agent. 
No. 227A: Funds were supplied directly by Eximbank. 
(b) Specific  Projects were approved by Nicaraguan Government and Eximbank. 
(c) Disbursements: No. 227: Disbursements were made against clean sight drafts  of 
Banco National de Nicaragua, accompanied by lists showing what creditors in the U.S. 
were receiving payments,. 
No. 221 A: Notes were accompanied by the Chief  Engineer's and Banco National de 
Nicaragua Certificates  covering all expenditures. 
(d) Reports required: Quarterly Engineering Reports were required for  Highway 
projects under No. 227A. 
5. Contractor: Construction of  these highways was administered by the U.S. Public Roads 
Administration. 
6. Utilization: 
(a) Amount of  credit utilized to the June 30,1943 expiration: 
No. 227: $650 000 
No. 227A: $2000 000. 
(b) Amount still available to borrower: None. 
(c) Amount repaid by borrower to November 1,1943: 
No. 227: $555 833.36 
No. 227A: $238000. 
(d) Balance outstanding: No. 227: $94166.64 
No. 227A: $1762000. 
(e) In applying for  an additional Credit (No. 291) for  this Highway Program the Republic 
showed its investment in it from  other sources up to early 1942 as having been 
$651000. 
7. Accomplishment to date: Sections of  the Highway covered by this loan were fully 
completed. 
8. Other pertinent information: Construction equipment purchased under this credit 
continues to be used for  the work on the Inter-American Highway being done under Credit 
No. 291. 
(The figures  given herein as to the status of  advances under this Credit are as of  October 
31,1943). 
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Suggested Procedure in Carrying Out the 
Nicaragua Construction and Development Program 
1. The Nicaraguan Government has indicated that it wishes to reserve a portion of  the 
$2 000 000 credit arranged by President Somoza with the Export-Import Bank for  the purchase 
of  certain equipment urgently needed in connection with the development of  Nicaraguan 
resources. It has indicated that in addition to the proposed highway construction it feels  it 
essential to improve its railway facilities,  its transportation by boat on Lake Nicaragua, and to 
provide implements and equipment for  agricultural development in the regions to be opened 
up by the new highways. President Somoza has indicated that he would like to devote $100 000 
to the purchase of  agricultural implements and equipment and $100 000 for  railway equipment, 
and the Minister of  Finance has indicated that he considers that it should be possible to 
purchase a suitable boat and transport it to Nicaragua for  $100 000. In a conversation yesterday 
with the Nicaraguan Minister, it was pointed out to him that the Coast Guard's estimate is 
nearer $400 000, to which he replied that if  the boat were to cost a very great amount he believed 
that the railway, which operates boats on Lake Nicaragua, would prefer  to devote the funds 
to the purchase of  railway equipment. He first  indicated that his government might wish to 
reserve $500 000 for  purposes other than highway construction, but finally  agreed to suggest 
that such purchases be limited to not more than $300 000. 
The American Minister in Nicaragua was informed  some time ago that the Export-Import 
Bank had indicated that it felt  that a period of  seven years was too long a term for  credits in 
connection with the purchase of  agricultural implements and equipment. In a recent telegram 
he indicated that President Somoza had suggested a term of  three years for  this type of  credit. 
2. It is accordingly suggested that of  the $2 000 000 indicated for  Nicaraguan construction 
and development not more than $300 000 be set aside for  purchases of  urgently desired 
equipment, consideration of  financing  such purchases to follow  the receipt of  a specific 
detailed request. The remaining $1700 000 on this basis would be allocated to the highway 
construction program. On the basis of  Mr. Coleman's estimates at $10 000 per kilometer this 
should cover all of  the costs for  American materials, equipment and engineering and 
supervision services for  the entire 200 odd kilometers which he proposes. Mr. Coleman and 
Mr. James have indicated, however, that the costs of  construction might exceed this amount, 
while the Nicaraguan Government has indicated that it believes that such costs would be 
less than $10 000 per kilometer. 
3. It is suggested that the construction be undertaken by the appointment by the Nicaraguan 
Government of  some reputable American firm  to furnish  the Chief  Engineer and general 
supervision and purchasing services, on a basis similar to that envisaged for  Paraguay. Such a 
firm  would appoint a Chief  Engineer not from  the existing personnel of  the Bureau of  Public 
Roads. The Bureau is prepared to furnish  the services of  its engineer, Jones, who is now in 
Managua, as consultant and observer for  the Export-Import Bank. In accordance with the 
President's letter to President Somoza, the Bureau of  Public Roads is also prepared to furnish 
at least two engineers under Public 63. It is suggested that these engineers under the 
supervision of  Mr. Jones carry out all the engineering surveys for  the highways, while the 
construction firm  under its Chief  Engineer carries out the actual construction work. In this 
way the services of  the engineers loaned by this Government would not tend to conflict  with 
the services performed  by the Chief  Engineer and his staff.  It might be necessary to charge 
against the job (that is against the cordoba funds)  the payrolls of  the local assistants who would 
be employed by the surveying group. 
4. The contracts between the Government of  Nicaragua and the Chief  Engineer and 
engineering firm  should provide for  the establishment of  two revolving funds  in the National 
Bank of  Nicaragua, one in dollars for  the dollar expenditures, and one in cordobas for 
expenditures on local labor. The Nicaraguan Minister has indicated that the National Bank is 
hesitant to establish a revolving fund  of  as much as $100 000 on the grounds that this would 
immobilize $100 000 of  the Bank's resources for  the duration of  the job. It has been suggested 
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that this might be reduced to $50 000, which would be sufficient  to cover ordinary monthly 
expenditures, heavy initial expenditures on equipment being covered by additional issues of 
Nicaraguan Government notes at intervals more frequent  than once a month. 
5. Regarding the obtaining of  cordobas for  the cordobas expenditures, President Somoza has 
indicated that he will devote the present public works appropriation which he states amount 
to 500 000 cordobas a year, that he will devote certain cordobas which otherwise the railway 
company might have devoted to purchases of  railway equipment, that he will sell the 
agricultural implements to the National Bank for  cordobas, the National Bank in turn renting 
or selling such equipment to agriculturists, and that the remainder of  the funds  will be found 
in the general budget. In this connection it may be recalled that the Nicaraguan Government 
has recently changed the rate of  conversion of  cordobas for  collection of  Customs duties which 
are imposed in dollars from  two to the dollar to four  to the dollar, thus presumably increasing 
its cordoba revenue. It is suggested that no matter how the Nicaraguan Government obtains 
the funds  in its own accounting, arrangements be made whereby the Collector of  Customs 
replenish monthly a revolving fund  in cordobas established in the National Bank. 
6. The Nicaraguan Minister is very anxious to conclude the arrangements with the 
Export-Import Bank and a Chief  Engineer or engineering firm  since it is now four  months 
since the arrangements were concluded with President Somoza, the period up to June 1941 is 
getting short, and the Nicaraguan Congress is now in session and can thus enact any legislation 
or changes in the recently enacted legislation which may be deemed necessary. 
RA: Collado:MJC 
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Table I I I . . 
NICARAGUA: FOREIGN TRADE BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES 
(Thousands  of  United  States  dollars) 
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Exports 
Total 5 230 5 658 4 648 7 038 5 884 
Coffee  2 374 3 118 2115 3 078 2 031 
Gold 680 567 808 849 1 550 
Bananas 1546 1 201 770 985 777 
Sugar refined  185 88 84 133 129 
Lumber 91 140 98 432 377 
Imports 
Total 4 610 5 073 5 580 5 621 5 120 
Cotton manufactures  1336 1 369 1 375 1 249 1 226 
Iron and steel products 343 423 574 515 416 
Machinery 314 404 539 664 790 
Chemicals drugs etc. 342 341 417 383 275 
Wheat flour  247 248 225 227 138 
Petroleum 282 249 227 362 209 
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MEMORANDUM 
Based Upon Which the Export-Import Bank of 
Washington Might Consider the Extension of 
Financial Assistance to the Republic of Nicaragua 
The Export-Import Bank of  Washington is prepared to consider the extension to the 
Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua of  credits which would assist the Government of 
the Republic of  Nicaragua in a program of  expanding production and domestic and foreign 
trade. It is suggested that such assistance might take one or both of  the following  forms. 
A. Highway and Other Public Works Construction 
I. Selection of Engineering Firm: 
The Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua and the Export-Import Bank of  Washington 
would jointly select a responsible United States engineering firm  to study possible useful  public 
works projects and thereafter  to proceed with the construction of  those projects approved by 
the Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua and the Export-Import Bank. Projects to be 
thus studied might include the completion of  certain links in the Pan American Highway 
through Nicaragua, lateral highways, and perhaps certain sanitary works and hydroelectric 
developments. 
II. Enactment of enabling legislation by the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua: 
The Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua would enact legislation and take such other 
steps as might be necessary and proper to authorize the issuance and delivery of  serial notes 
to be utilized for  payments for  the proposed public works; to authorize that such notes be fully 
guaranteed by the Republic of  Nicaragua; to provide revenues adequate to meet the interest 
and amortization of  the notes; and to exempt from  all taxes of  the Republic of  Nicaragua, or 
of  any political subdivision thereof,  any payments to the engineering firm  and any payments 
with respect of  interest and amortization of  the serial notes. The maturities, interest rates, form 
and other conditions of  the serial notes would be determined later. 
III. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua and the United 
States Engineering Firm: 
The Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua and the United States engineering firm 
selected would enter into an agreement. It is suggested that among the essential provisions of 
this agreement should be the following: 
(a) The engineering firm would undertake among other things: 
1. To study specific  public works construction projects designated by the 
Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua and to recommend the execution of 
such projects as would be of  real benefit  to the Nicaraguan nation. 
2. To supervise and administer, for  a fixed  engineering fee  payable monthly, the 
execution of  public works construction projects in Nicaragua. Supervision would 
include the services of  the general office  of  the engineering firm  in the United 
States in such matters as technical advice and the use of  its purchasing and 
accounting departments. The administration of  the work would be conducted in 
Nicaragua by an administrative unit consisting of  a first-class  chief  engineer, an 
assistant engineer, a comptroller, a purchasing agent, and such clerical assistance 
as may be necessary. The engineering fee  would consist of  the total salaries of  the 
personnel of  the administrative unit plus an amount approved by the 
Export-Import Bank for  general supervision. 
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3. To proceed immediately to construct public works projects recommended by the 
engineering firm  and approved by the Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua 
and the Export-Import Bank. 
4. To assist in the financing  of  the construction of  such projects: the engineering firm 
to finance  payments for  materials and equipment imported from  abroad and the 
engineering fee  plus the salaries of  such additional engineers as are brought in from 
abroad; the Republic of  Nicaragua to finance  payments for  all local labor and local 
engineers, as well as materials which may be acquired locally. The undertaking of 
the engineering firm  to assist in the financing  of  such construction would be 
conditioned upon its ability to discount serial notes which would be issued by the 
Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua. 
(b) In consideration of  the foregoing  undertakings on the part of  the engineering firm,  the 
Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua would agree, among other things, to pay to 
the engineering firm  the stipulated engineering fee  plus an amount equal to the 
expenditures for  materials and equipment imported from  abroad plus the salaries of 
such additional engineers as are brought in from  abroad, such payment to be made by 
the issuance and delivery to the engineering firm  each month of  serial notes described 
above. 
(c) The materials and equipments which were not already in the possession of  the 
Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua or which were not produced in the Republic 
of  Nicaragua would be purchased in the United States of  America and materials so 
purchased in the United States of  America would be transported to Nicaragua in 
American flag  vessels. 
(d) The agreements between the Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua and the 
Engineering firm  would be terminable by either party thereto upon three months 
written notice. 
IV. Agreement between the Export-Import Bank of  Washington and the Engineering 
Firm: 
The Export-Import Bank and the engineering firm  selected would enter into an agreement. 
It is suggested that among the essential provisions of  this agreement should be the following: 
(a) The Export-Import Bank would agree, among other things: 
1. To purchase the notice of  the Republic of  Nicaragua issued pursuant to the 
agreement between the Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua and the 
engineering firm,  without recourse to the engineering firm,  provided that: 
a. The notes be of  the maturities, interest rates, and form  satisfactory  to the 
Export-Import Bank: 
b. The Notes be accompanied by certificates  of  the Government of  the Republic 
of  Nicaragua and the engineering firm,  in form  satisfactory  to the 
Export-Import Bank, evidencing that they had been issued and delivered to 
the engineering firm  in payment of  amount due in accordance with the 
agreement with the Republic of  Nicaragua and the engineering firm; 
c. The notes be duly endorsed by authorized representative of  the engineering 
firm. 
2. To purchase said notes at any time prior to June 30, 1941, and thereafter  in the 
event that the Congress of  the United States should extend the Export-Import 
Bank as an agency of  the United States; provided, however, that the Export-Import 
Bank would reserve the right to discontinue any or all purchases of  said notes at 
any time following  three (3) months written notice to the engineering firm  of  its 
intention so to do. It would be understood and agreed that the Export-Import Bank 
would exercise its right to discontinue purchasing said notes only if,  in the opinion 
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of  the Export-Import Bank, events should have occurred which caused it to find 
that further  financing  would no longer reasonably be calculated to implement the 
expressed purpose of  the Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua to stimulate 
the expansion of  production and domestic and foreign  trade. 
(b) The engineering firm  would agree, among other things: 
1. That the personnel of  the administrative unit and their individual salaries be 
approved by the Export-Import Bank. 
2. To make periodic reports to the Export-Import Bank, in such form  as might be 
specified  by the latter, showing the progress and the cost to date of  the highway 
and other public works construction projects. 
3. That materials and equipment which were not already in the possession of  the 
Government of  the Republic of  Nicaragua, or which were not produced in the 
Republic of  Nicaragua, would be purchased in the United States of  America, and 
that materials so purchased in the United States of  America would be shipped to 
Nicaragua in American flag  vessels. 
V. Services of Engineers of the Government of the United States of America: 
The Government of  the United States of  America would be prepared to furnish  the services 
of  engineers to assist in surveying proposed public works projects, to make recommendations 
regarding the selection of  such projects, and to advise and assist it in general matters in 
connection with financing  the proposed construction. 
B. Line of Credit to the National Bank of Nicaragua, Inc.: 
The Export-Import Bank might place at the disposal of  the National Bank of  Nicaragua, 
Inc., a modest line of  credit which could be drawn upon if  necessary to facilitate  commercial 
trade with the United States, and to make possible the elimination of  seasonal or unusual 
fluctuations  in the rate of  exchange. Such a line of  credit might be extended for  one year and 
be renewable for  one year periods up to five  years. Such a credit would be conditional upon 
the employment by the National Bank of  Nicaragua, Inc., of  a suitable financial  adviser 
approved by the Export-Import Bank, and the National Bank of  Nicaragua, Inc., would in 
addition furnish  frequent  periodic reports to the Export-Import Bank demonstrating its 
position and operations involving foreign  currencies and this line of  credit. 
Suitable revenues would be created and allocated by the Government of  the Republic of 
Nicaragua to provide for  the amortization and service of  the various forms  of  credits extended 
by the Export-Import Bank. 
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6. TACA AIRWAYS FINANCIAL PROGRAM (1946) 
From: A Financial Program for  TACA Airways, S.A., and Synopsis of  Credit No. 361, to TACA 
Airways, S. A., July 3,1946; Records of  the Export-Import Bank, Record Group 275, case 
files  1934-51. 
July 3,1946 
SYNOPSIS OF CREDIT NO. 361 
TACA AIRWAYS, S.A. $1000 000 
TACA AIRWAYS AGENCY, INC. 
1. Background 
In July of  1944 The Commercial National Bank and Trust Company of  New York initiated 
discussions with Eximbank regarding a line of  credit for  Taca Airways, S.A. and Taca Airways 
Agency, Inc. 
2. Purpose 
To participate with The Commercial National Bank and Trust Company of  New York in assisting 
in financing  the purchase of  aircraft  in the United States for  use in the air lines of  Central and South 
America known as the Taca System and thus facilitate  exports and imports and the exchange of 
commodities between the United States and those countries. 
3. Credit Agreement 
(a) Parties: Taca Airways, S.A.. (a private Panamanian corporation), Taca Airways Agency, 
Inc., (a private Delaware corporation) and Export-Import Bank of  Washington. 
(b) Date: July 21,1945. 
(c) Amendment Dates: August 23,1945 and March 18,1946, March 25,1946. 
(d) Available until December 31,1946. 
(e) Amount: $1000 000 to be reduced by the amount of  advances made by The Commercial 
National Bank and Trust Company of  New York under its credit line of  $100 000. 
(f)  Amended amount: None 
(g) Guarantor: None 
(h) Other guarantees or collateral: First and prior lien upon aircraft,  the purchase of  which is 
financed  under this credit line. Taca Airways, S.A. and Taca Airways Agency, Inc. deposit 
in a special account to be maintained with The Commercial National Bank and Trust 
Company an amount equal to 6 1/2% of  the total original face  amount of  any notes 
outstanding under the credit, as security for  the payment of  principal and interest. 
(i) Interest rate: 4% per annum from  the date of  the note, on the unpaid principal balance 
outstanding, such interest to be due and payable on the dates for  the payment of  installments 
of  principal. 
(j) Term: Principal of  each note shall be due and payable in 36 approximately equal monthly 
installments, the first  of  which shall fall  due the first  day of  the month succeeding a period 
of  30 days from  the date of  the note. 
(k) Form of  obligation: Joint promissory note of  Taca Airways, S.A. and Taca Airways Agency, 
Inc., payable to the order of  Eximbank or its nominee. 
(1) Special features:  Notes shall not exceed 80% of  the total cost (including reconversion costs, 
but excluding delivery costs) of  aircraft  purchased, less any amount which may be advanced 
therefor  by The Commercial National Bank and Trust Company of  New York under an 
agreement dated August 23,1945 between Taca Airways, S.A., Taca Airways Agency, Inc., 
and The Commercial National Bank and Trust Company of  New York whereby that bank 
established a credit of  $100 000. 
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(m) Aircraft  are to be purchased in the continental United States. 
(n) Summary of  amendments to agreement: On August 23, 1945 Taca Airways, S.A., Taca 
Airways Agency, Inc., The Commercial National Bank and Trust Company of  New York 
and Eximbank entered into a supplemental agreement to add to the previous agreements 
further  covenants and an additional event of  default.  Advances of  Eximbank and 
Commercial were to be in the ratio of  90% and 10%. On March 18,1946 Bankers Trust 
Company substituted in lieu of  The Commercial National Bank and Trust Company of  New 
York, took over all Taca notes outstanding under the Commercial agreement of  August 23, 
1945 and the Eximbank agreement of  July 21, 1945 and placed on its books the special 
account mentioned in this synopsis under subject 3(h). 
4. Operational Arrangements 
(a) A commercial agent bank is used. Private capital is participating to the extent of  $100 000 
on a non-recourse basis. Taca invests 20% of  cost price. 
(b) There are no specific  projects to be approved by Eximbank. 
(c) Disbursements are to be made against 
(1) Statements describing the aircraft  purchased by Taca. 
(2) Suppliers' receipted invoices and certified  copies of  each bill of  sale. 
(3) Certificates  of  insurance issued by companies satisfactory  to Eximbank with 
designation of  Eximbank as a payee of  the proceeds as its interest may appear. 
(4) Promissory note of  Taca for  a sum not to exceed 80% of  total cost (including 
reconversion costs but excluding delivery costs) representing expenditures made in 
the continental United States less any amount advanced therefor  by The Commercial 
National Bank and Trust Company of  New York. 
(5) Certification  by The Commercial National Bank and Trust Company of  New York 
that there is in the special account on its books a balance which is equal to 61/2% of 
the total original face  amount of  any notes at the time outstanding under the credit 
agreements. 
(6) Lien on the aircraft  which lien, at request of  Eximbank, may be converted into such 
instrument as is necessary to give effect  to lien in accordance with the laws of  the 
country in which the aircraft  will operate. Certificate  of  registration from  country in 
which aircraft  operates. 
(d) No reports are required. 
5. Execution of Projects 
Not applicable. 
6. Other Pertinent Comments or Information 
Agreement may be terminated at any time prior to December 31,1946, upon 15 days notice to 
Eximbank provided Taca is not indebted to Eximbank. The requirement that Taca furnished 
evidence of  registration of  the aircraft  within 60 days after  date of  purchase has been waived, with 
the understanding that the registration certificate  on the aircraft  will be sent to this Bank as soon as 
it is obtainable. 
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A FINANCIAL PROGRAM FOR TACA AIRWAYS, SA. 
I. SUMMARY 
TACA Airways System requires additional capital of  $1 500 000 to $2 000 000 immediately for 
necessary expansion of  its aircraft  fleet,  ground facilities  and working capital. It is proposed to secure 
these funds  through the issuance of  convertible notes to a small and select group of  substantial 
investors. These notes will bear 3 1/2% interest, mature in three years, and be convertible into 
common stock at a price of  $6. They will be secured by the pledge of  the stock of  the operating 
companies which make up the TACA System. It is not anticipated that a public registration will be 
required. 
The TACA System operated profitably  from  its inception in 1932 each year through 1945. 
However, the extreme obsolesence of  its aircraft,  rising costs and other factors  reversed this profit 
trend in the latter months of  1945, and resulted in a loss of  $408 706 for  the first  half  of  1944. Operating 
economics and the acquisition of  a few  additional aircraft  have, in turn, reversed this trend and it is 
anticipated that the company will be operating on a break-even basis by the end of  1944. However, 
total losses for  the year are expected to be approximately $600 000. 
To enable the company to fully  capitalize on the tremendous potentialities of  air transportation 
in Central and South America, the TACA organization is being materially strengthened. Executive, 
operating, traffic  and technical personnel are being made available to the company by TWA, and 
other top flight  executive personnel are presently being sought. 
The Company has recently acquired eleven twin-engine aircraft  which will be placed in service 
about the first  of  1945. Additional planes will be acquired under a comprehensive equipment 
program designed to eliminate all antiquated and inefficient  aircraft,  and to effect  the highest degree 
of  equipment standardization practicable under the operation conditions encountered. The 
operating organization has already been expanded in anticipation of  the receipt of  these aircraft, 
and it is believed that substantial earnings will follow  immediately upon their being placed in service. 
While we cannot now accurately forecast  the growth of  business to be expected in the next several 
years, we have prepared estimates based upon the known operating costs and anticipated revenues 
of  the new equipment acquired and to be acquired. These forecasts  indicate that approximately the 
following  earnings may be expected in the next few  years: 
Table III.6.1 
EXPECTED NET EARNINGS: COMBINED TACA COMPANIES AND TACA AIRWAYS, S A. 
1945 1947 1947 









2 753 017 
$21 793 594 
19007552 
2786042 
TACA Airways SA. 
Net earnings $254 753 $1523311 $1414377 
249 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE TACA SYSTEM 
The TACA Airways System comprises a group of  operating companies furnishing  charter air 
transportation from  Miami to Cuba, regularly scheduled international service from  Cuba to British 
Honduras, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, and local service within the 
four  latter countries. Service has been recently extended from  El Salvador to Mexico City and rights 
have been negotiated for  the commencement of  operations in Venezuela through a local company 
which will be 45% owned and 100% managed by TACA. A similar arrangement is being worked out 
in Colombia. Aerovías Brasil, which is 60% owned by TACA Airways, S.A., operates from  Rio De 
Janeiro northward through Brazil to Santo Domingo, and on a charter basis, from  there to Miami. 
Rights are currently being negotiated for  operations in Paraguay and Argentina and it is hoped that 
within the next year, service will extend from  Buenos Aires to Miami. 
The keystone of  the TACA System has been the four  100% owned operating companies in 
Central America. 
The TACA Airways System was started in 1932 by Mr. Lowell Yerex with a total capital of  about 
$1 500, invested in a second-hand airplane. By mid-1945, the System's net worth had grown to 
$2 500 000 almost entirely through earnings. This was accomplished without benefit  of  mail subsidy 
through the development of  what was then the largest air freight  service in the world. Freight rates 
are based upon "expedited freight"  and "deferred  freight",  the latter carried at a substantially reduced 
rate. Because of  this system, enough deferred  freight  is generally on hand awaiting shipment, to 
enable the company to maintain a near 100% load factor  on local services. 
In anticipation of  future  growth trends, the company has been concentrating in the past two years 
on the development of  an international passenger business to supplement its freight  service. Modern 
equipment of  the Lockheed 14 type are used for  these passenger runs. The bulk of  the local freight 
runs is still flown  with an antiquated fleet  of  Ford tri-motors, single-engine Bellancas, and other 
miscellaneous aircraft. 
The company has recently undertaken the development of  a comprehensive equipment program 
designed to provide a fleet  of  modern, economical and efficient  aircraft.  As a part of  this program, 
the company has contracted for  the construction by the Canadian Car & Foundry Co., of  ten (10) 
Burnellis twin-engine aircraft,  and has secured an option on an additional forty  (40) of  these planes. 
The Burnellis is a semi-flying  wing type, tailor-made for  Central and South American operations, 
which must be flown  from  small, unsurfaced  airports. The Burnellis are expected to operate at 
approximately the cost of  a Douglas DC-3, but will carry a payload of  about double that of  a DC-3 
under similar operating conditions. Delivery of  the Burnellis is scheduled to begin in the latter part 
of  1945. In the meantime, it is necessary that the company acquire either Douglas or Lockheed 
equipment needed for  its international services or needed to replace the Ford tri-motors. 
The requirements of  local laws have made it necessary for  the TACA Airways System to maintain 
a complicated corporate structure illustrated in Table 5 attached. Steps are currently being taken 
to simplify  and improve the organizational structure of  the companies so as to eliminate many of  the 
difficulties  now experienced under the complex corporate plan. Specifically,  there will shortly be 
created three regions within each of  which operations will be conducted as a unit. These regions will 
bet the Central-American region (with international service to Mexico City and Miami); the 
Colombia-Venezuela region and the Brazil-Paraguay-Argentina region with operations extended to 
Miami. 
III. EARNINGS RECORD OF TACA 
As stated above, the TACA Airways System operated profitably  from  the inception of  its 
operation in 1932 until about the middle of  1945. A statement of  earnings prepared by Arthur Young 
& Co., reported net profits  for  the first  eight (8) months of  1945 to be $206 510, but by the year end 
this profit  had been reduced to $3 814. Losses for  the first  six (6) months of  1944 were $408 076. At 
that point drastic economies and some strengthening of  management were effected  with the result 
that monthly losses declined to an estimated average of  $35 000 per month for  the last half  of  the 
year. We are hopeful  that operations will be on a break-even basis early in 1945. 
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A condensed statement of  earnings for  the past several years follows: 
Table III.6.2 
CONDENSED STATEMENT OF EARNINGS, TACA AIRWAYS SYSTEM, 1941-1944 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
(1st 6 mos.) 
Operating revenues $1 178 747 $1 576 401 $2 245 771 $1 044 294 
Operating expenses 
Depreciation 148786 140 391 160 272 115 423 
All other 949 813 1 109 933 2 080 426 1 352 792 
Total 1098 599 1250 324 2 240 698 1468 215 
Net operating profit  or 
loss (-) 80 148 326 077 5 073 -423 921 
Other income and 
expense (-) -17 481 44 720 -1259 15 345 
Net profit  or loss (-) $62 667" $370 797 $3 814 -$408 076 
"Exclusive of  direct charge of  $72 400 to surplus to write off  Guatemalan Co. 
In October 1942, TACA organized Aerovías Brasil to operate internally in Brazil and to the 
United States on a charter basis. The company is owned 40% by Brazilian nationals and 60% by 
TACA Airways, S. A. During 1945 this company, with only one Lockheed 14 in operation, earned 
$93 944. 
It was anticipated that additional equipment would be secured in 1944, enabling Aerovías Brasil 
to considerably expand its operations. A substantial organization was created preparatory to the 
operation of  these aircraft,  with the result that operating expenses of  the company increased about 
12% over 1943. Unfortunately,  no additional aircraft  were available in 1944 and, on the contrary, 
utilization of  the Lockheed 14 substantially lower due to maintenance and scheduling difficulties, 
resulting in an estimated reduction of  $171 000 or 40% in operating revenues. Accordingly, the 
substantial profit  of  1943 was turned into an anticipated loss of  approximately $145 000 for  1944. 
Two Fairchild single-engine planes and one Lockheed 12A, which were acquired but little utilized 
in 1944, are expected to be brought up to full  utilization in 1945. In addition, three Douglas DC-2s 
and one Lockheed 12A will be added to the Aerovías Brasil fleet  during the next several months. 
IV. FORECAST OF FUTURE EARNINGS 
In recent months TACA has acquired additional aircraft  which should enable the company to 
enjoy a profitable  operation almost immediately. These aircraft,  and the estimated dates and places 
where they will be utilized, follow: 
Table III.6.3 
ESTIMATED DATES AND PLACES WHERE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT WILL BE UTILIZED BY TACA 







DC-2 3 12/10/44; 1/10/45; 2/10/45 Brazil 
Lockheed-12A 1 12/10/44 Brazil 











The first  Burnelli is expected to be received about September 1945. The company's contract with 
the Canadian Car & Foundry Co., is such that no obligation to accept the aircraft  will exist unless 
they meet exceedingly rigid contract specifications. 
We believe that TACA should immediately acquire not less than eleven Douglas DC-3 or 
Lockheed Lodestar type aircraft  to implement its international service, and to replace the Ford 
tri-motors which are no longer profitable.  Much of  the reduction in earnings in the past 11/2 years 
can be attributed to the fact  that the company has been unable to maintain a sufficient  utilization of 
the Ford tri-motors. Repair time has considerably exceeded flying  time. 
TACA owns 45% of  companies which have acquired or are in the process of  acquiring operating 
rights in Venezuela, Colombia, Paraguay and Argentina. Aircraft  will be available before  the end of 
1944 for  the Venezuelan and Colombian services. Because of  the almost complete absence of  any 
other form  of  transportation than by air, it should be possible for  these companies to operate 
profitably  almost from  the commencement of  services. Assuming a 65% load factor  (which we 
believe to be exceedingly conservative), local services in Colombia and Venezuela are estimated to 
produce total earnings of  approximately $1 757 408 for  the next three years. Further, TACA de 
Venezuela anticipates that it will secure the help of  the Venezuelan government to obtain permanent 
entrance rights into Miami. Assuming a 65% load factor  and rates reduced well below present levels, 
we forecast  total earnings of  $2 038158 for  1946 and 1947 for  the Venezuelan international operation 
alone. In each of  the above cases, the estimated earnings represent those of  the local company of 
which TACA Airways' portion would be 45%. The granting of  permanent operating rights into the 
United States to any part of  the TACA System should immeasurably increase the profit  potentialities 
of  the entire system. 
The forecasted  earnings of  TACA Airways for  the years 1945,1946 and 1947 as set forth  in the 
summary were based upon the following  major assumptions: 
1. A 65% load factor.  TACA's present load factor  on its international operation is over 90%. 
The system average is estimated to be about 75%. 
2. Placing the equipment recently acquired in service in the near future. 
3. Purchase early in 1945 of  eleven additional aircraft  of  the DC-3 or Lodestar type. 
4. Delivery of  Burnelli aircraft  on a reasonable production basis commencing in September 
5. Establishment of  anticipated routes in Colombia. The local TACA company has received 
permission to operate an airline from  the Colombian government but definite  routes have 
not yet been prescribed. 
6. Award of  entrance rights into Miami for  the Venezuelan company. If  this route should not 
be awarded it is believed that the aircraft  assigned to this operation can be used about as 
profitably  elsewhere. 
7. No consideration has been given to operations in Paraguay and Argentina where the local 
TACA companies have been given permission to operate an airline but where definite 
routes have not yet been prescribed. 
8. A substantial reduction in air transportation rates has been anticipated. 
9. Operating costs have been adjusted to local conditions. 
The effect  of  improved or decreased load factors  during the forecast  period is illustrated below 
for  TACA Airways, S.A.: 
1945. 
Table III.6.4 
FORECAST OF NET EARNINGS, TACA AIRWAYS, SA. 
Load factor 





$1 127 566 
3 114 069 
3 492 057 
$7 733 692 
$254 753 
1 523 311 
1 414 377 








TACA AIRWAYS SA. - CORPORATE STRUCTURE AS OF OCTOBER 1,1944 (EXHIBIT 'C') 
a. State and/or country of  incorporation, b. Shares authorized and par value expressed in U .S. dollars current rate. 
c. Shares issued and amount paid if  full  payment has not been made. d. Percent owned or subscribed by TACA Airways, S.A. 
The following  companies have been formed  but are not yet operating: Lineas Aéreas TACA de Colombia, Aerovías Paraguayas, S.A., Aerovías Argentinas, S.A. and 
Línea Aérea TACA de Venezuela. TACA de Mexico, S.A. is currently acting only as agents for  TACA, S.A.; however, local operations in Mexico are planned. 
Table III.6.6 
TACA AIRWAYS, S A. AND AGENCY: FORECAST OF ANTICIPATED CASH REQUIREMENTS, 1945 
Cash on Hand January 1 1945 
Aircraft 
International Run 
6 Planes - DC-5 or Lodestar 
Local Replacement 
3 to Replace Fords 
Brazil 
2 Burnellis 
Inventories - Parts Supplies -
Spare Engines and Props 
Working Capital 
Buildings Hangars etc. 





New Capital for Colombia 
Total 


















7. FINANCIAL CRISIS IN NICARAGUA (1947) 
From: Financial Crisis Arising from  Withholding of  Bank of  America Loan - Serious Foreign 
Exchange Position; Despatch No. 1736 from  Foreign Service of  the United States of 
America, Managua, D.N., Nicaragua, to Secretary of  State; August 21,1947; CDF 1945-49, 





UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Managua, D.N., Nicaragua, August 21,1947. 
Subject: Financial Crisis Arising From Withholding of  Bank of  America Loan- Serious 
Foreign Exchange Position. 
The Honorable 
The Secretary of  State, 
Washington. 
Sir: 
I have the honor to refer  to my telegram no. 307 of  August 15 and previous correspondence 
with the Department regarding the local financial  flurry  aroused by refusal  of  the Bank of 
America to continue advances under its loan agreement with the Nicaraguan National Bank. 
As previously reported, the unexpected action of  the Bank of  America left  the Nicaraguan 
National Bank with only about $60 000 in liquid dollar balances as of  August 12. With refusal 
of  the Federal Reserve Bank of  New York to make an otherwise normal 90-day advance of 
$500 000 against earmarked gold owing to the defacto  character of  the Government, it was 
then considered that the National Bank's gold assets in the United States had been frozen. 
Such assets comprised: 
Gold 
Collateral with Bank of  America $2 750 000 
Earmarked with Federal Reserve Bank of  New York 1594 385 
International Monetary Fund 500 000 
Dollars 
Collateral with Bank of  America 904159 
Total $5 748 544 
As against this, the National Bank has already received from  the Bank of  America and 
expended net advances of  $2 155 000 on loan account. 
The crisis broke on August 13 when, as a result of  the foregoing  situation, the National Bank 
discontinued dollar operations: all new and pending import applications as of  that day were 
rejected and importers attempting to meet sight drafts  covering merchandise already at 
Corinto were told that the National Bank was not in a position to furnish  the dollars. 
The immediate result was a sharp rise in the black market rate for  dollars and a state of 
panic and confusion  in commercial circles. With replacement costs uncertain, some merchants 
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discontinued sales and others raised prices markedly. Rumors of  economic sanctions were 
prevalent, and anxiety was, if  anything, accentuated by the following  statement to the press on 
August 13 by Rafael  Huezo, Manager of  the National Bank: 
"Commerce has been abusing the law of  October 15, 1945 which authorizes 
applications for  foreign  exchange through the deposit of  60 percent of  the total value 
of  the imports involved. The National Bank has been forced  to issue an order 
temporarily restricting the entry of  imported goods, since there are in warehouses and 
in the customs stocks of  goods which could not be consumed in a year. Commerce has 
violated its obligations by absorbing more than its share of  foreign  exchange. The Bank 
is now disposed to maintain a equilibrium between imports and exports." 
The situation remained tense until August 15 when the admittedly1 unexpected purchase 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of  New York of  15 000 ounces of  earmarked gold valued at 
$525 000 permitted the limited resumption of  dollar operations. Although not yet restored to 
normal, economic conditions have as a result receded from  the panic stage. Black market 
dollar quotations have declined from  a momentarily frenzied  high of  C$9.00 to about C$5.50 
- 5.75. * The quotation on April 12 was C$5.35. Shops have been reopened and general business 
activity has returned to the limited levels consonant with the currently acute political situation. 
An examination of  the National Bank's foreign  exchange position reveals that the action of 
the Bank of  America has merely served to precipitate the initiation of  severe import and 
exchange restrictions which were in any case inevitable. As itemized above, current gold and 
exchange assets prior to the recent sale of  gold amounted to $5 748 544. Taking into 
consideration outstanding gold-secured loans from  the Bank of  America of  $2155 000 and the 
non-liquid character of  the $500 000 deposit with the International Monetary Fund, liquid 
foreign  exchange assets totalled only $3 093 500. (This represents a decline of  $2170 250 from 
the comparable balance on December 31, 1946 of  $5 263 8002). As against this, collection 
accounts payable aggregated $1200 0003 and pending import orders to approximately 
$5 000 0004. With estimated foreign  exchange receipts during August-December estimated by 
the National Bank at only $1 500 0005, the end of  the year will, even assuming the 
discontinuance of  all import licenses and non-import dollar transactions, find  the National 
Bank with an exchange deficit  for  the year well in excess of  $6 000 000, and dollar-bankrupt. 
Resumption by the Bank of  America of  its loan obligations would, in view of  the stringent 
repayment terms provided by the loan contract, only reduce the pending deficit  by about 
$1000 000 for  the current year. 
It is difficult  to adequately explain how such a situation could have come about - especially 
by August when the heavy dollar receipts of  January - June from  coffee,  sesame, lumber, gold 
and other exports are usually reflected  in a substantial exchange surplus. The following 
comparative tabulation of  National Bank foreign  exchange operations during the first  half  of 
1947 illustrates not only a yet-unexplained rise in receipts, but also highlights an unprecedented 
volume of  exchange sales. With the total outlay on import account during the first  half  of  1947 
at only $6 000 000, according to the Manager of  the National Bank, the difference  of  over 
$7 000 000 may tentatively be attributed to precautionary foreign  exchange-hedging by 
politically favored  "Somocistas". 
¡By Rafael  Huezo, Manager of  the National Bank. 
C$ is the symbol given in the original document for  the Nicaraguan córdoba. 
2See Report of  the Februaty 11,1947 (Nicaraguan Foreign Exchange Position). 
3According to Rafael  Huezo. 
4Deposits (60%) with the National Bank against imports amounted on July 31 to C$14 900 517. 
sAccording to Rafael  Huezo. 
January-June 
Foreign Exchange 1945 1946 1947 
Receipts US$3 362 159 3 475 294 11176 6S56 
Sales 2537380 3456 292 13 048 6027 
Balance + US$ 824779 + 19 002 -1 871 947 
Source: Monthly Statement of  National Bank, Issue Dept. 
As stated to me yesterday by Rafael  Huezo, the anticipated foreign  exchange shortage has 
led to the decision to restrict all future  import applications to only scarce and essential items. 
Pending the elaboration of  a new schedule by the National Bank, no new import applications 
are being accepted. He assured me, however, that existing dollar obligations are being fulfilled, 
and in illustration stated that only $200 000 is left  of  the $525 000 sale of  gold last week to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of  New York. Further gold sales are contemplated. It is also planned 
to liquidate the loan account with the Bank of  America in the event the latter does not see its 
way clear to comply with the loan contract. 
From the political viewpoint, the incident is generally interpreted as having been related to 
economic sanctions by the United States, and has reportedly reinforced  the belief  of  opposition 
leaders, including General Chamorro, that "further"  sanctions will soon eventuate. I shall, of 
course, do my utmost to discreetly disabuse them of  this idea as running counter to our 
repeatedly-declared policy of  non-intervention. 
The foregoing  belief  is, so far  as can be ascertained, based on: a widely publicized 
prediction from  Washington by Dr. Fernando Sacasa during the first  days of  August that 
economic sanctions were in the offing;  the wording of  the Federal Reserve Bank's refusal  to 
grant the requested 90-day loan; and the apparently evasive policy of  the Bank of  America. 
The following  excerpts from  telegrams sent by the Bank of  America indicate an apparent desire 
to convey the impression that the American Bank's "inability" to continue with the advances 
provided in the loan agreement was due to pressure from  the Department rather than mere 
caution: 
August 4 
"Unable to confirm  credit $500 000 your cable August 1, pending approval our State 
Department." 
August 13 
"We today received wire from  Secretary of  State declining to approve further 
operations under loan agreement. We are continuing to seek State Department's 
approval. Suggest you do everything you can at your end." 
Although under the circumstances virtually swamped by appeals for  information  from  the 
press, businessman, and "politicos", the Embassy refrained  from  any comment pending news 
from  the Department. Following an earlier statement to General Chamorro that there was no 
reason to believe sanctions were contemplated, comment was restricted to conversations with 
General Somoza, Rafael  Huezo and the Panamanian Minister in which I expressed the opinion 
that the matter was of  a legal rather than political nature. This was confirmed  to Rafael  Huezo 
upon receipt of  the Department's telegrams No. 187 and 190 of  August 14 and 16, and made 
public following  a concurrent telephone call from  Jose's Sandino in Washington to the then 
^oes not include advances by the Bank of  America of  $2 335 000. 
7Does not include loan repayments to the Bank of  America of  $180 000. 
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"the Department of  State has not and is not exercising sanctions in accordance with its already 
well known international policy." It is still, however, apparently considered in both official  and 
opposition circles that sanctions are either in effect  through coercion on the Bank of  America 
or were discontinued in the face  of  an unexpectedly strong reaction. 
It appears that the net results of  the incident has been to further  weaken Somoza's political 
position and encourage opposition hopes that international action will force  him out. 
Respectfully  yours, 
(signed) 
Maurice M. Bernbaum 
Chargé d'Affaires  a.i. 
851 
MMBernbaumrbjm 
To Department in hectograph 
Copies to Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and Salvador. 
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8. GUATEMALA SEEKS A LOAN FOR RECONSTRUCTION (1949) 
From: Guatemala Considers Foreign Loan for  Rehabilitation and Reconstruction; Despatch No. 
590 from  Foreign Service of  The United States of  America, Guatemala, to Secretary of 
State; October 26,1949; 814.517/10-2049. 
THE FOREIGN SERVICE 
OFTHE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
UNCLASSIFIED 
814.51/10-2649 
Guatemala, October 26,1949 
No. 590 
SUBJECT:: Guatemala Considers Foreign Loan for  Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction. 
THEHONORABLE 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 
WASHINGTON. 
SIR: 
I have the honor to report that Guatemala is considering a foreign  loan for  rehabilitation 
and reconstruction. 
During the latter days of  the week of  October 16-22, the press reported that the Guatemalan 
Government might seek such a loan. El  Imparcial,  on October 21, mentioned a loan of 
$5 millions. Other reports have named sums up to $50 millions. The Official  Daily of  October 
22, while not mentioning any specific  amount, stated as follows  with regard to the possibility 
of  a loan: 
"Deputy Silva Falla also told the representatives his opinion that a loan is 
necessary for  the recovery of  the national economy. A demand for  credit by 
the country people and Guatemalan farmers  will follow  shortly, he said, and 
Guatemala - will not have the means to help these Guatemalans with not 
credits they request to replant. 
"Representative Silva Falla announced that the National Emergency 
Committee considers that the only way to resolve the catastrophe is a loan and 
that this Committee will formulate  a project suggesting the expediency of  a 
loan to the Executive. Of  course, he said, the loan would be made after  a careful 
study. Many countries that have not experienced a calamity such as 
Guatemala's have obtained loans for  the improvement of  their national 
economies; for  example, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, etc., and Guatemala has 
greater reason, being in danger of  losing its harvest completely, with which loss 
the economy of  the country would be ruined and chaos would follow.*  With 
the modern standards for  agricultural equipment loans there is nothing to fear, 
said Silva Falla and it should be clear that it (a loan) is Guatemala's only 
salvation." 
*The New  York  Times  reported what the Guatemalan Government called "the worst flood  in Guatemala's 
history." Seventy-two hours of  "torrential rains" caused the most severe damage in the northern and southern parts 
of  the country, in the Departments of  Escuintla, Quezaltenango and San Marcos, where the entire coffee  crop was 
destroped, and in the Departments of  Santa Rosa, Jutiapa, Jalapa and Sacatepequez. ("Heavy Floods Kill 1 000 
Guatemalans", New  York  Times,  October 19,1949, p. 59; and "Guatemalan flood  Toll is 4 000; Damage Is Placed at 
$40 000 000", New York  Times,  October 20,1949, p. 1.) 
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Agreement on the need for:  loan is not unanimous, however. Both the £7 Imparcial  and La 
Hora  of  October 22 advise caution, and an El  Imparcial  writer says that the catastrophe is 
merely a new pretext for  a loan and raises the question of  where the means will come from  to 
pay off  the loan if  the economy of  the country is in such bad shape. 
On October 24 both La Hora  and El  Imparcial  printed stories of  interviews with prominent 
people. In the latter paper the Minister of  Finance, Alfonso  Padilla, came out strongly against 
the loan. He declared that he would oppose a loan; that it is unsound. He said his opinion is 
based on his knowledge of  the country's finance  from  the time he was an accountant in the 
Government Accounting Office  up to the present. He said that future  generations should not 
be saddled with the burden of  a loan; that Guatemala should first  exhaust internal resources; 
that a foreign  loan would lead to disequilibrium and eventual devaluation. The new 
sub-secretary of  the Ministry of  Finance, Alfonso  Marroquin, agreed with the Minister, 
opposing a loan. 
In favor  of  a loan are the Minister of  Foreign Relations, Gonzalez Arevalo, the Minister of 
Defense,  Jacobo Arbenz, the Minister of  Government, Cesar G. Solis, the Minister of 
Economy, Alfonso  Bauer Paiz, and the Minister of  Communications, Aldana Sandoval. The 
Minister of  Education, Raul Osegueda, advised caution and a careful  study, but is not opposed. 
The Minister of  Economy apparently is the main proponent of  a loan. 
The Embassy's quarterly financial  report, No. 189 of  October 24, 1949, summarized the 
available  statistical information.  A review of  certain data leads to the conclusion that the 
Minister of  Finance knows what he is talking about and that from  a financial  standpoint 
Guatemala is not in a good position to assume the burden of  a foreign  loan. 
1. For the first  ten months of  fiscal  1948-9, July 1948 through April 1949, Government 
income1 was $37.8 millions, expense $39.6 millions. A deficit  for  the year seems inevitable. 
The Government's financial  position has worsened in recent years. For fiscal  1947-8 the 
budget surplus was reported as $1.9 millions, the smallest in years. Because of  peculiarities of 
Government accounting, however, there is some doubt as to whether published figures  are 
completely reliable. The difference  between current income and expense in fiscal  1947-8 was 
a deficit  of  $6.3 millions. 
The Government has recently been short of  cash, indicating a weak financial  position. The 
Embassy's despatch No. 566 of  October 11,1949, reported that the Treasury could not pay 
budgeted appropriations in the Denby case. 
2. Foreign trade figures2  for  the first  7 months of  1949, January through June, show imports 
of  $41.6 millions and exports of  $34.2 millions. At this rate 1949 will end with an unfavorable 
trade balance probably of  at least $10 millions. Imports for  1949 are at about the rate of  1948 
imports, which year (1948) ended with an adverse trade balance of  about $18 millions. 
Merchandise operations are, of  course, the largest single factor  in the balance of  payments. 
For 1948 there was an adverse payments balance of  $3.3 millions, the Bank of  Guatemala 
reported. An adverse balance for  1949 seems probable. 
3. Foreign exchange reserves3 on September 30,1949, were $41.6 millions. On September 
30,1948, reserves were $47.7 millions. Reserves on March 31,1948, the peak month, were $55.6 
millions; on the same date in 1949 they were $50.1 millions. Obviously, here has been a decline 
in the reserves in the last 2 years. On the basis of  1949 foreign  trade figures  for  the first  7 
months, and after  the recent storms, it is reasonable to expect that the downward trend will 
continue. It may be more pronounced in 1950. 
So far  Guatemala has been fortunate  in not having import and exchange controls. As the 
Minister of  Finance suggests, however, a large foreign  loan, in excess of  the ability to repay 
and unwisely used could be the turning point leading to controls. A large internal loan resulting 
in inflation,  excess purchasing power and a demand for  imports exceeding the supply of  foreign 
exchange, would also bring about the same result. Guatemala would do well to proceed 
cautiously at this point. 
'Source: Boletín de la Dirección General de Estadística, April and June 1949. 
S^ource: Monthly statistical reports from  Customshouse, January-July, 1949. 
Boletines del Banco de Guatemala, 1949. 
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A special commission consisting of  financial  experts of  the Bank of  Guatemala, the 
Ministries of  Economy, Communications and Finance has been appointed to study national 
rehabilitation and will determine the need for  a loan. The idea expressed at present is that 
foreign  loan proceeds will be handed over by foreign  banks directly to successful  bidders on 
reconstruction projects and that loan proceeds for  agricultural credits will be turned over to 
local Government banks with the understanding that the credits will be used only for  such 
purposes. 
Further significant  developments will be reported. 
Respectfully  yours, 
For the Ambassador: 
(signed) 
Gilbert E. Larsen 
Attaché (Economic) 
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9. PUBLIC FINANCE IN THE REGION (1956) 
From: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Foreign Commerce, American Republics 
Division, Investment  in Central  America: Basic Information  for  U.S.  Businessmen. Study 
prepared by firm  of  Albert O. Hirschman and George Kalmanoff,  Economic Consultants 
(Bogotá, Colombia, December 1956), pp. 30-33. 
FINANCE 
The financial  system of  the Central American countries is of  interest to the potential investor not 
only because of  the resources supplementary to his own funds  which this system may make available 
to him, but also because the public finance  and the monetary and banking structure of  any country 
are an important component of  the general climate within which the investor operates. 
Public Finance 
The development of  public finance  in the five  countries during recent years shows many similarities. 
All budgets have grown rapidly, as shown in Table 1. Larger proceeds from  exports of  coffee  and 
other commodities were followed  by increases in imports and, consequently, in customs revenue, 
which in all of  these countries is a major component of  total Government receipts. On the 
expenditure side, all of  the Governments undertook public works and economic development 
programs, so that the increase in income was easily absorbed. 
Table III.9.1 
NATIONAL BUDGETS, BY COUNTRIES, 1950-54 
(In  millions  of  dollars) 






























































aData are not available. 
Note: When only July-June fiscal  year statistics were available,calendar-year data were obtained by averaging two fiscal 
years. 
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Nevertheless, the size of  Government budgets remains comparatively small in Central America, 
and the importance of  the public sector of  the economy is minor, particularly in view of  the fact  that 
the revenues and expenditures of  the capital cities normally are included in the National budgets 
and other Provincial and municipal budgets are greatly reduced. 
The budget figures  are not strictly comparable for  a variety of  reasons and the national income 
totals are even less reliable, but the ratio between the budget and national income gives an indication 
of  the importance of  Government operations in the economic life  of  each country. This ratio varies 
from  slightly more than 10 percent in Honduras and Guatemala to as much as 16 or 17 percent in 
Costa Rica. These are definitely  low levels for  this very general indicator, not only in comparison 
with the more developed, industrial countries, but also in relation to such Latin American countries 
as Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia. 
Import duties constitute from  one-third to one-half  of  total Government receipts. Export duties 
also have become important in recent years, particularly in the two principal coffee-exporting 
countries, Guatemala and El Salvador. Other important components of  Government revenue are 
excise taxes levied on beer and cigarettes, and on liquor except where the production of  distilled 
beverages is organized as a Government monopoly. 
Income taxation is of  minor importance as a source of  Government revenue. The ratio of  income 
and capital taxes to total receipts is highest in Costa Rica and Honduras-approximately 20 
percent-and is less than 10 percent in the other three countries. However, the relative importance 
of  income taxation may be expected to increase, since most countries have recently introduced 
income-tax laws or raised their rate schedules and are perfecting  their collection procedures. 
A large part of  Government expenditures is absorbed by general administration and by the costs 
of  national defense  and police. The Costa Rican budget is burdened also by relatively large 
expenditures (more than 10 percent of  the total) for  servicing the public debt, which was incurred 
largely through nationalization of  the country's commercial banks in 1948. However, expenditures 
for  public health, education, and economic development have been expanding considerably in all of 
the countries as total Government revenue increased, and such expenditures in all countries now 
amount to approximately one-half  of  the budgets. Among these expenditures, those for 
transportation generally have first  place. An exception is Costa Rica, where the main emphasis has 
long been on public education. 
Central Banking, Money, and Prices 
The monetary structure of  the Central American countries has undergone considerable 
modernization since World War II. In 1945-46 the Guatemalan central bank was given a completely 
new statute. In 1950 a central bank was organized in Honduras, and in Costa Rica a large 
styate-owned bank, which exercised both commercial and central banking functions,  was divided 
into two separate institutions. El Salvador has had a central bank since 1934. Nicaragua alone of  the 
Central American countries has no separate central banking institution; its National Bank is the only 
bank of  issue and the largest commercial bank in the country. In addition to their importance as 
managers of  the countries' money and foreign  exchange, the central banks are generally also the 
best-equipped centers of  economic research and information. 
The central banks of  Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, being of  recent origin, have statutes 
incorporating the latest advances in central banking theory and are endowed with broad powers of 
monetary management, such as the variation of  reserve requirements and the influencing  of 
commercial bank lending through the establishment of  differential  rediscount rates. Many of  these 
powers have not been used. However, the Central Bank of  Honduras has attempted to restrict credit 
expansion by upward changes in reserve requirements and the Central Bank of  Costa Rica has 
pursued the same objective by setting portfolio  ceilings for  the commercial banks. 
El Salvador's central bank, having been established during an earlier period, has powers less 
broad than those of  like institutions in the other Central American countries, but it has acquired 
great prestige as a result of  excellent management over a period of  many years and can effectively 
influence  the policy of  the commercial banks through moral suasion. Moreover, El Salvador's central 
bank enjoys the greatest degree of  freedom  from  Government intervention in its management, the 
Government having merely the right to approve or veto the person elected as president of  the bank. 
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In the central banks of  the other countries, the Minister of  Finance is a member of  the board of 
directors. However, provision is always made for  representation on the board of  the principal sectors 
of  the economy and for  a certain degree of  independence of  central bank management from  the 
executive branch of  Government. The banking laws also contain provisions limiting the right of  the 
National Treasuries to obtain advances from  the central bank. 
Table 2 shows that the money supply of  the Central American countries at the end of  1954 
consisted in large part of  checking deposits. The banking habit appears to be widespread, 
particularly in Costa Rica and Nicaragua; in Guatemala, possibly as a result of  cash hoarding, more 
than two-thirds of  the total money in circulation consisted of  notes and coins. Expressed in United 
States dollars per capita, the money supply is highest in Costa Rica; El Salvador and Nicaragua are 
in second and third place, respectively, and Guatemala and Honduras last. 
Table III.9.2 
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA MONEY SUPPLY, BY COUNTRIES, END OF 1954 
Bank deposits 
Total money as percent of  Money supply 
Country supply (mil- total money per capita 
lions of  dollars) supply (dollars) 
Guatemala 76.1 29.0 23.8 
El Salvador 77.1 45.5 35.7 
Honduras 34.4 41.3 22.4 Nicaragua 
Costa Rica 38.0 52.7 31.1 47.8 51.7 51.3 
This ranking of  the five  countries corresponds to that noted in chapter II with respect to their per 
capita purchasing power. It reflects  to some extent the general level of  business activity and the 
degree to which money is used in the economy. For instance, the low figure  for  money supply per 
capita in Guatemala is easily explained by the large indigenous population, which is almost entirely 
self-sufficient  and uses money only for  a few  transactions. In Honduras, also, a large segment of  the 
population raises food  primarily for  its own consumption and has few  commercial contacts. 
Because there is still much room for  expansion in the use of  money in all of  the Central American 
countries, and because national output has been increasing sharply, so that more money would have 
been needed to finance  transactions even at constant prices, the money supply in all countries has 
increased to a much greater extent than has the price level. This is clearly shown in Table 3. 
Table III.9.3 
MONEY SUPPLY AND COST OF LIVING IN CAPITAL CITIES, 1948-54 
(1948 = 100) 
Year:8 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1952 1954 
Guatemala 
Money supply 100 105 113 115 123 144 146 
Cost of  living 100 107 114 114 115 118 122 
El Salvador 
Money supply 100 118 145 164 190 199 218 
Cost of  living 100 111 128 138 141 148 154 
Honduras 
Money supply 100 98 102 126 139 158 182 
Cost of  living 100 105 114 118 120 128 136 
Nicaragua 
Money supply 100 126 138 168 202 263 297 
Cost of  living 100 107 129 141 150 161 182 
Costa Rica 
Money supply 100 111 115 124 147 162 180 
Cost of  living 100 109 118 120 117 119 126 
aAs of  the end of  year. 
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Prices have been subject to upward pressures in all of  the countries because of  the rise in world 
coffee  prices and the consequent increase in bank lending and private spending. Government 
expenditures also have risen substantially as new public works and other economic projects were 
undertaken, but these expenditures cannot be considered to have caused the rise in prices since 
Government receipts increased simultaneously. 
Of  the five  countries, Guatemala has maintained the most stable price level, probably in large 
part because of  the general caution displayed by businessmen and investors up to the change of 
regime in 1954. Since 1950, Costa Rican prices also have remained relatively stable. Salvadoran and 
Honduran prices advanced by about 20 percent in the 4-year period 1950-54, a fairly  moderate 
increase. The rise in prices during recent years has been most marked in Nicaragua, but that 
country-besides not having a separate central bank with broad powers of  monetary management-has 
gone through a phase of  exceptionally rapid economic expansion, stimulated by the cotton boom, so 
that control of  inflation  was a particularly difficult  task. 
Banks Dealing With the Public 
The commercial banking systems of  the Central American countries have certain common 
characteristics. In general, private initiative in providing credit facilities  has long been so inadequate 
and so completely lacking with respect to certain important fields,  such as agriculture, that in almost 
all countries, the Governments have helped in setting up banking institutions which, with the aid of 
National Treasuries and through special rediscount privileges with the central banks, have become 
the most powerful  lenders. 
The outstanding example of  this situation has been Nicaragua, whose state-owned National Bank 
was for  many years the only bank of  any importance.1 The situation has changed somewhat in recent 
years with the opening of  two private banks in Nicaragua, which have become relatively successful 
in a short period. Costa Rica's Banco Nacional also occupies a predominant position; however, other 
banks, all nationalized since 1948, are actively competing with it for  the commercial business. 
Guatemala and El Salvador have Government-sponsored mortgage banks whose portfolio  each is 
larger than that of  any other single bank; El Salvador, however, has a vigorous private banking system 
to which three new units have been added recently. The only country in which private banks have 
been dominant thus far  is Honduras, where two banks, the larger one of  which is owned by United 
States capital, were the only lenders until the establishment in 1950 of  the National Development 
Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento), which has since made important strides. 
The National Development Bank of  Honduras is a financial  institution of  mixed character since, 
in addition to its lending activities, it may engage in direct financing  of  agricultural and industrial 
projects which are important for  the development of  the country but for  which private equity capital 
is not available or is forthcoming  in insufficient  amounts. Similar "fomento"  institutions have been 
set up in Guatemala (Instituto de Fomento de la Producción, or INFOP) in 1948 and in Nicaragua 
(Instituto de Fomento Nacional) in 1953. The Guatemalan institution has become primarily an 
agricultural credit bank, specializing in small agricultural loans and in the financing  of  special crops, 
suh as cotton. 
The principal activity of  the National Development Bank of  Honduras is to satisfy  the great need 
for  credit of  small and medium-sized farmers.  It is, however, also active in promotional activities. 
The Nicaraguan institution has devoted its major energies to the development of  new enterprises, 
and, as a lender, it is financing  primarily agricultural activities of  a clear-cut developmental character, 
such as the starting of  new coffee  plantations, the opening up of  new lands, and the purchase of 
pedigreed animals. The need for  specialized lending institutions in the field  of  credits to small 
farmers  is being supplied in El Salvador by a cooperative organization (Federación de Cajas Rurales 
de Crédito) and in Costa Rica by a special section of  the Banco Nacional, devoted to providing 
supervised agricultural credit, whose work is a model of  its kind. 
Personal credit needs are in general not well attended by the banking system and are therefore 
supplied by private funds  seeking investment at very high rates. In Costa Rica, however, one of  the 
nationalized commercial banks extends small credits to the customers of  its savings deposit section, 
'This bank, however, was originally founded  by United States capital. 
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and in Guatemala a branch of  Colombia's Banco Popular has recently been inaugurated for  the 
purpose of  supplying credit to salary and wage earners, as well as to small shopkeepers and 
industrialists. 
On the whole, the banking systems of  the Central American countries are in a period of  expansion. 
Several new private and officially  sponsored banks have been established in the area in the past few 
years. The banks are slowly realizing that, with the development of  these countries, new segments 
of  the population are becoming creditworthy. They are also taking a greater interest in industrial 
ventures, as distinct from  their traditional preference  for  financing  import and export transactions, 
real estate loans, or loans guaranteed by cattle or commercial crops, such as coffee. 
Effective  interest rates, including fees  and commissions, vary between 6 and 10 percent, 
depending on the term, the collateral, and the risk factor.  Rates tend to be lowest in El Salvador and 
highest in Nicaragua. 
The banks of  El Salvador and Honduras Traditionally maintain a very liquid position, so that they 
always have funds  available for  sound, promising projects. The resources of  the Guatemalan banking 
system have remained small because of  the inability of  the banks to attract savings deposits, and also 
because of  the capital flight  and hoarding resulting from  uncertain political conditions in recent 
years. In Nicaragua rapid economic expansion since 1950 has resulted in a great demand for  credit 
so that all banks are using their rediscount privileges at the National Bank. Ceilings have been 
imposed on certain types of  commercial-bank lending to restrain further  credit expansion. The 
general portfolio  ceilings to which the Costa Rican banks are subject naturally have limited the 
availability of  bank credit in that country. 
Capital Markets and Savings 
Capital markets are in their infancy  in Central America. No country has a stock exchange and only 
El Salvador and Costa Rica have some trading in the stock of  domestic enterprises. Customarily, 
corporations are formed  through contributions from  a few  families  and continue thereafter  to be 
closely held so that the public at large normally does not have an opportunity to subscribe or buy 
shares. Consequently, savings have traditionally taken the form  of  cash hoards, often  deposited 
abroad, or they are invested in land Or urban real estate, or in the purchase and expansion of 
individually owned business enterprises. Substantial funds  also are invested in personal or mortgage 
loans at very high, usury-type rates of  interest. 
The financial  systems of  most of  the countries have done little to provide attractive media for  the 
investment of  personal savings. Some progress has been made in recent years, however. In El 
Salvador, for  example, the Mortgage Bank (Banco Hipotecario) and the Lempa River Commission 
(Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica del Río Lempa) have been able to place sizable bond issues 
with the public and financial  institutions. Costa Rica is the only country in which a successful  effort 
has been made to attract savings deposits to the banks. The availability in Central America of  small 
savings, indicative of  the rise of  a middle class, has also been demonstrated by the success of  the 





This chapter deals with direct investments in several sectors and regional economic integration. 
A. DIRECT INVESTMENT 
1. A REGIONAL SURVEY (1926) 
From: Robert W. Dunn, American Foreign  Investments  (New York: The Viking Press, 1926), pp. 
107-119. 
AMERICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 
COSTA RICA 
The estimates of  American capital in Costa Rica run from  $20 million to $30 million. Our investment 
totals about the same as the British but the dominant company in the country is easily the United 
Fruit Co. 
According to the Annual Report of  the United Fruit Co. in 1923, its investment in plantations and 
equipment in Costa Rica was $8 585 268. This investment includes ownership of  322 of  the 404 miles 
of  railway in the country in addition to a large acreage in banana and other fruit  lands. 
Oil has been another interest of  American capital in Costa Rica and "there is ground to hope for 
very optimistic results in this line."1 
The Sinclair Central American Oil Corporation owns a large concession on a million acres, and 
has carried on development work through the Costa Rica Oil Co., itself  a subsidiary of  the Sinclair 
Consolidated Oil Corporation.2 
A mining interest closely associated with the United Fruit and Minor C. Keith enterprises was 
the Abangarez Gold Fields of  Costa Rica which owned several formerly  independent properties, as 
well as the entire stock of  the Costa Rica Esperanza Mining Co.3 This company was reported 
dissolved in 1924. 
There is also the American Manganese Manufacturing  Co. (Pa.) which in 1917 acquired the 
holdings of  the Costa Rica Manganese and Mining Co., including several thousand acres of  land, 
four  mines, water transport facilities,  and railways. 
All American Cables, Inc., has an extension into Port Limon. 
'Moody's Governments  and Municipals,  1925, p. 362. 
2Petroleum  Register,  1923, p. 381. 
3Moody's Industrials,  p. 452. 
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GUATEMALA 
The International Railways of  Central America, capitalized at $40 million including its lines in 
Salvador, is the chief  investment of  American capital in Guatemala. Its lines comprise 498 of  the 
575 miles of  railroad in the country, 69 of  the remainder being operated by the United Fruit Co. The 
gross revenue for  1921 amounted to $3 609 703. 
The International Railways of  Central America controls certain industrial subsidiaries. On 
January 1, 1923, it owned $77 160 of  the shares of  the Guatemala Marble and Granite Co., and a 
$580 967 investment in the Novella Cement Co.4 It had also an investment of  $260 000 in the 
Alotepeque Mines and $984540 or almost all the shares of  the Occidental Railroad, included in the 
mileage above stated. 
Another recent and substantial investor in the country is the American and Foreign Power Co., 
formed  in 1923 and controlled by the General Electric Co. It owns the electric lighting system of 
Guatemala City (Guatemala Tramways and Power Co.), an enterprise worth $1250 000, formerly 
controlled in part by the International Railways of  Central America. The American and Foreign 
Power Co. concession granted by the Government runs for  more than 50 years.5 
Closely associated with the International Railways is the United Fruit Co., whose investment in 
Guatemala in 1923 amounted to $3 944 762 and whose lands comprise approximately one-fifth  of 
the total area of  the country including 25 500 acres of  improved land, 114 500 acres of  unimproved, 
and 67 300 under lease of  which 1770 are improved.6 
The United Fruit Co., also operates a radio station in Guatemala and All America Cables, Inc., 
has properties there. 
The Sinclair Exploration Co., and the Rickard Exploration Co. are negotiating for  oil concessions, 
and the Benedum and Trees oil interests of  Pittsburgh are said to have entered into an agreement 
with the Petrolera Izabel, a local oil development corporation, for  drilling wells on a two million acre 
tract near Peten. If  successful,  a $30 million dollar corporation is to be formed.7 
The New York Engineering Co., is behind a gold dredging project in Guatemala.8 
The American Chicle Co., controls large areas of  chicle producing lands in Guatemala.9 
Americans associated with the financing  of  coffee  plantations established the Bank of  Guatemala, 
the leading bank of  the republic, in 1905. At least a part of  its shares are owned by Americans.1 
The American International Corporation through G. Amsinck & Co., controls and operates 
Quezada & Co., coffee  exporters. 
The latest estimate in 1920 places the total American capital in Guatemala at $15 million. 
HONDURAS 
In 1920 the American investment in Honduras was estimated by Ingalls at $18 million, a gain of  $8 
million since 1916.12 The two major investments then, as now, were the United Fruit Co. and the 
New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Co. It is probable that the total investment is now at least 
$40 million, for  the United Fruit Co.'s plantations and equipment alone in 1923 amounted to 
$24 232 275. 
The United Fruit Co.'s investment includes the ownership of  392 out of  488 miles of  railway in 
the country, as well as extensive banana, coconut and rubber lands. The growth of  the interests of 
4Moody's Governments  and Municipals,  p. 483. United V  ml Annual Reports,  1923. International Railways of  Central 
America, Report,  1924. 
Poor and Moody, Public  Utilities,  p. 941. 
Moody's Governments  and Municipals,  p. 482. 
7New  York  Times,  Feb. 25,1924. Annalist,  v. 25, p. 132. 
^Mineral  Industry,  1923, p. 291. 
'Moody's Industrials,  p. 832. 
10Boston Transcript,  Oct. 15,1922. 
1 1 Ingalls, Wealth  and Income,  p. 56. 
12Ingalls, Wealth  and Income,  p. 56. 
268 
United Fruit in Honduras has been significant.  According to the, Annual Report of  the Company, 
1923, the increase has been as follows: 
Table IV.1.1 








7 614 535 
9 983 288 
13 118 067 
16 323 299 
19 077 752 
24 232 275 
$45 628 
The United Fruit Co., works also through certain subsidiaries, one being Vaccaro Bros. & Co., 
and another Hubbard, Zemurray & Co., banana plantation owners.13 Vaccaro Bros., banana 
exporters, controls the Banco Atlantida and owns and operates some 93 miles of  railway and a line 
of  steamers. The Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (Del.) took over the Honduran interests of 
Vaccaro Bros, on Jan. 1,1924, though no change took place in the financial  control. The plan was 
to segregate the steamship, fruit,  and railways business of  Vaccaro Bros, from  their other properties 
in the country. Some 196 miles of  railway are now run by the Standard Fruit and Steamship Co.14 
Cuyamel Fruit is another large fruit  company, its acreage running over 50 000, some 12 000 acres 
under cultivation in bananas. The company controls the Cortes Development Co., banana 
producers, and through another subsidiary the Sula Sugar Co. Cuyamel is engaged in sugar growing 
and owns a sugar mill handling 150 tons of  cane a day. It operates also some 47 miles of  standard 
gauge railway and 75 miles of  narrow gauge. The Ramal del Ulua Railway, a subsidiary of  the 
Cuyamel, operates, in addition, 100 miles of  road, a fleet  of  fruit-passenger-freight  ships, warehouses, 
docks and other facilities.  The Cuyamel operates also in Nicaragua, its investment in the business 
of  both countries amounting to nearly $25 million. 
An important American mining company is the New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Co. 
Its capital stock outstanding is $2 million; its total assets in 1921 amounted to $3,795 378. "This 
long-established American company has been highly successful,  and its record of  silver production 
is probably the best for  any silver mine in Central America during modern times."16 
Other American companies are the West End Consolidates Mining Co. (Ariz.), whose property 
is operated in Honduras by the West End Opoteca Mines Co.,17 and the Antigua Gold and Copper 
Co., and American concern incorporated in 1917 with a capital of  $2 million. 
There seems to have been some exploration for  petroleum carried on by the Central American 
Petroleum Co., which holds altogether 4 million acres, a part in Colombia and a part in Honduras. 
The Honduras Petroleum Co., presumably American controlled, has also prospected for  oil in four 
states of  Honduras. 
American companies are interested in port development, in railroads, in steamboat operation 
and in automobile roads. The International Railways of  Central America, it is reported, will 
eventually extend its lines some 90 miles through Honduras. 
The National Railways of  Honduras have since 1920 been under the management of  American 
interests represented by the Cía. Agrícola de Sula.19 
13U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Cooperation  in American Export  Trade,  v. 2, p. 176. 
14U.S. Trade  Promotion  Series,  No. 5, p. 67. 
15Moody's Industrials,  p. 1935. 
16U.S. Special  Agents  Series,  No. 169, p. 425. 
''Moody's Industrials,  p. 1637. 
18U.S. Special  Agents  Series,  No. 169, p. 531. 
^Moody's Governments  and Muncipals,  p. 488. 
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NICARAGUA 
Fruit companies, mining companies, railway and banking interests comprise the major connections 
between the United States and Nicaragua. 
1. Fruit  growing. 
The United Fruit Co., is only slightly interested in the country, its holdings covering but 171000 
acres of  unimproved lands and the investment of  approximately $170 000. 
The Atlantic Fruit Co., however, has a 132 000 acre tract almost wholly under cultivation, while 
the Cuyamel Fruit Co. imports bananas which are grown by the New Orleans and Blue-fields  Fruit 
and Transportation Co. (a subsidiary of  Cuyamel) the latter company holding in its own name about 
150 0000 acres of  land in Nicaragua. 
2. Mining 
The Central American exploration Co. is a small company owning a gold gravel mine and an 
exploration concession covering 4 million acres. 
The La Luz and Los Angeles Mining Co., owned by Pittsburgh interests, has been producing 
since 1901. 
The Gold Mines Co. has carried on some exploration work. Contracts for  the exploration of 
petroleum lands were signed in 1923 between an American company and the Nicaraguan 
Government, the territory covered being about 200 000 hectares. The full  text of  the report is as 
follows: 
"The Government has signed a petroleum contract with an American citizen granting him 
permission to explore for  petroleum in certain parts of  the Departments of  Bluefields, 
Chontales and Nueva Segovia. The land to be explored is 200 000 hectares in extent, divided 
into 40 lots of  5 0000 hectares each, from  which during five  years from  the publishing of  the 
contract (October 1 and 2,1923) competitors are to be barred. At the end of  the exploratory 
period the concessionary may exploit any oil wells for  40 years. The Government is to receive 
12 1/2 per cent royalty on the gross oil products if  the yield is not equal to or over 100 000 
barrels per day, and 20 per cent of  the gross production exceeding that amount. A $10 000 
deposit is required, to be returned in five  years if  the conditions are fulfilled.  All material 
brought into the country for  the works of  the concession are to be free  of  import duties. Half 
of  the workmen must be Nicaraguans."21 
The Tonopah Mining Co., a large American concern owning a majority of  the $1 million stock of 
the Eden Mining Co., has also carried on construction and development work in the gold fields.  It 
owns a controlling interest in the Tonopah Nicaragua Co., operating the Santa Rita Mines'22 
3 .Railroads 
The Pacific  Railway or National Railway of  Nicaragua is now after  several years of  shared control 
with American bankers again owned by the government, but is still under the management of  J.G. 
White & Co. 
Several of  the fruit  companies operate short branch lines; Cuyamel now has some 10 miles under 
operation. 
A contract was signed not long ago between the Government and an American corporation for 
the construction of  a railroad which will be a link in the International Railways of  Central America 
line. This railway project is known also as the Pan American Railway.23 
^United Fruit Co., Annual Report,  1923. 
21Pan American Union, Bulletin,  v. 58, p. 190. 
^U.S. Special  Agents  Series,  No. 169, p. 435 
23South  American Handbook,  1924, p. 548. 
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4. Miscellaneous  Interests 
The Brangman's Bluff  Lumber Co. in 1923 obtained a concession through Leroy T. Miles for 
20 000 hectares of  nationally-owned land. The right to construct sawmills, wharves, wireless stations 
and railways is included in the concession. Six miles of  railway tract have already been laid.24 
An oil concession was granted Robert J. McKinley of  Kansas in 1924. It covers several 
departments. A $50 000 deposit was given for  the franchise.25 
Keilhauer and Hebard of  New York in 1925 signed a contract with the President of  Nicaragua 
for  a paving and sanitation project and for  the construction of  a railroad to the Atlantic Coast, at a 
cost of  approximately $12 million.26 
The Nicaraguan Government in 1920 granted a 49-year timber concession to Manuel Pena, an 
American citizen, covering timber exploitation and resin export.27 
The Central American Corporation owns 24 000 acres in lands devoted to banana, sugar cane 
and pineapple cultivation. The properties of  the company include railways, wharf  and warehouses.28 
The National Bank of  Nicaragua, formerly  controlled by Brown Bros. & Co., and J. and W. 
Seligman & Co., was bought back by the Nicaraguan Government in 1924, the new directorate, 
however, still including three Americans, Robert F. Loree, President of  the Bank of  Central and 
South America, Abram F. Linberg, financial  expert, and Jeremiah Jenks.29 
Other American firms  reported to be operating in Nicaragua in addition to those above 
mentioned, are the following:  Cia. Mercantile de Ultramar, the Grecia Mines, San Albino Mines, 
Casa Commercial and Moravian Mission, Bluefields  Tanning Co., Samuel Weil & Co., Astor 
Mahogany Co. (through its subsidiary, the Nicaraguan Mahogany Co.), I. T. Williams & Sons, Wawa 
Commercial Co., Friedlander Commission Co., H. F. Springer, A. Fagot & Co., Central American 
Saw Mills, Constancia Gold Mines, Nicaragua Mining Co., and Mendel & Co. Other American 
firms  have interests in radio, railroads, street paving and public works. 
Over 70 per cent of  the foreign  trade of  the country is conducted with the United States. 
EL SALVADOR 
The International Railways of  Central America owns 158 of  the 252 miles of  railway in the country 
with an extension of  138 additional miles now under construction. The gross receipts in 1921 
amounted to $400 589.30 
Prior to the taking over of  the International Railways of  Central America by United States interests, 
a correspondent of  the London Economist,  with a British point of  view, wrote: 
"With slight exceptions, the steamship and railway transport arrangements in Central America, 
including El Salvador, have passed under the domination of  North American interests, at the head 
of  which stand Mr. Minor C. Keith, president of  the International Railways of  Central America, and 
his associates. During the lifetime  of  Mr. Mark J. Kelly, for  many years chairman and managing 
director of  the Salvador Railway Company (and formerly  of  the Salvador Steamship Company), 
strenuous efforts  were made to exclude these enterprises from  American domination; hitherto the 
railways has been spared absorption. It would appear, however, that this British-owned enterprise 
may ultimately be engulfed  by irresistible North American interests, which have ever regarded the 
system...with envy, and as destined to form  part of  the Pan-American Railway project." 
Several mining companies, among them the Central American Mines, Inc., with $3 million capital, 
and the Comararan Gold Mining Co., presumably financed  in the United States, are operating in 
Salvador. 
MU.S. Trade  Promotion  Series,  No. 5, p. 91. 
25Annalist,  v. 24, p. 452 
26Ibid.,  v. 25, p. 586 
r'Latin-American  Year  Book, 1920, p. 525 
^Moody's Industrials,  p. 1159. 
29'Annalist,  v. 24, p. 285. 
^Moody's Governments  and Municipals,  p. 602. Internal Railways of  Central America, Annual Repon, 1923. 
31Economist,  v. 95, p. 577. 
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R. W. Hebard & Co. (also interested in the International Railways of  Central America), has the 
contract for  constructing sanitary works for  the city of  San Salvador estimated to cost $3 million. 
René Keilhauer has other interests in the country, in addition to those represented by his connection 
with the International Railways of  Central America. 
The Occidental Bank, with a capital of  $5 million, is the most important bank of  Salvador and 
was organized by David Bloom and his associates of  San Francisco, as a result of  their commercial 
undertakings in that country.32 
Salvador external bonds of  1923 to the amount of  $6 million are handled through the New York 
banking house of  F. J. Lisman & Co., which through the terms of  the contract acquires complete 
control of  the customs collections in case of  default  in the loan.33 
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32Boston Transcript,  Oct. 15,1923. 
33 Commercial  and  Financial  Chronicle,  v. 117, pp. 1615-16. v. 117, pp. 452,479. 
2. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BLUEFIELDS, NICARAGUA (1930) 
From: Foreign Investments in Latin America; Required Report from  American Consul Samuel J. 
Fletcher; Bluefields,  Nicaragua to Department of  State; March 24, 1930; 
811.503110-STATISTICS/9; Central Decimal Files, 1930-39; Record Group 59; NARA. 
REQUIRED 
(In compliance with the Department's Multigraphed Instruction of  March 6, 1930, File No. 
811.503110 Statistics/2.) 
VERY CONFIDENTIAL 
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
From American Consul 
(signed) 
Samuel J. Fletcher 
American Consulate, 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua. 
Date of  completion: March 24,1930 
Date of  mailing: March 24,1930 
In compliance with the Department's Very Confidential  Instruction of  March 6,1930, the 
tables compiled and furnished  by the Department of  Commerce, which show the estimated 
totals of  American, British, and combined other foreign  investments in each of  the Latin 
American States as of  December 31,1928, have been studied, and the following  table has been 
prepared to bring the estimate of  American foreign  investments in the Bluefields  Consular 
District up-to-date. 
This table was originally compiled on September 6, 1929, in compliance with the 
Department's Multigraphed Instruction of  August 8,1929, File No. 811.503100/36. 
Declassified 
NARA Date: 6-23-88 
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Table IV.2.1 
AMERICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS BLUEFIELDS CONSULAR DISTRICT 
Names and addresses 
of  American corporations, 







Allen, Mrs. Mary 
Rama, Nicaragua 
Real estate Rama $25 000 
American Fruit Company 










Pearl Lagoon 50 000 
Brand, A. B. 
San Juan del Norte 
Mercantile San Juan del 
Norte 
5 000 
Bonanza Mines Company 
Pis-Pis District 
Gold mines Pis-Pis District 250 000 
Bluefield  Ice & Bottling 
Works (Factory owned by 
an American, H.F. Springer) 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Ice factory Bluefields 5 000 
Bluefields  Tanning Company 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Tannery & shoe 
factory 
Bluefields 40 000 
Bluefields  Mercantile Co. 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Mercantile Bluefields 250 000 
Bragmans Bluff  Lbr. Co. 




Puerto Cabeias 12 000 000 
Brayshaw & Brayshaw 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Clinic Bluefields 5 000 
Central American Sawmills 
(W.J. Green) 
Cape Gracias, Nicaragua 
Sawmill Cape Gracias 5 000 
Clancy, Michael J. 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Real estate Bluefields 5 000 
Cukra Development Co. 







2 500 000 
Draper, Alonzo 
Boco Mico, Rama 
Banana planta-
tions 





Rama 5 000 
El Cocal 
El Cocal Plantation 
Coconut groves South of  Bluefields 50 000 
Fagot, Albert 
Cape Gracias 
Mercantile Cape Gracias 10 000 
Fagot & Wendt (Conrad 
Fagot, American partner) 
Bilwi, Puerto Cabezas 
Mercantile Puerto Cabezas 25 000 
Franklin Baker Co. 
Corn Island 
Coconut groves Corn Island 10 000 
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Table IV.2.1 (concluded) 
Names and addresses 
of  American corporations, 









Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
La Luz y Los Angeles 
Mining Company 
Pis-Pis District 
Marchand, John L. 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
McCoy, Clayton O. 
Staten Island, N.Y. 
Moravian Mission 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Nicaragua Mahogany Co. 




Skaling, Harold M. 
Rama, Nicaragua 
Springer H.F. 





United Fruit Company 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Vrooman Co. Ltd, S.B. 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Wawashon Sugar Co. 
(not operating) 
Waters, Thomas W. 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua 
Weil & Co., Samuel 





















tions & lands 














fields,  missions in 
































$16 429 000 
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B. COMMUNICATIONS 
3. A WIRELESS STATION IN RUATAN, HONDURAS (1923) 
From: Wireless Station at Ruatan, Honduras; Voluntary Report from  Consul Robert L. Keiser, 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras to Department of  State; May 3,1923; 815.74/40; Central Decimal 
Files 1920-29; Record Group 59; NARA. 
Voluntary Report 
WIRELESS STATION AT RUATAN, HONDURAS 
From Consul Robert L. Keiter, (signed) 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras Date of  preparation: April 29,1923 
Date of  mailing: May 3,1923 
(Further supplementing report of  March 5,1925, file  874, 
subject: Wireless Station to be erected in Bay Islands, Honduras) 
As mentioned in a report of  March 12,1923, file  No. 874, on the above subject, the United 
Fruit Company has presented to the Government of  Honduras a contract setting forth  the 
terms upon which the company will construct and maintain on the island of  Ruatan a wireless 
station. 
It is believed that the initiative in this project has come from  the United Fruit Company 
rather than the Government and that the company desires the station for  its own future  uses. 
A copy of  the contract and a translation thereof  are transmitted herewith. It is understood 
that Executive approval will be given to the contract. 
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The undersigned Secretary of  State 
For the Department of  Fomento, Public Works and Agriculture 
DECLARES: 
That on this date the following  application has been filed  in this office: 
RUATAN WIRELESS STATION 
I, Ernest Lazarus, of  legal age, married and residing in this city, as representative for  the 
Tropical Radio Telegraph Company and recognized by the Department of  Fomento, Public 
Works and Agriculture, respectfully  come to state as follows: 
The Tropical Radio Telegraph Company as requested by you, has taken into consideration 
the building of  a wireless station at or near the port of  Ruatan, in the island of  the same name, 
in the Department of  Bay Islands, to provide a rapid and safe  means of  communications 
between those places and the capital by which the Government and the Departmental 
authorities will profit,  inasmuch as the actual method of  communication is slow, subject to the 
effects  of  weather, and further  irregular. Due to the small amount of  private business carried 
on a Ruatan town and the island the income derived from  the public and the press service 
would be negligible, and it is for  this reason that there has been proposed in the contract 
submitted to you that the Government pay to the Tropical Radio Telegraph Company the 
estimated amount to pay salaries for  operators, fuel  and maintenance of  the station for  proper 
service and operation; and with this end in view I submit to you the following  projected 
contract: 
The Government, through the Chief  Clerk of  the Department of  Fomento, Public Works 
and Agriculture, hereinafter  known as the Government, as party of  the first  part and the 
Tropical Radio Telegraph Company, hereinafter  known as the Contractor, as party of  the 
second part, hereby agree to enter into the following  contract: 
1. The Contractor hereby agrees to build, maintain and operate a wireless station at or near 
the port of  Ruatan in the Island of  the same name in the Bay Islands of  Honduras, this to be 
of  sufficient  capacity and power to communicate between the port of  Ruatan and the capital 
of  Honduras, either directly or through the other stations on the North Coast of  the Republic 
which the Contractor may be able to use, not only to receive but to transmit as well as official 
messages of  the National Government and those of  the Departmental authorities of  Ruatan. 
2. The Contractor further  agrees to equip this wireless station with the necessary personnel 
and employees so as to provide an efficient  service and full  operation of  the plant in order that 
the official  messages between Ruatan and Tegucigalpa or vice-versa may not be subject to 
delays and to establish between Ruatan Island and the other stations actually used by the 
contractor an efficient  and permanent wireless service. 
3. The Contractor agrees to supply at all times during the term of  this contract the material, 
fuel,  repairs and other fixtures  necessary to the perfect  operation of  the wireless station at 
Ruatan, without cost whatsoever to the Government. The Government hereby declares this 
station to be a public necessity and utility, consequently the Contractor shall be exempt from 
the payment of  fiscal,  municipal, ordinary and extraordinary duties and taxes, now effective  or 
later established, during the term of  this concession or extension of  same, on the land used as 
site for  the station, or on the machinery, apparatus, tools, implements, material, or any 
necessary effects  either imported or acquired by the Contractor, for  the construction, 
exploitation or maintenance of  said wireless station and its appurtenances. Likewise, messages 
transmitted and received shall not be taxed. Exemption of  taxes also includes consular fees 
and Peaje and Sanitary taxes. 
4. The Contractor agrees to transmit all Government messages sent from  Ruatan to 
Tegucigalpa and those from  Tegucigalpa sent to Ruatan, as well as those official  messages of 
the Government between Ruatan and other stations operated by the Contractor in Honduras, 
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free  of  cost to the Government excepting those hereinafter  expressly subject to charge; 
however, the Contractor is authorized to accept messages from  the public and the press sent 
from  or to Ruatan charging for  this service a tariff  which may be established from  time to time 
jointly by the Government of  Honduras and the Tropical Radio Telegraph Company. 
Messages connected with the operation, maintenance or working of  the station, or those arising 
from  the service thereof  or those of  employees shall not be subject to charge and the Contractor 
is authorized to use Ruatan Station whenever necessary as a transit station between other 
stations operated by or connected with those of  the Tropical Radio Telegraph Company. 
5. The Contractor agrees to have the station herein referred  to ready for  service within two 
years, duly proven Acts of  Providence or force  majeur excepted, the term to be counted from 
the date on which the National Congress passes the present contract; and he further  agrees to 
equip the said station with modern instruments of  wireless telegraphy and the required 
installations to provide for  an efficient  official  and public service herein proposed by him in 
this contract; and the Government upon receipt of  notice from  the Contractor that the work 
is completed shall appoint such a Technical Commission as it may deem fit  to report on said 
work, and declare upon receipt of  the report of  the Commission whether or not the Contractor 
has complied with the obligations of  this contract. 
6. The Government hereby declares that the work herein referred  to shall be considered a 
public necessity and utility, consequently the Contractor, his successor or causahabientes shall 
be exempt from  all fiscal,  municipal, ordinary or extraordinary taxes, now or later established, 
which might affect  in any way the material, land or property by them acquired for  the 
construction, exploitation and maintenance of  the wireless station, its annexes or 
appurtenances; further  the Contractor shall be exempt from  any taxes on the income derived 
from  the operation of  the station, the Government agreeing to grant the Contractor for  the 
construction herein mentioned a necessary land-site as chose by the Contractor free  from  any 
cost and said land shall be considered at all times as dependency of  the work herein referred 
to. 
7. The Government agrees to transmit to the Custom-House at Ruatan the necessary 
instructions to secure the free  introduction of  the material for  construction and those for 
maintenance of  the plant and its appurtenances as set forth  in article 3 of  this contract, against 
the simple presentation of  the respective Bills of  Lading and Consular Invoices inasmuch as 
the distance and lack of  proper means of  communications between Ruatan and the seat of  the 
Government would effect  a great loss of  time if  the Contractor had to obtain from  Tegucigalpa 
the usual permit for  the free  introduction of  material. 
8. The Government agrees not to grant, during the term of  this contract any concession, or to 
permit the installation or operation of  any wireless station in Ruatan Island or in any other of 
the Bay Islands, but the Government shall have the right to establish any station for  its official 
service. 
9. In consideration of  the capital invested by the Contractor in the construction of  the work 
and its appurtenances and of  the cost of  operation of  the wireless station, including the salaries 
of  the employees and engineers, the Government shall pay to the Contractor the amount of 
$5 000.00 dollars U.S. Currency annually during the term of  this contract this amount to include 
the official  telegraphic service for  the Government and the Island of  Ruatan; this amount to 
be paid in monthly installments of  $416.66 American gold through the Custom-House at Tela 
against the receipt presented by the Contractor at the end of  each month, this to be effective 
from  the time the Government has issued the declaration referred  to in Article 5 of  this 
contract. 
10. The Government shall have the right to purchase the wireless station with all its annexes 
and appurtenances at the expiration of  the present contract in preference  to any other 
interested party. 
11. The term of  this contract will be a period of  30 years counted from  the date on which the 
National Congress gives its approval thereto; and in the event of  the Government not using its 
right to purchase the wireless station as above mentioned, the Contractor, if  so desired by him, 
may continue to use the rights and privileges as granted by this contract for  a further  period 
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of  30 years, and shall then fix  for  the services rendered a reasonable compensation that shall 
be mutually agreed between the Government and the Contractor. 
12. The operators and employees of  the wireless station herein referred  to may import free 
from  customs duties or any other taxes that might be collected by the Custom-Hose all 
furniture,  household utensils and foodstuffs  needed by them during their stay in the island. 
13. The Contractor, his successors or causahabientes, even if  all or any of  them be foreigners, 
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of  Honduras in all matters of  which the cause or action may 
take place within its territory; extraterritoriality shall never be alleged in connection with this 
contract; they shall only have and exercise the rights granted by the Laws of  Honduras to the 
Hondurans; therefore  foreign  diplomatic and consular agents cannot interfere  in said matters; 
and it is hereby expressly agreed that no diplomatic recourse may be had no matter upon what 
grounds such a claim might be founded. 
14. Any difference  arising from  this contract between the Government and the Contractor 
shall be submitted to the decision of  two friendly  arbiters who shall be persons of  good and 
recognized reputation, appointed one by each party and authorized to appoint a third arbiter 
in case of  disagreement. Should they not agree as to this appointment, the designation shall 
be made by nominating four  candidates of  the same qualifications  as the former  and proposed 
one half  by the Government and the other half  by the Contractor. If  one party should not 
propose a candidate within the term assigned by the Judge the nomination of  said candidates 
shall be made by this official.  Arbitration shall be effected  in the capital of  the Republic and 
the functions  of  the Jury shall be executed in this place unless both parties agree to decide 
upon another place. The decision of  the majority shall be binding on both parties and there 
shall be no recourse against it. 
15. The present contract shall be submitted to the approval of  the National Congress at its 
next session for  the necessary legal effects. 
Tegucigalpa, April 20,1923 
Earnest Lazarus 




4. THE RAILS OF COMMERCE (1925) 
From: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 
Transportatin Division, Trade Promotion Series No. 5, Railways of  Central  America andlhe 
West  Indies,  by W. Rodney Long (Washington: Government Printing Office,  1925), pp. 
Ill-VII, XVI, 1-157. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Bureau of  Foreign and Domestic Commerce 
Julius Klein, Director 
TRADE PROMOTION SERIES - No. 5 
RAILWAYS OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
AND THE WEST INDIES 
By 
W. Rodney Long 
Transportation Division 
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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL 
Department of  Commerce, 
Bureau of  Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 
Washington, December 1,1924. 
Sir: There is submitted herewith a report on the railways of  Central America and the West 
Indies, prepared (from  a great variety of  sources) by W. R. Long, of  the Transportation 
Division of  this bureau. The monograph presents very detailed information  with respect to all 
the railways in this territory, covering such phases as the development of  the line, the mileage, 
operating officials  method of  purchases, finances,  traffic  statistics, characteristic of  the right 
of  way, number of  employees, motive power and rolling stock, repair shops and equipment. 
The report was prepared through the cooperation of  various locomotive and car building 
companies, manufacturers  of  railway equipment, exporters of  crossties, and other interested 
companies with the Transportation Division, the Machinery Division, and the Iron and Steel 
Division of  the bureau. 
Special assistance has been rendered in the preparation of  this handbook by Mr. C. E. 
Babcock, librarian, Pan American Union; Miss E. O. Cullen, assistant librarian, Bureau of 
Railway Economics; Mr. V. M. Cutter, vice president, United Fruit Co., of  Boston; the R. H. 
White Management Corporation, of  New York; the International Railways of  Central 
America; Vacarro Brothers, of  New Orleans; the Cuyamel Fruit Co., of  New Orleans; the 
Panama Canal Office;  other small industrial roads with home offices  in this country, which 
have provided the necessary information  on each of  their respective railroads; Trade 
Commissioner Frank E. Coombs, whose reports on the Cuban railways were of  great 
assistance; Mr. L. W. James, whose remarks on the Porto Rican railways were helpful;  and the 
following  American consular officers,  from  whose reports minor and major information  as to 
the details given in this book was obtained: John C. Watson, Barbados; B. S. Rairden, 
Curacao; Charles B. Hosmer, Santo Domingo; Charles A. Day, Haiti; Charles L. Latham, 
Jamaica; Henry D. Baker, Trinidad; W. W. Early, British Honduras; Henry S. Watson, Costa 
Rica; Arthur C. Frost, Guatemala City; George P. Shaw, Honduras; Harold Playter, 
Nicaragua; Lynn W. Franklin, San Salvador; and George Orr, Panama. 
The Bureau wishes to express to the Pan American Union its appreciation of  the courtesy 
shown in loaning photographs for  use as illustrations in this book. 
Respectfully, 
Julius Klein, 
Director of  Bureau. 
To Hon. Herbert Hoover, 
Secretary of  Commerce. 
This document is an edited and abridged version of  the original. 
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RAILWAYS OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES 
Parti. CENTRAL AMERICA 
GUATEMALA 
GENERAL FEATURES OF COUNTRY 
The Republic of  Guatemala is the most northern of  the Central American countries, lying between 
the Atlantic and Pacific  Oceans, with Mexico on the north and west, British Honduras on the north 
east, and Honduras and Salvador on the south. The Pacific  coast line extends 300 miles, from  the 
Mexican border on the north to the Salvador border on the south. The total area of  the Republic is 
approximately 50 000 square miles. Its greatest length from  north to south is 360 miles, and its greatest 
width from  the Atlantic to the Pacific  is 390 miles. 
The surface  of  the land is irregular, being generally mountainous with high plateaus in the central 
and southern parts and plains along both the eastern and western coasts. The land is well drained 
by rivers, which are of  little commercial importance. The lakes are numerous, and some are found 
at high altitudes. A chain of  mountains crosses the Republic, with spurs extending in many directions. 
The western and southern portions, comprising about two-thirds of  the country, are mountainous, 
with several volcanoes. The coast lands in the northern region are low and covered with tropical 
vegetation. 
The climate of  Guatemala varies according to the altitude, ranging from  tropical heat along the 
coastal regions to occasional snow in the mountains. 
The country itself  is essentially an agricultural one, the principal products being coffee,  sugar 
cane, tobacco, cacao, bananas, and other tropical fruits.  Coffee  is the chief  agricultural product, with 
220 0000 acres under cultivation, while a little over 54 000 acres of  sugar cane are cultivated. 
Puerto Barrios, on the Atlantic coast, is the principal port. It is the terminus for  the Northern 
Railway. Vessels drawing 21 feet  can be berthed at the wharves, where they can be unloaded directly 
into railway cars. The principal commodities moving through this port are bananas and other tropical 
fruits. 
Ocos, the most northern port on the Pacific  side, has an extremely deep harbor, vessels anchoring 
about one-half  mile from  shore. Champerico is on the Pacific  Coast and is connected by the 
International Railway System. There is an iron wharf  1 111 feet  in length equipped to handle about 
400 tons of  cargo per day. Warehouses are connected with the pier by two narrow-gauge railway 
tracks. The principal exports from  this port are coffee,  hides, and mahogany. 
San Jose, the most southerly Pacific  port of  Guatemala, is connected with Guatemala City by a 
narrow-gauge railway. The port is provided with an iron wharf  900 feet  long with facilities  for 
handling 600 tons of  cargo per day and with cranes capable of  handling as high as 15-ton loads. Ships 
lie about half  a mile from  the pier and load and unload by lighters. The chief  exports are coffee, 
hides, mahogany, salt, and bananas. 
Transportation facilities  are fair.  The principal railroads, with the exception of  the Verapaz 
Railway, are controlled by the International Railways of  Central America. Among the industrial 
roads are those of  the United Fruit Co. Outside of  the railroads, transportation is confined  to 
animal-drawn carts which can haul approximately 250 pounds. Some new highways are being 
constructed which will provide suitable roads for  automobile traffic  between inland cities. 
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The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official  endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
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INTERNATIONAL RAILWAYS OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Guatemala Railway was incorporated on June 8,1904, under the laws of  the State of  New Jersey, 
U.S.A. The name of  the company was changed to the International Railways of  Central America on 
April 19,1921, by certificate  filed  and recorded in the office  of  the Secretary of  State of  New Jersey. 
The purpose of  the organization was that of  constructing, acquiring, and operating railways in 
Central America. It has secured concessions from  the Governments of  Guatemala and Salvador. 
These concessions granted a right of  way 100 feet  wide for  the whole length of  the line and a greater 
width where it was necessary for  the purposes of  the railroad. Freight and passenger rate are to be 
paid in gold on all railways constructed and acquired in both countries. The concession from  the 
Government of  Guatemala is perpetual, with the Government possessing the right to take over the 
railroads at the end of  99 years at a valuation to be arrived at by arbitration. The concession from 
the Government of  Salvador is for  99 years, at the end of  which time the railroads become the 
property of  the Government without payment. The Government, however, has the right to take over 
the railroads at the end of  70 years at a valuation to be arrived at by arbitration. Both concessions 
give exclusive rights of  railroad construction within a zone of  20 miles on each side of  its lines and 
the preferential  right to construct other railroads in the respective countries. Both countries have 
granted freedom  from  taxes, duties, stamp duties, and imposts on all machinery, rolling stock, etc., 
required for  the construction, equipment, and maintenance of  the railroads, which may be operated 
by steam or electricity in either country. 
The Salvador Government granted a subsidy of  $7 000 gold for  every kilometer ($11200 per mile) 
of  railroad constructed. This subsidy was guaranteed by 14 per cent of  certain specified  import 
duties, and by $6 gold per ton of  coffee  exported, and has been regularly paid. The Guatemala 
Government granted a subsidy of  $12 000 gold per mile on certain railways and $5 000 per mile on 
other railways. In addition it has granted a block of  22 acres of  land for  terminals. The company itself 
owns, in addition, a block of  42 acres about three-quarters of  a mile from  the city. The company has 
entered into a contract with the United Fruit Co. for  the carriage of  the whole of  its product within 
the region served by the railway. When the company was reorganized in 1922 it joined a composite 
organization of  the following  railroads: The Guatemala Railroad, the Guatemala Central Railroad 
and its Pan-American extension, the Occidental Railroad, and the Ocos Railroad. A brief  summary 
of  these roads follows. 
NORTHERN RAILWAY (GUATEMALA RAILROAD) 
The idea for  the construction of  the road afterwards  called the Guatemala Railroad originated with 
Gen. Justo Rufino  Barrios, and it was sponsored by the Liberal Government. In 1883 President 
Barrios issued a decree for  the construction of  the Northern Railroad, the work to be directed by 
the Government. However, his death in 1885 put an end to the operations. The work constructed 
under his auspices consisted of  some 15 or 20 miles, laid with 33-pound rails. From that time no work 
of  importance was done on the line until the administration of  Gen. Jose Maria Reyna Barrios, in 
whose administration the line was completed as far  as Rancho. 
During the administration of  President Manuel Estrada Cabrera several contracts were entered 
into, but none with definite  results until, on January 12,1904, a new contract was made with Percival 
Farquhar, as representative of  Minor C. Keith and William C. Van Horn, for  the completion of  the 
Northern road, a distance of  51.4 miles. The concession reserves to the Government the right to 
purchase the entire railway 99 years from  the date of  approval of  the contract, or April 9,2003, and 
if  this right is not exercised the railway belongs to the concessionaires in perpetuity. On April 4,1904, 
this concession was approved by Congress, and on June 11,1904, it was transferred  to the Guatemala 
Railroad, organized for  that purpose. The company was incorporated under the laws of  New Jersey 
on June 8,1904, for  $40 000 000. 
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EXTENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ROAD 
The railway, leaving Puerto Barrios, passes over the end of  a long spur of  mountains, dividing the 
Rio Motagua from  Lake Izabal, and then reaches the valley of  the Motagua at Tenedores. Following 
the valley of  the Motagua the road extends to El Rancho; the alignment is generally good and the 
grade is slight. The valley is narrow in some places and the line has to follow  along the slope at the 
foot  of  the hills, which necessitated heavy side-hill work and some river protection. 
The length of  the railway is: 
Miles 
Guatemala City to Puerto Barrios 194.3 
Connection to the Guatemala Central .6 
Total 194.9 
CENTRAL RAILROAD 
In 1873, under the régime of  the local Government, the first  contract for  the construction of  the road 
from  San Jose to Guatemala City was signed. This contract was undertaken by Mark J. Kelly, but 
the undertaking failed  on account of  financial  difficulties.  The Government then signed a contract 
with William Nanne on April 7, 1877, for  the construction of  a railway between San Jose and 
Escuintla. Mr. Nanne was assisted by Louis Schlesinger, and actual work was commenced on June 
20,1880. The contract, as defined,  expires 99 years from  the date on which the road was officially 
opened to traffic,  which was June 20,1880. 
On July 13,1880, another contract was secured by the same men, covering the construction of  a 
line from  Escuintla to Guatemala City, and in 1882 the rails had reached the city of  Amatitlan. The 
road was finally  completed and through train service from  San Jose to the capital was inaugurated 
on July 19,1884. The concession is to continue 99 years from  this date. 
In 1885 the Guatemala Central Railroad Co., a California  organization, was incorporated and 
took over the above existing roads and concessions. On July 9,1889, the Occidental Railroad was 
incorporated, of  which corporation the Guatemala Central Railroad owned 26 000 of  30 000 shares 
issued. The company also operates a short line between Guatemala City and Guarda Viejo, where 
it maintains a park and pleasure resort. This makes the total mileage of  the road as follows: 
Miles 
Guatemala City to San Jose 74.5 
Santa Maria to Mazatenango 60.1 
Palo Gardo to San Antonio 3.5 
Branc to Guarda Viejo 2.8 
Total 140.9 
OCCIDENTAL RAILWAY 
The construction of  this road, originally called the Guatemala Western, was provided for  in a 
concession granted to J. H. Lyman, D. P. Fenner, and J. B. Bunting on March 12, 1881, for  the 
construction of  a railroad from  the port of  Champerico on the Pacific  to Caballo Blanco and from 
there to Retalluleu. The concession expires 99 years after  the road is opened to the public or on 
September 24,1984, the road having been opened in 1882. This concession was approved by the 
President on June 20, 1881, with the understanding that the company always be considered a 
Guatemalan corporation. On July 9,1889, the Occidental Railway Co., was incorporated under the 
laws of  Guatemala and took over the concessions above mentioned, together with the road 
constructed. 
On February 12,1890, a concession was granted to the Occidental Railroad for  the extension of 
its line to San Felipe. The concession expires on September 24, 1983. The road was carelessly 
constructed, the track following  closely the natural surface  of  the ground, resulting in a faulty 
alignment and many short and continually varying curves. On December 11, 1895, another 
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concession was granted to this company for  the construction of  a branch from  Mulua to Mazatenango 
which was completed on November 21,1903. The concession expires on the same date as the others. 
By means of  this branch, connection is made with the Santa Maria-Patul branch of  the Central. The 
Occidental Railway traverses a distance of  41.8 miles and serves as an outlet for  the products of  the 
country and an inlet for  imports. 
The mileage of  the road is as follows:  Champerico to San Felipe, 41 miles; branch from  Mulua 
to Mazatenango, 10 miles; total, 51 miles. 
On April 18, 1902, a concession was granted to Antonio Macias del Real for  a railroad from 
Caballo Blanco (Las Cruces) to Coatepeque. The concession was valid for  99 years from  the date 
of  opening the railroad to the public, the road being completed in 1913. The concession was 
somewhat modified  by later decrees and was transferred  in full  to the Guatemala Central Railroad 
Co. on March 8,1909. On May30,1908, a concession was granted to the Guatemala Central Railroad 
to construct a road from  Coatepeque to Vado Ancho (Ayutla) on the Mexican frontier.  This has 
been called the Pan American extension of  the Central. The lease is valid for  99 years. The distance 
of  the through line, Las Cruces to Ayutla, is 20 miles. 
On April 24,1912, the control of  the Occidental Railway passed into the hands of  the International 
Railways of  Central America, which took over the Guatemala Central Railroad Co., including the 
26 000 shares of  the Occidental Railroad which was owned by it. The International Railway now 
owns 28 208 of  the 30 000 shares of  this company. 
On September 23, 1895, a concession was granted to Enrique Neutze for  the construction of  a 
railroad from  the port of  Ocos on the Pacific  to Santa Catana. The concession expires 75 years from 
the date on which the road was opened to the public, or September 13,1973, the road having been 
completed in 1898. On July 23,1898, the Ocos Railroad Co. was organized and took over the above 
concession and road. On March 11,1905, it was purchased at public auction by Schwartz Bros., of 
San Francisco. They sold it to the Guatemala Central Railroad on October 15,1910. Operating from 
Ocos it extends as far  as Vado Ancho, a distance of  23 miles. It connects at Ayutla, on the Mexican 
border, with the Mexican Pan-American Railroad, which stops on the Mexican side of  the Suchiate 
River, and also with the extension of  the Occidental line at Las Cruces. 
DIVISION FOR PURPOSE OF OPERATION-MILEAGE OF SYSTEM 
The railroads described above which have been joined together under the name of  the International 
Railways of  Central America have been divided into districts for  the purposes of  operation. Under 
this arrangement the Guatemala Railroad is known as the Atlantic District and the Central Railroad 
and Pan-American branch, the Occidental Railroad, and the Ocos Railroad as the Pacific  District. 
The mileage of  the combined system in operation as of  December 31,1912, is as follows: 
OCOS RAILWAY 
Miles 
Atlantic District 195.10 











Total miles of  main line and branches 






From 1912 to 1921 various improvements have been made; projects that were uncompleted in 
1912 have been finished,  or further  advanced, and new concessions have been obtained. The former 
separation into districts has been changed into one of  divisions so that now there are the three 
divisions-Guatemala, Salvador, and Honduras. 
Of  those branches which are entirely new since 1921 there are only two, neither in Guatemala, 
namely, the Illopango to Texistepeque, for  which no concession has been given, and the extension 
through Honduras to Nicaragua. The latter was authorized on October 7,1912, in a concession 
granted by Honduras to Rene Keilhauer for  a railway from  the frontier  of  Salvador (connecting with 
the International Railways) to a point on the Nicaragua frontier,  to be determined by surveys, with 
a branch to Fonseca Bay. The concession is valid for  99 years from  February 28,1913. It was later 
transferred  to the International Railways. 




Atlanta Division 197.445 
Central Division 138.772 
Occidental Division 50.243 
Ocos Division 12.103 
Pan-American Extension 41.097 
Salvador Division 156.119 
Total miles main line and branches 595.779 
Miles of  sidings 58.721 
Total mileage in operation 654.500 
Under Construction 
Salvador Division: Salvador frontier  to Santa Ana 50.00 
Construction Contemplated 
Guatemala Division: : Zacapa to frontier  of  Salvador 0.57 
Salvador Division: 
Santa Ana to Ahuachapan .31 
Illopango to Texistepeque .55 
To connect with line in Honduras .20 
Honduras Division: Through 
Honduras to frontier  of  Nicaragua .88 
Total contemplated 2.51 
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OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The operating officials  of  the road are as follows: 
Board  of  directors: 
Minor C. Keith. 
Henry M. Keith. 
Henry H. Hanson. 
Edward S. Hyde. 
H. I. Miller. 
B. W. Palmer. 
Amdred W. Preston. 
Rene Keilhauer. 
President: Minor C. Keith, New York. 
Vice president: Henry M. Keith, New York. 
Comptroller: Henry H. Hansen, New York. 
Secretary and treasurer: E. S. Hyde, New York. 
Acting general manager: R. M. Aylward, Guatemala City. 
Resident engineer: C. R. Chandler, Guatemala City. 
Acting general auditor: E. Lehnhoff,  Guatemala City. 
Superintendent transportation: J. T. Cheek, Guatemala City. 
Locomotive and car superintendent: Mr. Turton, Guatemala City. 
General freight  and passenger agent: R. A. Naune, Guatemala City. 
Material superintendent: J. E. Farrell, Guatemala City. 
Salvador Division, general manager: W. E. Mullins, La Union, Salvador. 
London agent: A. J. Shepherd, Dashwood House. 
A comparison of  passenger traffic  for  the calendar years 1912 and 1921 is as follows: 
GUATEMALA: PASSENGER TRAFFIC, INTERNATIONAL RAILWAYS OF CENTRAL AMERICA, 
1912 AND 1921 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
Table IV.4.1 
Items 1912 1921 
First-class passengers 
Second-class passengers 
Total number of  passengers 
Total passenger miles 
Passenger mues per mile of  line 
Chair-car tickets sold 
Average distance traveled (miles) 
Average number of  passengers on a train 
Average number of  passenger cars per train 
Revenue from  chair-car tickets 
Average revenue per passenger 
Revenue from  chair-car tickets 
Average revenue per chair-car ticket 
Average revenue per passenger per mile 






























RAILWAYS OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
Following is a statement of  combined freight  traffic  statistics: 
Table IV.4.2 
GUATEMALA: COMBINED FREIGHT TRAFFIC STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL RAILWAYS OF 
CENTRAL AMERICA, 1912 AND 1921 
Items 1912 1921 
Bunches of  bananas firsts 
Tons of  bananas 
Tons of  other exports 
Tons of  imports 
Tons of  local freight 
Tons of  commercial freight 
Tons of  company freight 
Tons of  express freight 
Tons of  free  freight 
Tons of  freight  carried 
Ton-miles of  bananas 
Ton-miles of  other exports 
Ton-miles of  imports 
Ton-miles of  local freight 
Total ton-miles of  commercial freight 
Ton-miles of  company freight 
Ton-miles of  express freight 
Ton-miles of  free  freight 
Total ton-miles of  freight 
Ton-miles of  commercial freight  per miles of  line 
Average mileage of  commercial freight 
Average mileage of  all freight 
Revenue from  bananas 
Revenue from  other exports 
Revenue from  imports 
Revenue from  local freight 
Total revenue from  commercial freight 
Revenue from  company freight 
Revenue from  express freight 
Total revenue from  freight  traffic 
Earnings per ton of  commercial freight 
Earnings per ton of  all freight 
Earnings per ton-mile of  commercial freight 
Earnings per ton-miles of  all freight 
1397559 3 978165 
45 449 113 378 
49885 73 883 
35222 39887 
136 583 161187 
267139 388335 




1817960 6 012356 
5369134 5 842940 
4 536 244 4 736643 
7171429 7 529 815 
18894767 24 121 754 
4420550 9 426 877 
120952 
52989 15 880 
23 489258 33 564 511 




$393 595.36 $803 788.37 
$586936.46 $769077.90 
$397913.75 $668232.84 
$1518 201.53 $2851084.41 
$68 005.62 $49484.73 
$21772.44 $83 374.83 





FERROCARRIL DE LOS ALTOS 
The Department of  Fomento, under Minister Lie. Alberto Mecas, has appointed nine Guatemalan 
engineers to construct the Ferrocarril de los Altos, which is to extend from  San Felipeo -one of  the 
terminals of  the Occidental Road-to Quezaltenango, a distance of  about 60 miles. San Felipe is 
about 1000 feet  above sea level, while Quezaltenango has an altitude of  9 000 feet.  It is planned to 
develop a hydroelectric plant, power for  which will be supplied by the Samala River. The power 
derived from  the plant is to be used in the operation of  this road. The road is to be of  3-feet  gauge. 
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On September 25,1924, a contract was signed between the Government of  Guatemala and Otto 
Rusche, representative of  the Allgemeine Elektricitaets Gesellschaft,  for  the completion of 
construction of  the Los Altos Railway and the electric plant at Santa Maria. The principal details of 
this contract are as follows: 
The Government will emit bonds in the amount of  $3 000 000 American gold, which will be called 
"Bonds of  the Los Altos Railroad of  1924." The bonds will be given in payment to the construction 
company, the A.E.G., and will draw interest annually at the rate of  8 per cent. They will be dated 
September 1, 1924, and will fall  due on September 1,1934. Interest will be paid in semiannual 
installments on the 1st of  September and the 1st of  March of  each year. 
The Government grants, as a guaranty of  the payment of  the bonds, a first,  irrevocable line on the 
following  taxes: 
(a) On one-half  of  the 6 per cent and on one-half  of  the 4 per cent consular invoice fees  which, 
at present, are collected in conjunction with customs duties, and which, by Decree 874 of  September 
1 of  this year, have been assigned to the construction of  the Ferrocarril de los Altos. 
(b) From August 1,1926, on a part of  the aguardiente tax, which is 3 pesos per bottle and is now 
assigned to the construction of  the Ferrocarril de los Altos, in accordance with Decree 874. 
(c) On the annual net profits  of  the above-mentioned railroad and the hydroelectric plant, which 
at present are under construction. 
The proceeds from  the taxes pledged shall be deposited by the Government in a bank designated 
by the financial  agent. 
FERROCARRIL VE RAPAZ 
EXTENT AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LINE 
The construction of  this line, which extends 28 miles from  Panzos to Panacajche, was commenced 
in January, 1896, and completed in 1897. The road was built with German-American capital and was 
reorganized in 1907. On the latter date it was partly owned by American interests, chiefly  by Allan 
Foster Willard, the balance of  the stock being distributed among the coffee  growers of  the Alta 
Verapaz district. In 1922 Schlubach, Sapper & Co., a leading German import, export, and banking 
firm  of  Guatemala City, bought out the interests of  the Willard heirs, and at the present time this 
company is in complete control of  the railroad. 
The city of  Panzos is on the banks of  the River Polochic, from  which the mail boat makes a weekly 
trip to Livingston. The Verapaz Railway acts as a feeder  for  the water transportation of  the company, 
which is carried on by steel lighters and two boats from  Panzos, the terminal of  the railway, to the 
port of  Livingston. The railway is used to transport coffee,  the sole product of  importance, over the 
worst part of  the country-that is, from  the wagon road to the head of  navigation at Panzos. 
The mileage is: Main line, 28 miles; yard, track, and sidings, 3 miles; total, 31 miles. It has been 
planned to extend the road an additional 10 miles during 1924, from  Pancha to Tucuru. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
There is but one passenger train a week. Import cargo is very limited in volume, and exports consist 
almost entirely of  coffee.  The exports of  coffee  from  Livingston in the five-month  period, October 
1,1922, to February 28,1923, amounted to 16 994 quintals. 
EMPLOYEES 
One hundred employees are engaged in the work on the road~60 on maintenance, 20 on operations 
and 20 in repair shops. All are natives. 
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EL SALVADOR 
GENERAL FEATURES OF COUNTRY 
The Republic of  Salvador, although the smallest, is the most densely populated of  the Central 
American Republics. It lies southeast of  Guatemala and south of  Honduras and has as its southern 
boundary the Pacific  Ocean. The total area of  Salvador is about 13 000 square miles, and the coast 
line is 160 miles in length. The country is crossed by two mountain chains, among which are numerous 
valleys of  great fertility.  The most important river is the River Lempa. The climate in the low country 
is tropical, but in the higher altitude it is very pleasant. 
Methods of  communication are better than in most Latin American countries. Even in the rainy 
seasons the highways are passable. In addition to the roads, the other methods of  communication 
are by three railways-the Salvador Division of  the International Railways of  Central America, the 
Salvador Railway (Ltd.), and the San Salvador to Santa Tecla Railroads (electric). Two tramways 
are in operation, one in Sonsonate and the other in San Salvador. The methods of  communication 
are fairly  satisfactory  and, no doubt, will be improved within the next few  years, when the northern 
part of  Salvador is developed. Plans are under way for  the construction of  new railway lines and 
highways. 
INTERNATIONAL RAILWAYS OF CENTRAL AMERICA, SALVADOR DIVISION 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
This railroad was started at the port of  La Union under the administration of  Gen. Santiago 
Gonzalez. The first  contract called for  the construction of  the road from  La Union to San Miguel 
and from  San Miguel to the Guatemala frontier.  This contract was drawn between the Government 
of  El Salvador and Juan Bueron in 1872. Fifteen  years later -in 1887- the provisions of  the contract 
had not been complied with. The Government subsequently entered into several similar contracts, 
none of  which was fulfilled.  In 1895 the Government undertook the work of  building the road, but 
little progress was made, and in 1898 work was suspended. From 1900 to 1907 the Government 
entered into contracts with several other private organizations, and on May 9, 1908, the National 
Legislative Assembly of  the Republic of  Salvador passed a decree authorizing Rene Keilhauer to 
construct a road from  the port of  La Union, passing through the city of  San Miguel, to connect with 
the Guatemalan frontier  at the junction of  the line extending from  Zacapa, Guatemala. 
On June 3,1908, a concession was granted by the Government of  Salvador to Rene Keilhauer for 
the construction of  a railway from  the port of  La Union, on the Pacific  coast, via San Miguel, 
Usulutan, and San Vicente, to the frontier  of  Guatemala; this concession included the construction 
of  a wharf  at La Union. The road reverts to the Government 99 years from  the date when construction 
is begun, with the right of  the Government to purchase at appraised value at the expiration of  70 
years. On June 24,1908, the section connecting with the wharf  at La Union and the railway from  La 
Union to San Miguel and from  Santa Ana to the frontier  and to Almachapan was transferred  to the 
Guatemala Railway. The remaining section was transferred  to Henry M. Keith on July 24,1908, and 
transferred  by him to the Guatemala Railway February 29,1912. 
MILEAGE 
The mileage of  the uncompleted road as it was taken over originally by the International Railways 
Of  Central America was 39 miles from  Punta Cutuco to San Miguel. 
The International Railways extended the road to Vicente in 1915, to Cojutepeque in 1920, and 
to San Salvador March 15,1922, in accordance with their contract with the Salvadorean Government. 
The extension of  the road from  San Miguel to San Salvador is 117 miles. 
Since the completion of  this line travelers from  San Salvador can reach Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 
in 22 hours, and Managua, Nicaragua, in 26 hours. 
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The proposed extensions on this road in accordance with the concessions now owned by the 
International Railways are as follows: 
Miles 
Santa Ana to Guatemala frontier  50 
Santa Ana to Ahuachapan 31 
Texistepeque to Illopango 63 
Total 144 
Of  the above extensions, two have actually been surveyed and are in the process of  construction, 
while one, the Texistepeque to Illopango line, has simply been considered. 
A brief  description of  each of  these branches follows. 
SANTA ANA TO AHUACHAPAN BRANCH 
The line extending from  Santa Ana, Salvador, through Chalchuapa, Atiquizaya, and Jacapa to 
Ahuachapan, a total distance of  31 miles, is to be constructed on the estimate submitted by B. H. 
Bryant. The line will have an elevation of  from  2 100 to 2 400 feet  above the sea. 
The maximum grade ascending to the west from  Santa Ana is 2.65 per cent. The maximum grade 
descending to the west, between the summit and Chalchuapa, is 1.25 per cent. The maximum grade 
ascending to the west on this section is 1 per cent. The maximum grade descending to the west, 
between Chalchuapa and Atiquizaya, is 1.50 per cent. This grade continues to a point nearly 3 miles 
west of  Atiquizaya. From that point to Almachapan the grade is 2 per cent. The station at 
Ahuachapan will be 2 376 feet  above sea level. The estimated cost of  construction of  this branch is 
$922 315, or about $33 129 per mile. This includes laying all rails, establishment of  25 miles of 
telegraph lines, construction of  water stations, building of  turntables, and the purchase of  the right 
of  way through 100 acres of  coffee  lands and 260 acres of  other lands. 
GUATEMALA & EL SALVADOR RAILWAY 
The Guatemala & El Salvador Railway extends from  Santa Ana to the Guatemalan frontier.  The 
cost of  construction is estimated at $1 847 064, which includes grading, bridges and curves, track, 
water service, buildings, tools, telegraph, fencing,  and right of  way, for  50 miles of  main line. 
The line as projected lies well in on the supported grades, great care being taken where lines lie 
alongside streams to protect them against high water. The grading will be made of  loose rock, and 
60-pounds rails are to be used, with creosoted ties. Five water stations are to be placed in service. 
Fifty  miles of  telegraph line is to be erected. Equipment is to consist of  2 consolidated freight 
locomotives, 2 ten-wheel locomotives, 50 flat  cars, 50 box cars, 4 passenger cars, 2 baggage cars, and 
20 freight  cars. 
PROPOSED TEXISTEPEQUE TO ILLOPANGO BRANCH 
This line, as planned at present, will run from  Illopango (mile 151 on the road running from  La Union 
to San Salvador) to Texistepeque, on the road running from  Santa Ana to the Guatemalan frontier. 
No concession has yet been awarded for  the construction of  this road. 
Table IV.4.3 
GUATEMALA AND EL SALVADOR RAILWAY: PASSENGER TRAFFIC STATISTICS, 1921 
1921 
Total number of  passengers 234 185 
Number of  passengers carried 1 mile 5 936 776 
Average distance traveled (miles) 25.35 
Revenue from  passenger traffic  $138 140.08 
Average revenue per passenger $0.59 
Average revenue per passenger per mile $0.0233 
Average earnings per passenger train-mile $4.3380 
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TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
The following  statements give statistics of  traffic  over the Salvador Division of  the International 
Railway systems: 
SALVADOR RAILWAY CO.( LTD.) 
Table IV.4.4 
EL SALVADOR: FREIGHT TRAFFIC STATISTICS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1921 
(Short  tons) 
1921 
IMPORT FREIGHT 
Oils greases and lubricants 456 
Hardware 298 
Diy goods 592 
Flour 885 
All other 1159 
Total 3 390 
EXPORT FREIGHT 
Coffee  8 757 
All other 1 339 
Total 10 096 
LOCAL FREIGHT 
Sugar 1830 
Coffee  570 
Hardware 217 
Fruit and vegetables 615 
Dry goods 370 
Lumber 1085 
Corn and beans 7 574 
Salt 4128 
Tobacco 293 
Wines and liquors 159 
Express freight  1 614 
Allother 7030 
Total 25 485 
SUMMARY 
Total commercial tonnage 38 971 
Total company tonnage 43 816 
Total 82 787 
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SALVADOR RAILWAY CO.( LTD.) 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
The Salvador Railway was originally undertaken by the Government of  Salvador in 1882 and at that 
time was called the National Railroad. The first  section was constructed form  Acajutla to Sonsonate, 
a distance of  121/2 miles; from  there it was extended 16 miles to Armenia, and through Ateos to La 
Ceiba, a distance of  13 miles in 1892. 
It was the intention of  the Government to build a line into San Salvador, through Santa Tecla on 
the south side of  the volcano of  San Salvador via the route of  the present San Salvador-Santa Tecla 
Railway. At La Ceiba it was found  that to proceed it was necessary to construct a bridge across a 
large creek into Colon, and, as funds  were not forthcoming,  work on this branch stopped, and since 
that time the branch from  Ateos to La Ceiba has been discontinued. 
In 1889 the Government secured a loan of  £300 000, bearing 6 per cent interest and 2 per cent 
accumulative sinking fund  from  British bankers. The security for  this loan was 10 per cent of  the 
customs duties and the rights of  the Government in the railway from  Acajutla to Ateos, a distance 
of  35 miles, and in the proposed extension of  the railway. Out of  the proceeds of  the loan the 
Government paid off  a £183 000 mortgage on its interest in the section of  the road between Acajutla 
and Sonsonate. 
The extension of  the railroad was continued for  a distance of  only 7 miles from  Acajutla to La 
Ceiba. 
On April 25,1891, a concession was granted to Alberto J. Scherzer to continue the construction 
of  this railway from  Ateos to Santa Ana, including telegraph and telephone lines to main stations. 
Under the terms of  this concession the Government undertook to pay the concessionaire for  the 
construction of  the railway the sum of  £500 000 by the issue of  6 per cent Government bonds. The 
proceeds of  the sale of  these bonds were to be deposited for  payments of  expenses incurred in 
construction. For meeting charges on these bonds the Government allocated 10 per cent of  the 
import duties received and additional funds  to the extent necessary from  general revenue. The bonds 
were to be acceptable at face  value in payment of  import duties and all other taxes. A fund  of  5 per 
cent of  all payments made on account was to be set aside by the bank administering the fund  until 
it reached the sum of  £15 000 to guarantee faithful  performance  on the part of  the concessionaire. 
The expiration of  time allowed in the contract for  completion of  the railway found  the work 
scarcely under way. The concession was therefore  canceled, and on April 1,1984, a new contract 
was made with the Central American Public Works (Ltd.), which was organized by the previous 
concessionaire. 
After  the revolution of  April, 1891, the provincial government tried to obtain more favorable 
concessions from  the company, and on December 17, 1894, the government and the Central 
American Public Works Co., entered into another contract supplementing the previous one. 
On August 1, 1895, a company called the Salvador Railroad Co. was formed  to take over the 
concession from  the Central American Public Works Co. Proposals were laid before  the 
bondholders of  the 1889 and 1892 loans to convert their bonds into first-mortgage  debentures of  the 
railroad company. Some of  the bondholders declined to join in this scheme, and consequently it was 
not found  possible to arrange for  the release of  the mortgage on the first  section of  the railroad. As 
a result, the Central American Public Works, which had undertaken in this contract to deliver to the 
Government all the bonds by December, 1898, approached the Government for  the purpose of 
securing further  legislation in order to get over the difficulty.  In this they were not successful,  and 
the Government declined to pay the company the sum due it under the guaranty for  the half  year 
ended December 31,1898. 
On February 8, 1899, a contract was entered into between the Government and M. J. Kelly, 
representing the Central American Public Works. The following  are the principal provisions: 
1. The company was to hand over to the Government for  cancellation the outstanding 1889 and 
1892 bonds (about £725 000) within six months from  the date of  ratification  of  the contract by 
Congress. The company might, however, leave outstanding £60 000 of  the bonds if  it could not make 
delivery of  the whole of  them, but on these they were to pay on their own account the same interest 
(6 per cent) and amortization (2 per cent ) as the Government was under obligation to do. 
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2. The Government was to pay the company for  18 years from  January 1, 1899, a fixed  annual 
subsidy of  £24 000 in lieu of  the previous guaranty, and to hand over all the railways free  of  charge. 
The subsidy was to be secured on 15 per cent of  the import duties, in respect of  which the Government 
was to issue special customs notes. These notes were to be handed to a bank named by the company, 
which was to sell them and collect the proceeds. 
The company engaged to complete the line to the capital by June 30,1900. If  the bonds of  the 
external debt were not handed over within the period stipulated, the Government was to have the 
right, subject to existing hypothecations, to take possession of  the railways. 
In April, 1899, an agreement was entered into between the council acting in conjunction with the 
committee of  1889 bondholders and the Central American Public Works for  the transfer  to the 
Salvador Railway Co. (Ltd.) of  the railways and concessions held by the works company, including 
the subsidy payable under the contract of  February8,1899, on such terms as might be agreed between 
the works company and the railway company. 
The railway company was to issue: 
1. Prior line debentures to the amount of  £163 000, forming  part of  a total authorized issue of 
£250 000, and bearing 5 per cent interest and 1 per cent accumulative sinking fund,  to be applied by 
purchase or drawings at par-such issue to be for  the purpose of  providing the funds  for  the 
completion of  the railway, repairs, working capital, and expenses. 
2. Five per cent mortgage debentures to the amount of  £660 000 to provide for  the cancellation 
of  the outstanding bonds of  the 1889 and 1892 loans, the debentures of  the Public Works Co. 
(£150 000), and other claims. 
These debentures to be redeemable by an accumulative sinking fund  of  1 per cent per annum, 
commencing from  August 15,1906, to be applied by purchases or drawings, at the price, in the case 
of  drawings, of  £103 for  each £100 of  debentures. 
The holders of  the 1889 bonds to receive, in respect of  each £100 bonds, £100 mortgage debentures 
of  the railway company, bearing interest from  August 15,1899 -the 1899 bonds to be deposited with 
the council against the issue of  negotiable receipts, with two coupons of  £2 10s. each attached, 
payable out of  the first  two installments of  the subsidy in respect of  the coupons on each bond of 
£100 due February 15 and August 15,1899. 
This arrangement was accepted by the holders of  the bonds of  the 1889 and 1892 loans, who by 
the necessary majorities authorized the trustees of  the loans to release the respective mortgages. It 
was also approved by the holders of  the debentures of  the Public Works Co., and was duly carried 
into effect. 
The concession which the railroad holds is for  88 years from  April, 1894, at the expiration of  which 
term the railroad and all its accessories are to become the property of  the State, while the 
Government has reserved the right at the expiration of  50 years to purchase the railroad at a price 
to be agreed upon or fixed  by valuation. The company is protected from  competition and has 
preferential  rights (except as against the Government) for  constructing future  extensions. Payment 
of  the subsidy provided in the contract of  February 8,1899, of  £24 0000 per annum for  18 years from 
January 1,1899, was suspended during the years 1915 and 1916, as the consequence of  the adverse 
effect  of  the European war; £3 000 of  this was paid during the year 1916-17 and £1000 was paid in 
1918, leaving £44 000 with interest due. This they undertook to pay off  gradually with interest. 
Because of  the defaulting  on the subsidy, the railway was unable to meet the mortgage debenture. 
A new scheme in 1916, approved by the mortgage debenture holders and sanctioned by the court, 
consented to the suspension of  the debenture sinking fund  until August, 1918, and agreed to accept 
in the meantime deferred  interest certificates  for  any amount of  interest that the income available 
would not permit to be paid in cash. In 1918, the arrangements of  the 1916 scheme were extended 
until August 15, 1921, and in August, 1921 they were further  extended to August 15, 1931. No 
dividend or bonus is to be paid on any part of  the share capital unless at the date of  such payment 
the company shall, as regards the prior line and mortgage debentures, respectively, have redeemed 
the full  amounts thereof,  respectively, originally required under the trust deeds securing the same, 
and shall have redeemed all deferred  interest certificates  issued under the schemes. 
296 
Under the control of  this company the road was extended so that now it has in operation lines 
from  Acajutla to Santa Ana completed in 1896 and from  Sitio del Nino to San Salvador in 1900. 
The officials  of  the company are A. J. Sumner, manager, San Salvador, and A. J. Gillingham, 
submanager, San Salvador. 
Purchases for  this road are made through the Salvador Railway Co. (Ltd.), Vashwood House, 
New Broad Street, London. 
The mileage of  the road in 1921 was 90. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
The following  traffic  statistics are available for  the fiscal  year ended June 30,1913: 
Table IV.4.5 
SALVADOR RAILWAY CO. (LTD.): TRAFFIC STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,1913 
1913 
Number of  passengers carried 295 111 
Receipts from  passengers £27 331 5s. 2d. 
Receipts per passenger Is. lOd. 
Receipts per passenger-mile Is 12d. 
Goods traffic: 
Coffee  (long tons) 15 941 
Sugar (long tons) 4 994 
Flour, maize, etc. (long tons) 14 758 
Dry goods (long tons) 4 719 
Building materials (long tons) 5 228 
Live animals (long tons) 1458 
All others (long tons) 31 398 
Total goods tonnage (long tons) 78 496 
Train-miles run, 160 017 
Vehicle miles run 1 262 735 
Receipts per train-mile. 15s. 3 l/4d. 
Working expenses per train-mile 8s. 5d. 
Net profit  per train-mile 6s. 10 l/4d. 
Miles of  line open 100 
Proportion of  working expenses to receipts 49.07% 
Number of  passenger coaches 23 
Number of  freight  cars 172 
Gasoline motor coach 1 
The annual report of  the Salvador Railway Co. (Ltd.) for  the year ended June 30,1920, has become 
available. 
The following  data were obtained for  the report: 
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Table IV.4.6 
SALVADOR RAILWAY CO. (LTD.): 
PASSENGER TRAFFIC FREIGHT TRAFFIC AND GENERAL 
STATISTICS FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1920 
1920 
PASSENGER TRAFFIC 
First class (49 506 passengers) Pesos 132 271 
Second class (298 084 passengers Pesos 262 221 
Passenger miles: 
First class 1489 908 
Second class 5 741 912 
Average journey: 
First class (miles) 30.09 
Second class (miles) 19.26 
Both classes (miles) 20.80 
FREIGHT TRAFFIC 
Tonnage carried: Per cent of  total 
Imports: 15 953 short tons 17 
Exports: 30 991 short tons 34 
Local: 45 196 short tons 49 
Total: 92 140 short tons 100 
GENERAL STATISTICS 
Number of  passengers carried 347 590 
Receipts from  passengers Pesos 170 172 
Receipts per passenger Pesos 0.485 
Receipts per passenger per mile Pesos 0.0225 
Total tons of  freight  carried 92140 
Revenue from  freight  carried Pesos 651 725 
Train-miles run 133 491 
Revenue per train-mile Pesos 6.22 
Expenses per train-mile Pesos 4.70 
SAN SALVADOR & SANTA TECLA RAILWAY 
The San Salvador & Santa Tecla Railway was completed and opened to the public on February 17, 
1894. The road was built under a concession granted to Pablo Orellano and Miguel Trigueros by the 
Salvador Legislature April 28,1891, and approved by the President May 9, 1891. The road at the 
present time is operated by private interests and does not receive governmental guaranty or subsidy. 
The stock is reported to be valued at 574 000 colones. 
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OFFICERS 
The principal offices  are as follows: 
Board  of  directors: 
Angel Guióla. 




Manager  and  chief  engineer: J. Federico Mejia, San Salvador, Salvador. 
Purchasing agents: 
De Sola Bros. & Pardo, 106 Front Street, New York City. 
Railway Storage & Battery Car Co., 50 Broad Street, New York City. 
Hellman Bros., 22 Battery Street, New York City. 
MILEAGE 
The extent of  the line in operation is 3 936 feet  in the cities and about 8 miles between the cities. 
Plans are now being drawn up for  the electrification  of  the road, and these are to be presented for 
approval at the meeting of  the board of  directors at the end of  the year 1923. It is proposed to install 
a trolley system to replace the Edison battery cars now running on the main line; the latter are to be 
used merely for  trips through the main streets of  the city and to the stations of  the Salvador Railroad 
Co., and the International Railway of  Central America. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
Approximately 95 per cent of  the freight  carried on the railroad is baggage; a very small amount of 
sugar and corn is carried between the two cities. Traffic  figures  for  two representative years are: 
Year 1913 -Passengers, 315 800; freight,  3 960 000 pounds. Year 1922- Passengers, 432 728; freight, 
4 620 000 pounds. 
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HONDURAS 
GENERAL FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY 
Honduras is the second largest Republic of  Central America, with an area of  about 45 000 square 
miles, located between 13 and 16 north latitude and between 86 and 92 west longitude. Its coast line 
extends for  400 miles on the Atlantic and 60 miles on the Pacific.  The country is very mountainous 
and abounds in mineral deposits. The climate along the Atlantic and Pacific  coasts is generally torrid; 
in the higher altitudes of  the interior the climate is temperate. The temperature in the neighborhood 
of  Tegucigalpa averages 74 degrees. Communications in the country are very poor. Aside from  the 
industrial roads operated by the various fruit  companies, which, however, have assumed proportions 
of  public carriers, there is only one railroad, the National Railroad. Highways are poor and do not 
offer  satisfactory  arteries to the rail lines in operation. 
HONDURAS RAILWAY 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
During the years 1850-1852 the idea was conceived of  constructing a railway across the Republic of 
Honduras from  Port Caballos to the Bay of  Fonseca. Accordingly the matter was taken up in 1853; 
a commission was sent to report on the proposition, returning in the same year with a favorable 
report. On June 23,1853, a concession was granted to George L. Squires by the Government, and a 
company was formed  in New York for  this undertaking. It was dissolved soon after  as a result of  the 
opposition encountered from  the promoter of  the Panama Railroad line. The promoters then took 
the proposition to European markets and after  two years succeeded in forming  a mixed company 
-that is, English, French, and American- with its headquarters in London and under the direct 
sanction of  the British Government. 
The company formed  in London made a complete survey of  the line during the years 1857-1858, 
the sum of  £80 000 having been paid by the directors personally. At that time the Civil War broke 
out and so many unfavorable  circumstances arose that the proposition was dropped, and the 
concession became void. 
In 1867 the Government of  Honduras, being convinced that the best means of  developing the 
country would be by an interoceanic railroad, contracted in England loans to the amount of 
£1000 000 for  the execution of  a third part of  the work, mortgaging the railroad before  construction 
work was begun. 
The loan was to bear 10 per cent interest. It was issued at 80 per cent by Bischoffsheim  & 
Goldschmidt. The interest was secured upon the railway and its revenues and the produce of  the 
mahogany forests.  The Government undertook to provide an annuity of  £140 000 for  15 years from 
December 31,1869, for  the service of  the loan, and promised the subscribers half  the profits  of  the 
proposed railway for  15 years after  its redemption. In October, 1868, work was formally  begun at 
Puerto Cortes, but only 50 miles of  the railroad were laid, at a probable cost of  £1500 000 before 
financial  difficulties  put a stop to construction. Loans obtained in 1869 amounting to £2 490 108, 
bearing 6 2/3 per cent interest, were issued in Paris by Dreyfus  & Co., at 75 per cent, redeemable at 
par in 17 years by half  yearly drawings. In 1870 a 10 per cent Government railway loan amounting 
to £2 500 000 was secured. From this time until 1873 only 38 miles of  road were in actual operation, 
since the destruction of  an iron bridge extending over the Chamelecon River rendered the remaining 
12 miles useless. 
All four  loans went into default,  and the obligations to the bondholders were assumed by a bond 
company called the Honduras Interoceanic Railway Co., which went into liquidation in 1882. In that 
year the Council of  Foreign Bondholders formed  a committee to protect the bondholders' interests. 
In 1887, Mr. Binney, the consul general of  Honduras in London, obtained a concession for  the 
completion of  the Interoceanic Railway, which also included a settlement of  the defaulted  external 
debt in which the obligation of  the Government to effect  this settlement was fully  recognized. 




The concession expired in 1892, and the Government declined to renew it. The Government 
thereupon granted a similar concession to an American company, which, however, contained no 
provisions for  the settlement of  the external debt; this concession was cancelled in 1893. 
In 1896 a new concession for  the completion of  the railway (embracing the settlement of  the 
external debt) was granted to an American company, the Honduras Railway Co., which, it appears, 
was the successor of  the company formed  in 1892. The terms were not satisfactory  to the committee, 
and accordingly the concession lapsed. 
In 1897 an American syndicate, called the Honduras Syndicate, which was the successor of  the 
Honduras Railway Co., concluded a contract with the Honduras Government for  the completion of 
the road, the establishment of  a bank charged with the collection of  the customs duties, and the 
settlement of  the foreign  debt. Each £100 external debt bond, with arrears of  interest, was to be 
exchanged for  £25 of  new 1 per cent bonds redeemable within 25 years and secured by a guaranty 
from  the bank and a first  charge upon the railway. The contract did not specify  the date at which 
interest on the new bonds would begin, nor the length of  time allowed for  the conversion. All new 
bonds not claimed within the period allowed by the syndicate were to be divided between it and the 
Government. The committee consented to negotiate on this basis, provided that they were satisfied 
with the security offered,  that the interest would commence forthwith,  and that the conversion would 
remain open for  a reasonable time. Disputes arose between the Government and the syndicate over 
the latter's having failed  to carry out its contract as regards both the construction of  the railway and 
the settlement of  the debt, which led to the concession's being annulled in 1900. 
On May 26, 1900, a new concession was obtained, which was silent as to the settlement of  the 
external debt and merely leased to the syndicate the completed portion of  the railway for  a term of 
25 years at a rental of  $15.00 gold per annum. Under penalty of  forfeiting  the lease the syndicate 
undertook to carry out within a specified  time the following  work in connection with the extension 
of  the railway: To erect a bridge over the Ulua River and to reconstruct that over the Chamelecon 
River within 2 years; to reconstruct the existing line within 4 years; to build and open to traffic  the 
line from  Ulua to Comayagua within 5 years, to construct 15.5 miles of  railway within 2 years, and 
to compete the line to the Gulf  of  Fonseca within 7 years. It also obtained a preferential  right to 
construct branch lines, and, for  15 years from  the fulfillment  of  the first  three stipulations, the right 
to construct a line from  the northern coast parallel to the existing section. 
On March 7 the Government granted the syndicate an extension of  its lease for  12 months -that 
is, until May 26, 1903. Notwithstanding the extension of  time granted by the Government, the 
syndicate again failed  to carry out the contract, and on May 26, 1903, the Government took 
possession of  the railway. 
From this time until August 1,1908, the line was operated by teh Honduran Government. In June, 
1908, the Government of  Honduras granted a concession to lease the railroad to Washington S. 
Valentine for  a period of  30 years. The terms of  the concession did not protect the bondholders. It 
provided for  a payment of25  000 pesos per year for  the first  four  years and an increase of  5 000 pesos 
per year for  each four-year  period thereafter.  The contract further  provided that the Government 
could at any time reassume control of  the road by giving three months' notice, paying the unearned 
rental, and paying for  the betterment and equipment that had been put on the road. Three years' 
rental in cash was paid at the signing of  the contract. In February, 1912, the Honduran Government 
reassumed control of  the railroad by order of  the President. 
From this time until May 16, 1920, the affairs  of  the railroad were managed by the Honduran 
Government. Track was relaid between Puerto Cortes and Mile 59. In 1914 a steel bridge with one 
400-foot  span and one 100-foot  span was constructed across the Ulua River at Pimienta. 
On May 16,1920, the road was leased to the Agrícola de Sula (a subsidiary of  the Cuyamel Fruit 
Co., of  Delaware) line. 
The Agrícola de Sula has been taken over by the Cortes Development Co., also a subsidiary of 
the Cuyamel fruit  Co. At present the railroad is owned by the Government of  Honduras, but is being 
operated by the Cortes Development Co. 
Since the Cuyamel Fruit Co. interests assumed active control of  the road they have reballasted 
the whole line, relaid 18.6 miles with new rail, put in new crossties over the whole line, rebuilt bridges 
of  creosoted timber, purchased considerable new equipment, overhauled the machine shop, and put 
in electrically driven machines, and built a 400-foot  reinforced-concrete  bridge at Laguna, Puerto 
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Cortes. The company has also constructed 4.3 miles of  spurs at Choloma for  the private cane 
planters, a spur of  3/4 mile between Miles 24.2 and 24.8, and a spur of  2 miles at Villa Estera. 
In 1918 the Cuyamel Fruit Co. made a contract with the Government to operate the trains of  its 
private line, the Ramal del Ulua, over the first  13.6 miles of  the National line, as far  as Baracoa 
Junction. It agreed to pay for  this privilege the sum of  $500 per kilometer per year, and also to pay 
the cost of  the maintenance of  this section of  track. This has averaged about $895 per month since 
the contract has been in operation. 
MILEAGE 
A comparison of  the mileage of  the road for  the calendar years 1913 and 1923 is as follows:  1913 
-Main line, 59 miles. 1923- Main line, 59 miles; Choloma branch, 4.3 miles; Villa Estera branch, 
2 miles; spurs, 0.75 mile; total, 66.05 miles. 
It has been proposed for  some time to extend this railroad from  its present terminus at Potrerillos 
to or a little beyond Amapa, a distance of  about 13.6 miles. The route for  this extension has been 
located, but it is doubtful  when the track will be laid. 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The operating officials  of  the road for  the calendar year ended December 31,1923, were as follows: 
Samuel Zemurray, president, New Orleans, La. 
H. V. Rolston, vice president, New Orleans, La. 
W. E. Turnbull, manager, Puerto Cortes, Honduras. 
J. B. Richards, special manager, Puerto Cortes, Honduras. 
F. Canales Salazar, superintendent, Puerto Cortes, Honduras. 
M. J. Ferrer, auditor, Puerto Cortes, Honduras. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
The following  is a statement of  the traffic  moving over the road for  the 12 months July, 1922, to June, 
1923: 
Table IV.4.7 
HONDURAS RAILWAY: FREIGHT TRAFFIC STATISTICS, JULY 1922 TO JUNE 1923 
July, 1922, to June, 1923 
Revenue freight  only Metric tons Per cent of 
revenue 
Merchandise, n.e.s. 13 417 42.27 
Bananas 12 768 26.45 
Sugar cane 30 634 15.76 
Cattle 2187 2.44 
Ice 2134 5.96 
Lumber 558 1.77 
Wood, fuel 9 
Sand and gravel 558 .73 
Gasoline and kerosene 404 1.52 
Barbed wire and staples 286 1.21 
Cement 56 .16 
Machinery 10 .08 
Wheat 639 1.65 
Total 63 660 100.00 
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CUYAMEL FRUIT CO. RAILWAY 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
Construction of  this road was begun by William F. Streich in 1902, and in 1903 about 5 miles of  track 
had been laid from  Vera Cruz to Cuyamel. In 1914 the line was extended from  Vera Cruz to Omoa, 
a distance of  9 miles. Omoa is a seaport, and the railroad has a wharf  where deep-water steamers 
may come alongside. In 1918,9 miles additional were finished  to Cacao Plantation. A further  5 miles 
was were graded and partly laid to Chachahualilla. The last 5 miles was taken up in 1923 on account 
of  there being too little available banana land along the line and on account of  its location in the 
disputed territory between Honduras and Guatemala. A survey was made in 1918 from 
Chachahualilla to Macuelizo, in Quimistan Valley, a distance of  about 32 miles. This contemplated 
extension taps a good timber and agricultural country. In addition the road took over the E.P. Morse 
Timber Co. The road was built to handle the private traffic  of  the Cuyamel Fruit Co., about 95 per 
cent of  which is the transportation of  bananas to the seaboard. No subsidy is granted the road by the 
Government. 
MILEAGE 
A comparison of  the mileage for  the calendar years 1913 and 1923 is as follows:  1913 -main line, 17 
miles; branches, 6 miles; total, 23 miles. 1923- main line, 34 miles; branches, 13 miles; total, 47 miles. 
There are no lines under construction at the present time. 
In addition to the above-named line, the Cuyamel Fruit Co. has about 75 miles of  tram-car track, 
running through its banana plantations and acting as feeders  to the standard-gauge road. 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The operating officials  of  the road for  the calendar year ended December 31,1923, were as follows: 
Samuel Zemurray, president, New Orleans, La. 
H. V. Rolston, vice president, New Orleans, La. 
W. E. Turnbuil, manager, Puerto Cortes, Honduras. 
P. H. Myers, chief  engineer, Puerto Cortes, Honduras. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
The following  figures  are indicative of  the traffic  moving over the road for  the calendar year 1923: 
Bananas, 26 579 tons (of  2 000 pounds) or 885 963 stems; commercial freight,  6 645 tons; passengers 
carried, 8 718. 
RAMAL DEL ULUA 
The survey for  this railroad was begun in 1918. A special agreement was made with the Honduran 
Government to operate the company's equipment over the line of  the Ferrocarril Nacional de 
Honduras, a distance of  13.6 miles to Baracoa Junction. This concession was granted to Samuel 
Zemurray, Junta de Fomento, under decree No. 93. Construction work on the main line from 
Baracoa Junction began in 1919. The road has been steadily extended until at the present time it has 
100.3 miles in operation. It is a subsidiary of  the Cuyamel Fruit Co. 
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MILEAGE 
The mileage of  the road for  the calendar year 1923 was as follows: 
Miles 
Main  line:  Baracoa Junction to La Lima 33.5 
Branches: 
Indian spur 2.0 
Mopala spur 1.8 
Santiago branch 17.3 
Santa Ana branch 1.2 
San Juan branch 3.1 
Copen branch 3.1 
Refinery  spur 6.2 
Cane Field spur 6.2 
La Lima yards 5.5 
Puerto Cortes yards 8.0 
Passing and loading tracks (about) 3.1 
Cane-loading tracks (totaling about) 4.3 
Tram roads (30-inch gauge)feeding  main line 5.0 
Total 1003 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The operating officials  of  the road are as follows: 
Samuel Zemurray, president, New Orleans, La. 
H. V. Rolston, vice president, New Orleans, La. 
W. E. Turnbull, manager, Puerto Cortes, Honduras. 
P. H. Myers, chief  engineer, Puerto Cortes, Honduras. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
The traffic  statistics for  the calendar years 1922 and 1923 are as follows: 
Table IV.4.8 
RAMAL DEL ULUA RAILROAD: TRAFFIC STATISTICS CALENDAR YEARS 1922 AND 1923 
Commodities 1922 1923 
Banana Tons® 30 942 35 284 
Stems 1202 207 1 449 061 
Sugar cane: Tons 22 806 55 762 
Sugar, raw: Tons 3 532 8 326 
Commercial freight:  Tons b 42 550 
Passengers carried b 99 656 
" Of  2 000 pounds. ~~ 
No record. 
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STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO. RAILWAY 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
Construction of  this railroad was started in 1905 by the Vacarro Bros., of  New Orleans. The line 
began at a place called Salado Bar and ran south to La Ceiba, a distance of  7 or 8 miles. From that 
time onward the line was extended eastward from  La Ceiba and westward from  La Union. During 
this construction 4 miles of  railway and some equipment operated by the Tropical Timber Co., was 
absorbed by this company. The organization of  the company to-day is practically the same as at the 
beginning. The company now owns a dock at La Ceiba and also controls a line of  steamships which 
operate between that port and the United States. During the construction of  the road no financial 
guaranty or subsidy was offered  the company, but it received some land grants from  the Government. 
A comparison of  the mileage for  the years ended March 1,1913 and 1923, is as follows: 
Main line 
Branches 
Yard track and sidings 






At the present time there is possibly 16 miles of  road under construction, and it is proposed to 
build 15 more miles in the future. 
On January 1, 1924, the Standard Fruit & Steamship Co., incorporated under the laws of 
Delaware, took over the interests of  the Vacarro Bros, in Honduras from  their other properties. 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The operating officials  for  the road are as follows,  all located at La Ceiba, Honduras: 
H. D. Scott, local manager. 
M. Carey, superintendent. 
W. J. Klerk, superintendent of  transportation. 
Louis Joanni, master mechanic. 
Otto Rickle, master car builder. 
H. H. Dolby, chief  engineer. 
O. M. Suter, supervisor, bridges and buildings. 
A. E. Barefield,  roadmaster, East Lines. 
S. Kipina, roadmaster, West Lines. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
Traffic  statistics are not available for  1913. In the year ended March 1,1922, bananas constituted 70 
per cent of  the total tonnage of  freight  moved. 
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INTERNATIONAL RAILWAYS OF CENTRAL AMERICA 
On October 7,1912, a concession was granted by the Government to the International Railways of 
Central America for  99 years for  the construction of  a railroad commencing at a point on the frontier 
of  Salvador in connection with their railroad lines in that country and extending to a point on the 
frontier  of  Nicaragua to be determined by a survey, together with other rights and advantages 
necessary for  the maintenance and operation of  a railroad. The proposed line is to be about 71 miles 
long, extending through the districts of  Choluteca and Dalle, which have valuable agricultural and 
mineral resources. 
At the present time no actual work has been done on this proposed branch, on which the 
Government of  Honduras has notified  the International Railways of  Central America that the 
concession has lapsed. The company has protested this decision, and the matter is held in abeyance 
at the present time. 
TELA RAILROAD 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
The Tela Railroad was incorporated under the laws of  the State of  Delaware on October 7,1912. 
The company was organized to take over a concession granted on April 8,1912, by the Government 
of  Honduras to H. V. Rolston for  the construction and operation of  a railroad with its terminal at 
the port of  Tela. Mr. Rolston transferred  this concession to Samuel Zemurray on June 10,1912, and 
he in turn transferred  it to the Tela Railroad Co. on March 4,1913. The road at that time consisted 
of  7.6 miles of  terminal at Tela and 0.6 mile of  main line west. Since then it has been extended to 
175.8 miles. At the end of  1922 the mileage was made up as follows: 
Miles 
Public lines, branch and freight  104.3 
Tela terminal 12.9 
Branch, fruit  lines, spurs and sidings 58.6 
Total 175.8 
In addition the company has under construction 3.8 miles. It is intended to extend the road an 
additional 30 miles as soon as possible. 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The operating officials  of  the road are R. H. Goodell, manager, Tela, Honduras; W. C. Yarbrough, 
accountant, Tela, Honduras; T. J. Barnett, chief  engineer, in charge engineering, transportation, and 
motive-power departments, Tela Honduras. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
From the meager traffic  statistics available it can be seen that bananas constitute the principal article 
of  transport. Of  the other freight  hauled, about 50 per cent is classed as company merchandise, the 
rest consisting of  native products. The following  table notes the character of  the traffic: 
Table IV.4.9 
TELA RAILROAD: FREIGHT TRAFFIC STATISTICS 1916 AND 1922 
Freight 
1916 1922 
Tons Per cent of  total Tons 
Per cent 
of  total 
Bananas 14 499 97 195 876 88 
Other fruit 2057 3 5 755 12 
Total 16 556 100 201631 100 
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The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official  endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
TRUJILLO RAILWAY CO. 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
The Trujillo Railway Co. was chartered under the laws of  the State of  Delaware. The company is 
now operating and constructing railroads in the Republic of  Honduras. The construction of  this road 
began in 1913. During the years of  the World War, on account of  the shortage of  experienced men 
and power, the actual construction was approximately 20 kilometers per year. 
The name of  the terminal, Rincon, was officially  changed by the Honduras Government to Puerto 
Castilla and the port was opened during the month of  August 1921. During this period the company 
absorbed the railroads of  the Honduras Rubber Co., about 6 miles in length, and the Camors 
Railway, with a small mileage. Both of  these roads have completely lost their identity in the fusion. 
At the beginning of  the fiscal  year construction under way was: main line, Mile 79.53 to Mile 83. 
MILEAGE 
The road as of  June 30,1923, had the following  mileage: 
Miles 
Main line (Puerto Castilla toCusuna) 79.53 
Aguan branch 60.00 
Trujillo branch 8.00 
Spurs, sidings, yards, etc. 38.52 
Total 186.05 
Plans are under way for  construction of  the main line to Juticalpa, a distance of  approximately 
100 miles beyond Cusuna. It is not proposed to electrify  any of  the road in the near future. 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The operating officials  of  the road are as follows  (all at Puerto Castilla, Honduras): 
W. E. Brown, manager. 
R. A. Timlin, chief  engineer. 
R. S. Worwin, auditor. 
J. Ramsey, superintendent of  railways. 
J. Oberle, master mechanic. 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
A summary of  the revenue and expenses of  this road for  the calendar year 1921 is as follows:  Freight 
revenue, $10 031.65; passenger revenue, $18 372.98; total operating expenses, $381428.20. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
The traffic  handled consists mostly of  bananas, which form  approximately 85 per cent of  the total 
traffic.  Other commodities are vegetables, grain, domestic lumber, crossties, and livestock. The total 
freight  carried for  the calendar year 1921 was 9 373 tons. The freight  ton-miles totaled 393 666, 
passengers numbered52 962, passenger miles totaled 1059 240 and locomotive miles 106 448. During 




GENERAL FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY 
Nicaragua is the largest of  the Central American Republics. It has an area of  about 49 000 square 
miles, and its population is estimated at 750 000. Its Atlantic coast line extends for  300 miles, while 
the Pacific  coast line is 200 miles long. The country is crossed by two mountain ranges, causing a 
diversity in climate and products. Rain is very frequent  during the entire year in the eastern part of 
the country. In the western part there are wet and dry seasons from  May to November and December 
to April. 
There are two large lakes-Lake Nicaragua, about 110 miles long and 45 miles wide, navigable 
throughout, and Lake Managua, connected with Lake Nicaragua by the River Tipitapa. This lake is 
38 miles long and from  10 to 16 miles in width. The principal river is the San Juan, connecting Lake 
Nicaragua with the Atlantic, on which a regular steamship service runs between Greytown and 
Granada. The Bluefields  River is navigable for  65 miles from  Bluefields  to the city of  Rama. In 
addition to the lakes and rivers, transportation is afforded  by fair  roads and a small amount of 
railroad mileage. The principal railroad in the country is the Pacific  Railroad, which has 156 miles 
of  track in operation. The other railroads are privately owned and operated and are used for 
industrial purposes. Some concessions have been granted by the Government for  the construction 
of  new roads which, if  carried out, will prove valuable additions to the transportation arteries of  the 
country. The railroads are taken up individually as follows: 
PACIFIC RAILWAY OF NICARAGUA 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
Railroad construction of  Nicaragua dates back to the year 1878, when the Government proposed to 
construct a road from  Corinto to Granada via Lake Managua. The work was divided into two 
divisions, the western and the eastern division. The former,  the western division, was to start at 
Corinto and extend through Chinandega, turning abruptly and extending to Momotombo, a port on 
the western shore of  Lake Managua. The eastern division was to begin at Managua, the capital of 
the Republic and a lake port, and run by way of  Sabana Grande to Granada, its terminus on the 
northern shore line of  steamers running between Momotombo and Managua. 
The first  section of  the road to be constructed was that between Corinto and Chinandega on the 
western division, which was open for  service on January 1, 1881. The first  shipments were made 
under rather unfavorable  circumstances; the lack of  a bridge connecting the island, on which Corinto 
is situated with the mainland, made it necessary to run two trains, one on either side of  the strait. 
This difficulty  was overcome on March 1, 1882, by completion of  the Paso Caballos Bridge, a 
structure of  54 25-foot  spans, supported on mild-steel screw piles 12 inches in diameter, which were 
driven through the mud and sand into the rock. 
The line was extended from  here to Leon, and the western division was ormally opened to traffic 
on November 15, 1882, although it was not completed until December 30, 1883, when the road 
reached its originally called-for  port terminus at Momotombo, a distance of  58 miles. 
The original contract called for  the completion of  the eastern division simultaneously with the 
western, but that division was not opened to traffic  until April 5,1885, and then only from  Managua 
as far  as Masaya, a distance of  19 miles. Granada, 12 miles distant, was reached on March 1, the 
following  year. The branch extending to the wharf  was completed three months later. The distance 
covered by the western section at this time was 58 miles, while that on the eastern division was 31 
miles, there being a total of  89 miles of  road constructed. During this period from  1884 to 1903, 
communications between Momotombo and Managua were carried on by means of  five  small 
steamers on Lake Managua which ran between these two points carrying passengers and freight.  In 
February of  the year 1903 the center section of  this line between Momotombo Junction and 
Managua, a distance of  38 miles, was completed. This provided an all-rail route from  Corinto to 
Granada, a distance of  127 miles. Upon the completion of  this center section, the branch running 
from  Momotombo to Momotombo Junction, a distance of  8 miles, was abandoned. 
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The next step in the development of  the road was the construction of  a branch line running from 
Masaya to Diriamba, a distance of  27 miles, in April, 1899. While this road had been first  projected 
by the Government in 1889, it was not until the above year that it was completed. In 1895 a branch 
line was constructed, running from  Chinandega to El Viejo, a distance of  3 miles. This was 
abandoned in 1917 on account of  insufficient  traffic.  Up to the year 1905 the Government not only 
had charge of  the construction of  the road, but of  its operation as well. In that year the road was 
leased to a private syndicate which operated it until 1909; at the end of  that time it was returned to 
the Nicaraguan Government, which operated the line until negotiations where entered into with 
Brown Bros. & Co. and J. W. Seligman & Co. in March, 1912. Under this agreement the present 
corporation, the Ferrocarril del Pacifico  de Nicaragua, was formed,  and the bankers were given the 
option of  purchasing 51 per cent of  the capital stock of  the new corporation. This purchase was 
effected  in October, 1913, for  $1500 000, the bankers thereby acquiring control of  the property. The 
J. G. White Management Corporation was appointed operating manager of  the line for  the bankers. 
The concession granted to the bankers, which extends for  99 years from  June, 1912, exempts the 
company from  all taxes in Nicaragua for  a period of  30 years and from  all duties on materials 
imported for  its use. Transportation services rendered the Nicaraguan Government by the company 
are at one-half  the regular rates, and free  passes are extended to certain officials  and employees of 
the Government. Maximum freight  and passenger rates are established, and numerous other 
provisions are contained in the concession. 
In February, 1919, the corporation took over a concession for  the construction of  a railroad 
between San Juan del Sur, a Pacific  seaport, and San Jorge, a port on Lake Nicaragua. This line was 
originally projected by the Government in May, 1887, when the Government ordered a number of 
engineers to prepare studies for  the construction of  this railway. The line as projected was to extend 
from  San Juan del Sur along the coast to Nacascota Bay by way of  Bastón, La Calera Jocote, La 
Chocolata, and up to Rivas, and from  there to San Jorge. The line is estimated to be about 22 miles 
in length and to cost in the neighborhood of  1000 000 pesos. 
On October 5,1920, by contract, the bankers sold back to the Republic the 51 per cent of  railway 
stock purchased in 1913, the Republic again becoming sole owner of  the property. The Republic 
paid the bankers $300 000 in cash and $1 450 000 in Nicaraguan Government treasury notes. This 
contract provides for  the creation of  a committee, or board, of  five  members to supervise the 
construction and operation of  the line when constructed to the Atlantic coast of  Nicaragua and to 
supervise the operation of  this road. At the present time the plans for  the road to the Atlantic have 
not yet been carried out, the committee has not yet been appointed, and no change has been made 
in the management of  the above road. 
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1 Discontinued 1917. b 
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OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The following  is a list of  the operating officials  of  the roads: 
President: Frederick Strauss, New York City. 
Vice President: James Brown, New York City. 
Secretary-treasurers: Earle Baile, New York City. 
Assistant secretary-treasurer: Hugo Kohlman, New York City. 
Operating managers: The J. G. White Management Corporation, 
43 Exchange Place, New York City; Joseph K. Choate, vice president; cable address, 
"Whitemanco, New York." 
In Nicaragua 
General manager: Thomas O'Connell, Managua, Nicaragua; cable address 
"Tomconnell, Managua." 
Assistant manager: J. B. Gaylord, Managua. 
Engineer of  maintenance: G. Saathof,  Managua. 
Superintendent of  motive power: R. Delgade, Managua. 
Auditor: E. Schulz, Managua. 
Cashier: F. Mora, Managua. 
Storekeeper: J. C. Diaz, Managua. 
Supervisor fuel  and water service: J. R. Foley, Managua. 
Traveling auditor: L. Kemper, Managua. 
Physician: D. Campari, Managua. 
Nurse: R. O'Connell, Managua. 
FINANCES 
The company has outstanding 33 000 shares of  capital stock at a par value of  $100 per share. It has 
no bonded or floating  indebtedness except current operating accounts. Under the articles of 
incorporation the company may issue bonds on the resolution of  the board of  directors. The net 
corporate income for  the nine fiscal  years (ended June 30), 1914 to 1922, inclusive, has amounted 
to $2 368 433, an average of  $263 159 per year. Under the present management and up to June 30, 
1922, dividends totaling $1 630 275 have been paid; of  this amount the Nicaragua Government 
received $926 622 and the New York shareholders $702 652. 
The cost of  the line and its equipment when the present company was formed  in 1912 was fixed 
at $3 243 783, or $22 218 per mile. The book value of  the systems on June 30,1922, was figured  at 
$3 916 549. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
For the fiscal  year ended June 30, 1922, 54 per cent of  the transportation earnings of  the railway 
were from  freight  and 46 per cent from  passenger traffic.  The volume of  passenger traffic  carried 
during this fiscal  year was about 30 per cent normal. First-class passengers may carry 66 pounds of 
baggage free;  second class, 44 pounds. First-class fare  is 3.6 cents per mile; second class, 44 pounds. 
First-class fare  is 3.6 cents per mile; second class, 1.6 cents. The additional charge for  chair-car 
service is 0.8 cent per mile. 
Of  the freight  traffic  moving, manufactured  goods, mostly imports, constituted 51 per cent of  the 
total tonnage, while agricultural products formed  34 per cent, products of  forests  12 per cent, 
products of  animals 2 per cent, and products of  mines and unclassified  articles 1 per cent. The 
absence of  low-grade commodities accounts for  the high average receipts per ton-mile. The 
steamship traffic  on Lake Nicaragua amounted to 1706 tons of  freight  and 12 955 passengers carried. 
The total operating revenue was $24 353, of  which 66 per cent was derived from  passengers carried 
and 26 per cent from  freight.  The average receipts per passenger carried were $1 247; per ton of 
freight,  $3 718. The metric system of  weights and measures is used. 
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The following  statements are indicative of  the traffic  on the road for  the fiscal  year ended June 
30,1922. 
Table IV.4.10 
PACIFIC RAILWAY OF NICARAGUA: TRAFFIC STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED 
JUNE 30,1922 







Products of  agriculture 
Products of  animals 
Products of  mines 



































Note: In revenue the percentages of  the total are: Passenger, 37,17 per cent; freight,  54.36 per cent; express, 8.47 per cent. 
WAWA RAILROAD CO. 
Several years ago a group of  American mahogany companies financed  the construction of  a railroad 
in the vicinity of  Wawa on the Atlantic coast of  Nicaragua. Those engaged in the project were the 
Wawa Commercial Co., the Astoria Mahogany Co., the Otis Manufacturing  Co., and the Freiberg 
Mahogany Co. The main object of  the road was for  hauling mahogany. The road as built was 48 miles 
long and of  standard gauge, 4 feet  8 inches. The original concession called for  the construction of  a 
75-mile roàd to begin at the point on the Cuculaia River and run itl a northwesterly direction 
following  the course of  the Bombana and Oconguas Rivers, ending in the mineral region of  Pis Pis. 
In addition the Government gave to the concessionaire, for  each mile of  the road built, every alternate 
lot of  1 000 hectares on each side of  the right of  way. A large sum of  money was spent on this 
construction, but it was not operated to any extent, and the Wawa Commercial Co. failed.  Its 
liabilities mounted from  $200 000 to $600 000. Its property was taken over by Mr. Rene Fransen, a 
Belgian resident of  Bluefields,  who was one of  the principal creditors. Only 6 miles of  road is now 
being operated by him, and that for  logging purposes. The remainder of  the line needs considerable 
repairs before  it can be used. At the present time there are in use three Shay wpod-burning logging 
locomotives and 22 flat  cars. Water for  locomotives is pumped into tenders from  streams. Mr. 
Fransen expects to reconstruct a portion of  the old road next year, but whether he will accomplish 
this is doubtful. 
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CUYAMEL FRUIT CO. RAILROAD 
The Cuyamel Fruit Co. started building railroads in Nicaragua in March, 1921. At this time about 4 
miles were constructed. Since that time 4 additional miles of  sidings have been constructed. The 
road is owned and operated by private capital. The termini of  the road are El Galo Farm and Ocotol 
Farm. The traffic  on the road is confined  mainly to the handling of  bananas. 
MILEAGE 
The mileage of  the main line is 8 and of  the spurs 4. Additional branches are constructed to take 
care of  additional planting when done. 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The Manager for  this road in Nicaragua is Ernest Schultz, who may be addressed in care of  the 
Cuyamel Fruit Co., El Galo Farm, Nicaragua. 
BRANGMAN'S BLUFF LUMBER CO. 
In March, 1923, Leroy T. Miles obtained a permit from  the Government of  Nicaragua to purchase 
20 000 hectares of  nationally-owned land in the vicinity of  Brangmans Bluff  át the rate of  $2 per 
hectare. The Brangmáns Bluff  Lumber Co. was formed  to exploit the pine region in that section. 
The concession granted by the Republic of  Nicaragua authorizes them to operate sawmills, wharves, 
wireless stations, and everything pertaining to a port, as well as a railroad. The company plans to 
construct some 30 or 40 miles of  standard-gauge railroad back from  the coast. Six miles of  track have 
already been laid, and the grading has been finished  on 15 additional miles. The road will be used 
exclusively for  logging purposes, but later, if  sufficient  capital can be invested, planting of 
bananas will be undertaken. The road has at the present time one locomotive and 10 cars. All 
purchases are made by the Salmon Brick & Lumber Co., 913-914 Whitney Central Bank Building, 
New Orleans, La. 
PROJECT FOR RAILWAY TO THE ATLANTIC 
While nothing definite  is known as to the exact status of  the railway to the Atlantic, it is known that 
in 1887 a contract was granted for  the construction of  a road to be known as the Atlantic Road 
running from  the port of  San Ubaldo (on the eastern side of  Lake Nicaragua) to some point on the 
Atlantic or on one its navigable rivers. The contract was amended on July 29,1891, and Rama was 
selected as the Atlantic terminus. 
Apparently the original project has been dropped, for  according to a survey made in 1920-21, the 
proposed route will extend from  San Miguelito, on Lake Nicaragua, to Monkey Point, on the 
Atlantic, a distance of  117 miles. It is planned to construct a line of  a 3-foot  6-inch gauge with a 
maximum grade of  2 per cent. The cost of  equipment necessary for  its operation was estimated at 
$6 215 798. This includes $978 414 for  a breakwater and other port-development work at Monkey 
Point. It does not, however, include the purchase of  lands for  right of  way or other railway and 
port-development uses. The line will not connect directly with the Ferrocarril del Pacifico  de 
Nicaragua, as San Miguelito is at the eastern end of  Lake Nicaragua while Granada, the inland 
terminus of  the Pacific  Railway, is at the western end. Connection will be made by water over the 
lake, a distance of  90 miles. 
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NICARAGUAN SUGAR ESTATES RAILROAD 
The road which belongs to the Nicaraguan Sugar Estates (Ltd.) extends from  the sugar mill to 
connect with the Pacific  Railway at Chichigalpa. Its construction was authorized by a decree in 1916. 
Purchases on this road are made by the manager of  the Nicaraguan Sugar Estates Railroad, 
Chichigalpa, Nicaragua. 
It has 6 miles of  main track of  42-inch gauge and 7 miles of  24-inch track running through the 
cane fields. 
CONCESSION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF ROAD TO NICARAGUA FRONTIER 
On May 17, 1920, a contract was signed between the Nicaragua Minister of  Fomento and a 
representative of  Rene Keilhauer for  the construction of  a road from  a point on the Gulf  of  Fonseca 
or from  Playa Grande to Chinandega, at that point connecting with the Pacific  Railroad. Provision 
was also made in the contract whereby the contractor will have to construct a branch to the Honduran 
frontier,  to a point on the Rio Negro. The gauge of  this road is the same as that of  the rest of  the 
Nicaraguan system. Preliminary surveys are to begin 90 days after  the approval of  the contract by 
the President, and final  plans must be submitted within the four  following  months, contractors to 
have exclusive rights of  the road without any interference  from  the Government. The railway 
company will be considered, from  the time of  the signing of  the contract, as a public utility and will 
enjoy all the rights and privileges of  such as conferred  by the law; the Government will condemn any 
property necessary to be used as right of  way. The right of  way is to be 100 feet  wide along the entire 
line except where switches, yards, etc., may be installed; the width of  these places will be increased 
if  necessary. The concession allows the company to construct a wharf  on the Gulf  of  Fonseca or on 
the inlet of  Playa Grande at its discretion. The Government reserves the right to purchase the road 
and wharf  after  60 days from  the date of  beginning of  work. 
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COSTA RICA 
GENERAL FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY 
Costa Rica occupies in Central America an area of  54 000 square miles, with a population of 
379 000. The broken character of  its surface,  in which the mountain ranges alternate with plains, the 
variety of  its climate, and the fertility  of  its soil, crossed regularly by large and small rivers, indicate 
that it is an agricultural country of  great possibilities and one where railways may have extensive 
development. 
That this development has been delayed is due to the absence of  capital and immigration. The 
transportation facilities  of  the country are few  and consist mainly of  the two principal railroads, the 
Pacific  Railroad and the Northern Railroad, together with their branch lines extending to various 
plantations. There is less than 40 miles of  road suitable for  traffic  by heavy motor vehicles. The 
majority of  the roads are suitable for  use only by oxcart, and transportation to many of  the smaller 
towns and the more remote villages is by means of  mules and horses. The San Juan River, the most 
important stream, in Costa Rica, is navigable for  a considerable distance by large vessels. Rivers and 
lakes are numerous and afford  opportunities for  the development of  hydroelectric power. 
Although Costa Rica is somewhat backward in the construction of  railroads, it is interesting to 
note that Richard Trevithick, who disputes with Stevenson the honor of  having invented the 
locomotive, was in this country during the years 1822 to 1827 and that he proposed the construction 
of  a railway from  the limit of  navigation of  the River Sarapiqui to the capital and from  there to the 
mines of  Aguacate and Machuca. If  the project had been carried out at that time, Costa Rica would 
have had the distinction of  being the first  field  of  trial for  an invention that has transformed  the 
economic and social conditions of  the world. 
Before  the railroads exportation and importation were carried on through the port of  Puntarenas, 
on the Pacific,  and then through Carrillo by oxcarts, the trip taking eight days to the central table 
-land from  the coast. This route was in use until 1890 and resulted in the development of  an ox-drawn 
cart in Costa Rica, which performed  a service similar to that of  prairie wagons in the United States. 
The roads in Costa Rica occupy the central strip of  the Republic, there being no rail 
communication to either the north or the south. Railroad construction was started in the year 1854, 
when Ricardo Farrer constructed, between Puntarenas and La Barranca, a "bloody" tramway, which 
was later abandoned. From this time onward railway development continued until, at the present 
time, a through route exists from  coast to coast, consisting of  the following  railroads: Costa Rica 
Railway Co. (Ltd.), Northern Railway Co., Pacific  Railroad, and the Guanacaste Railway 
Concession. 
RAILROAD LAW 
Until the promulgation of  the railroad law of  1909 legislation on the subject did not exist in Costa 
Rica. The relations between the companies and the Government were regulated by contract and 
general laws controlling civil relations. The principal features  of  the railroad law of  December 1,1909, 
are as follows: 
All construction in Costa Rica of  a railroad for  general use requires authorization by the Congress. 
The concession which is agreed upon can not exceed 99 years and implies strick adherence to the 
laws of  the Republic. 
No concession can establish a monopoly in favor  of  an enterprise; however, the State may agree 
to subventions, advantages, and privileges. 
Every conveyance of  a railroad concession require the approval of  Congress, but in no case can 
this be granted to a foreign  government. 
No State railroad can be leased without authorization of  Congress. Whoever seeks a rail 
concession shall apply to the Ministerio de Fomento, and in case of  approval the applicant shall put 
up such deposit as that department stipulates in order to guarantee compliance with the obligations 
of  the contract. 
Railroad companies may be organized abroad but must always be Costa Rican. 
The State has the right to supervise, regulate, and inspect the railroad. 
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Proportionate tariffs  are similar for  competing roads. 
No railroad company can object to its lines being crossed by other lines, public roads (highways), 
or canals. 
Only in case of  war or internal crisis can the Government order the suppression of  railroad traffic, 
recompensing for  damages and losses. 
The companies will be responsible for  losses which occur to persons or interests through 
deficiencies  in the established service except when demonstrated that such deficiency  is not traceable 
to the companies. No railroad can refuse  to transport passengers or merchandise at the rates fixed 
by its tariff. 
The tariffs  will be "legal, general, or special." The first  represent those that the company can not 
exceed and that are fixed  by the respective concessions; the second are those that the companies 
establish. All others are special. 
In the last group those based upon distance are "proporcionales" (proportional), while those 
established outside this criterion are "diferenciales"  (differential). 
Factors in rate making are distance and weight. 
Complete carloads or trainloads also may be factors  in rate making, and for  this purposes the 
companies should establish the sizes of  these in advance. 
COSTA RICA RAILWAY CO. (LTD.) 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
The Atlantic Railway Co. (Ltd.) was organized in 1871 to take over a contract for  the construction 
of  a railroad from  Port Limon to San Jose and from  San Jose to Alajuela. This concession was secured 
by Henry Meiggs from  Manuel Alvarado, Minister of  Public Works, acting for  the Government of 
Costa Rica, on July 20,1871. It was approved on August 18,1871, by decree No. 34, and construction 
work was started at Alajuela in October of  the same year. Mr. Meiggs, being actively engaged in 
railroad construction elsewhere, this time turned his interests over to Minor C. Keith, who undertook 
the construction. At this time a loan of  £2 400 000 was secured. It may be pointed out here that the 
construction of  the road was started inland and worked toward the coast. This was a political 
necessity and as such it may have been expedient, but it resulted in great waste of  money, since the 
cost of  transportation of  a locomotive from  Puntarenas to Alajuela overland by mule amounted to 
400 000 colones. 
In April, 1874, according to the resolution of  November 7,1873, this contract was terminated and 
the Government undertook to complete the work. At that time the railroad was complete and open 
to public service from  Limon to Matina, 21 miles, and from  Alajuela to Cartago, 27 miles. The 
roadbed was graded from  Matina to the Pacuare River, 10 miles, and from  Cartago to a point 10 
miles east of  Cartago. The cost of  this work amounted to 8 000 000 colones. On October 4,1875, 
a new contract was signed by the Government with Meyers and Douglas to complete the line from 
Matina to the Pacuare River. On February 14, 1879, the Government entered into a contract with 
Minor C. Keith to construct a railroad from  the Pacuare River to Reventazón River, 7 miles. On 
September 14, 1879, the Government entered into a contract with Minor C. Keith to construct a 
railroad from  the Reventazón River to Rio Sucio, 30 1/3 miles. This portion of  the railroad was 
completed in March, 1882. Great difficulty  was experienced in maintaining bridges on the last 8 
miles of  this line, and in 1893 the Government authorized the company to abandon the 8-mile stretch 
between the Rio Sucio and the Toro Amarillo River. 
In 1883 a proposal was submitted to the Costa Rica Government by Minor C. Keith for  the 
construction of  a railroad from  Cartago to join with the Limon-Rio Sucio line at the Reventazón 
River crossing, a distance of  51 miles. This proposal was accepted by the Government by decree 
No. 2 of  April 21, 1884, which stipulated that Minor C. Keith furnish  the capital for  the work. 
Accordingly, a company was organized in London April 21,1886, under the name of  the Costa Rica 
Railway Co. (Ltd.), and approved by decree of  December 31,1886. The company had previously 
been called the Atlantic Railway. Construction was commenced at Cartago on August 20,1886, and 
the railroad was connected up with the Limon-San Jose and Alajuel line and was opened to through 
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traffic  on December 7,1890. Under this concession the Costa Rica Railway Co. (Ltd.) retains full 
ownership of  the railroad for  a period of  99 years from  January 1,1891. The road was operated under 
this name until 1905, when on July 1, of  that year the Northern Railway Co. leased the above road 
from  the Costa Rica Railway Co. (Ltd.) for  the remaining period covered by their concession. Since 
that date the road has been operated jointly with the Northern Railway Co.'s properties. The 
following  additional branches have been authorized: 
Agreement No. 52, of  September 13,1900: The Cairo branch, 2 miles, costing 75 250 colones. 
Agreement No. 83, of  December 3,1902: The extension of  the branch as far  as Rio Peje, 2 1/3 
miles, costing 78 421 colones. 
Agreement No. 27, of  July 25,1903: The extension to the estate La America, 2 1/3 miles, costing 
54 825 colones. 
Agreement No. 101, of  March 5,1904: The extension of  the Cairo branch as far  as Los Negritos, 
3 2/3 miles, costing 200 000 colones. 
Agreement No. 74, of  July 30,1904: "La Herediana" branch, 2 miles, costing 52 500 colones. 
Agreement No. 163, of  September 24,1906: Branch from  the town of  Matina to the river of  the 
same name, 5 miles, costing 56 860 colones. 
A summary of  the mileage and cost of  the Northern Railroad in 1905 at the time when it took over 
the Costa Rican Railroad is as follows: 
Lines 
Costa Rica Railway 
Alajuela to Cartago 
Limón to Siquirres 
Siquirres to Guapiles 
Cartago to Reventazón 
Cairo branch 
Ramal del Cairo prolongation 
Ramal de "La América" 
Ramal del Cairo, prolongation 
Ramal de "La Herediana" 
Ramal de Matina 
Subtotal 
Northern Railway Co.: 
Limón to Banano 
Limón to Zent 
Línea de Zent (special) 





Miles Cost, in colones 
27 8 000 000 
38 
20 2 000 000 
52 8 764 422 
3 1/2 75 250 
2 1/3 78 421 
21/3 54 825 
3 2/3 200 000 
2 52 500 
5 1/2 56 861 










The Costa Rica Railway Co. (Ltd.) was registered April 22,1886, to take over the then existing lines 
in Costa Rica and to construct additional lines, and, as part of  an arrangement of  the debt of  the 
Republic of  Costa Rica which was made in 1885, shares of  the Costa Rica Railway were given for 
interest in arrears on loans that had been issued in 1871 and 1872. The Government transferred  its 
railways for  a period of  99 years from  the completion of  the new lines, which was January 1,1891, 
free  of  any charge, and in addition conveyed to the company 800 000 acres of  land in consideration 
of  the allotment to the Government of  one-third and to the Government bondholders of  about 
one-third of  the company's share capital. 
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The company raised capital by certain debenture issues, but the early years of  its existence were 
filled  with difficulties.  A committee of  investigation was appointed in 1895, and a long report was 
issued concerning the company's position and prospects. From the very first  a number of  disputes 
arose and a good deal of  competition had to be faced  from  the Northern Railway Co. of  Costa Rica, 
which was an offshoot  of  the United Fruit Co., and in 1904 lengthy negotiations took place with a 
view to eliminating this competition. Eventually it was arranged that the Northern Railway Co. 
should be granted a lease of  the Costa Rica Railway for  a period of  the remainder of  its concession, 
less the last two months. 
This agreement was approved in the early part of  1905, and since July 1 of  that year the operating 
of  the company's venture, until the termination of  the concessions less two months, was transferred 
to the Northern Railway Co. of  Costa Rica (the whole of  whose share capital of  $1000 000 is owned 
in Great Britain) with the understanding that the railway shall be kept in good working order and 
the right to construct branches transferred  to the Northern Railway Co., which paid to the Costa 
Rica Railway Co. £131100 for  the year ended June 30,1906, a similar sum for  1906-7, £135 600 
for  1907-8, a similar sum for  1908-9, £150 1000 for  1909-10, £144 600 for  1910-11, and £149 100 for 
each of  the 10 years to 1920-21. 
The annual payment for  the last 10 years is subject to an increase in the event of  the prior mortgage 
debentures being increased from  £380 000 to £400 000, while in the event of  any complete issue of 
the debenture being paid off  the rental is to be reduced by the amount of  the annual service of  such 
debentures. The performance  of  the obligations of  the lease is guaranteed by the deposit with the 
trustees of  the whole of  the share capital of  the Northern Railway Co. to the amount of  $1000 000. 
The Northern Railway Co. itself  is a comparatively weak undertaking which had been worked at 
a loss for  some time previous to 1905. Its capital was small and it was certainly not in a position to 
provide much money if  the sum were needed to fulfill  its bargain. Consequently the directors of  the 
Costa Rica Railway made every effort  to get the above-mentioned agreement arranged with the 
backer of  the northern Railway Co., the United Fruit Co. That organization, however, refused  to be 
tied up in any manner with this concern. It might be well to point out here, as regards the performance 
of  the obligation of  the lease, that while this is guaranteed by the deposit of  the share capital of  the 
Northern Co. it is very obvious that this, being only in shares, might easily be of  little value. According 
to the Stock Exchange Yearbook, the authorized capital stock is £1800 000, with power to issue 
£655 000 first  mortgage 6 (formerly  6) per cent debentures, £600 000 second 6 (formerly  6) per cent 
debentures, £200 000 5 per cent prior mortgage debentures (2d series). 
NORTHERN RAILROAD CO. 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
The origin of  the Northern Railroad Co. dates back to decree No. 2, of  November 8, 1892, which 
approved a contract between the Minister of  Public Works and Richard Schutte, covering the 
construction of  a railroad from  Limon to the Rio Banano River. This concession was transferred  to 
Minor C. Keith on February 27, 1893, and from  Minor C. Keith to the "Compañía Industrial y 
Agrícola de Costa Rica" by decree No. 58, of  October 14,1893, and by them to the Tropical Trading 
& Transport Co. on February 28,1895. It was transferred  to Hoadley & Co. on March 8,1895, and 
by them to the United Fruit Co. on Jyly 21,1900, which transferred  it to the Northern Railway Co. 
on July 1,1901. 
Decree No. 21, of  February 28,1894, approved the contract between the Minister of  Public Works 
and Hoadley & Co. for  the construction of  a railway line from  the Matina River to the Banano River. 
This was transferred  to the Tropical Trading & Transport Co. on March 9,1895, to the United Fruit 
Co. on July 2,1900, and to the Northern Railway Co. by decree No. 1, of  July 2,1901. 
On October 29, 1900, a Contract was approved between the Minister of  Public Works and the 
Tropical Trading & Transport Co. to construct a branch ine railway on the right-hand side of  the 
River Matina in the Estate La Luisa. This concession was transferred  to the Northern Railway Co. 
On July 1,1905, the company leased the Costa Rica Railroad Co. line for  the remaining period 
covered by its concession. 
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MILEAGE 
The total mileage of  the Northern Railway Co. in compared with 1913, is made up as follows: 
1913 1922 
Costa Rica 163 189 4/5 
Northern Railway (own property) 127 65 1/2 
United Fruit Co. (plantation tramways) 79 1/2 75 1/2 
Total 369 331 
No construction work is going on, nor is any proposed. 
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
The following  table indicates the traffic  over the roads for  the calendar years 1913 and 1922: 
Table IV.4.11 
COSTARICA: NORTHERN RAILROAD CO.: TRAFFIC STATISTICS, CALENDAR 
YEAR 1913 AND 1922 
Items 1913 1922 
Exports: Tons Tons 
Bananas 276 423 133 419 
Coffee 15 092 13 602 
Sugar 2 225 4 395 
Lumber 9 935 16 255 
Cacao 979 5 274 
Imports: 
Cereals 4 225 3 773 
Flour 6 857 7 689 
General merchandise 59 844 41 654 
Miscellaneous 44 777 33 669 
Total 420 357 259 730 
Number Number 
Passengers carried 678 873 973 321 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The following  is a list of  the officials  of  this road: 
G. P. Chittenden, manager, Limon, Costa Rica. 
M. M. March, superintendent, Limon, Costa Rica. 
R. J. Salassi, accountant, Limon, Costa Rica. 
F. Sheehy, trainmaster, Limon, Costa Rica. 
R. Ferris, master mechanic, Limon, Costa Rica. 
G. E. Kirk, roadmaster, Siquirres, Costa Rica. 
F. W. Thomas, storekeeper, Limon, Costa Rica. 
Y. Sorensen, wharfinger,  Limon, Costa Rica. 
M. O. Carter, general foreman,  building construction, Limon, Costa Rica. 
J. J. Carraña, telegraph and telephone inspector, Limon, Costa Rica. 
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PACIFIC RAILWAY 
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
Authorization for  the construction of  the Pacific  Railway was provided for  in agreement No. 14, of 
March 25,1879. The road extends between San Jose and Puntarenas and is the property of  the State, 
by which it was constructed. Under the agreement a section of  21 726 kilometers was constructed 
between Esparta and Puntarenas at a cost of  1900 000 colones, the entire cost of  the Pacific  Railway 
being 12 000 000 colones. Construction of  the railway proper was begun after  the approval by 
Congress of  the contract for  its construction made August 6,1879, between the Minister of  Fomento 
and John S. Casement. This contract provided for  the construction of  a road between San Jose and 
Tivives, the only harbor on the Pacific  coast. The total amount paid for  the fulfillment  of  the contract 
was $2 998 971, American gold. Under this contract 69 kilometers were built between San Jose and 
Orotina, the work continuing slowly but regularly until it reached the valley of  Santo Domingo de 
San Mateo, where it was ended, the contract being broken by mutual consent of  the parties in 
December, 1902. The cost for  this stretch amounted to 6 744 059 colones, which also included the 
equipment. 
In the meantime the citizens of  Puntarenas, seeing that their interests were threatened by having 
the road constructed to Tivives instead of  Puntarenas, started a movement to have the road 
constructed to their port. This was authorized by Congress May 28,1904. Under decree No. 10 of 
November 22, 1905, Congress authorized the executive power to continue the work on the 
Puntarenas-Esparta line and to construct a branch between Las Ciruelas and Alajuela. Under this 
authority, the president continued work on the line and constructed 15.2 kilometers between Orotina 
and Las Cruces at a cost of  242 848 colones. 
On August 28, 1908, Congress approved the contract between the Minister of  Fomento and 
Warren S. Knowlton, to finish  the road and to establish direct communication to the Pacific.  This 
was accomplished at a cost of  1069 689 colones, and the line was placed in service in October, 1910. 
From that time to the present the line has been administered by first  one group and then another, 
until May, 1921, when an executive order delegated the direction, administration, and management 
of  the railroad to an administrative council of  five  members, including one engineer, one farmer, 
and one merchant. This council is authorized to direct the exploitation of  the railroad with the view, 
primarily, of  developing the agricultural industry. Earnings adequate to return interest on the capital 
are not contemplated, but proper maintenance and expansion of  the lines is to be provided out of 
railway revenue. The council appoints the administrator of  the railroad and the administrative 
personnel. It regulates tariffs  and passes upon projects for  strengthening the lines, in general 
performing  the functions  previously delegated to the Secretary of  the Interior. 
The funds  of  the railroad will be deposited, day by day, in the national tax office  in an account 
completely separate from  that of  the public treasury. This account can be drawn upon only by the 
admnistrator with the countersignature of  the auditor, but those officials  will not authorize any draft 
upon it which is not destined to cover some part of  the budget or which is not provided for  by some 
resolution of  the council. 
The auditor at the close of  each day remits to the president of  the council. 
The board can, in case it is necessary to cover ordinary expenses in the administration, borrow 
money, but it must not compromise for  the payment of  such loan more than the balance of  receipts 
after  meeting the requirements of  the current service. It will inform  the Secretary of  the Interior 
immediately for  any such transaction. 
For any other loan or for  compromises the railroad must request legislative authorization through 
the secretary and must secure his approval. 
OPERATING OFFICIALS 
The road is operated by the Government under a body known as the Consejo Aministrativo de 
Ferrocarril al Pacifico,  San Jose, Costa Rica. The administrator general is R. Yglesias. The operating 
officials  are as follows: 
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General manager: Jose Cabezas. 
Secretary: Manuel Barrionuevo. 
General superintendent: Leon Rojas. 
Cashier: Gonzalso Güiros. 
Auditor: Manuel F. Quesada. 
Traffic  manager: Anibal Chacon. 
Master mechanic: Jose Chavarria. 
Master car builder: Arturo Flores. 
Chief  engineer: Vincent E. Gregg. 
Road master: Ildefonso  Mora. 
FINANCES 
A comparison of  the road's revenues for  the calendar years 1913 and 1923 is as follows: 
Table IV.4.12 
COSTA RICA: PACIFIC RAILWAY, COMPARISON OF REVENUES, 1913 AND 1923 
1913 1923 
Revenues 
Kilos Colones Kilos Colones 
Freight: 
General merchandise 64 756 744 278 597.94 66 497 386 868 580.10 
Lumber 19 658 493 87 651.40 23 412 489 197 426.60 
Coffee 1 781 836 21 364.20 4 257 642 107 408.95 
Hides and skins 60 935 730.61 1 113 868 39 181.70 
"Encomiendas" 1 296 640 40 563.20 2 027 481 50 734.50 
Baggage 34 320 4 003.10 66 219 6 168.75 
Total Freight 87 588 968 432 910.45 97 375 085 1 269 500.60 
Passengers 287 082.50 444 010.50 
Storage — 352.70 — 2 194.85 
Special trains — 18 936.75 — 66 283.65 
Car movement — 19 407.85 — 26 255.18 
Total Revenues 758 690.25 . . . 1 808 244.78 
MILEAGE 
The mileage of  the road for  the calendar year ended December 31,1923, is as follows: 
Miles 
Main Line: San Jose to Puntarenas 68.35 
Branches: 
Roble to Esparta 6.83 
Ciruelas to Alajuela 4.97 
San Jose to junction with Northern Railway 1.24 
Subtotal 81-39 
Yard trackage 5.09 
Total 86.48 
Under construction 5.2 
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CONCESSION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROAD 
IN PROVINCE OF GUANACASTE 
A contract was concluded August 7,1920, between representatives of  the Costa Rica Government 
and H. H. J. Tost for  the construction of  a railway across the Province of  Guanacaste. 
According to the terms of  this contract, the contractor agrees to organize a company, which may 
be either national or foreign,  to construct a railway beginning at Puntarenas, crossing the Province 
of  Guanacaste, touching towns of  Canas, Bagaces, and Liberia and ending of  at the bay of  Coco or 
that of  Culebra. If  it proves impossible or entirely unfeasible  to cross the estuary with the railway, 
the contract grants permission to begin the line at the most convenient point between Esparta and 
Puntarenas. The company must be organized within three months after  final  approval of  plans. 
The preliminary survey to be made by the contractor must be begun within six months from  the 
day the law approving the contract is published and must be concluded within 18 months thereafter. 
Within that period detailed plans and specifications  are to be submitted to the Secretary of  Fomento, 
whose approval or disapproval must be given within 90 days after  their receipt. 
Failure to present plans and specifications  or to organize the company within the periods 
designated makes the contract null and void, with no right of  redress through legal action. The same 
course is to be followed  if,  after  the company is organized, it does not begin construction within the 
specified  period, unless war, strikes, or similar circumstances interfere  with the transportation of 
supplies from  the United States. In this case an extension of  time, equal to the period of  delay plus 
six months, is allowed. 
A minimum of  25 kilometers per annum must be constructed and the railway must be finished 
throughout its extent five  years after  construction is begun. If,  during the period, work should have 
to be suspended because of  war or strife  occurring in either Costa Rica, or the United States, or for 
any other equally valid reason, an extension, equal to the period of  interruption, will be granted. 
The contract gives permission for  the use of  coal, petroleum, or electricity for  motive power. If 
electricity is used, water power existing in the concession may be used without payment to the 
Government. 
Materials necessary for  the enterprise maybe imported free  of  customs and similar charges, both 
during construction and for  subsequent maintenance. The company is also relieved, during the life 
of  the concession, of  all municipal and national imposts on railway enterprises. 
Beginning with the day when construction begins and for  20 years thereafter,  the Government 
guarantees a 6 per cent return on the capital invested, up to a minimum investment of  4 000 000 
pesos. If,  within the 20-year period, a net return of  more than 6 per cent is earned, half  of  the excess 
is to be devoted to amortization of  advances made by the Government under its guaranty. This 
guaranty does not apply to branches, whose construction may be authorized. 
Sixty years after  the line is open wholly and officially  to public traffic,  the railway, including 
telephone, telegraph, hydroelectric, and all other properties, shall revert to the State, without 
payment, and must be handed over in good condition and free  from  every sort of  obligation. 
Within 90 days subsequent to the promulgation of  the law approving this contract the contractor 
shall give a guaranty of  $50 000 to provide for  the fulfillment  of  the obligations of  the contract. 
PAN AMERICAN RAILROAD 
Ideas for  an international Pan American railway were entertained in the early eighties, but it was 
not until 1889 that any actual steps were taken toward the formation  of  a plan to bring about such a 
road. A resolution was adopted by the First International American Conference  held in Washington 
in 1889-90, which recommended the construction of  an intercontinental railroad extending from 
New York to Buenos Aires, passing through the republics of  Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina, an estimated 
distance of  10 116 miles. A committee was subsequently appointed to make surveys for  the 
construction of  this road, and a report covering this project was issued. The report is in five  volumes, 
together with maps and profiles  and detailed explanations of  the route chosen. It is estimated that 
between 65 and 70 per cent of  the entire road, taking advantage of  available lines, was completed 
prior to 1914. Since that date construction has amounted only to a few  miles. 
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The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official  endorsement OÍ acceptance by the United Nations. 
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At the present time communication exists between New York and the Mexican-Guatemalan 
border. This border is formed  by the River Suchiate. The trains of  the Pan American Railroad of 
Mexico stop on the Mexican side of  the river. Directly across the river is the town of  Ayutla which 
is the terminus of  the International Railways of  Central America in Guatemala. The river is not 
bridged, and consequently both freight  and passengers have to disembark on the Mexican side going 
south and on the Guatemalan side going north. From Ayutla, the line as projected will utilize the 
lines of  the International Railways of  Central America which are now in operation in Guatemala 
running from  coast to coast. Certain sections of  these lines will form  an excellent feeder  service to 
the main line of  the company, which will be utilized as a section of  the Pan American Railway. 
From Zacapa, a point on the Guatemalan lines, the International Railways of  Central America 
is intending to construct a line to the Salvadorean border. It has already secured a concession from 
the Government of  Guatemala for  this purpose, and some grading and construction on this line have 
been done. From this point on the Salvadorean border the same company has secured a concession 
from  the Government of  Salvador to construct a line to Santa Ana. At the present time work is 
proceeding on this section. Unfortunately,  however, the company has not been able to secure a 
concession enabling it to enter Santa Ana to connect up with its other road which extends from  La 
Union to this point. On completion of  these two short stretches, through transportation will be 
afforded  to La Union, the Pacific  seaport of  Salvador. 
The International Railways have also secured a concession from  the Government of  Salvador for 
the construction of  a line to extend from  La Union to a point on the Salvador-Nicaragua border and 
from  the Nicaraguan Government a concession for  a line from  this point on the Salvador-Nicaragua 
border to connect up with El Viejo, the terminus of  the Pacific  Railway of  Nicaragua. The plans for 
the Pan American Railway call for  the utilization of  the Pacific  Railway of  Nicaragua as far  as 
Grenada, located on the shore of  Lake Nicaragua. As far  this point little construction will be 
necessary, but the remainder of  the distance from  Grenada to the Colombian frontier  is where most 
of  the work will have to be done, since the through road can utilize practically none of  the existing 
railroads in Costa Rica and Panama. Fortunately all connect with a terminus at some point on the 
through road, thus providing through service without additional connections. From Grenada it will 
be necessary for  the company to secure a concession for  a line to a point on the Nicaragua-Costa 
Rica border, and also to secure a concession from  the Costa Rica Government for  a line from  this 
point to Puntarenas in Costa Rica. At this place the road will connect with the Pacific  Railway of 
Costa Rica which it will follow  as far  as Orotina. In this country as well, fortunately  the lines are all 
linked up with a point on the proposed through Pan American Railway and consequently no 
additional connection will have to be made. From Orotina it is intended to extend the road in a 
southerly direction to the Panama border. It will be necessary to secure a concession from  the 
Government of  Costa Rica for  the construction of  the road from  Orotina to the Costa Rica-Panama 
border. 
In Panama it is planned to obtain a concession to construct a line from  the point on the 
Panama-Costa Rica border to LaConcepcion, one of  the termini of  the Chiriqui Railway. This road 
will be utilized to some extent and also will act as a feeder  to the main line from  La Concepcion. The 
Chiriqui Railway will be utilized as far  as Pedregal, and from  there plans call for  the road to extend 
south until it reaches Panama City. From there it will follow  the coast, keeping west of  the mountain 
chain and continuing into Colombia. For the Panama section it will be necessary to secure a 
concession from  the Government. 
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5. RAILROAD LOSSES IN GUATEMALA (1958) 
From: International Railways of  Central America; Memorandum for  the Department of  State; 
October 16, 1958; Lot file  60D 647, box 6, under heading "Guatemala - International 
Railways of  Central America (IRCA)"; Records of  the Office  of  Middle American Affairs, 
Department of  State; NARA. 
October 16,1958 
Memorandum for  the Department of  State 
Re: International Railways of  Central America 
The Company, a New Jersey corporation, operates an extensive railroad system in 
Guatemala and El Salvador, supplying virtually all rail transportation in those two countries. 
This memorandum deals with its present desperate - virtually hopeless- position. 
1. Enormous losses in Guatemala during 1958 
Losses in Guatemala in 1958 have been so severe that the Company will soon be without 
resources to continue operations; suspension of  operations will profoundly  and adversely 
affect  social and economic conditions. Whether the Company can continue operating in El 
Salvador, if  obliged to suspend in Guatemala, is problematical because if  operations in that 
country had to be burdened with all the Company's overhead expenses it is highly probable 
that those operations would no longer be profitable.  This is especially to be feared  in view of 
the extension of  the El Salvador highway system and construction of  the new port in Acajutla. 
Furthermore, much of  the El Salvador traffic  is through traffic  to and from  the Atlantic port 
in Guatemala of  Puerto Barrios; this through traffic  involves constant interchange of 
equipment (locomotives and cars) on a large scale. 
A major crisis is at hand. 
In 1958 through August 31, the Company lost $941 889 on Guatemala operations. Of  this 
amount, $388 000 was for  depreciation and amortization of  reverting properties. Even if  these 
necessary and proper charges were disregarded, the Company failed  to cover its actual out of 
pocket  expenses in Guatemala by about $554 000. This deficit  had to be made up by sending 
cash to Guatemala from  outside. 
There were operating losses in Guatemala in every month of  1958 except April, when there 
was a small profit  of  $62 977. 
The operating loss in Guatemala for  September 1958 is estimated to be $350 000. 
The operating loss in Guatemala for  the year 1958 is estimated at $1600 000. Of  this amount 
$580 000 represents depreciation and amortization of  reverting properties. The estimated out 
of  pocket  deficit  in Guatemala for  the year 1958 is thus over $1000000, meaning that this amount 
of  cash has to be provided from  sources outside  Guatemala to maintain service in that country. 
The figures  given regarding losses and profits  do not take into account United States income 
tax credits or debits. 
2. EI Salvador operations are being used as a subsidy for Guatemala 
In 1958 through August 31, operations in El Salvador show a profit  of  $659 000. 
The overall operations in 1958 of  the Company in both Guatemala and El Salvador through 
August 31, show a loss of  $282 500. Present indications are that the overall operating loss for 
the year 1958 will be about $600 000. 
The cash money to make up the deficit  in Guatemala -that is, the difference  between money 
received and money required to be paid out for  wages, fuel  oil and other supplies, etc. came 
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from  El Salvador and from  the bank account of  the Company in New York. Approximately 
$350 000 was sent from  El Salvador to Guatemala in the period May to August 1948 for 
payment of  wages, etc. Thus, the El Salvador operations were in effect  subsidizing the 
operations in Guatemala, and El Salvador receipts were being used to pay wages in Guatemala. 
This is obviously an unhealthy condition and cannot continue. 
3. Capitalization of the Company 
The Company has about $3 000.00 in long term debt and a past due note of  $1 375 000 to a 
subsidiary of  United Fruit Company. Interest on debt is about $250 000 per year. 
The Company (incorporated in 1904) has outstanding 100 000 shares of  5% cumulative 
preferred  stock and 500 000 shares of  common stock. United Fruit Company owns about 48% 
of  the common stock, or about 40% of  all stock outstanding, common and preferred. 
There has never been a dividend on the common stock in the 54 years of  the Company's 
existence. No dividend has been declared on the preferred  stock since October 1957 and only 
irregularly before  that time. The dividend arrears on the preferred  stock are $48.50 per share 
or a total $4 850 000. 
The Company has cash on hand of  only about $1500 000 now rapidly diminishing by reason 
of  the drain to Guatemala. 
The directors of  the Company are with one exception citizens of  the United States. 40% of 
the Company's stock is owned by a United States corporation. The preferred  and common 
stock and the bonds of  the Company are listed on the New York Stock exchange and owned 
predominantly in the United States. 
4. Why are there losses in Guatemala? 
The Company has had to reduce many of  its rates to meet truck competition. The construction 
in Guatemala of  a network of  modern highways -encouraged and in a great measure financed 
from  the United States- inevitably forces  reduction of  rail rates to meet the competition of 
trucks which is instant on the completion of  any highway. 
A new, modern highway is virtually complete between Puerto Barrios and Santo Tomas 
(ports on the Atlantic) and Guatemala City (the capital). Trucks are now operating over this 
route and the railroad has had drastically to reduce its rates to keep its business. 
The Pacific  Highway is now paved from  Guatemala City to Retalhuleu. There has been a 
good highway for  some time between San Jose and Guatemala City. Truck competition on 
these routes has similarly forced  rate reductions for  rail service, even though the reduced rates 
return little or no profit. 
Despite reduction in rates, the railroad loses business nonetheless. A comparison of 
revenues in Guatemala during the past two years in instructive: 
1957 1958 
(through August 31) (through August 31) 
$8 731621 $7063 361 
A part of  the reduction is due, of  course, to the lowered rates as just described, but some 
business is lost to trucks even when rail rates are reduced. For example, the railroad has lost 
to trucks more than 60% of  the import traffic  between San Jose and Guatemala City. 
Other reasons for  reduced revenues in Guatemala are lowered coffee  prices, destruction 
of  bananas by tropical storms in June 1958, general business instability, etc. 
5. Artificial obstacles to reducing expenses in Guatemala 
The situation of  the railroad Company clearly calls for  a reduction of  expenses. Common sense 
and ordinary business prudence dictate this as a first  and immediate step. 
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Although there has been a drastic decline in revenues in Guatemala, there has been no 
corresponding decline in expenses. The figures  for  Guatemala are again instructive: 
The Company has been unable to reduce its expenses in Guatemala because of  the attitude 
of  the labor union and the inability or unwillingness of  the Guatemala Government to change 
that attitude. 
The following  steps are required: 
a. Complete  elimination of  unnecessary overtime. 
Over a period of  several years, the practice has developed for  numerous employees to work 
overtime and to be paid therefor  at the much higher overtime rates. Much of  this work is not 
necessary on an overtime basis, but the Company has been threatened with a strike by the union 
whenever it attempted to stop this unnecessary expense. The Company has also been requested 
in the past by Guatemala Government officials  not to change the practice. 
Because of  the desperate present position of  the railroad, it has been obliged to face  this 
issue and on September 26,1958 a large part of  this unnecessary overtime was abolished. An 
open letter of  explanation to the workers was distributed by the President of  the Company. 
Although the union has opposed this action by the Company, there has not yet been a strike. 
b. Reduction  in number of  employees by elimination of  surplus. 
The Company has too many employees in Guatemala. There are more employees than are 
needed, thus adding unnecessary expense. 
The Company has been unable to reduce expense by eliminating surplus personnel, because 
every discharge brings forth  denunciation by the union and the threat of  a strike. 
Example: 6 brakemen had been temporarily promoted to that position from  the position 
of  common laborer. When no longer needed as brakemen the Company offered  (a) to release 
them from  employment and pay separation allowance under Guatemala law or, at their option, 
(b) to restore them to the position of  common laborer. The men were satisfied  with this offer 
but the union protested and went directly to the President of  the Republic to make trouble. 
Moreover, reduction in personnel brings charges by the union that working conditions of 
the remaining personnel have been changed in violation of  law. This leads to lawsuits before 
the Labor Court, etc. 
c. Reduction  in number of  trains. 
The Company has the right, under its Concessions, to determine what trains are needed. 
There are a number of  unnecessary trains. The Company encounters tremendous difficulty  in 
eliminating these because of  opposition from  the union and threats of  a strike. 
d. Reorganization  of  work. 
The Company should reduce expense by rearrangement of  the work of  its employees to 
secure greater efficiency.  The Company is unable to do this because of  opposition from  the 
union, and the consequent danger of  innumerable lawsuits in the Labor Court on charges of 
unlawful  change in working conditions. 
There appear to be only these alternatives: 
a. Prompt reduction in Guatemala expenses, with the support of  the union and of  the 
Guatemala government, so as to enable the Company to meet its expenses in Guatemala out 
of  revenues from  Guatemala and to end the present unhealthy and impossible situation. 
1957 (through August 3) 
1958 (through August 3) 
Revenues 
$8731621 
$7 063 361 
Expenses 
$7 629 600 
$7 573 573 
6. Alternatives now facing the Company and Guatemala 
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In considering this alternative, it must be kept in mind that neither the government nor the union 
are willing to accept the fact  that the Company is losing enormous amounts in Guatemala; they refuse 
to recognize the accuracy of  the Company's accounting statements even though these are now and 
have for  many years been, audited regularly by independent certified  public accountants of  high 
standing. 
b. Suspension of  service in Guatemala, with liquidation through bankruptcy or receivership. 
This is inevitable if  present conditions continue, the only uncertainty being the date. 
It needs no elaboration to demonstrate the chaos and injury which would follow  from  a cessation 
of  railway service in Guatemala with bankruptcy or receivership for  the railroad Company. 
Obviously the second alternative would not be acceptable to the Guatemala Government. If  the 
first  alternative is likewise not acceptable to the Government and the union, then the only other 
solution is for  the Government to buy the railroad properties in Guatemala and operate them. 
With operation of  the railroad made the responsibility of  the Guatemala Government, its 
treatment of  the workers would be accepted as fair  and just because the motive of  hope for  private 
profit  could no longer be asserted as against this American Company now conducting the enterprise. 
Subject to the approval of  its stockholders, the Company is prepared, therefore,  favorably  to 
consider an offer  by the Government of  Guatemala to buy the Company's railway properties in 
Guatemala. The fixing  of  a price should present no obstacle because the relevant concession provides 
for  arbitration to determine price when in some fifty  years important properties revert to ownership 
of  the Guatemala Government on payment of  compensation. The same procedure of  arbitration 
should logically be followed  to fix  the price for  a prompt transfer  of  ownership without waiting for 
expiration of  the concessions. The Company would be prepared to consider deferred  payment in 
the form  of  a combination of  cash and securities. 
It is believed that one of  the best plans would be for  the Governments of  El Salvador and 
Guatemala together to own all the railway properties of  the Company, and to operate them through 
a joint agency on the order of  Port of  New York Authority, as an example. The technique of 
ownership and operation can be the subject of  negotiation and discussion. 
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D. BANANAS 
6. THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY (UFCO) IN COSTA RICA (1938) 
From: Contracts between the United Fruit Company and the Government of  Costa Rica; 
Despatch No. 356 from  U.S. Legation, San José, Costa Rica to Secretary of  State, August 
5,1938; and attached Memorandum to Mr. Briggs, Mr. Duggan and Mr. Welles, Division 
of  American Republics, Department of  State, August 16,1938; 818.6156/101 L/M; Central 
Decimal Files 1930-39; Record Group 59; NARA. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 





Mr. Duggan: Declassified  NARA 5-8-87 
Mr. Welles: 
This excellent despatch from  Collins at San José regarding the new United Fruit contracts 
deserves to be read in full.  Outstanding points are: 
(1) A loan of  $1000 000 to the Costa Rican Government at 3 percent interest, both interest 
and amortization to be deducted from  future  Banana export taxes over 15 years. This will be 
spent on roads, buildings and waterworks during the remaining two years of  the Cortés 
administration, with the present Minister of  Public Works, Ricardo Pacheco Lara, probable 
next president. 
(2) The 1930 and '34 contracts are continued, together with a comprehensive development 
of  the Pacific  area. The company will 
a. Plant at least 4 000 hectares of  bananas within 5 years, 
b. Construct a port on the Golf  Dulce, within the same time. 
c. And a port at Quepos Point within half  that time. 
d. Within about 8 years, if  plans are approved and the Costa Rican-Panama boundary fixed, 
a 42-inch railway from  Golfo  Dulce to the Panama Boundary by way of  Puerto Cortés. 
e. A modern hospital. 
The company obtains an extension of  existing customs and other tax exemptions, may import 
chemicals and equipment, may use waters for  cultivation, electricity, locomotives and 
steamers, and construct canals, water-works, et cetera, with free  use of  lands. 
(3) The two cents per stem banana export tax fixed  in 1930 will be maintained to 1988. 
(4) Collins sees vital effects  upon commercial, economic, political and social conditions and 
international relations. 
a. About $5 000 000 will be spent within 5 years, with about 180 kilometers of  railway 
and the complete establishment of  ports, towns and all other facilities.  About $5 000 000 more 
will be spent five  years thereafter.  German competition is apparently already strong. 
b. There will be an abundance of  dollar exchange. 
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c. Costa Rican income will increase about $3 000 000 annually because of  doubling banana 
exportation in 5 years. 
d. Resulting price rise will adversely affect  the coffee  industry. 
e. With the Atlantic producing only 3 000 000 stems and the Pacific  8 000 000 per year, 
economic weight will shift,  with many consequences. The Germans and the Japanese already 
established on the Pacific  will be strengthened; the Goodyear Company, experimenting with 
rubber production on the Atlantic, will assume greater importance; some 20 000 blacks will 
be left  on the Atlantic, while Nicaraguans, Hondurans and Panamanians will be imported by 
the Fruit Company on the Pacific. 
(5) The Costa Rican-Panama boundary dispute must be settled before  the railway can be 
constructed to the Panamanian border. Apparently the Costa Rican Congress is favorably 
inclined. 
(6) With the decline of  coffee  power and European orientation, American influence  should 
increase, and a greater national income will be guaranteed. 
(7) Article 7 expressly submits the company to Costa Rican laws, and company renounces 
diplomatic recourse to settle differences  arising from  the contract -previously arbitration on 
equal terms was provided for. 
(8) Whereas the company on the Atlantic Coast purchases about 75 percent of  its bananas 
from  private growers, it will itself  grow that percentage on the Pacific. 
RA:LB:BLS:SS 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
No. 356 




The Secretary of  State 
Washington. 
LEGATION OF THE 
Declassified  NARA 5-8-87 
I have the honor to refer  to my despatch No. 347 of  July 23,1938, informing  the Department 
of  the approval by the Congress of  the contract signed on April 2,1938, between the Compañía 
Bananera de Costa Rica, subsidiary of  the United Fruit Company, and the Government of 
Costa Rica for  the development of  the Pacific  banana area; and, in this connection, to enclose 
a copy of  the contract and its annexes as promulgated by the executive in the OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE under date of  July 23,1938. 
The supplementary contract, signed on May 3, 1938, providing for  the immediate 
advance of  $1000 000 United states currency by the Company to the current account of  the 
Government in anticipation of  future  banana export tax was approved on August 3. A copy of 
the final  text taken from  the OFFICIAL GAZETTE is enclosed.* 
The development contract, as its Article I makes evident, extends, supplements and 
perpetuates the contracts of  1930 and 1934 and their related legislation according to tax 
exemptions and other privileges to the Company. Its purpose is to provide a basis for  the 
comprehensive, integrated development of  the Pacific  area, which neither of  the preceding 
contracts accomplished. Under it the Company is to plant a minimum of  4 000 hectares of 
bananas within five  years of  the implementing of  the contract (on July 23,1938); is to construct 
a port at a point to be selected on the Golfo  Dulce within the same period, and a port at Quepos 
Point within two years and a half;  and is to complete within eight years, more or less, depending 
upon approval of  plans by the Ministry of  Public Works, and the fixation  of  a boundary between 
Costa Rica and Panama, a forty-two  inch railway from  the Golfo  Dulce to the Panama 
boundary by way of  Puerto Cortés. All these works with their equipment and appuertenances, 
are to become the property of  the Government upon the expiration of  the contract at the end 
of  fifty  years. Also to be constructed by the Company within five  years is a modern hospital of 
a capacity sufficient  for  the needs of  employees and dependents in the area. This establishment 
may, at the Company's option, be transferred  gratuitously to the Government at any time. In 
consideration of  its assumption of  the foregoing  obligations, the Company receives 
prolongation of  the customs and other tax exemptions provided by the Soto-Keith Contracts 
of  1884 and the contracts of  1930 and 1934 and their related legislation, and is specifically 
authorized to import free  of  duty chemicals and equipment for  use in connection with 
cultivation, and control of  plant diseases and pests. It is further  authorized to use the waters 
of  the public domain for  purposes of  cultivation, generation of  electricity and the supply of  its 
locomotives and steamers; and to construct canals, waterworks and other necessary facilities, 
importations in connection with which are to be free.  It is guaranteed, gratuitously, for  the 
term of  the contract the use of  public lands needed for  its railways, docks, workshops, 
warehouses, pipe lines, offices,  residences and the like. It is authorized to transport through 
•This edited version does not include the text taken from  the OFFICIAL GAZETTE. 
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warehouses, pipe lines, offices,  residences and the like. It is authorized to transport through 
Costa Rica for  export loading bananas produced in Panama, and is assured egress facilities 
for  bananas destined for  export through Panama. Highly important from  the standpoint of  the 
Company is the guaranteed maintenance for  an additional period of  thirty-eight years of  the 
banana export tax at $0.02 per stem, to the exclusion of  all other taxes except the Territorial 
Contribution. This tax was fixed  by the Contract of  1930, to be maintained until October 29, 
1950. Its extension to April 2, 1988, provided by the present contract, assures a continued 
stability without the definite  prospect of  which the Company could not have undertaken the 
financial  commitments involved in the Pacific  development. A significant  provision of  the 
contract as approved is the repeal of  Decree No. 14 of  December 20,1937. This measure, which 
followed  the breaking off  of  negotiations between the Company and that Government last year, 
empowered the administration to construct a port and carry out other works in the Pacific 
area, which might have been a first  step toward nationalization of  the banana industry in that 
new region. The repeal retracts that step, and definitely  commits the industry to the Company 
for  another fifty  years. Similar to provisions embodied in former  contracts is Article IX, 
under which the Company is to deposit $50 000 in escrow with the National Bank of  Costa 
Rica as a guarantee of  performance. 
The approval of  this contract and its related $1000 000 agreement appear clearly to bring 
Costa Rica to the starting point of  a development that is momentous, a development that will 
touch to a greater or lesser degree virtually every phase of  the national life,  and produce 
definite  and significant  effects  upon commercial, fundamental  economic, political and social 
conditions and international relations. Not the least interesting implication from  our 
standpoint is that it brings the Company and the Government into a new, or returns them to 
an old juxtaposition. 
The first  and most evident effect  in the commercial and economic field  will be the carrying 
out within the next five  years of  construction work on a scale nothing comparable with which 
has occurred in this country in the present generation. According to the Manager of  the United 
Fruit organization in Costa Rica, the Company will probably spend between four  and five 
million dollars in discharging its immediate obligations under the contract. Detailed plans have 
not yet been announced, but it is estimated that about 180 kilometers of  railway will be 
constructed and equipped, besides which there are the ports, with their wharves, machinery 
and equipment; powerhouses, warehouses, residences, offices,  storage tanks, chemical plant 
for  the production of  insecticides and fungicides,  roads and streets, waterworks, and all the 
other facilities  in connection with the rapid industrialization of  a primitive area. Ultimate 
expenditure is not definitely  calculable, but it is not likely to be less than ten or twelve million 
dollars in the next ten or fifteen  years. 
In addition to the construction to be carried out by the Company, the Government, 
according to official  announcements, will expend within the next two years the $1000 000 that 
it is to receive on public works, including roads, buildings and waterworks. 
It is probable that the bulk of  the total of  $5 000 000 - $6 000 000 to be thus expended in the 
next five  years will be for  imported machinery, equipment and materials. Reports in German 
circles in San José indicate that Germany is preparing to make a strong bid for  this business, 
using the compensation system as a means. As previous despatches have indicated, the 
Government is favorably  inclined toward Germany; and the United Fruit Company in the past 
has from  time to time filled  its requirements through barter transactions with Germany. 
American exporters should be prompt in putting themselves in touch with the market in 
prospect, and should be prepared to cope with German competition. It is to be borne in mind 
in this connection that experience shows that in Costa Rica the importance of  successful 
competition extends far  beyond the first  sale in the case of  machinery and industrial equipment, 
for  every sale sets up a series of  transactions involving replacements, repairs and auxiliaries. 
The Pacific  Railway is typical.Having electrified  the line, using peculiar Germany basic 
equipment, the Germans now have practically the monopoly of  supplying the recurrent needs 
of  the road, and, further,  possess in it a nucleus for  their political and cultural activities in this 
country. 
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As the whole transaction between the Company and the Government is on a dollar basis, a 
feature  of  the economic situation to be produced by the development proceeding from  the 
contracts will be a flood  of  dollars in Costa Rica during the intensive period of  the next five 
years. Thus, there should be an abundance of  dollar exchange available for  payments to 
American holders of  Costa Rican bonds now in default,  as well as for  the meeting of  expanded 
commercial obligations. 
The Manager of  the Fruit Company estimates that at the end of  five  years banana production 
and exportation should be about eleven million stems annually, or somewhat more than double 
the present rate. This should add about $3 000 000 to the national income, and thereby increase 
by about 25% the capacity of  Costa Rica to acquire foreign  products and services, and meet 
foreign  obligations. 
This influx  and distribution of  dollars, may be expected to result in a rise in prices, and the 
appreciation of  the colon. Such an eventuality will have a radical effect  upon the national 
economy, for  it will increase the already pressing difficulties  of  the coffee  growing industry, 
the well being of  which is based on low wages and a low colon. There is a fundamental  economic 
antagonism between coffee  and bananas, in that wages in the banana industry are two or three 
times as high as in the coffee,  which tends constantly to buoy coffee  wages upward to the 
prejudice of  the industry. The Pacific  contract, implying as it does intensification  and expansion 
of  the banana industry, will heighten the conflict  between bananas and coffee,  a development 
already foreshadowed  by the opposition of  the coffee  interest to the contract. 
The Manager of  the Fruit Company estimates that with the total annual production of 
bananas raised to eleven million stems, production in the Atlantic area will be only three million 
stems, while the Pacific  area will produce eight million. Thus, the contract implies the rapid 
commercial decline of  the Atlantic costal region, and a more than corresponding rise by the 
Pacific  in a word, the sudden shift  of  economic weight from  one side of  the country to the 
other. This can hardly do otherwise than set up difficult  stresses. On the Atlantic there is 
prospect of  diminishing business and increasing unemployment, while on the Pacific  rapid 
expansion of  business and shortage of  labor are in view. This change will imply reorientation 
of  the business organization of  the country, including importation and production, distributing 
and banking. Obviously, this situation is of  significance  to American exporters. The shifting  of 
the center of  consumption away from  the Atlantic port of  Limon toward the Pacific  ports will 
be to the disadvantage of  exporters in our eastern industrial area, who have hitherto enjoyed 
the benefits  of  the short water routes between New York and New Orleans and Limon. At the 
same time German and Japanese exporters who have been cultivating Puntarenas during 
recent years will be facilitated,  and strengthened in competition with their American rivals. 
Our encouragement of  steamship services from  our eastern ports to the Pacific  Coast of  Costa 
Rica by way of  the Panama Canal suggests itself. 
The decline of  the banana on the Atlantic side is likely to work to the advantage of  one 
American interest in Costa Rica, the Goodyear Company, which, as the Department is aware, 
is experimenting with rubber production on the Atlantic slope. Decline in Atlantic land values 
and wages will facilitate  the operations of  the Goodyear Company, and that organization 
should benefit  in its relations with the Government by the prospect that it will be able to hold 
out as the ultimate rescuer of  the Atlantic economy. 
The Pacific  banana development seems likely to be as influential  in the political field  as in 
the economic. The first  and most obvious political effect  of  the contracts is the probable 
securing of  the next election to the present administration, or its designated successor. The 
$1000 000 advance to be made by the Company to the Government is evidently tube used in 
the traditional Costa Rican manner - as a campaign fund  during the last two years of  the 
administration's term. Possessed of  this quantity of  money, for  distribution in the form  of  roads, 
schools, watering troughs and other gratifications  for  the electorate the Cortés administration 
is in a position to make itself  invulnerable even to old ex-President Ricardo Jiménez, who, with 
the opposition that has been steadily coalescing around him, looms larger and larger as the 
opponent of  the administration's candidate in 1940. The defeat  of  Mr. Jiménez, or the heading 
off  of  his appearance as a candidate, would be a highly significant  development growing out 
of  the contract, both from  the national and the international standpoint. Already failing  in his 
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power of  command over his associates toward the end of  his last administration, and already 
at a very advanced age, Mr. Jiménez, whatever his personal virtues may be, would, if  he were 
to become President in 1940, serve only as a sort of  Wooden Horse of  Troy in which a coterie, 
probably headed by ex-Minister of  Foreign Affairs  Manuel F. Jiménez, would gain admittance 
to the political citadel. In such a set-up, Manuel F. Jiménez would exact, as recompense for 
the money of  Lindo Brothers that he would contribute to the Jiménez campaign fund,  the office 
of  First Designado to the presidency, which would make him president in the event of 
Mr. Ricardo Jiménez's demise, an event not unlikely in view of  the old ex-President's age. 
Nothing more obstructive of  the definite  and wholesome, if  unduly mild, new deal that is being 
carried out in Costa Rica, or more adverse to American interests in this country, than the 
coming into the presidency, or into a position to dominate the presidency, of  Manuel F. 
Jiménez could occur. 
The principal political prospect that the contract appears at present to open up is that 
Ricardo Pacheco Lara, Minister of  Public Works, who will distribute the $1 000 000, will be 
the next president. American educated, and a partner in one of  the principal American owned 
concerns in San José, Mr. Pacheco is markedly friendly  to the United States. 
The relative decline of  the coffee  power, in proportion to the rise in the banana is of  obvious 
political significance,  when it is considered that the coffee  interest is one the whole 
conservative, exploitative and European in its orientation, while the banana is progressive, 
democratic and American. 
In the sociological field,  the effects  of  the contract will be those naturally to be produced 
by the economic and political bearings that have been mentioned. On the Pacific  Coast and 
over the western section of  the central plateau the standard of  living will be raised, with all that 
such a rise Connotes. On the Atlantic Coast where some 20 000 blacks will be left  exposed to 
unemployment, the sociological phenomena associated with depression will be produced. In 
this connection, it may be said that the Government, desirous of  avoiding on the Pacific  the 
race problem that the importation of  black laborers has created on the Atlantic, hás forbidden 
the transfer  of  the Atlantic Coast blacks to the Pacific  side. Lacking black labor for  the Pacific, 
the Fruit Company plans, with the cooperation of  the Government, to import Nicaraguans, 
Hondurans and Panamanians. Thus, there is in prospect for  the Pacific  area, a relatively well 
paid immigrant society, closely related culturally to, and approximating ethnologically, the 
native stock. 
The international relations of  Costa Rica cannot but be influenced  by domestic 
developments such as have been mentioned. 
The first  and most obvious international development to which the banana contract is likely 
to lead is the settlement of  the boundary question between Costa Rica and Panama. The 
fulfillment  of  one of  the essential conditions of  the contract, the construction by the Company 
of  a railway to the Panamanian border, is contingent upon the definition  of  the border. The 
transit trade in bananas for  which the contract makes provision, the exchange of  labor with 
Panama, and the development of  the lands along the border all demand the fixing  of  the border 
line. Further, Congress, having approved a contract the fulfillment  of  which is contingent upon 
the boundary settlement, has to a degree estopped itself  from  obstructing, in its traditional 
way, such reasonable settlement as may be proposed to it for  approval. Solicitude on the part 
of  Congress for  Panamanian susceptibilities was evidenced in a change which it made in Article 
III of  the contract, to avoid the implication of  conflict  carried by the original wording, "in the 
zone in dispute" for  which was substituted the phrase "until the boundary line between the two 
countries is definitely  delineated". Again, in Article IV, the word "controversy", used to define 
the situation between Costa Rica and Panama, was eliminated. Indeed, the settlement of  the 
boundary question, which it is authoritatively reported in official  circles in San José, has been 
reached, and will be submitted to the extraordinary session of  Congress which is to convene 
at the end of  this month, apparently originated in the contract, and was given impulsion by 
press discussion of  the tactlessness of  the use of  such words as "dispute" and "controversy" in 
the text of  the contract as submitted to Congress. 
As has been indicated, the rise of  the banana power that the contract will promote, connotes 
a relative decline in the coffee  power. The former  is oriented toward the United States, where 
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it sells the bulk of  its products, educates its children and takes its holidays. The latter is oriented 
toward Europe, its market, cultural nursery and playground. The contract can, therefore, 
scarcely do otherwise than dilute the European influence  in Costa Rica, and strengthen the 
American. Moreover, increased production and exportation of  bananas, the great bulk of 
which will go to the United States to swell with dollars the national income, will diminish the 
exceedingly strong sense of  economic dependence on Europe that is apparent in the 
Government and sections of  the trading community. Feeling the comfortable  assurance that 
possible impairment of  the European market for  coffee  will be more than compensated by 
increase in American consumption of  bananas, the Government will be in a much better 
psychological situation to resist such European commercial hi-jacking as that involved in the 
German compensation system. 
Japanese penetration in Costa Rica in the last three or four  years has been successful  largely 
because of  two conditions:- The pressing need in this country for  ultra cheap merchandise for 
the low paid populace, and the need for  devising economic activities for  the economically 
retarded Pacific  area. These two conditions gave rise to a boom in imports from  Japan, and 
led the Costa Rican Government to accept Japanese proposals for  cotton growing on the 
Pacific.  The contract by raising wages will weaken the need for  the cheapest goods, and by 
providing a major industry for  the Pacific  will deprive Japanese cotton growing of  much of  its 
appeal. 
Upon the important matter of  relations between the Government and the Company, the 
contract will have pronounced effect,  will, indeed, put the relationship upon a new basis, or 
return it to an old basis. As Mr. Jefferson  Coolidge, Chairman of  the Board of  Directors of 
the United Fruit Company, observed to an officer  of  the Department on May 5, 1938, the 
Company will as a result of  the contract be put into a position of  greater dependency upon 
Government policy than at any time during the last twenty years, and direct cooperation of  the 
two parties will be essential. Over a period of  twenty years the Company in its operations in 
the Atlantic area has gradually withdrawn from  the production of  bananas, narrowing its 
activities more and more to a point where its function  would be that of  buyer and shipper. 
According to the Manager of  the Company in Costa Rica, this process has reached a point 
where at present the Company produces only about 20-30% of  the bananas that it ships, 
purchasing 70-80% from  growers, either completely independent or related to the Company 
only by contract. The achievement of  this position was possible only after  pioneering had been 
done, because easy going individual growers from  the central plateau, disinclined to reside in 
the hot lowlands and given to absentee lordism, could not be relied upon to carry on the 
arduous work of  developing virgin area. Further it was possible only where banana disease was 
nonexistent, or of  light incidence, because individual growers lacked the knowledge, 
technique and facilities  for  combatting disease. In the Pacific  development, there must be a 
reversion to pioneering, and, while the area itself  is not diseased, it is dangerously exposed to 
infection  from  the Atlantic area. Hence, on the Pacific  side the Company must assume the 
responsibilities of  functioning  as a grower; and conditions the reverse of  those existing in the 
developed Atlantic area will prevail. The Company will probably produce 70-80% of  the 
bananas grown on the Pacific  for  some years to come. 
This means that the Company comes into direct contact and association with the 
Government to a much higher degree than where it functions  only as an intermediary, and that 
it is much more exposed to the effects  of  Government attitude and policy than where it enjoys 
the protection of  a buffer  of  native banana growers. 
This situation is reflected  in the contract, which contains provisions for  what it is obviously 
intended shall be an increase in Government control. Throughout the contract there is 
assertion of  the paramount of  the Government, in provisions for  inspections, the issuance of 
permits, et cetera. Noteworthy is Article VIII, under which the Company expressly submits 
itself  to the laws of  the republic, and expressly renounces diplomatic recourse to settle 
differences  that arise out of  the contract. This provision is the more striking, because it replaces 
the arbitration on equal terms as between the Government and the Company for  which 
previous contracts have provided. 
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Indeed, the very essence of  the contract is joint enterprise (with the Government the senior 
partner), for  the intention is that the Company shall create property of  which the Government 
is the ultimate owner. 
What will be the outcome of  this altered relationship it is difficult  to forecast,  as the factors 
shaping the outcome are incalculable. On the one hand, the Company is deprived of  the 
protection of  the buffer  constituted by growers, for  the most part influential  Costa Ricans, 
attached to the Company by business ties, and ready to rally to it politically or otherwise in 
case of  need. On the other it will acquire, as time goes on, a large group of  direct employees, 
well paid, and presumably loyal, who should be ultimately influential  in domestic affairs.  Such 
acquisition, however, must be a gradual process, as, initially at least, most of  the lower 
employees will be aliens, without connections and influence  in Costa Rica. On the whole, it 
seems likely that for  some years to come the Company will be in a considerably less favorable 
position to control national affairs  to its advantage than it has been in the past, although it is 
not to be forgotten  that the present administration, if  it succeeds itself,  will do so largely with 
the aid of  Fruit Company money, and may, therefore,  be influenced  in its attitude toward the 
Company by a sense of  dependency and gratitude. 
The development contract, as indicated in my despatch No. 347 of  July 23,1938, was the 
subject for  a long and heated debate in Congress, in the course of  which the ever present, 
irreducible residue of  chauvinists and Gringo haters took full  advantage of  the opportunity 
afforded  them for  the venting of  their feelings  about the Company and the United States. There 
was much contentious press publicity, and the whole question of  American economic influence 
in Costa Rica was aired. The atmosphere thus engendered is being rapidly dispelled, and there 
seems to be promise that when it has been completely dissipated the Company, and, by 
association, American interests in general, will occupy a more favorable  position in the public 
and the official  mind than before  the contract. The closeness of  the scrutiny that the opposition 
minority in Congress was able to direct toward the contract may be judged by the fact  that 
fifty-one  changes were made in it during its passage through Congress. 
The foregoing  is a synthesis of  information  obtained over a somewhat prolonged period in 
conversation with Fruit Company officials,  Government officials,  banana growers, bankers, 
and other individuals, and from  the press, reference  works on the banana industry and 
statistical and other publications. 
Respectfully  yours, 
(signed) 
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From: Revision of  Cía. Bananera's Contracts; Memorandum to Ambassador Hill, from  Second 
Secretary of  United States Embassy, San José, Costa Rica, sent as enclosure with letter to 
John L. Ohmans, Costa Rica Desk Officer,  Office  of  Middle American Affairs,  Department 
of  State, January 8,1954; Lot file  57 D15, box 5, filed  with documents related to the United 
Fruit Company; Records of  the Office  of  Middle American Affairs,  Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, 1951-55; Diplomatic Division, NARA. 
THE FOREIGN SERVICE 
OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
January 8,1954 
CONFIDENTIAL AMERICAN EMBASSY, 
San José, Costa Rica. 
Declassified  NARA 5/10/88 
Dear Jack: 
We have had several discussions in the office  regarding the United Fruit Company 
negotiations and, because of  John Crume's interest in the subject, I have asked him to prepare 
a memorandum on the negotiations. 
I found  the memorandum interesting and am forwarding  it to you, not as an expression of 
how the problem should be solved, but just as one man's opinion of  developments at this end. 
With kind personal regards, I remain 
Sincerely yours, 
(signed) 
Robert C. Hill 
American Ambassador 
Enclosure: 
Copy of  Memorandum 
John L. Ohmans, Esquire 
Costa Rica Desk Officer, 
Office  of  Middle American Affairs, 





Declassified  NARA 5/10/88 
COPY 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Ambassador Hill. 
From: John B. Crume, Second Secretary of  Embassy. 
Subject: Revision of  Cía. Bananera's Contracts. 
I. Introduction 
President Figueres has set in writing his proposal for  new contract terms for  Cía. Bananera, 
while the United Fruit Company has made an initial offer  of  its own. Neither plan is fully 
detailed. The two parties are in a very early stage of  discussion, and it is probably still too early 
to forecast  the probable outcome of  the negotiations. Nonetheless, the fact  that the two parties 
have now made concrete proposals renders in order an analysis of  their respective positions. 
In setting forth  my views on the revision of  Cía. Bananera's contracts, I am writing, you will 
appreciate, as an outsider, lacking full  command of  all the details and ramifications  involved. 
In particular, I am not well informed  on United States tax rulings in respect to deductions for 
taxes paid abroad, nor do I have thorough grasp of  the effect  contract revision in Costa Rica 
would have on the United Fruit Company's operations in other countries or on other foreign 
investments in the area. 
The basic question that the United Fruit Company faces,  in my opinion, is what level of 
compromise will satisfy  President Figueres. Throughout this analysis, I am assuming that 
Figueres will insist on major counter-concessions from  the company. 
II. Figueres' Proposal and the Fruit Company's Initial Offer 
The table below summarizes the proposal for  new contract terms offered  by President 
Figueres in his letter to you dated December 19,1953 and the United Fruit Company's initial 
offer  of  December 12,1953, as stated in Mr. Hammer's undated, unsigned memorandum to 
you. As I understand it, the company's offer  did not become an item of  discussion between the 
two parties. No mention of  this offer  is made in Figueres' own proposal. 
Table IV.7.1 
PROPOSALS FOR CIA. BANANERA'S CONTRACT REVISION 
Item Figueres' Proposal Company's Offer 
1. Income Tax Company be subject 
to national income tax 
schedules. Maximum 
rate to be 50 percent. 
Company not be subject to national income tax schedules but to 
pay profit  tax of  20 per cent rather than 15 percent. 
2. A d d i t i o n a l 
Income Tax 
Benefit 
No comment. Company to pay a minimum of  33-1/3 per cent of  its gross profits 
in the form  of  total tax payments (profit  tax, land tax, customs, 
etc.). If  these payments fall  below 33-1/3 percent of  total profits 
before  taxes, company to payan additional sum, as income tax, to 
make up the difference. 
3. Customs Company be subject 
to national customs 
tariffs. 
Company continue to enjoy custom exemption on certain specified 
major imports, which amount to 70-75 percent of  monetaiy value 
of  total customs exemption, but be subject to duty on all other 
imports. 
4. Social Services State assume cost of 
social services of-
fered  by company. 
No comment. 
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The results which the two schemes would have given for  1952 operations are compared in 
Table 2, with the actual situation in that year. The computations are, in some instances, my 
own estimates. A number of  figures  are approximations; only the company could give a precise 
accounting. The estimates, while containing a margin of  error, give a general idea of  the 
comparative incomes involved. 
Table IV.7.2 















1. Income Tax 
2. Additional Income Tax Benefit 
3. Additional Customs 
4. Social services6 
Total 
$7 500 000a 
2 800 000e 
555 800 
$10 855 800 
$3 474 300 $2 605 700 
528 600b 
813 300d 
558 800' 555 300 
$5 375 0008 $3 161 000 
Computed as follows:  A 15 percent profit  tax of  $2 605 700 indicates a profit  before  taxes of  $17 370 000. From 
this amount is deducted the additional customs payment and added the saying on social services. Fifty  percent 
tax on this sum is about $7 500 000. This amount is an estimate, since the income tax would be graduated up to 
50 percent. 
''The additional amount paid to bring total tax payments to 33-1/3 percent of  gross profits. 
cBased on total exemptions of  CR015.7 millions in 1952. 
^Based on only partial customs exemption. This is the company's own figure. 
eFigueres has not spelled out what social services the State would assume. Computation is based on the net cost 
to the company of  schooling, hospital and dispensary operations. 
*The company in its memorandum does not take up the matter of  Social services. This calculation assumes that 
the company continues to bear their cost. 
®Total becomes $4 257 400, if  company intended that the State pay for  the cost of  social services. 
It must be borne in mind that Table 2 does not include all of  the company's payments to the 
Costa Rican Government. In 1952, the company paid $1 461 500 in other taxes besides the 
profit  (or income) tax. These other payments include such items as customs duties on 
non-exempt importations, consular tax, banana export tax, cacao export tax, land tax, etc. 
Including these payments, the schedules are as follows: 
I II 
$11317 300 $6 836 500 
III. Income Tax 
At this stage of  negotiations, President Figueres and the Fruit Company are far  apart on 
the income tax issue, not only in dollars and cents but also in principle. The company is willing 
to pay a somewhat higher income tax, but it wants a fixed  limit (20 percent) on its liability. Such 
limitation conflicts  with the principles which Figueres gives as the basis for  new contract terms: 
non-discrimination, national sovereignty, and justice. The conflict  is plain in regard to the first 




President Figueres, on the other hand, violates his own principles in seeking to impose a 50 
percent income tax on the Fruit Company. Even though based on a national income tax law, 
it would be discriminatory against the company. On a graduated tax scale, probably only the 
Fruit Company would be in the bracket subject to the maximum tax. Moreover, the few  Costa 
Rican income earners who would fall  in the high brackets would, if  past and present practice 
continues, largely evade sizable taxation. Figueres originally spoke of  a 30 percent maximum 
rate for  the new income tax law, expressing the opinion at the time that this is as steep a rate 
as the social economy will bear. (See Embdes No. 123 of  August 17,1953 and No. 132 of  August 
21,1953.) He also said on that occasion that he would not insist on a 50 percent share of  the 
company's profits  although he was intent on eliminating better-than-national treatment. 
If  the negotiations are to be put on the basis of  principle, as President Figueres calls for,  it 
seems to me that the object is to have the Fruit Company subject to national income tax 
schedules but that injustice the maximum rate should not exceed 30 percent. It might even be 
less. Various computations and considerations might be made, for  the sake of  appearances, 
to show that the Government receives a given share, say 35,40,45, or 50 percent, of  the Fruit 
Company's gross earnings. The company's 33-1/3 percent offer  is a step in this direction. 
I am not at all clear regarding United States legislation and rulings on taxation on the 
earnings abroad of  United States companies; however, I understand that the United States 
Treasury allows the tax payments made abroad, up to a certain limit, to be deducted from  the 
United States tax payment. 
According to a recent memorandum of  conversation from  the Department, United Fruit 
Company representatives informed  Messrs. Woodward and Leddy that the company can now 
receive full  deduction from  its United States taxes for  an income tax payment up to 24 percent 
in Costa Rica. Whether the company can obtain any United States tax deduction, full  or partial, 
on a foreign  tax payment above 24 percent is, I gather, being explored by United Fruit Company 
officials. 
Should the Fruit Company consent to be subject to Costa Rica's national income tax 
schedule, it would be concerned that it not place itself  at the mercy of  Costa Rican legislators. 
It would want assurance of  a maximum schedule not to exceed a certain percentage, let us say, 
25 or 30 percent. Perhaps an article could be inserted in the revised contract which would 
recognize the Government's responsibility not to impose discriminatory taxation against the 
company but which would be so worded as not to violate the principle of  national sovereignty. 
IV. Customs 
President Figueres and the United Fruit Company have also a wide gap to close on the 
customs issue. The company has at least taken a step in offering  to give up customs exemptions 
on all but its major imports. Again, however, partial exemption violate Figures' principles of 
non-discrimination and national sovereignty. 
Any customs charges which the Fruit Company agrees to pay represent increments to the 
cost of  operations. Unlike the case of  added local tax payments there is not a corresponding 
reduction in payments in the United States. Still there would be some small reduction in total 
tax payments since net profits  before  taxation would be diminished by the extent of  the customs 
charges. 
Personally, I believe it would be desirable for  the United Fruit Company to relinquish its 
customs exemptions. Figueres does have a valid point, in my opinion, when he says that 
conditions have changed from  those of  50 years ago "when the banana business was unknown 
and difficulties  for  its realization were very great". With customs exemptions the company, now 
a thriving enterprise without need of  protection and special aid, operates under privileged 
conditions. It has full  right to insist upon continued customs exemptions in accordance with 
contract guarantees; nonetheless, I see strong public relations arguments for  abandoning the 
exemptions. 
If  the Fruit Company did agree to be subject to national tariff  schedules, it would have to 
pay an additional CRC/15 or 16 millions in customs duties to the Costa Rican Government, 
based on the present tariff  schedules and on a level of  imports equal to those of  1952. Against 
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this cost might be set off  about CR<£3 millions, which the company spent on hospitals, 
dispensaries and schools in 1952 and which Figueres proposes that the State take over. If  labor 
sanitation and malaria control are included, the total figure  comes close to CRÇ5 millions. 
Perhaps, in return for  payment of  all customs duties, the company might ask that the State 
reimburse it for  the costs of  workers' housing. This item ran close to CR06 millions in 1952. It 
is conceivable that if  the State relieved housing, the company's savings in this field  would not 
be very far  from  compensating for  the added costs in operation from  payments of  all customs 
charges. 
In giving up customs exemptions, the Fruit Company would want to be protected against 
important future  increases in customs duties, especially on such an item as copper sulphate of 
which the company is virtually the sole importer. Perhaps, as suggested on income tax liability, 
the new contract could be so worded as to give the company protection from  discriminatory 
customs duties without denial of  the principle of  national sovereignty. Any concessions on 
custom duty payments, as a further  thought, would also have to be considered in terms of 
custom tariffs  in the other countries where the FruitCompany operates. In this respect, the 
customs issue is probably more complicated than the tax issue, since the latter resolves for  all 
countries largely about the United States Treasury's rulings on joint tax participation. 
V. Social Services 
As previously stated, I am not informed  as to whether the company's initial offer  carried 
the understanding that the company would continue to bear the cost of  social services. No 
mention is made of  social services in the memorandum; but, since the memorandum does not 
deduct the cost of  these services in its table of  added government receipts, the implication is 
that the Fruit Company continue to pay. If  so, there is a saving to the company of  some 
$500 000 to $600 000 if,  as Figueres proposes, the State assumes the cost of  these operations. 
The Fruit Company can have no unalterable objection to the State's taking over the financial 
obligation of  social services. Furthermore, in furtherance  of  Figueres' principle of  national 
sovereignty, it is desirable that the State provide the social services. I should think there is no 
fundamental  issue here. 
VI. Conclusions 
As I view it, there are only two major points to be settled in the contract revision: the 
company's liability to income tax and the company's liability to customs duty. Other issues and 
ideas, I feel,  are either minor or extraneous. In particular, I do not take very seriously Figueres' 
suggestion that the State buy out the United Fruit Company's holdings. The idea, which appeals 
to Figueres as bold and forward-looking,  is too impractical -or at least too immature- to play 
a part in present negotiations, in my opinion. Some satisfaction  might be given to Figueres in 
this respect, however, by the company's offer  to sell the State lands or secondary operations 
which the company might not want. I am thinking particularly of  the Quepos area and of  cacao 
and African  oil palm operations. Likewise, I consider Figueres' request for  a 50 percent share 
for  the company's profits  unwarranted and beside the point. Such a division cannot be 
defended  on logic or on justice. Still if  desired for  propaganda purpose, depending on the 
accounting method used and the items included in the calculation, a figure  of  50 percent or 
some smaller percentage can be arrived at, I believe, within a framework  of  reasonable contract 
terms. 
Personally I should like to see the principle of  non-discrimination applied as fully  as 
possible. This would entail the company's liability to customs duties on all imports. This added 
cost might be partly offset  by the State's assuming responsibility for  social services and perhaps 
housing. It would likewise mean higher income tax. For the sake of  national sovereignty, it 
seems to me preferable  that the company be subject to the national income tax schedule, but 
only if  the maximum is fixed  at a reasonable level and some guarantee given against 
discriminatory increases in the future.  If  the company can receive deduction on United States 
tax payments to provide for  about 30 percent tax payment abroad, the maximum rate might 
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then be this amount. If  the deduction would cover less than this amount, the company might 
then decide either to pay the difference  out of  pocket or to insist upon Figueres' compromising 
by fixing  a maximum of  say 25 percent in the national income tax legislation. 
Let Figueres think in terms of  principles and the United Fruit Company in terms of  dollars 
and cents. In the effect,  the two can be reconciled, although the formula  reached will require 
some compromise on both sides -as is correct. I offer  for  consideration the thought that the 
company determine an ultimate offer;  say, full  customs liability (with the understanding that 
the State takes over social services) and income tax liability up to 25 or 30 percent. Figueres 
might then be given to understand that the company is prepared at once to make a generous 
but undisclosed final  offer,  provided Figueres can be counted on to cooperate on his part and 
not take the offer  as a stepping stone to bigger demands. Otherwise, it might be intimated to 
Figueres that the company has no alternative other than to haggle, to prolong the negotiations, 
and to fight  over every dollar. Figueres wants a bold new approach in State-Company relations. 
Why not a good offer  from  the company, a gracious compromise on Figueres' part where 
necessary, a quick conclusion to the negotiations, and a public show of  new understanding 
between the two parties? The suggestion, I acknowledge, is risky and possibly naive. The 
approach, if  tried, would have to be handled with extreme adroitness. 
In recapitulation, I offer  an estimate of  the results of  a compromise settlement of  the 
company's full  liability to income tax of  30 percent maximum and total payment of  customs 
duties, with the State's assuming the cost of  all social services, including housing. Operations 
in 1952 are used as basis of  calculations. 
Table IV.7.3 
ESTIMATE OF THE RESULTS OF A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE 
GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA AND THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY, 





1. Income Tax $7 500 000 
2. Additional Income Tax Benefit 
3. Additional Customs 2 800 000 
4. Social Services 555 800 
Total $10 855 000 




$5 375 000 
$5 000 000 
2 800 000 
-2 000 000 
$5 800 000 
For not much more loss in net revenues, as I compute it, than involved in its initial offer, 
the company can satisfy  Figueres on his principles of  non-discrimination and national 
sovereignty, provided Figueres is prepared to apply his "non-discrimination" line both ways. 
American Embassy, 
San José, January 6,1954. 
345 
E. PLANNING FOR FUTURE INVESTMENTS 
8. INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL INVESTORS (1956) 
From: U.S Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Foreign Commerce; American Republic 
Division, Investment in Central America: Basic Information for United States 
Businessmen. Study prepared by firm  of  Albert O. Hirschman and George Kalmanoff, 
Economic Consultants (Bogotá, Colombia, December 1956), pp. 3,5-9,45-48. 
Introduction 
This investment handbook covers the five  Central American countries of  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. It was found  advisable to deal jointly with these five  countries 
because of  the relatively small size of  each, and because of  their geographic proximity and historical 
ties, and the similarity of  their economic structure. Moreover, certain types of  investors regard 
Central America as a distinct area or unit. 
The movement toward economic cooperation, and integration among the five  countries, which 
has made progress in the past few  years and which should substantially increase the attractiveness 
of  the area to potential investors, was another factor.  The Republic of  Panama has not been included 
in the handbook because it is not participating in this cooperative movement and because it occupies 
a special place from  the point of  view of  the United States investor as a result of  the existence of  the 
Panama Canal and Canal Zone. 
The five  countries, situated in the narrow isthmus between Mexico and Panama, have a combined 
population of  almost 10 million people, and they have one of  the highest rates of  population increase 
in the world today. Since the end of  World War II, their economic development has made significant 
strides, but it lags in comparison with some of  the larger Latin American countries of  the tropical 
zone. Agriculture and industry have advanced appreciably, but there are abundant untapped 
agricultural resources and investment opportunities in manufacturing. 
In response to public demand and following  a worldwide trend, the Governments have adopted 
active economic development policies, ranging from  the intensification  of  transportation and electric 
power programs to the establishment of  special development banks and institutions. They also have 
taken special measures to encourage private investment, whether domestic or foreign.  All five 
countries welcome foreign  capital and, with the exception of  the period of  Communist domination 
in Guatemala, the official  and private attitudes toward foreigners  in general and United States 
citizens in particular always have been friendly  and free  of  excessive nationalism. 
In spite of  many similarities in history, geography, and economic structure, there are notable 
differences  among the five  countries. Each country has developed its own institutions and policies, 
and the stage and pace of  development varies: Consequently, the businessman who may think of  the 
region as a whole as a promising area for  investment should study carefully  the comparative 
characteristics of  each country before  making his choice. 
For example, Guatemala is likely to be particularly attractive to the potential investor because it 
has the largest urban center of  the area and because a backlog has accumulated of  investment 
opportunities which were not exploited during the period of  Communist influence  which ended in 
1954. El Salvador has a very high population density and a fairly  well developed industry, and it has 
negotiated free-trade  treaties with the other markets as well. 
Honduras, thus far  the least developed among the five  countries, for  this very reason offers  many 
opportunities and appears to be on the threshold of  important economic progress as a result of 
presently planned basic improvements in transportation and electric power. Nicaragua has 
witnessed the most rapid economic development in recent years, originating principally in rapidly 
expanding cotton cultivation but sustained by advances in many other sectors of  the economy. Finally, 
Costa Rica has the highest level of  general education and per capita purchasing power. 
To enable the prospective investor to review and understand the common characteristics of  the 
five  countries, as well as the most salient differences  among them, this first  part of  the study deals 
with Central America as a whole. Special sections are devoted to a discussion of  the movement 
toward economic integration and an appraisal of  the total size of  the Central American market and 
its five  national components. The five  countries are dealt with separately in succeeding parts. 
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CHAPTER I The Climate for Foreign Investment 
EXTENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Private foreign  investment in Central America has traditionally been of  considerable importance, 
primarily because of  the development by the fruit  companies of  banana plantations and related 
transportation and other facilities  for  their export trade. The preponderance of  these companies in 
foreign  investment activities in the area is suggested by the relatively small amounts of  such 
investment found  in El Salvador and Nicaragua, the two countries which do not include bananas 
among their principal exports. 
The development of  the banana trade was accompanied by important investments by the 
companies in services necessary to their operations, such as railroads, electric power, housing, 
schools, and other social services. In addition, the fruit  companies have branched out into other 
agricultural activities, including the cultivation of  abacá, cacao, and the African  oil palm, and 
-particularly in Honduras- a variety of  other activities, such as breweries and banking. 
Non-fruit  company investments that have been important to the development of  some of  the 
countries are principally those in public service railroads and electric power. Other fields  that have 
attracted investment include telecommunications, lumber exploitation, gold and silver mining, 
petroleum distribution, and banking and insurance. Èxploration for  petroleum by foreign  capital 
has been going on for  some years in Costa Rica, and is likely to expand in Guatemala, following  the 
adoption of  a new Petroleum Code in August 1955. Such exploration is also under way in Honduras. 
In recent years, as the countries have pushed programs of  economic diversification,  considerable 
interest by foreign  investors has been noted in a varied range of  industrial activities, including lumber 
mills, construction materials, soluble coffee,  hotels, fertilizers,  and food  processing. 
The United States is the principal source of  private foreign  investment in Central America. Other 
sources, however, are of  some significance,  mainly as a result of  investments made in earlier periods. 
For example, important railroads in El Salvador and Costa Rica are British owned, and British 
investments in banking exist in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The principal 
electric power company in El Salvador is Canadian owned. The most important German investments 
in the area were in coffee  farms  and a railroad in Guatemala, but these investments were 
expropriated during World War II. 
As indicated in table 1, United States private direct investments in Central America amounted 
to some $280 million at the end of  1953, having risen from  $255 millón at the end of  1950, largely as 
a result of  increased fruit  company investments in Honduras. The largest amounts are found  in the 
three important banana-exporting countries, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Aside from 
the fruit  company investments, the principal investments in these countries are in railroads and 
electric power in Guatemala, mining in Honduras, and electric power in Costa Rica. 
Table IV.8.1 
PRINCIPAL FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND FOREIGN LOANS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
(In  millions  of  dollars) 
Loans 8 of 
U. S. private International Bank Export-Import 
Country direct invest- for  Reconstruction Bank loansb 
ments® and Development 
Guatemala 107 c 0.5 d 
El Salvador 21 23.6 .1 
Honduras 82 e 
Nicaragua 9 8.4 f .4 
Costa Rica 62 ... 10.3 g 
Total 281 32.0 113 
* As of  end of  1953. 
b Outstanding as of  June 30,1955. 
® Highway loan of  $18.2 million granted July 29,1955. 
Exporter credit for  communications equipment of  $675 000 approved August 10,1955. 
' Highway loan of  $4.2 million granted December 27,1955. 
Additional loans: $7.5 million for  electric power on July 8,1955; and $1.5 million for  agriculture and livestock on August 26,1955. 
8 Inter-American Highway loan of  $9 540 000 granted November 7,1955. 
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The major United States investment in El Salvador is in railroads, and in Nicaragua -where the 
investment is the smallest of  any of  the countries- it is largely in lumber exploitation and gold mining. 
The recent activities and interest of  United States investors in opportunities in various fields  of 
manufacturing  and service industries have been particularly noticeable in Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Costa Rica. 
Foreign investment in the form  of  long-term loans has been limited in the area in recent years to 
operations by the International Bank for  Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import 
Bank of  Washington. As of  June 30,1955, outstanding loans of  the International Bank in the area 
amounted to $32 million, and of  the Export-Import Bank, to $11 million. On that date, the 
International Bank loans were confined  to El Salvador and Nicaragua and the Export-Import Bank 
loans were concentrated largely in Costa Rica. 
International Bank activities in Central America are not reflected  fully  in these loans to El 
Salvador and Nicaragua outstanding on June 30,1955. The Bank has given considerable technical 
assistance to countries in the area in planning the development of  their economies; comprehensive 
survey missions developed reports for  Guatemala and Nicaragua, and additional loans have recently 
been granted. 
In July 1955 the Bank granted its first  loan -in the amount of  $18 million- to Guatemala, to help 
finance  that country's new Atlantic and Pacific  coastal highways. At the end of  1955, an additional 
Bank loan to Guatemala of  $1.7 million was reported pending, to be granted to the Production 
Development Institute (Instituto de Fomento de la Producción) for  agricultural machinery, cattle 
breeding stock, and small grain-storage units. 
In December 1955 the Bank made its first  loan to Honduras, in the amount of  $4.2 millón for 
highway construction and maintenance. Only two loans have been granted to El Salvadoro -one for 
electric power and the other for  the Pacific  coastal highway, similar to the Guatemala project-but 
they constitute the largest credit to any of  the five  countries. Loans to Nicaragua have been more 
numerous and for  more varied purposes. Including additional loans in July and August 1955 
amounting to $9 million, the total of  some $18 million granted to Nicaragua represents eight loans 
for  highway construction, electric power expansion, and agricultural development. 
The only country that has not yet received financial  assistance from  the International Bank is 
Costa Rica. However, it probably will apply in the near future  for  a loan to its banking system to 
finance  the importation of  capital equipment once settlement has been effected  of  certain external 
debts in default. 
Export-Import Bank lending in Central America has been almost wholly to Costa Rica. A loan 
of  $9.5 million was granted to Costa Rica in November 1955 to enable that country to finance  its 
contribution for  completion of  the Inter-American Highway. The $10 million outstanding as of  June 
30, 1955 (see Table 1), represent loans granted in the early 1940's also for  the Inter-American 
Highway, and more recent credits for  electric power development and the purchase of  aviation 
equipment. The small loans to the other countries cover mining and telecommunications equipment 
in Guatemala, a small balance outstanding on a 1941 Inter-American Highway loan to El Salvador, 
and electric power equipment in Nicaragua. 
Important United States funds  are being spent in the area by the Bureau of  Public Roads, which 
supervises the construction and improvement of  the Inter-American Highway and defrays  two-thirds 
of  the cost of  this program. In 1955, the United States Congress appropriated $63 million to make 
possible the completion in 3 years of  the highway from  the Mexican-Guatemalan border to the 
Panama Canal. In addition, a sizable program of  grant aid by the United States Government has 
been carried out in Guatemala since mid-1954, to finance  principally highway and hospital 
construction. Under this program $4.6 million of  United States aid funds  were spent in the year 
ended June 30,1955, another $4.6 million were carried over for  expenditure in the subsequent fiscal 
year, and new funds  in the amount of  $15 million were appropriated for  the year ending June 30, 
1956. 
Active technical assistance by the United States Government's International Cooperation 
Administration is being carried out in all of  the Central American countries in a variety of  fields, 
including principally agriculture, health and sanitation, and education. Advisory work is also being 
done in some of  the countries in the fields  of  public administration, industry, electric power, 
transportation, fisheries,  and housing. 
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the other countries have values as follows:  Guatemala, 1 quetzal per dollar; El Salvador, 2.50 colones 
per dollar; and Honduras 2 lempiras per dollar. 
In Nicaragua, the principle of  free  entry and exit of  foreign  capital is contained in the Foreign 
Investment Law of  March 1955. However, such capital must register, and the investment must be 
approved as advantageous to the national economy. Once registered in this way, investments may at 
any time be fully  repatriated and profits  transferred  without limit. The investment is registered in 
the currency of  the country of  its origin, so that the value of  the investment for  repatriation is 
protected against the risk of  exchange depreciation. Moreover, the exchange rate at which capital 
and profit  transfers  are effected  is that applying to essential imports. This provision has of  course 
lost its practical importance since the unification  of  exchange rates in July 1955. 
In Costa Rica, capital registered and brought in at the official  exchange rate has the right to 
transfer  profits  at this rate each year to the extent of  10 percent of  the value of  the investment. The 
capital itself  may be repatriated at the official  rate in the discretion of  the Central Bank, and 
depending upon the country's exchange availabilities. Beyond these limits, transfers  may be freely 
effected  through the free  exchange market for  either registered or unregistered foreign  capital; 
unregistered foreign  capital, which, of  course, has no rights to exchange at the official  rate, is initially 
brought in also at the free  rate. 
Protection against future  risks of  inconvertibility of  exchange in Central America exists also by 
virtue of  the fact  that three of  the countries -Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica- signed 
investment guaranty agreements with the United States Government in 1955. Pursuant to these 
agreements, new American investors may be eligible to purchase insurance against the risks of 
exchange inconvertibility and expropriation. The two countries that have not yet entered into such 
an agreement either maintain no exchange control (El Salvador) or provide for  unlimited 
repatriation of  capital and transfer  of  profits  for  registered foreign  investments (Nicaragua). 
Thus, in those countries in the area that have restricted exchange transactions because of 
exchange difficulties,  the trend has been to enact provisions that minimize the impact on foreign 
investments and that accord such investments fair  treatment in comparison with other exchange 
requirements of  the economy. The sole restriction on transfers  that now exists in the area -in Costa 
Rica- limits only the amount of  transfers  that may be made at the more favorable,  official  rate of 
exchange. 
INCENTIVE LEGISLATION 
During recent years some of  the Central American countries have enacted legislation providing 
for  tax incentives for  the establishment of  enterprises, particularly in new fields  of  manufacturing. 
This legislation, of  general application, is in line with the trend of  moving away from  the individual 
concessions traditionally granted to large foreign  investors under contracts with the governments. 
The new type of  legislation has been developed to apply equally to qualifying  domestic and foreign 
investors, as the countries have embarked upon policies of  stimulating development and 
diversification  of  their economies. 
Legislation of  this type exists in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica, but it is of  limited scope 
in the latter country. Costa Rica and the two countries entirely without such legislation -Honduras 
and Nicaragua- are now studying and drafting  general laws to encourage investment in new 
industries. The principal laws in effect  date from  1940 in Costa Rica and 1947 in Guatemala, and 
are most extensive in their application in El Salvador, where several such measures were enacted in 
the period 1949-54. 
El Salvador, in addition to a general Law for  the Development of  Manufacturing  Industries, has 
special incentive laws covering the cement industry, which antedated the general law and are still in 
effect,  and special laws for  the establishment of  hotels and of  theaters and motion-picture houses. 
In Guatemala, mining and petroleum concessionaires can obtain certain import duty exemptions, 
and manufacturing  industries, pursuant to the Industrial Development Law of  1947, can obtain 
exemptions and reductions in the real estate and profits  taxes as well. The concessions under the 
general law range up to 10 years. In both Guatemala and El Salvador, an important criterion 
determining the extent of  the concession is whether the enterprise is new, but the use of  local raw 
materials is another important governing factor,  particularly in Guatemala. In El Salvador, this latter 
criterion does not determine the extent of  the concession; all enterprises in that country that are 
granted a concession are expected merely to give priority to the use of  domestic raw materials. Both 
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El Salvador and Guatemala require certain minimum participation by local capital as qualification 
in the granting of  concessions. This requirement is somewhat more stringently defined  in Guatemala. 
Costa Rica at present merely provides for  import duty exemptions and protection against foreign 
competition for  new industries, according to a general law of  1940. The duty exemptions can extend 
up to 5 years. A specific  law, enacted in 1949, which provided for  such exemptions for  canneries, 
was followed  by the establishment of  several such enterprises. 
In view of  the legislation recently adopted and in process of  formulation  in all of  the Central 
American countries, the trend appears to be one of  extending fiscal  incentives for  the establishment 
of  neGustries considered to be beneficial  to the economies, particularly in manufacturing  fields.  The 
tax exemptions and reductions that appear easiest to obtain are those involving import duties on 
machinery and equipment, but relief  from  direct taxes such as those on income can also be obtained, 
depending on the importance attached to the industry by the local authorities. From the point of 
view of  United States investors, however, the exemptions from  indirect taxes are likely to be of  greater 
importance, since these taxes cannot be credited against United States tax liabilities although they 
can be deducted as a business expense. 
OUTLOOK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
In summary, the quickened pace of  economic development noticeable in Central America today 
is coupled with favorable  attitudes in all five  countries toward private enterprise, as well as with fair 
treatment of  foreign  investors. 
In the past the region has attracted primarily the interest of  large investors who contributed much 
to the development of  public utilities and to the stimulation of  agricultural production for  export in 
isolated sections. With the elimination in recent years of  frictions  that had developed with local 
governments, effected  by the revision of  early concession contracts, and with the continued existence 
of  large agricultural resources to be profitably  developed, these investments are being expanded. 
Transportation and power development is being aided by loans from  the international financial 
institutions and by grants from  the United States Government. The countries are also taking full 
advantage of  technical assistance made available by United States and international agencies. 
Finally, a new type of  private investment, of  a more diversified  nature, and often  in association 
with local capital, has developed in recent years in response to the economic progress on a broad 
front  that is now being made. To accommodate and encourage this type of  investment, there is a 
growing tendency to enact general legislation that fixes  uniform  conditions for  all investors. 
Treatment of  foreign  investments in general is nondiscriminatory but certain measures encourage 
particularly the formation  of  joint enterprises with the participation of  local capital. Tax incentives 
for  the creation of  new industries exist in three of  the countries, and such legislation is being 
liberalized in these countries and being drafted  in the other two. There is no control over foreign 
exchange transactions in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, and in Nicaragua and Costa Rca 
the exchange rules for  remitting profits  and dividends and for  the treatment of  foreign  investments 
in general are fair.  Three of  the countries have signed investment guaranty agreements with the 
United States. 
To these specific  favorable  aspects of  the climate for  foreign  investments must be added the 
general goodwill enjoyed by United States citizens, the friendly  and cooperative attitudes 
characteristic òf  small countries, and the wider horizons opened by the area's progress toward 
economic integration. 
This favorable  account of  the climate for  foreign  investments in Central America does not, of 
course, mean that the foreign  investor will find  no problems upon establishing a business in the area. 
The conditions affecting  foreign  investments are encouraging because of  the region's general 
economic upswing and the fair  treatment accorded to investors, but the daily problems to be met 
obviously are different  from  those encountered in doing business in the United States. These 
differences  in conducting business operations, which arise from  the fact  that the traditions and 
culture of  Central America differ  from  those of  the United States, must be accepted and assimilated 
if  the investor is to be successful.  The important factor  is that successful  adjustment is facilitated  by 
the favorable  economic, legal, and institutional environment existing in Central America. 
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CHAPTER VI Doing Business in Central America 
SUMMARY OF BUSINESS LAWS 
A foreign  investor can establish a business in Central America either by registering a foreign 
company to operate through a branch in a specific  country or by setting up a local company under 
any of  the forms  provided for  by the country's commercial laws. There is little difference  in the 
requirements for  either type of  operation. Moreover, the procedures to be followed  are substantially 
similar in all five  countries. 
All of  the countries have commercial codes or commercial laws covering the formation  of 
companies and the conduct of  commercial transactions. The principal details of  these laws are 
included in the respective country sections. Honduras has the most modern code, adopted in 1950. 
Costa Rica is now studying an up-to-date codification  of  its commercial laws, to be modeled after 
United States legislation. 
Each country requires that a new business enterprise be registered at the time of  its formation, 
whether it is a branch of  a foreign  company or a subsidiary or company formed  entirely on a local 
basis. In some of  the countries, there are additional requirements for  certain types of  companies. 
For example, Honduras requires that, in addition to the general registration, a branch of  a foreign 
company must be authorized by the Ministry of  Finance. In Guatemala, if  the foreign  company to 
be registered is a corporation, it must be authorized by the Ministry of  Finance -a requirement which 
applied to any stock-issuing company in the country. In Nicaragua, a firm  which engages in importing 
goods into the country must obtain a special license from  the Ministry of  Economy. 
Costs incident to the setting up of  the business organization vary among the countries, but in 
general they are minor. Such costs are highest in Guatemala, where they reach a maximum of  about 
10 per mil on the capital of  the company to be formed,  including registration taxes and notarial fees. 
All countries recognize the corporate form  of  business enterprise, as well as the general 
partnership. A third but less frequently  used form  of  organization is the limited partnership. This 
type of  organization consists of  partners with unlimited liability, who administer the business, and 
other partners with limited liability, who do not participate in the management and whose share of 
the business may or may not be represented in stock ownership. The essential feature  of  the general 
partnership is, of  course, the unlimited liability of  all of  the partners. The corporate form  of 
organization, as opposed to the partnership form,  is steadily gaining in popularity in the Central 
American countries as development proceeds. However, corporations generally are closely held. 
There are no organized stock markets, but El Salvador and Costa Rca have some professional 
brokers. 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras also have a form  or organization, known as the 
limited-liability company, which is well-suited to conditions in many Latin America countries. The 
limited-liability company is composed of  a limited number of  partners -up to a maximum of  20 to 
25- all of  whom have limited liability in the business, and it generally provides for  more active 
participation in the company by the partners than is accorded to shareholders in a corporation. For 
example, shares generally may be transferred  only with the consent of  all of  the partners in a 
limited-liability company. 
Early in 1955, El Salvador's Legislative Assembly introduced legislation to authorize the limited 
liability form  of  organization. 
All of  the Central American countries provide for  the protection of  industrial property through 
legislation on patents and trademarks. The duration of  patents varies among the countries, ranging 
from  5 years in Nicaragua to 20 years in Costa Rca. There are provisions for  the registration of  foreign 
patents for  the unexpired period of  time in the foreign  country of  registration, within the limitation 
of  the maximum period in a given Central American country. Trademarks generally have stipulated 
durations ranging from  10 to 20 years, but they are usually renewable indefinitely. 
LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
All of  the Central American countries have extensive labor and social legislation that provides 
for  the regulation of  labor-management relations and for  certain guaranteed conditions of  work and 
benefits  to protect the position of  the worker. Local laws differ  in certain details, but they all cover 
essential principles, such as maximum working hours, minimum wages, provision for  paid holidays 
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and vacations, separation pay upon dismissal without just cause, and the regulation of  collective 
labor relations and disputes. From the employer's point of  view, there may be advantages in certain 
specific  respects as between one country and another, but on the whole there are no significant 
differences. 
Honduras, which lagged behind the other countries with respect to labor and social legislation, 
enacted a basic labor code in February 1955 after  the need became apparent as a result of  extensive 
strikes in 1954. That country now has a set of  legislative principles, similar to those of  the other 
countries, which remain to be more specifically  defined  in future  decrees and regulations. The 
legislation was drafted  with foreign  technical assistance. 
El Salvador's labor legislation was enacted in 1950, and the provisions enacted since have been 
protective of  labor's interests; however, the policy has been worked out with moderation and a sense 
of  economic responsibility. The régime in Guatemala that came into power in mid-1954 is effecting 
changes in what was considered to be a strong antiemployer bias of  the previous Government. 
Nicaragua, which had lagged with respect to the institution of  a social-security system, was drafting 
such legislation, with foreign  assistance, in 1954-55. Costa Rica has the oldest social-security system, 
and extensive system of  administration and judicial procedures for  carrying out labor regulations, 
and possibly the most highly developed labor movement among the five  countries. 
All of  the countries restrict the extent of  employment of  foreigners  in enterprises, but Honduras 
and Nicaragua do so to a noticeably lesser degree than the others. At least 90 percent of  the personnel 
must be nationals and 85 per cent of  the payroll must be paid to nationals in Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Costa Rica. Managerial personnel is not included in this count, to the extent that there may be 
two in each enterprise in Guatemala and Costa Rica and four  in El Salvador; and under special 
authorization, which carries with it the obligation to train local workers, the limits may be lowered 
temporarily. 
Honduras has no general limitation, except that in mining 75 percent of  the personnel must be 
Honduran. In all other fields  of  activity, the matter has been handled on a case-by-case basis. 
Nicaragua requires that 75 percent of  the personnel in all enterprises be nationals, but managers, 
administrators, etc., are excluded from  the count, with no numerical limitation. 
The 8-hour day is established in the legislation Of  all of  the countries, and the maximum workweek 
ranges from  44 to 48 hours. The overtime pay rate is set at time and one-half  in all the countries 
except Nicaragua, where it is double time. Nicaraguan legislation also provides for  longer vacations 
-30 days per year, compared with a maximum of  15 days in the other countries. However, sick leave 
is charged against vacation time in Nicaragua. 
Each country has legislation providing for  separation pay, and some also provide for  advance 
notice when workers are dismissed except for  reasons considered to be just cause. These provisions 
vary considerably from  country to country. Costa Rica's regulations, which combine advance notice 
and separation pay, are cited as illustrative: For employees who have worked 3 to 6 months, 1 weeks' 
notice and 10 days of  separation pay are required; for  service from  6 months to 1 year, 2 weeks' 
notice and 20 days of  separation pay; and for  service of  more than 1 year, 1 month's notice and 
separation pay of  1 month per year of  service or fraction  of  at least 6 months. 
Wage levels in all of  the countries are much lower than in the United States, but in evaluating 
them consideration must be given to the additional fringe  benefits  mentioned and to the lower level 
of  productivity. In this latter respect, Costa Rica has an advantage over the other countries because 
of  its higher level of  general education. A comparison of  the levels in the different  countries is 
qualified,  of  course, by variations in the purchasing power of  the currencies. On this basis and 
translating local currencies into dollars, wages for  unskilled labor are about $1 a day in Honduras 
$1.5 in Nicaragua, about $2 in Guatemala and El Salvador, and approximately $2.50 in Costa Rica. 
Wages for  skilled labor are about double the rates for  unskilled labor. 
Salaries of  secretarial personnel average about $100 a month, and range from  as low as $50 in 
Honduras to as high as $150 in Costa Rica. Bilingual secretaries are generally paid about double the 
amounts paid to secretaries who speak Spanish exclusively, but in Costa Rica the rate is only about 
50 percent higher. 
Social security systems have been in effect  in Costa Rica since 1943, in Guatemala since 1948, and 
in El Salvador since 1954; and Honduras and Nicaragua will soon initiate social security programs. 
Costa Rica's system has the most widespread risk and geographic coverage, for  which employers 
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contribute 5.5 percent of  payrolls, workers a like percentage, and the Government 3.5 percent. 
Employers contribute 5 percent in both Guatemala and El Salvador. The development of  these social 
security systems has done much to eliminate certain onerous employer liabilities for  occupational 
risks provided for  in labor legislation. 
TAXATION 
In evaluating the levels of  taxation to which investments in the Central American countries would 
be subject, United States investors will wish to consider their United States income tax liabilities and 
the relationship between the two. The United States Internal Revenue Code, principally in the part 
dealing with income from  sources outside the United States,1 provides for  certain deductions from 
taxable income, tax credits, and exclusions from  taxable income with respect to income derived from 
abroad.1 
Under these provisions, the United States taxpayer may deduct from  his taxable income or take 
as a credit against his tax liability to the United States any income and excess profits  taxes or any 
taxes in lieu of  a tax on income or on excess profits  paid or accrued during the taxable year to any 
foreign  country. 
In addition, the Internal Revenue Code provides for  certain deductions in computing taxable 
income for  domestic corporations that qualify  as Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations, and for 
exemption from  taxation, under certain circumstances, of  income personally earned abroad by 
individuals. 
A Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation is defined  in section 921 of  the Code as "a domestic 
corporation all of  whose business (other than incidental purchases) is done in any country or 
countries in North, Central, or South America, or in the West Indies, and which satisfies  the following 
conditions: 
"(1) If  95 percent or more of  the gross income of  such domestic corporation for  the 3-year period 
immediately preceding the close of  the taxable year (or for  such part of  such period during which 
the corporation was in existence) was derived from  sources without the United States; and 
"(2) If  90 percent or more of  its gross income for  such period or such part thereof  was derived 
- from  the active conduct of  a trade or business." 
The formula  (section 922) providing for  the deduction from  taxable income of  Western 
Hemisphere Trade Corporations amounts to a reduction in the corporate tax rate of  14 percentage 
points for  such firms.  This is a substantial reduction in relation to the corporate tax rates, which 
consist of  a normal tax of  30 percent, and a surtax of  22 percent on income in excess of  $25 000. 
With respect to United States income tax on individuals, earned income from  sources outside the 
United States -defined  as compensation for  personal services- is entirely exempt from  taxation 
(section 911) if  the person is a bona fide  resident of  a foreign  country or countries for  an 
uninterrupted period which includes an entire taxable year (except for  amounts paid by the United 
States or any agency thereof).  An alternative to the requirement of  bona fide  residence for  this 
purpose is presence in a foreign  country for  at least 510 days during any period of  18 consecutive 
months, in which case the amount exempt from  tax is limited to $20 000 or a proportionate amount 
thereof  during any taxable year. 
These exemptions are limited to income derived from  personal services and do not include income 
that can be considered to be derived from  the investment of  capital. If  an individual is engaged in a 
business where both personal services and capital are income-producing factors,  the part of  his 
income that can be considered to be "earned" and so exempt from  tax may not exceed 30 percent of 
his share of  the net profits  of  such business. 
All of  the Central American countries impose, as the principal direct tax on business income, an 
income or profits  tax which presumably can qualify  for  credit against United States tax liability under 
the United States Internal Revenue Code. In addition, they all levy taxes on capital in some form, 
'Part III, "Income from  Sources Without the United States," pages 285-294, of  the Internal  Revenue Code,  1954. This 
publication can be purchased from  the Superintendent of  Documents, United States Government Printing Office. 
Washington 25, D.C. or any of  the Field Offices  of  the United States Department of  Commerce. 
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which presumably cannot qualify  for  this purpose as "taxes in lieu of  a tax on income or excess profits." 
However, as can be seen in tables 2 and 3, these capital taxes are minor compared with the income 
taxes. 
The amounts of  income tax payable vary somewhat among the five  countries, but any decision to 
establish an enterprise in one country rather than another on the basis of  taxes alone would not seem 
to be clearly warranted for  the following  reasons: 
1. The levels of  income tax in all five  countries are below those in the United States, and 
consequently tax liability to the United States would equalize the situation (assuming complete 
repatriation of  earnings to the United States). 
2. There has been a tendency in recent years for  the countries to establish income taxation and 
to increase income tax rates as they undertake development programs requiring large capital outlays. 
Nicaragua, which adopted an income tax in 1952, was the last of  the countries to do so; Costa Rica 
increased its income tax rates in September 1954, and Honduras in March 1955. 
3. There is also a trend in all of  the countries toward the adoption of  incentive legislation that 
grants tax reductions or exemptions to new industries. 
With respect to investors who move to a given country and qualify  for  the United States exemption 
on earned income, the amount of  tax payable in each country on such income determines the relative 
advantages among the countries. For example, Guatemala imposes no individual income tax on 
earned income; therefore,  an investor in that category would pay no tax, either to the United States 
or to Guatemala. In contrast, El Salvador has the steepest progression of  individual income tax rates 
(3 percent to 44 percent); however, as indicated in table 2, the taxes payable in Costa Rica are slightly 
higher in the levels of  income up to $50 000. 
Table IV.8.2 
INCOME TAX PAYABLE BY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES OR INDIVIDUALS IN THE CENTRAL 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(In  dollars) 
Amount of  tax payable 
El Salvador" 













20000 1908 4950 2 940 1588 1203 3191 
50000 8083 12450 11864 5838 4181 11215 
100 000 22208 24 950 33464 15 838 10560 25 937 
150000 38 708 37450 55 464 27 088 18 730 40 937 
200 000 56 708 49950 77464 39588 27730 55 937 
250 000 76083 62450 99464 52088 36 730 70937 
300 000 96458 74 950 121464 67088 45 730 85 937 
350 000 117958 87450 143464 §2 088 54 730 100 937 
4000ÓÒ 139458 99950 165 464 97088 63 730 115 937 
450000 160958 112 450 187464 112 088 72 730 130 937 
500000 182458 124 950 209464 127088 81730 145 937 
a Quetzal at par with the dollar; schedule ranges from  5 percent on 500-quetzal to 1 000-quetzal bracket to 43 percent on 
amounts above 300 000 quetzales; the tax on income at the personal level, which applies only to income from  invested 
capital, is not paid by the individual if  it has been paid by the company. 
b 2.50 colones equal US$1. 
cThese tax amounts include both a profits  tax, which consists of  2.5 percent on the first  5 000 colones and 5 percent thereafter, 
and a 20-percent tax levied on income accruing to companies or persons domiciled abroad. 
This tax is paid by local residents in addition to the tax on profits  paid by the business; the schedule of  rates ranges from 
3 percent on amounts up to 1000 colones to 44 percent on income above 150 000 colones. 
e 2 lempiras equal US$1; schedule ranges from  3 percent on amounts up to 2 50Ô lempiras to 30 percent on income above 
500 000 lempiras; dividends and profits  are excludable from  taxable income at the^personal level. 
7.05 córdobas equal US$1; schedule ranges from  4 percent on amounts up to 40 0(X) córdobas to 18 percent on income 
above 1 million córdoras; dividends and profits  are excludable from  taxable income at the personal level. 
8 6.65 colones equal US$1; schedule ranges from  1 percent on amounts up to 3 000 colones to 30 percent on income above 
300 000 colones; dividends and profits  are excludable from  taxable income at the personal level. 
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Table IV.8.3 
TAX ON CAPITAL PAYABLE BY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES OR INDIVIDUALS IN THE CENTRAL 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(In  dollars)  ' 
Amount of  tax payable 
Taxable 
capital Guatemala® El Salvador" Honduras0 Nicaraguad Costa Ricae 
50 000 150 26 55 322 177 
100 000 300 63 130 647 514 
150 000 450 108 205 972 914 
200 000 600 158 280 1297 1314 
250 000 750 213 355 1622 1714 
300 000 900 288 430 1947 2 114 
350 000 1050 363 505 2 272 2 514 
400 000 1200 438 580 2 597 2 914 
450 000 1350 538 655 2922 3 314 
500 000 1500 638 730 3 247 3 836 
a On real estate only, 3 per mil. 
b Schedule ranges from  one-half  per mil on amounts ranging from  10 000 to 100 000 colones to 2 per mil on capital above 
1 million colones. 
c On business enterprises only; schedule ranges from  0.02 percent on amounts ranging from  1001 to 5 000 lempiras to 0.15 
percent on capital above 50 000 lempiras. 
d 6 per mil on net worth of  companies or persons above 3 000 córdobas. 
e On land, buildings, machinery, and equipment; schedule ranges from  0.3 prcent on amounts of  10 000 to 250 000 colones 
to 1.05 percent on amounts above 3 million colones. 
All of  the countries except El Salvador have the same schedules of  rates for  both corporate and 
personal income and, except in El Salvador, there is no double taxation of  dividend or profits  at the 
personal level. The schedules are progressive, ranging to 43 percent in Guatemala, 30 percent in 
Honduras and Costa Rica, and 18 percent in Nicaragua, which also provides for  the most liberal 
personal exemptions. 
In El Salvador, the tax at the company level consists of  two low rates: 2.5 percent on the first 
5 000 colones (US$2 000) and 5 percent thereafter;  but here profits  and dividends are included in 
the taxable income of  individuals, with rates progressing up to 44 percent. If  the company's 
distributed income accrues to other companies or persons domiciled abroad, a proportional rate of 
20 percent is substituted for  the progressive scale. 
The comparative calculations in table 2 show that the tax payable in Nicaragua is the lowest at all 
levels of  income, and that Honduras has the next lowest. Guatemala, El Salvador (including both 
the business tax and the 20 percent on profits  remitted to companies or persons domiciled abroad), 
and Costa Rica are comparable at the other end of  the scale, with Guatemala and Costa Rica tending 
to be higher at the upper levels of  income. 
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All of  the countries allow for  the deduction of  normal business expenses and depreciation of  fixed 
assets for  purposes of  determining taxable business income. Reinvested profits  may be deducted 
also under certain conditions in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Costa Rica allows for 
carry-forward  of  losses, at a rate of  20 percent per year for  5 years. 
With respect to the relatively minor taxes on capital, Nicaragua has the highest tax. Table 3 shows 
that Nicaragua's tax base applying to net worth of  companies or individuals is broader than Costa 
Rica's, despite the fact  that Costa Rica's tax on amounts of  $200 000 or more is greater. El Salvador 
and Honduras are comparable at the lower end of  the scale, but in Honduras the tax applies only to 
business enterprises. Guatemala probably has the lowest rate, since the tax applies to real estate 
only. 
Both Costa Rica and Guatemala levy a special annual tax on branches of  foreign  companies, Costa 
Rica at the rate of  0.5 percent on net profits  and Guatemala in absolute amounts ranging from  $300 
to $500. 
All of  the countries have miscellaneous stamp taxes that apply to legal documents and various 
business transactions. These minor taxes will tend to be simplified  or eliminated as additional 
progress is made in modernization of  the countries' fiscal  systems. Moreover, the traditional system 
of  imposing special taxes on individual companies operating under concession contracts is being 
replaced by general legislation applicable to all. The recent revisions of  United Fruit Co. contracts 
in several of  the countries are in line with this trend. 
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Chapter V 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
This chapter deals with efforts  to foster  economic cooperation among countries of  the region. 
1. INTRAREGIONAL TRADE (1951) 
From: Study of  the Intra-Regional Trade of  Central America; Office  Memorandum; Department 
of  State; October 31,1951; Lot file  57 D95, box 3; Records of  the Office  of  Middle American 
Affairs;  NARA. 
OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
Date: October 31,1951 
To: MID 
There is attached a draft  study of  the Intra-Regional Trade of  Central America, prepared 
by Mr. Dan Garcia. 





CENTRAL AMERICAN INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE SYMPTOMS OF 
NONCOMPLEMENTARY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economy of  Central America is basically and overwhelmingly agricultural. About 75% of  the 
Central American population of  8 700 000 derives its livelihood directly from  agriculture. Two crops 
-coffee  and bananasa- are the economic mainstay of  the region, occupying a primary position as 
the main export commodities of  all five  nations. Exports occupy a dominant role in the economy of 
the region. Statistics for  1949, for  example, indicate that foreign  trade for  the region as a whole 
amounted to $392 000 000 while the sum of  total of  national incomes of  the five  countries was 
$811000 000.1 
The United States shares in the foreign  trade of  the Central American region is preponderant. 
In 1948 for  example, an average of  78% of  all imports of  the region cam^ from  the tjnited States. In 
the same year, 77% of  the region's exports were shipped to the United States. The extent of 
dependence on the United States as a market and as a supplier of  goods differs  for  each country, 
but the United States position as the largest market and as the primary supplier is undisputed and 
consistent in all five  countries. 
Main products imported by the United States from  the region consist of  agricultural commodities 
-particularly the two mainstay crops of  the region, coffee  and bananas. Other products of  importance 
to the United States include chicle, honey, precious metals, essential oils, sesame seed, hard woods, 
abaca fiber,  and "balsam of  Peru." In 1948 coffee  was the leading export commodity of  all five  nations 
of  the region, with the exception of  Honduras, where bananas occupied first  position. (Honduran 
coffee  is usually exported as Salvadoran coffee.  Statistics on coffee,  therefore,  for  Honduras have 
to be treated with care. It would be interesting to know if  Salvador indicates how much of  its exported 
coffee  is home grown). In this year the United States took over 90% of  El Salvador's total coffee 
exports, 95% of  Nicaragua's and 82% of  Costa Rica's. 
This heavy export trade with the United States, of  which the foregoing  examples are 
representative, applied equally to the region's imports, particularly since World War II when the 
United States displaced Germany as the most important suppler. The bulk of  imports from  the 
Untied States consist of  manufactured  products such as machinery, textiles, chemicals, processed 
foods,  hardware, etc. The apparent dependence of  these countries on the United States for  the 
source of  supply of  capital and consumer durable goods -even soft  goods- is a manifestation  of  their 
technological under-development. But it is also symptomatic of  a lack of  economic complementarity 
within the area, and intra-regional trade -or rather its absence- is a further  symptom of 
noncomplementarity. 
The specific  intent here is to explore the degree of  complementarity among the republics of 
Central America by examining the nature and volume of  intra-regional trade. Attention there is 
invited to the following  table (V.l.l) which sets forth  the extent, in terms of  value, of  intra-regional 
trade which occurred in 1948, the latest year in which comparable reliable data are available: 
Table V.l.l 
INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE IN 1948a 
(Millions  US$) 
Exporters 
Importers 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Costa Rica .01 .01 .01 .02 
El Salvador .27 2.05 1.74 .12 
Guatemala Negli Negli Negli Negli 
Honduras .13 3.98 .27 .19 
Nicaragua .38 .19 
aP. 18, UN Document E/CN. 12/165. 
'This information  was compiled from  Tables 1 and VI, furnished  for  each of  the nations in question, in the Data 
Book, Latin America, Volume II, published by the Department of  State. 
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Two observations can be made from  the foregoing  table: (1) the amount of  intra-regional trade 
was astonishingly small, and (2) one country-El Salvador- was involved in each of  the instances of 
significant  volume (in its trade with Guatemala and Honduras). 
Trade volume figures  alone, as listed above, do not reveal the importance that intra-regional trade 
plays in the total trade picture of  any single country. A rank order table (V.1.2), constructed on the 
basis of  information  gathered from  several sources , reveals the relative level of  intra-regional trade: 
Table V.1.2 
1948 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(Thousands  US$  and Percentages) 
Country & value 





























.04% .04% .09% .22% 78% 
(11) (2) (4) (14) (1) 
.61% 4.60% 3.86% .25% 77% 
(23) (10) (16) (25) (1) 
89% .02% .28% .07% .008% 
(10) (2) (5) (15) (1) 
.28% 13.70% 1.41% .14% 70% 
(6) (3) WD (19) (1) 2.00% 3.00% .30% .10% 75% 
Imports'3 
Í 1 ?) (29) (23) (1) .80% .08% .20% .30% 78% 
(28) (14) (2) (11) (1) 
.03% .34% 4.96% 1.03% 73% 
(38) (4) (18) (43) (1) 
.01% 2.29% .42% .007% 76% 
(18) (2) (15) (21) (1) 
.08% 6.14% .18% .06% 79% 
(7) (19) (8) 
.40% 1.00% .10% 1.00% 84% 
a Figures in parentheses are rank order of  importance to exporter nation. Hence 
making her El Salvador's second best customer. 
b Figures in parentheses are rank order of  importance to importer nation. Hence 4. 
making her El Salvador's second best supply source. 
of  all Satvadoran exports went to Guatemala 
of  all Salvadoran imports came from  Honduras 
It must be borne in mind that the statistics of  each country have been used in compiling the 
foregoing  table. Thus some inconsistencies are apparent. Costa Rican exports to Nicaragua, for 
example, were .22% of  her total exports or approximately $69 000. According to Nicaraguan reports, 
however, imports form  Costa Rica amount to approximately $107 000. Guatemalan imports from  El 
Salvador were approximately $1562 000,3 whereas El Salvador claims its exports to Guatemala were 
approximately $2 105 0004. These discrepancies, not uncommon in trade statistics, do not detract 
from  the salient facts  established earlier, i.e., (a) that the amount of  intra-regional trade is small; (b) 
that although small, it has a high rank in the order of  importance in a few  cases; and, (c) that the 
greatest amount of  intra-regional trade occurs with respect to Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Honduras, with El Salvador being the pivotal nation engaged in most of  it. 
El Salvador, for  example, was Honduras' second best market after  the United States, taking 13.7% 
of  all Honduran exports. Guatemala ranked second, after  the United States, as the next best 
customer of  El Salvador, taking 4.6% of  the latter's exports. 
* * * * 
2See bibliography. 
Guatemalan statistics are expressed in local currency, the quetzal, which in 1948 was valued at 1.0075 to the US$1. 
4Salvadorean statistics are expressed in local currency, the colon, which in 1948 was valued at 2.50 to the US$1. 
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An inquiry into the nature of  the commodities exchanged between the most important Central 
American trading nations follows: 
El Salvador-Honduras 
Flow  of  goods  from  Honduras  to El Salvador.  Three items bulk large in the flow  of  goods going from 
Honduras to El Salvador. The largest of  these was livestock, accounting for  approximately 32% of 
all exports to El Salvador. In analyzing total Honduran shipments to El Salvador, however, it must 
be borne in mind that 10 to 15% of  those shipments represent cattle passing through El Salvador on 
the way to the Guatemalan market5. Hence El Salvador's export figures  indicate that approximately 
20% of  her exports to Guatemala consist of  livestock. 
The second most important Honduran export to El Salvador in this period was foodstuffs,  which 
accounted for  approximately 30% of  the trade flow.  These food  shipments consisted of  beans, lard, 
corn, sesame seed, cheese, animal fats,  wheat, potatoes, meat, onions, cacao, garlic and fish. 
Frequently the same food  article was shipped in both directions. Sesame seed, for  example, was 
shipped from  Honduras to El Salvador, but approximately four  times as much (in value) sesame was 
shipped from  EI Salvador to Honduras during the same period. Inadequate transportation, lack of 
storage facilities  and temporary market conditions may account for  this phenomenon. Wheat is 
grown on a small scale in the western part of  Honduras, but owing to lack of  internal transport, it is 
exported to El Salvador, while flour  mills in the rest of  Honduras import their supplies. 
Tobacco and tobacco products accounted for  an additional 20% of  Honduran exports to El 
Salvador, while timber represented 5%. Remaining trade consisted of  a variety of  items such as 
cotton, cotton products, clothing, soap, hides, turpentine, starch, resins, hats and pine boxes. No 
single one of  these items exceeded a valuation of  75 000 lempiras (US$36 764) . 
Flow  of  goods  from  El Salvador  to Honduras.  According to Honduran reports, imports from  El 
Salvador amounted to 4 175 000 lempiras (US$2 046 000), or approximately 6% of  total imports, 
thus ranking El Salvador as Honduras' second best source of  supply. This trade amounted to 3.8% 
of  El Salvador's total exports, and in Salvadoran eyes, made Honduras its fourth  best market. 
Salvadoran statistics claim the amount of  exports was 4 397 000 colones, or US$1759 000. 
Sugar was the largest single Honduran import from  El Salvador, accounting for  over 30% of  this 
trade flow. 
Cotton and cotton products were next, claiming 25%. Principal articles included in this category 
were cotton drills, thread, cordage, quilts, clothing and ginned cotton. 
Manufactured  goods, other than cotton manufacturers  accounted for  over 10% of  Honduran 
imports from  El Salvador. Eighty per cent of  the value of  this category of  goods consisted of  clothing 
and footwear.  The balance was fragmented  among numerous items such as perfume,  toys, jonquil 
mats, wooden furniture,  leather goods, combs and bricks. 
Foodstuffs  and beverages were the fourth  largest category of  goods, accounting for  10% of 
Honduran imports from  El Salvador. Individual items consisted mainly of  rice, fresh  fruit, 
confectioneries,  cheese, sesame seed, flour,  corn and alcoholic beverages. Rice was the largest single 
item in this category, accounting for  almost 2/5 of  the total. 
El Salvador - Guatemala 
Flow  of  goods  from  El Salvador  to Guatemala.  In 1948 the flow  of  goods from  El Salvador to 
Guatemala ranked after  El Salvador-Honduras commerce as the next most voluminous 
intra-regional trade. In this period, Guatemala ranked second, after  the United States, as the best 
Salvadoran market, taking 4.6% of  total Salvadoran exports or 5 242 000 colones (US$2 096 800). 
From the Guatemalan point of  view, this amounted to 2,29% of  total imports, ranking El Salvador 
as Guatemala's fourth  best supply source. Guatemalan statistics claim that imports form  El Salvador 
amounted to 1562 000 quetzales (US$1562 000). 
The largest single item going from  El Salvador to Guatemala during 1948 was ginned cotton, 
accounting for  60% of  this trade. Livestock was next, exceeding 19%. Manufactured  goods 
amounted to almost 7% of  exports. 
sAmembassy Despatch 774, p. 25. 
honduran statistics are expressed in local currency, the lempira, which in 1948 was valued at 2.04 to the US $1. 
7Original document was found  in an incomplete form. 
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2. NICARAGUA AND THE GATT (1953) 
From: Letter from  J.J. Sanchez, Nicaraguan Minister for  Economic Affairs,  to E. Wyndham 
White, Executive Secretary of  GATT, concerning the Nicaragua-El Salvador Free Trade 
Area; January 22,1953; Lot file  57 D15, box 1, under the heading "GATT"; Records of  the 
Office  of  Middle American Affairs,  Department of  State; NARA. 
United States Resident Delegation 
To the Economic Commission for  Europe 
Rue du Temple, 1 
Geneva, Switzerland 
February 18th, 1953 
Restricted 
Mr. Leonard Weiss 
Acting Chief 
Commercial Policy Staff, 
Department of  State, 
Washington 25, D.C. 
Dear Len: 
The attached exchange of  letters finally  clears up the mystery about what was bothering 
Nicaragua in connection with the GATT. It seems to me that the letter from  Sanchez is quite 
encouraging and you might want to consider a follow-up  through the appropriate offices  in 





cc: AMEMB Managua 
Declassified  NARA 6-13-88 
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C O P Y 
Provisional Translation 
GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA 
Managua 
Dear Mr. Wyndham White: 
I am extremely pleased to apply to you personally to secure information  concerning some 
points relating to the participation of  my country in the General Agreement and to collect your 
valuable and friendly  opinion. 
I shall first  inform  you that for  the last few  weeks I have been in charge of  the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs  which includes in its jurisdiction, all questions relating to the commercial 
policy of  my country and therefore  everything that concerns the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. In the circumstances I therefore  have to deal directly with the questions resulting 
from  our participation in the General Agreement. 
Though the Government of  Nicaragua has strictly carried out its commitments undertaken 
during the Annecy negotiations in a form  still more extensive than that provided for  during the 
negotiations, as we have been applying lower rates of  duty than those which were negotiated, 
it has not yet been in a position to set up an office  which could effectively  and extensively study 
the General Agreement and the Geneva, Annecy and Torquay negotiations. This has resulted 
in a deplorable deficiency  of  our public administration as regards the meaning, the scope and 
evolution of  the General Agreement and the tariff  negotiations. The non-participation of  my 
country in the Torquay tariff  negotiations caused the situation to deteriorate further  by making 
the whole subject matter more confused  in the minds of  the responsible officials.  Personally I 
was not in a position to contribute very much to the improvement of  the situation as I have to 
carry out political functions  which were more or less alien to questions of  commercial policy. 
When my country decided to participate in the Annecy-negotiations its 
balance-of-payments  position was unfavorable  and we were living as we are at present under 
the exchange control system, with this substantial difference,  however, that under the existing 
foreign  exchange legislation our currency has been devalued by forty  per cent. This measure 
and other action involved in the Exchange Control Act were necessary in order to restore our 
balance of  payments. The enactment of  the Law which I am referring  to was recommended to 
us by the International Monetary Fund Mission which acted in an advisory capacity to my 
government. 
As you are no doubt aware, Nicaragua came to the Annecy negotiations with its custom 
tariff  of  1918 which had hardly been modified  in its 33 years of  existence. The rates of  duties 
are expressed in gold cordobas, a currency which is at present theoretical and which 
corresponds in practice to the United States dollar. The currency devaluation and the interim 
regulations provided for  in the Act referred  to above raise many problems, in particular in the 
fiscal  domain, which are of  a truly urgent character. It is obviously for  those reasons which 
have occurred since the Torquay negotiations that the Nicaraguan Government is examining 
the signature of  the Torquay Protocol, including its withdrawal from  the General Agreement, 
because it believes that the readjustment of  the various substantive aspects of  its exchange 
economy and, particularly, the revision of  the customs tariff  which is at present under 
consideration, cannot be carried out or would constitute a difficult  and complex undertaking 
for  a country which is a member of  the GATT. 
Personally I am of  the opinion that the powerful  reasons which militate in favor  of  Nicaragua 
re-negotiating with the Contracting Parties on a different  basis would be understood and 
accepted by the countries concerned which would enable us to remain in the GATT on a more 
stable basis since the situation of  our economy is notably improving. If  my Government had 
this impression I am sure that this would dispel the present anxieties and that we could actively 
cooperate in the achievement of  the objectives of  the GATT, thereby contributing to creating 
an interest for  other small Central American countries to accede to the General Agreement. 
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It is therefore  with the intention of  contributing to the maintenance of  my country within 
the Organization that I am writing this letter in order that you may give me your valuable 
co-operation, by furnishing  your personal opinion which, I hope, will serve me as a 
guide. 
The points on which I should wish to obtain complete and clear answers can be expressed 
as follows: 
A. The five  Central American countries which since they became independent from  Spain 
have constituted a political Confederation,  wish to reinforce  their economic bonds; with that 
end in view and with the co-operation of  the Economic Commission for  Latin America, they 
are endeavouring to integrate their economies and to develop free  trade between themselves 
to the greatest extent possible. Would such national aspirations meet with obstacles from  the 
Contracting Parties? 
B. The Government of  Nicaragua is completely reconstructing its customs tariff  with a view 
to: 
1) Adopting a new customs nomenclature in conformity  with the United Nations 
nomenclature; 
2) Lowering charges levied on many items of  popular consumption in order to lower the 
cost of  living among the poorer classes; 
3) To raise duties on many non-essential articles in order to compensate for  the loss in 
revenue resulting from  the lowering of  duty rates referred  to in paragraph 2 above and to 
incorporating part of  the exchange charges; 
4) Readjusting the value of  the customs gold cordoba in accordance with the par value 
of  the cordobft  in relation to the United States dollar. This would result in a 40 per cent increase 
from  the purely monetary point of  view; an increase which would immediately be taken into 
account for  the determination of  duty rates under the new tariff.  Could Nicaragua carry out 
its plans, which are urgent, while remaining within the General Agreement, in view of  the fact 
that in 1954 the contracting parties will negotiate again? 
I understand that we may freely  modify  our customs tariff  while maintaining the concessions 
granted in Annecy but it seems obvious that such a situation would be abnormal in view of  the 
number and nature of  the items negotiated and, above all, though Nicaragua has not 
undertaken to maintain the par value of  our currency on the ratio of  five  to one, it would 
nevertheless suffer  some inconvenience from  the readjustment on the basis of  the present par 
value of  seven to one. It seems to me unquestionable, our new tariff  rates being computed on 
the basis of  gold cordobas equivalent to the United States dollar, that the new par value cannot 
be regarded as an increase in duties and that, for  that very reason, the new par value cannot 
be regarded as objectionable but, in any case, I should be very grateful  if  I could have your 
opinion on this point. 
C. Have the concessions granted by Nicaragua in Annecy, which were valid until 31 
December 1950, lapsed for  the very reason that this date is now past without any need for  any 
further  notification  to the Secretariat-General to that effect? 
D. In view of  the fact  that Nicaragua did not participate in the Torquay negotiations, what 
is the legal status of  the Annecy negotiations which were to remain valid until 31 December 
1951? If  they are to be regarded as still in force,  what is the situation of  Nicaragua as regards 
the concession negotiated in Torquay, in particular by the Torquay acceding governments such 
as Germany? I should be very grateful  for  some enlightenment on this particular point. 
E. In the event that my country should remain a GATT member what are the procedures 
which we would have to follow  in order to readjust our exchange and customs situation without 
having to wait until further  negotiations take place and if  we are to avoid that any contracting 
party should be affected? 
F. What would be the concrete effect  of  the signature or non-signature of  the Torquay 
Protocol as regards Nicaragua remaining within the Organization? 
I hope you will forgive  me, Mr. Wyndham White, for  asking such lengthy questions and I 
hope that you will understand that they are dictated by my sincere desire to reach an adequate 
solution which would enable my country to remain within the Organization without suffering 
any prejudice. They are also due to the fact  that no department of  my Government has until 
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now undertaken the task to study these important subjects which is the reason why, as I take 
over my new responsibilities, I find  myself  without adequate information  or studies. 
I should also like to ask you that you be kind enough, if  there is no inconvenience as far  as 
you are concerned, to give the necessary instructions in order that the Ministry for  Economic 
Affairs  should receive a complete set of  documents on the Torquay negotiations. May I also 
ask you to be good enough to send me in future  an extra copy in English of  the documents 
which are otherwise sent to the Ministerio des Relaciones. I am now setting up under the 
Ministry for  Economic Affairs  an office  which will be dealing exclusively with subjects relating 
to the General Agreement. 
I am enclosing for  your information  a copy of  our Foreign Exchange Control Act, of  the 
legislative Decree whereby our national Congress ordained the general revision of  our customs 
tariff,  and of  the Decree under which the Annecy Protocol entered into force.* 
Lastly I wish to express my profound  gratitude for  anything that you may do in order to 
enlighten me on this pleasant though complex subject matter, being fully  convinced that I shall 
be able to reciprocate one Way or another, and until I have the pleasure to see you again, I wish 
to remain. 
Yours etc. 
(J. J. Sanchez, R.) 
These were not included with the original. 
FAH/nsh 
11 February 1953 
VIIII-3-4 
Dear Dr. Sanchez: 
I was very pleased indeed to receive your long and interesting letter of  22 January in which 
you explain some of  the problems confronting  your Government and the considerations which 
caused them anxiety over their adherence to the General Agreement. 
First of  all allow me to extend my congratulations on your appointment as head of  the 
Economic Affairs  Ministry. I am very pleased to know that you will now be in charge of  all 
GATT matters, and that the question of  remaining in GATT is in your hands. 
I have looked at each of  the points of  difficulty  which you enumerate and I can see no 
insuperable obstacle to the achievement of  your objectives while remaining a contracting party 
to GATT. I would like to reply to your questions in the order in which they are posed in your 
letter. 
A. You will recall the sympathetic reception accorded by the Contracting Parties at their 
Sixth Session to your Government's enquiry concerning the establishment of  a free  trade area 
with El Salvador (GATT/CP.6/SR.24) which led to the Decision of  25 October 1951 (Basic 
Instruments II, page 30). I believe you could confidently  expect that the Contracting Parties 
would address themselves in an equally understanding and helpful  attitude to any request for 
authority to enter into a broader scheme with sister Republics of  Central America. 
B. A revision of  your tariff  on the lines of  a more modern nomenclature would be welcomed 
by all other governments and of  course there is never any objection to the lowering of  customs 
duties or charges. The raising of  duties on items which do not appear in the Nicaraguan 
Schedule to GATT presents no difficulties  and this is true also of  the items in the Schedule 
which are marked with a double asterisk and which were bound only until the end of  1950. (I 
believe these remarks will also serve to answer your question C.) For the other items in the 
Schedule, however, you would have to have recourse to Article XXVIII. All contracting 
parties, with the exception of  Nicaragua, have accepted the amendment of  the date in the first 
paragraph of  that Article which, for  them, now reads 1 January 1954. In your own case, your 
Government remains free  to enter into negotiations with a view to modifying  your 
commitments in respect of  any of  these items. The procedure for  the conduct of  such 
negotiations is set out in that first  paragraph. 
Dr. J. J. Sanchez 




The adjustment of  specific  rates of  duty to take account of  the reduced par value of  your 
currency, should be an easier matter. Under paragraph 5 (a) of  Article II, you could submit 
your proposed adjustments to the Contracting Parties and seek their concurrence that these 
would not impair the value of  the concessions in the Schedule. The Contracting parties could 
deal with your request early in the Eighth Session which opens on 17 September, or at the 
Special Session which is likely to be held in the Summer. This procedure was used in the 
Decision of  15 December 1950 to bring about adjustment of  certain specific  duties and charges 
in the Schedule of  Benelux (Basic Instruments II, page 12). (I believe these remarks will also 
serve as an answer to question E.) 
D. It is not quite correct to say that the concessions which Nicaragua negotiated at Annecy 
(other than those marked with double asterisks) "were to remain valid until 1 January 1951 ; 
that was merely the duration of  their "assured life".  In fact,  the Nicaraguan Schedule, like all 
others annexed to the agreement, remains in force  so long as Nicaragua is a contracting party. 
The date "1 January 1951" merely signified  that thereafter  items could be re-negotiatea under 
the procedures of  Article XXVIII. 
So long as Nicaragua remains a contracting party, she will enjoy most-favored-nation 
treatment from  all other contracting parties ana the benefit  of  all the concessions in all the 
schedules annexed to the Agreement. Thus the German Schedule, which you mention by way 
of  example, is applied to Nicaraguan trade even though Nicaragua did not negotiate at 
Torquay. 
F. Nicaragua can remain a contracting party without signing the Torquay Protocol. The 
principal consequence of  Nicaraguan signature would be the extension of  the "assured life"  of 
the Nicaraguan Schedule through the remaining months of  1953: in that event Nicaragua could 
not initiate re-negotiation of  scheduled items until 1 January 1954. Although signature of  the 
Torquay Protocol is not essential for  continued adherence to the General Agreement, it is 
hoped by the Contracting Parties that Nicaragua will sign so that there will be a uniform  text 
of  the Agreement, applicable to all contracting parties. 
A secondary consequence of  signature would be the automatic acceptance of  three other 
protocols which Nicaragua has not yet signed, namely the Fifth  Protocol of  Rectifications,  the 
First Protocol of  Rectifications  and Modifications  and the Second Protocol of  Rectifications 
and Modifications.  These protocols cannot enter into force  until they have been signed by 
every contracting party and, therefore,  if  your Government were to decide not to sign the 
Torquay Protocol, it would be appreciated if  you would arrange for  signature for  these three 
protocols. 
Under separate cover I am addressing to you personally a number of  documents relating 
to the Torquay negotiations (many are now out of  stock or are of  no present interest) and a 
copy of  the documents and Protocols to which I have referred  in tnis letter. Also I have 
arranged that in future  your Ministry of  Foreign Affairs  shall receive a copy of  all documents 
in English. 
I hope you will find  these remarks helpful  in understanding your Government's position as 
a contracting party to the General Agreement, but if  there remain any points of  obscurity do 
not hesitate to put them to me. Now tnat we have established contact, I hope we can continue 
to exchange letters on matters of  foreign  trade and commercial policy which affect  your 
Government. Further, I trust you will arrange to send a representative to the Eighth Session 
in September and possibly you will yourself  come to one or meetings. 
With your permission I propose to mention your plans for  closer ties with the other Central 
American Republics confidentially  to friends  in London and Washington and to write to you 
again on this problem. 
With kind personal regards, 
Your sincerely, 
E. Wyndham White 
Executive Secretary 
' in your letter you say "31st December, 1951", but presumably you mean "1st January, 1951". 
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3. NICARAGUA-EL SALVADOR FREE TRADE AREA (1953) 
From: Correspondence between James Maish, Jr., Economic Officer,  American Embassy, 
Managua, Nicaragua and John L. Ohmans, Department of  State regarding Nicaragua-El 
Salvador Free Trade Area; July 14 and July 17, 1953; Lot file  57 D15, box 1, under the 
heading "GATT"; Records of  the Office  of  Middle American Affairs,  Department of  State, 
NARA. 
July 17,1953 
OFFICIAL - INFORMAL 
Dear Jim: 
Thank you very much for  your prompt reply regarding the Nicaragua-El Salvador Free 
Trade Area. Attached is a position paper which I prepared before  your letter arrived. I will 
send the people working on GATT a copy of  your letter of  July 14 for  their information.  I am 
inclined to think that the GATT contracting parties will insist that Nicaragua give it a report 
on the operation of  the free  trade area with El Salvador. 
My letter to you was inadvertently attached to your letter. I am sending it back for  your 
records. 
Sincerely yours, 
John L. Ohmans 
Enclosures: 
Copy to Position Paper. 
Letter to Mr. Maish from  Mr. Ohmans dated July 7. 
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OFFICIAL - INFORMAL 
Dear Jack: 
This is in reply to your letter of  July 7,1953, regarding the Nicaragua-El Salvador free  trade 
area. 
At a reception last Saturday, I discussed this matter with Dr. Jorge Montealegre of  the 
Ministry of  Economy, and who soon will assume Alfredo  Sacasa's former  post in Washington 
as Commercial Counselor of  the Embassy of  Nicaragua. In reply to my question whether or 
not Nicaragua intends to prepare a report on the operations of  this free  trade area, 
Montealegre stated "not unless GATT insists". 
Based on conversations with Jorge Montealegre and Dr. Luis Augusto Cantarero, 
Superintendent of  Banks, operations of  the free  trade area have resulted in a greatly stimulated 
trade between the two countries. For comparison purposes, I enclose a table of  Nicaragua's 
exports to El Salvador during 1952, for  whatever worth it may be to you in your study. The 
table covers all trade and not only those commodities listed in Annex A of  the Nicaragua/El 
Salvador trade treaty. Additional background information  is contained in the MEMORIA 
DEL MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA - 1949-1951 (pages 173 -183) a copy of  which is 
enclosed for  your files.  (Two copies were air pouched to the department under cover of  the 
Embassy's despatch No. 603 of  June 23,1953.) 
According to the local customs bureau, Nicaraguan trade with El Salvador in the five  year 
period, 1948-52, was as follows: 
John L. Ohmans, Esquire, 
Department of  State (MID), 
Washington 25, D.C 
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Table V.3 
NICARAGUAN TRADE WITH EL SALVADOR, 1948-1952 
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The considerable decline in Nicaragua's exports to El Salvador in 1952, as compared to 
1951 is apparently due to a Salvadorean embargo on Nicaraguan corn which was lifted  this 
year. Millet and rice shipments in 1952 were way off-from  $184 705 and $406 627 to the figures 
that appear in the enclosed table. Exports of  Nicaraguan beans, however, were up some 
$241525. 
In August of  this year, Nicaragua proposes to send a delegation to El Salvador to iron out 
some minor differences  with respect to the treaty. There apparently is some confusion  in the 
interpretation of  the denomination "native products". Nicaragua desires to establish what 
percentage of  imported raw materials may enter into manufactured  goods and still be regarded 
as native product. Also, I understand that a treaty which El Salvador is about to sign with Costa 
Rica is more liberal than the present Nicaragua/El Salvador treaty. Therefore,  Nicaragua 
proposes to discuss a liberalization of  her existing treaty with El Salvador. 
There reportedly was some informal  talk between the Ministers of  Economy who attended 
the ODECA meeting just ended about the establishment of  a free  trade area for  all the Central 
American Republics. Just how or when it is to be worked out, nobody yet knows. Meanwhile, 
Nicaragua proposes to expand upon its free  trade area treaties and at the present time, there 
is talk in high government circles of  a treaty with Costa Rica similar to the one now in effect 
with El Salvador. 
Cordially yours, 
(signed) James Maish, Jr. 
Economic Officer 
Enclosures: 
Table of  Nicaragua's exports to El Salvador during 1952 
Memoria Del Ministero De Economia -1949-1951 
372 
Table V.3.2 
NICARAGUAN EXPORTS TO EL SALVADOR -1952 
(Value  in U.S.  Dollars) 
Unit Quantity Value 
Pigs Heads 4 168 83 252 
Poultry Each 40 24 
Butter Kilos 54 754 46 808 
Cheese M 60 657 31 545 
Millet M 9 701 462 
Rice M 302 793 40 206 
Corn M 6 397 496 396 066 
Pineapple H 600 30 
Other fresh  fruits It 35 965 855 
Potatoes It 268 488 22 976 
Onions •I 1932 420 
Beans II 2 212 095 333 979 
Cocoa beans It 145 851 91426 
Liquors Liters 11520 7 980 
Linseed Kilos 1100 250 
Cottonseed •I 280 646 10 980 
Sesame •I 1702 370 
Aceituno •I 22126 706 
Cottonseed oil li 6182 2 284 
Palm oil •I 16 493 7 741 
Castor oil li 7 564 4 949 
Starch ti 150 882 23 502 
Rubber tt 10 878 7 496 
Mahogany logs Bd. Ft. 3 000 80 
Cedar logs 32 451 2 249 
Genizaro logs li 7 760 564 
Guanacaste logs •I 68 408 2 395 
Pine logs it 22 000 945 
Cedar (Espino) lumber, sawn •I 39 389 2 457 
Cedar (Real) lumber, sawn M 542 213 48 451 
Genizaro lumber, sawn II 202 053 11919 
Guanacaste lumber, sawn II 290 544 17 172 
Furniture Kilos 126 50 
Raw cattle hides •I 15 328 8 768 
Leather, sole 81 97 
Cotton, combed or carded II 8 557 2 638 
Men's and children's ready-to-wear Each 52 48 
Women's ready-to-wear Each 2 4 
Waterproof  garments Doz. 29 1839 
Hammocks Each 1 15 
Tripe, dry Kilos 81 14 
Dyewoods 2 081 267 
Empty steel drums (re-export) 69 473 33 025 
Motion picture film  (re-export) Reels 1006 9 938 
Other re-exports Kilos 9 380 4 109 
Personal effects " 953 1 170 
Other exports tt 2 612 2 825 
Total 1 265 346 
Free Trade Area Between Nicaragua and El Salvador; Position Paper for  the Seventh 
Session of  the Contracting Parties to the GATT, 1952; Lot file  57 D15, box 1, under the heading 
"GATT"; Records of  the Office  of  Middle American Affairs,  Department of  State; NARA. 
SUBJECT: POSITION PAPER FOR THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE 
CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT 
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE. 
Free Trade Area Between Nicaragua and El Salvador 
Problem: 
To determine whether the report of  the first  year's operation of  the Nicaragua-El Salvador 
Free Trade Area shows operations to have been consistent with the objectives of  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade. 
Recommendation: 
That the United States accept the report and make a request that the annual reports on the 
operation of  the free  trade area be continued. Further reference  should be made to the 
understanding of  the contracting parties that Nicaragua will not resort to the quantitative 
restrictions provided for  in the Free Trade Treaty (Article 3) for  purposes other than those 
specified  in the GATT. 
Discussion: 
The Government of  Nicaragua has submitted, at the request of  the contracting parties, a 
report on the first  year's operations of  the free  trade area established by treaty between 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. The contracting parties approved establishment of  this free  trade 
area under the provisions of  paragraph 10 of  Article XXIV of  the General Agreements on 
Tariffs  and Trade, which permits approval of  free  trade areas which do not fully  comply with 
the requirements of  the article but appear to be generally consistent with the objectives of  the 
General Agreement. The one provision of  the Nicaraguan-El Salvador treaty whose 
consistency with the General Agreement was questioned is found  in Article III. Each country 
therein reserves the right to place quantitative restrictions on the importation or exportation 
of  specified  articles. If  this right were invoked with respect to any commodities the treaty might 
serve to restrict rather than to expand foreign  trade. Therefore  the contracting parties 
requested that Nicaragua submit reports so that it might review its decision from  time to time 
and determine whether the Free Trade Area was actually resulting in the maintenance of  a 
free  trade area in the sense of  Article XXIV of  the General Agreement. 
The treaty entered into force  on August 21,1951. Since then the Government of  Nicaragua 
has not established quantitative restrictions on any Salvadoran product. The fact  that the 
Government of  El Salvador has temporarily restricted the importation of  corn from  Nicaragua 
is not relevant, since El Salvador is not a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade. 
Each country is studying a request from  the other to expand the list of  duty-free  products 
in accordance with Article 19 of  the Free Trade Area Treaty which states the intention of  the 
two Governments to work towards a customs union. 
Statistics presented by Nicaragua demonstrate that during the period of  operation of  the 
free  trade treaty, from  September 1951 to May 1952, the movement of  trade has been favorable 
to Nicaragua. Nicaraguan imports from  El Salvador were only about 40 per cent of  the value 
of  Nicaraguan exports in the ten months covered. The major share of  the Nicaraguan imports 
were not on the free  list. Sixty per cent of  the value of  the imports were represented by iron 
tanks, trucks and buses, and private vehicles. These items obviously were not of  Salvadoran 




4. A PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CUSTOMS UNION (1954) 
From: Background Information  on a Proposed Central American Union and on the Foreign Trade 
Pattern of  Honduras; Special Paper No. 53 prepared by the Division of  Research for  the 
American Republics; December 16,1954; Lot file  57 D15, box 6, under the heading "Costa 
Rica: Regional organizations ODECA 1955"; Records of  the Office  of  Middle American 
Affairs,  Department of  State, NARA. 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Declassified  Special Paper No. 53 
NARA 6/14/88 Prepared by The Division of  Research 
for  the American Republics 
December 16,1954 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON A PROPOSED CENTRAL 
AMERICAN UNION AND ON THE FOREIGN TRADE 
PATTERN OF HONDURAS 
I. Central American Union 
The charter of  an Organization of  American States (ODECA) was signed on October 14,1951 
and became effective  on January9,1952. The ODECA's headquarters is in El Salvador. The member 
states are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Panama may join 
whenever it wishes to do so. The ODECA charter provides, among other things, for  the promotion 
of  social, economic, and cultural development, within the scope of  the UN and OAS charters. 
As a first  step toward attaining a regional economic union, the ODECA is studying the 
establishment of  a Central American customs union. The advantages of  economic union are 
integrated development for  the area, broadening of  the market for  local production, and united 
action in international negotiations. A union of  one sort or another has been under consideration 
for  more than a century. Political and economic instability in one or more of  the potential members, 
together with jealousy of  Guatemala's hegemony in Central America, have prevented a union from 
becoming a reality. 
In 1952, however, the UN's Commission for  Latin America (ECLA) reported in favor  of  a Central 
American union, and it presented plans and measures for  achieving this end. Since that time, 
additional ECLA studies have been in progress. As the combined financial  resources of  the area are 
relatively small, financial  assistance from  the United States would be required to put the union on 
a solid footing.  Although the ECLA has shown that a Central American economic union is 
theoretically feasible,  its realization will be slow and the project will remain in the discussion stage 
for  some time to come. 
The Central American countries have given consideration to various aspects of  regional 
cooperation. So, for  example, the central banks of  Central America, at their meeting in December 
1953, devised a plan for  reciprocal investment in each other's development bonds, both for 
development purposes and to obtain higher rates of  interest than that derived from  investments in 
bonds and commercial paper in the United States. It is also a technical method of  achieving regional 
convertibility. The investments are to be short-term and are to carry the guaranty of  the central bank 
of  the country receiving the investment. Honduras reportedly sent dollar funds  to Costa Rica on 
November 22,1954, for  investment in that country. 
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II. Importance of Trade 
A sizable share of  Honduran revenues is derived from  customs duties. In fiscal  1953, this share 
'  i 
was 23%, and the estimates for  fiscal  years 1954 and 1955 are 31% and 36%, respectively. By 
comparison, income taxes provided 14% of  total receipts in fiscal  1953; they are expected to drop 
to 11% in fiscal  1954, and then to rise somewhat to 13% in the following  year. 
Pattern of Trade 
a) Exports 
Honduran exports in fiscal  1954 amounted to US$66 573 000. The major Honduran exports are 
bananas, coffee,  silver, and lumber, which in the year ending June 30,1954 accounted for  more than 
90% of  the total value. The largest market for  these products is the United States, which took 77% 
of  the total. The composition and distribution of  exports are shown below. 
Table V.4.1 
HONDURAN EXPORTS: COMPOSITION AND DESTINATION YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,1954 
(Value  in US$1,000) 
Total % To U.S. % to U.S. 
Fresh fruit  (chiefly  bananas) 39 906 60 32 483 81 
Coffee 12 794 19 12 089 94 
Silver, in ore and bars 5 027 8 5 027 100 
Lumber 3134 5 342 1 
All other 5 712 8 1444 25 
Total 66 573 100 51358 77 
Other countries taking significant  shares of  Honduran exports in fiscal  1954 were Canada, 7%; 
El Salvador, 6%; the Netherlands, 5%; and Cuba, 2%. Only 3% of  the total remained to other 
purchasing areas. 
b) Imports 
Honduran imports in fiscal  1954 amounted to US$49 123 000. About 40% of  the total value 
consisted of  18 items valued at US$500 000 or above, and of  these, only 5 items, representing 11% 
of  total exports, are contained in the bilateral trade agreement with the United States. The United 
States supplied 69% of  Honduran imports in this year. The composition and origin of  imports are 
shown below. 
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'includes export duties, amounting to 3%, 2% and 3% in the respective years. 
Table V . . 
HONDURAN IMPORTS: COMPOSITION AND DESTINATION YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,1954 
(Value  in US  $1,000) 
Total % To U.S. % to U.S. 
Automobiles, trucks and buses® 2 532 5 2 244 89 
Copper sulphate 2 113 4 2113 100 
Agricultural, mining, and road machinery 2040 4 1927 94 
Crude petroleum 1766 4 343 19 
Silk or artificial  silk or ramie textiles 1317 3 669 51 
Fertilizers, all types 1209 2 377 31 
Gasoline 1188 2 20 2 
Drill, white or colored3 1029 2 876 85 
Linen, plain 993 2 740 75 
Heavy machinery, all types 987 2 957 97 
Wheat flour® 725 2 701 97 
Automobile accessories and 
repair parts 708 1 679 96 
Sugar 644 2 insig. 
Tires for  automobiles and trucks® 631 518 82 
Leather shoes 562 1 477 85 
Wheat 537 1 537 100 
Leather, hairless, n.e.s ® 535 97 18 
Industrial machinery and repair 
parts 528 1 445 84 
All other imports 29 079 60 20 392 70 
Total 49123 100 34 114 69 
" Included in bilateral trade agreement with the United States. 
Other supplying countries in fiscal  1954 were the Netherlands West Indies and West Germany, 
each with 5%; El Salvador, Japan, and the United Kingdom, each with 3%; Mexico, 2%; 
Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 1% each; and all other countries provided 8% of  total 
imports. 
"This document was found  in an incomplete form. 
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5. TRADE TREATY BETWEEN HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR (1956) 
From: Attitude of  Honduran Foreign Minister Toward Revised Trade Treaty Between Honduras 
and El Salvador; Foreign Service Despatch No. 495 from  Amembassy, Tegucigalpa, to 
Department of  State, Washington; June 7, 1956; 415.1641/6-756; Central Decimal Files, 
1955-59; Record Group 59; NARA. 
The subsequent documents in the series are from  the same section of  the Central Decimal Files, 
1955-59, and from  Record Group 59 at the National Archives: 
Progress on Negotiation of  New Salvadoran-Honduran Commercial Treaty; Foreign 
Service Despatch No. 334 from  Amembassy, San Salvador to Department of  State; 
December 31,1956; 415.1641/12-3156 HBS. 
Proposed Honduran/Salvadoran Commercial Treaty; Foreign Service Despatch No. 402 
from  Amembassy, San Salvador to Department of  State; February 8,1957; 415.1641/2-857 
HBS. 
Treaty of  Free Commerce and Economic Integration between the Republics of  Honduras 
and El Salvador; Foreign Service Despatch No. 192 from  Amembassy, Tegucigalpa to 
Department of  State; February 20,1957; 415.1641/2-2057 HBS. 
Honduran Trade with El Salvador; Foreign Service Despatch No.229 from  Amembassy, 
Tegucigalpa to Department of  State; December 17,1957,1957; 415.1641/12-1757 RMC. 
Economic Relations between El Salvador and Honduras and the bilateral trade agreement; 
Incoming Telegram No. 156 from  San Salvador to Secretary of  State; January 6, 1959; 
415.1641/1-659 DMS. 
Problems Regarding Honduran-Salvadoran Bilateral Trade Treaty; Foreign Service 
Despatch No. 356 from  Amembassy, San Salvador to Department of  State; January 9,1959; 
415.1641/1-959 DMS. 
Possible Customs Union Between El Salvador and Honduras; Memorandum of 






FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
Desp.No.495 
From: Amembassy, Tegucigalpa 
To: The Department of  State, Washington 
June 7,1956 
Ref: CERP - Item D-14 
Subject: Attitude of  Honduran Foreign Minister Toward Revised Trade Treaty Between 
Honduras and El Salvador. 
The free  trade treaty between Honduras and El Salvador which has been in effect  since 
1918 has been revised and the draft  is now on Foreign Minister Esteban MENDOZA's desk 
for  his recommendation to the Chief  of  State. The Director of  the Bureau of  Direct Taxation 
in the Ministry of  Economics and Finance was in charge of  negotiations for  Honduras. 
It will be recalled that the 1918 Free Trade Treaty was formally  renewed by adding a 
protocol in 1954 which modified  the original treaty by providing that manufactured  goods 
moving from  one country to another should contain at least 40% of  domestic materials. During 
1955 disputes over the interpretation of  the treaty arose and El Salvador put a ban on duty free 
entry of  Honduran shirts. Hcaduras retaliated by suspending free  entry of  Salvadoran shoes, 
soap, and matches. The ban on shoes was a serious matter for  the Salvadoran industry. 
Repeated efforts  were made to resolve the issues by negotiation without success, since both 
groups of  negotiators were subject to protectionist pressures. It was finally  agreed that the 
1918 treaty would have to be overhauled and the draft  now in the Foreign Minister's hands is 
the result. 
The Embassy has not seen a copy of  this draft  treaty, but the Foreign Minister expressed 
his views about it to the Ambassador. Mendoza said flatly  that he did not like many of  the 
treaty's terms. He thinks it might represent the beginning of  a complete customs union in 
Central America to which he is opposed at the present time. Mendoza reminisced about the 
history of  how Prussia dominated Germany by using customs union as an opening wedge. He 
says the economic development in Honduras at its present stage requires protection. Electric 
power is more expensive here than in Salvador, wages are higher, etc. Mendoza remarked that 
he felt  Salvador with its excess population and more advanced industry is the main threat to 
Honduras-Salvador boundary matter before  any further  steps toward the customs union were 
taken. In a nutshell, for  the moment, Mendoza, because of  the backwardness of  Honduras, is 
opposed to any tendency towards real Central American Union. 
Mendoza is one of  the ablest and most influential  members of  the Lozano cabinet and he 
may be able to block the pending trade treaty or to so modify  the terms that it would represent 
an important step toward economic nationalism rather than away from  it. Traditionally 
Honduras has been in favor  of  economic integration of  the Central American States. 
The Embassy will report further  developments on this matter as they occur. At present, it 
is not possible to obtain a copy of  the draft  treaty. 
For the Ambassador: 
(signed) 
Roy I. Kimmel 
First Secretary of  Embassy 
Economic Affairs 
cc: MID 
Amembassy, San Salvador • 
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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
From: AmEmbassy, San Salvador 
To: The Department of  State, Washington 
Desp. No. 334 
December 31,1956 
Ref:  CERP, June 10,1954, D-12 
Subject: Progress on Negotiation of  New Salvadoran-Honduran Commercial Treaty 
The long-pending revision of  the Salvadoran-Honduran commercial treaty was the object 
of  a recent visit to Honduras by Salvadoran Minister of  Economy Alfonso  Rochac. The 
Embassy has now obtained confidential  information  regarding the general outline of  the draft 
as it stands. It apparently follows  the form  of  standard bilateral agreements, with three 
protocols listing products which would enjoy benefits  under the treaty. The first  of  these, 
granting duty exemptions for  importation of  merchandise from  El Salvador into Honduras, 
reportedly includes a long list of  manufactured  products and some raw materials. The 
manufactured  productslisted are reported to be practically all items manufactured  locally with 
local raw materials, but the door is left  open for  items such as locally assembled bus bodies, 
refrigerators,  etc. The second list, granting duty exemptions on imports into El Salvador from 
Honduras includes a wide range of  raw materials. The third consists of  seven or eight items 
which would enjoy preferential  rates of  duty upon importation into either country from  the 
other. Included therein are controversial items such as shirts (for  which a duty of  25% is 
reportedly prescribed) and shoes (15%). It will be recalled that these were the principal items 
arbitrarily excluded form  benefits  under the old treaty (which otherwise continues in effect) 
at the time of  the 1955 disputes, when local interests demanded protection from  competing 
imports form  the other country. There is reported to be no provision in the new draft  similar 
to that in the old treaty which required that not more than 40% of  the declared FOB valued 
of  goods enjoying benefits  under the treaty could originate in countries other than the 
contracting parties, a point which was the bone of  contention in 1955. 
The draft  treaty in its present form  is unofficially  reported to be acceptable to the 
Salvadoran Government, but some changes may be necessary in order to obtain agreement 
thereto by the Honduran Junta. Local manufacturers  of  shirts and similar products, together 
with their employees (whose jobs may be affected),  may be expected to complain long and 
loudly about the preferential  rate accorded competing Honduran imports^  The problem of 
their costs has, however, been studied by the Government, which apparently feels  that such 
complaints would be without foundation.  Whether it would stand fjrinly  against pressures 
exerted this time is another question. The details of  negotiations and the proposed draft  have 
been kept classified  precisely to prevent such pressures being exerted until an agreement is 
reached between the Governments. 
Commentary. 
Ratification  of  this treaty would not affect  tariffs  on imports from  the U.S. or other countries 
outside of  Central America, since most-favored-nation  clauses in trade agreements between 
El Salvador and non-Central American countries do not apply to benefits  granted to other 
Central American countries. A new treaty with Honduras along the lines indicated would 
however stimulate commercial interchange between the two countries, and presumably would 
give Salvadoran industries such as shoes, matches, cement and soap the opportunity to 
compete in the Honduran market that was being developed up until last year. (Salvadoran 
shoe manufacturers  especially were hard hit by the cancellation of  duty exemptions that were 
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previously enjoyedon exports to Honduras). The question as to whether imports of  shirts and 
pants from  Honduras (which up until 1955 were sold in better quality and at lower prices on 
the Salvadoran market than those produced locally) would increase is dependent on a number 
of  factors:  a) whether Salvadoran producers would be wiling to cut profits  to lower prices or 
would merely cut production, b) whether they could obtain tariff  cuts on imported fabrics  used 
in order to equate costs with Honduran producers, who allegedly enjoy lower duties, or c) if 
not, whether suitable fabrics  produced by the new Japanese-Salvadoran textile mill could be 
obtained by local producers at advantageous prices. Be that as it may, however, approval of  a 
new treaty would be another small step in the direction of  creating a unified  Central american 
market for  goods produced in the area, and hence will be of  benefit  to both countries. 
For the Chargé d'Affaires,  a.i.: 
(signed) 
Robert P. Gwynn 
Third Secretary of  Embassy 
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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
Desp. No. 402 
February 8,1957 
From: Amembassy San Salvador 
To: The Department of  State, Washington 
Re: Embassy Telegram 14, February 5,1957 to Embassy Tegucigalpa; repeated to 
Department as Telegram 227 
Subject: Proposed Honduran/Salvadoran Commercial Treaty 
While visiting the Under Secretary of  Foreign Relations February 6,1957, regarding other 
matters, the Under Secretary said he wanted to refer  to the proposed Honduran/Salvadoran 
commercial treaty regarding which he had already discussed with Ambassador Mann, because, 
he said, he knew the United States is interested in the solution of  Central American problems. 
The Under Secretary stated that in the opinion of  El Salvador the treaty is important for 
both countries, especially so they can make progress toward economic integration and that it 
is similarly important for  the border Honduran/Salvadoran areas which have built up an active 
frontier  commerce. 
He said that he believes the treaty will be signed in about fifteen  days since the present 
Foreign Minister of  Honduras and other members of  the Honduran Government favor  the 
treaty. If  it fails  of  signature, he said, failure  will be due at least in part to opposition by various 
business interests in Honduras only one of  which, the Standard Fruit Company, is believed to 
be American. This American company apparently opposes, he said, free  entry of  Salvadoran 
sugar into Honduras because it can be sold for  half  the current price of  Honduran sugar. Other 
Salvadoran products which especially worry some of  the Honduran interests, the Under 
Secretary stated, are shoes, textiles and soap. 
The Under Secretary stated that it was necessary a few  days ago for  Salvador to close the 
border to Honduran corn because of  the over supply in El Salvador. However, this will be 
temporary only, he said, until the treaty is signed. There was no indication by the Under 
Secretary that this move was taken to put pressure on Honduras, although he said that in his 
opinion if  Salvador should suddenly deny free  entry to Honduran tobacco and "Blanquita" 
Honduras would be anxious to get along with the treaty. 
He said that if  unfortunately  the treaty should not be carried out he will recommend that 
"Blanquita" be excluded from  the Salvadoran market. 
For the Ambassador: 
(signed) 
Alton W. Hemba 
First Secretary of  Embassy 
cc: Amembassy Tegucigalpa 




FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
Desp. No. 192 
February 20,1957 
Amembassy, Tegucigalpa 
The Department of  State, Washington 
Treaty of  Free Commerce and Economic Integration between the Republics of 
Honduras and El Salvador. 
On Saturday, February 16, 1957, the Treaty  of  Free  Commerce and  Economic Integration 
between the Republics of  Honduras  and  El Salvador  was signed by Finance Minister Gabriel 
A. Mejiá [sic] for  Honduras and by Economic Minister Dr. Alfonoso  Rohac [sic] for  El 
Salvador. The treaty will become effective  upon ratification  by the Legislative Chamber of  El 
Salvador and the Council of  Ministers of  Honduras. 
This treaty represents a major revision in the free  trade treaty between the two countries. 
Under prior treaties, the last one of  which was signed in 1954, there were no duties on the 
merchandise traded by Honduras, except for  coffee,  alcoholic  beverages including  beer, and 
cigarettes.  Under the present treaty, approximately 216 commodities, listed in Annex "A" of 
the attachment, can be traded freely.  Commodities listed under Annex "B" are subject to the 
tariff  rates specified. 
Background: 
Honduras, in the past, has had an export surplus in its trade with El Salvador. Major 
commodities exported included tobacco, timber, corn, cattle, raw cotton (unginned), cheese 
and "Blanquita", an edible vegetable oil. Major imports from  El Salvador included textiles and 
textile products, clothing and shoes. The value of  Honduran exports to El Salvador has ranged 
between 7 and 9 million lempiras each year; the value of  Honduran imports from  El Salvador 
have ranged between 5 and 6 million lempiras each year. Hence, a trade surplus of  between 2 
and 3 million lempiras accrued each year to Honduras. 
Until 1954, foreign  trade between the two countries had been governed by the provisions 
contained in the treaty of  free  commerce of  1918. In 1954, a treaty of  free  trade was signed 
which was basically the same as the 1918 treaty. However, it was modernized in coverage and 
operation. 
In 1955 the flow  of  foreign  commerce between the two countries began to decline because 
of  pressures exerted by special interests within each country. In Honduras, the textile people, 
the shoe people, the shirt people and the producers of  edible vegetable oil (Blanquita) began 
to manifest  a desire to reduce, and if  possible stop, imports of  textiles, shoes, shirts and 
vegetable oils form  El Salvador in order to protect their "infant"  industries. The situation 
deteriorated to the point where El Salvador declared an embargo against the importation of 
shirts form  Honduras. In retaliation, Honduras embargoed imports of  shoes from  El Salvador. 
A Mixed Commission was established to negotiate the differences. 
In 1956, Honduras renounced the treaty. As provided for  under the Treaty of  1954, either 
country could renounce the Treaty three months prior to the termination date of  the treaty. 
The Mixed Commission continued to meet in order to resolve differences  between the two 
countries. After  months of  give and take a revised Treaty of  Free Commerce arid Economic 
Integration was evolved and signed as indicated above. 
FOR THE AMBASSADOR: 
(signed) 
Morris Kaufman 








FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
From: Amembassy, TEGUCIGALPA 
To: The Department of  State, Washington 
Desp. No. 229 
December 17,1957 
Subject: Honduran Trade with El Salvador. 
The Ministry of  Economy and Finance has recently published a report on the trade between 
Honduras and El Salvador for  the period from  January through August of  the current year. 
This trade is under the Treaty of  Free Commerce and Economic Integration (Tratado de Libre 
Comercio e Integración Económica) between the two countries. 
Table V.5.1 
TRADE BETWEEN HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR, JANUARY-AUGUST, 1957 
Value of  exports 
(Lempiras) 
Value of  imports 
(Lempiras) 
Live animals 2 631 030.44 
Edibles of  animal origin 201121.88 
Edibles of  vegetable origin 1427 891.84 
Edibles of  mineral origin 18 692.40 
Raw materials of  animal origin 42 565.00 
Raw materials of  vegetable origin 2107 387.88 
Raw materials of  mineral origin -
Manufactured  articles 168 529.86 
Edibles of  mixed origin 











Total 6 728 205.86 2 357 77332 
Exports 6 728 205.86 
Imports 2 357 773.32 
Balance in favor  of  Honduras 4 370 432.54 
Although the figures  above indicate a definite  balance of  trade in favor  of  Honduras, there 
has been a strong sentiment against the Treaty here. Representative of  this feeling  is an article 
published in EL DIA on December 10 which complains that Salvadorean exports to Honduras, 
particularly potatoes, rice, beans, bread and sugar cane are flooding  the market and ruining 
the local farmer.  The writer cities no figures  to support his argument. 
On the other hand, an article in EL CRONISTA for  December 13 strongly defends  the 
Treaty, declaring that its only effect  is to destroy the "monopolies" which now exist in Honduras. 
The article cites the above report from  the Minister of  Economy and Finance and states that 
these statistics clearly indicate the beneficial  effects  of  the Treaty. 
A copy of  each article is enclosed with this despatch. 
FOR THE AMBASSADOR: 
(signed) 
Lawrence S. Eagleburger 
Third Secretary of  Embassy 
Economic Affairs 
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From: San Salvador 
To: Secretary of  State 
Rec'd: January 6,1959 
10:21 p.m. 
No: 156, January 6,3 p.m. 
Foreign Minister today expressed grave concern regarding course economic relations with 
Honduras and principally with current campaign attacking bilateral trade agreement and 
accusing Salvador imperialistic intentions toward Honduras. 
Foreign Minister pointed out that economically Honduras and Salvador complement each 
other. Salvador has excess of  productive, hard-workingpopulation, also domestic capital which 
could be usefully  employed in Honduras to mutual advantage both countries. He pointed to 
long frontier  and similarity of  people of  both countries as additional factors  leading to natural 
affinity  of  one country for  other. He believes economic integration of  Honduras and Salvador 
would be mutually beneficial  and would serve as first  step in eventual economic integration of 
all CA countries. Although he looks toward eventual political association of  some kind, this, 
however, is long range in nature and not of  present concern. 
In recent weeks relations with Honduras have deteriorated because deliberate campaign 
being undertaken by certain elements in Honduras designed to undermine trade agreement 
and block expansion of  commercial interchange between two countries. He claimed while 
Villeda Morales and Liberal Party sympathetic idea economic integration with El Salvador, 
strong opposition developing headed by Nationalist-Carias element, special-interest groups, 
and finally  by United Fruit Company in Honduras. Said his Ministry had received reports 
UFCO indirectly participating in campaign vilification  against Salvador. Pointed out UFCO 
engaged production soap and vegetable oil in Honduras and that its interests would be 
adversely affected  by reduction tariff  barriers which would force  it into stiffer  competition with 
producers similar products in El Salvador and other CA countries. Said anti-El Salvador 
campaign included charges that El Salvador had imperialistic designs on Honduras and that 
El Salvador was being used by State Department to extend control over Honduras. 
He was pleased to read strong stand on CA common market Dr. Milton Eisenhower took 
in his report and felt  this would aid integration forces.  Also expressed hope US could be of 
further  help in encouraging economic integration. Warned, however, matter was one of  great 
delicacy and should be handled so as to avoid any implication US was exerting pressure m its 
own interests. 
Without making commitments, I assured Foreign Minister US Government sympathetic 
toward idea economic integration Honduras-Salvador and that I would consider seriously any 
suggestions he might wish to make. 
Comment: Told Foreign Minister I would look into matter of  UFCO activity. Believe 
Department ought to investigate and provide guidance. Foreign Minister expects answer from 
me. 
Also discussed general question economic integration and suggested further  meeting 
devoted this subject alone in which three of  us plus Minister Rochac and Martinez Moreno 
would participate. Informed  him we expected Frank and Turkel shortly and they might be 
helpful  with respect to any technical questions he might have. Believe if  this develops further, 





Air Pouch SECRET Declassified 
NARA 6/20/88 
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH 
Desp. No. 356 
January 9,1959 
From: Amembassy San Salvador 
To: The Department of  State, Washington 
Réf.:  CERP, Section D, Items I-A-4 & III-A-1; Embassy Telegram 156, Jan. 6,1959 
Subject: Problems Regarding Honduran-Salvadoran Bilateral Trade Treaty 
SUMMARY 
Begin SECRET 
The Salvadoran Foreign Office  is concerned over deteriorating relations with 
Honduras caused by an anti-Salvadoran campaign in that country advocating 
cancellation of  the bilateral trade treaty between the two countries. The 
Foreign Office  has received reports that both the United Fruit Company in 
Honduras and opposition Honduran political parties are backing the 
campaign, which includes charges that El Salvador has imperialistic designs 
on Honduras and that El Salvador is being used by the State Department to 
extend control over Honduras. 
End SECRET 
Begin UNCLASSIFIED 
As the Department is aware, El Salvador has historically been the primary exponent of 
Central American integration, political as well as economic. In addition many Salvadorans feel 
that unification  of  El Salvador and Honduras (first  economic, then eventually political) would 
only be natural and logical as a first  step towards such Central American integration. They 
argue that the economies of  the two countries are complementary, and look to Honduras as 
the most logical area for  settlement of  El Salvador's excess population and investment of 
Salvadoran capital, market for  the products of  Salvadoran industry, and source of  some raw 
materials. 
El Salvador has had trade treaties with Honduras since 1918. The first  of  these was the 1918 
Free Trade Treaty, which provided for  complete freedom  of  trade between the two countries 
for  the natural products of  each and for  the manufactured  products of  each made with raw 
materials from  either country. Excepted from  benefits  under the treaty were products under 
Government control and such items as coffee,  cigarettes and leather. 
In more recent years, with the development of  infant  industries in both countries and better 
communications between the two, protectionist pressures have developed in each. A protocol 
to the original treaty was nevertheless signed in 1954 modernizing many of  its provisions and 
specifying  that in general manufactured  goods produced in either country would be eligible 
for  benefits  under the treaty if  any foreign  materials used in the manufacturing  process 
represented less than 40% of  the FOB value of  the finished  goods. Alcoholic beverages were 
however added to the list of  items excluded from  benefits  under the treaty (replacing leather), 
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and provision was made for  modification,  expansion or contraction of  this list by means of  an 
exchange of  notes. 
In April 1955 protectionist pressures in El Salvador caused the Salvadoran Government 
unilaterally to suspend the benefits  of  the treaty in the case of  imports of  clothing from 
Honduras, the contention being that over 40% of  their value was represented by foreign 
materials used therein. The Honduran Government promptly retaliated by suspending treaty 
benefits  on Salvadoran shoes, matches, cement, soap and textile piece goods. After  much 
discussion of  the new problem, a new "Treaty of  Free Trade and Economic Integration" was 
negotiated and signed between the two countries in 1957, establishing lists of  items accorded 
duty exemptions, those accorded preferential  rates, and also providing for  the imposition of 
import and/or export controls on vegetable oils and fats  from  either country and on corn 
exported from  Honduras to El Salvador (reference  Embassy Despatch 484, March 21,1958). 
The duration of  the present treaty is for  two years from  the date of  exchange of  instruments 
of  ratification  (April 11,1957), renewable automatically for  additional two year periods if  not 
denounced by either contracting party 90 days prior to the expiration date. In recent weeks a 
campaign has been conducted in Honduras advocating cancellation of  the treaty, the belief 
here being that this is being conducted not only by industrial interests in Honduras facing 
competition from  Salvadoran products, but also by opponents of  the present Honduran 
administration seeking to make political hay. To counteract this thinking the recently-formed 
Salvadoran Industrial Association last month started an intensive campaign to point out the 
advantages of  the treaty to Honduras ahd thus seek to avoid cancellation thereof,  which was 
rumored to be planned by the Honduras Government for  January 11,1959 (90 days prior to 
the end of  the first  2-year period). The local press has given the Association's releases 
considerable publicity. The principal arguments presented are that the trade balance between 
the two countries for  the past several years has been heavily favorable  to Honduras and that 
the treaty thus benefits  not only the Honduras consumer through lower prices or better 
qualities but also the producers of  Honduran exports. 
The Salvadoran Government has also been espousing the view maintained by the Industrial 
Association that the treaty is beneficial  to both parties and should not be denounced. On 
December 28 the local daily La Prensa Grafica  carried a story to the effect  that in a telephone 
interview Honduran President Villeda Morales had confirmed  that there was a strong 
campaign to have his Government denounce the treaty, and that although he would not do so, 
a bilateral commission would sit down shortly to effect  a revision of  the treaty. Minister of 
Economy Rochac left  for  Honduras earlier this week with the apparent purpose of  attempting 
to work out a continuation of  the treaty with the Honduran Minister of  Economy. 
End UNCLASSIFIED 
Begin SECRET 
With this background, on January 6 the Foreign Minister expressed to the Ambassador his 
grave concern regarding the course of  economic relations with Honduras, and principally with 
the current campaign by certain elements there which he characterized as attacking the 
bilateral treaty agreement and accusing El Salvador of  having imperialistic tendencies toward 
Honduras. He indicated that in recent weeks relations with Honduras have deteriorated 
because of  this deliberate campaign to undermine the trade agreement and prevent the 
expansion of  commercial interchange between the two countries. He claimed that while 
Villeda Morales and his supporters in the Liberal party were sympathetic to the idea of 
economic integration with El Salvador, strong opposition was developing headed by 
Nationalist-Carias elements, special interest groups, and finally  by the United Fruit Company 
in Honduras. He said that his Ministry had received reports that the United Fruit Company 
is indirectly participating in the campaign of  vilification  against El Salvador, and pointed out 
that since it is engaged in the production of  soap and vegetable oil in Honduras its interests 
would be adversely affected  by a reduction of  tariff  barriers on competitive products from  El 
Salvador and other Central American countries. He said that the anti-El Salvador campaign 
included charges that El Salvador had imperialistic designs on Honduras and that El Salvador 
was being used by the State Department to extend control over Honduras. 
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COMMENT: 
This problem, as reported by the Foreign Minister, is of  course a matter of  concern to the 
Embassy. To a large extent, however, the importance of  the problem will probably be 
determined by the success (or lack of  it) of  Minister Rochac and/or other Salvadoran 
negotiators in obtaining a continuation of  the treaty without having to make extensive new 
concessions. 
End SECRET 
FOR THE AMBASSADOR: 
(signed) 
Robert P. Gwynn 
Second Secretary of  Embassy 
cc: Amembassy Tegucigalpa 
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Memorandum of  Conversation 
Date: March 11,1959 
SUBJECT: Possible Customs Union Between El Salvador and Honduras 
PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Dr. Alfredo  Ortiz Maneia, Minister of  Foreign Relations 
His Excellency Dr. Hector David Castro, Ambassador to the United 
States 
His Excellency Dr. Alfonso  Rochac, Minister of  Economy 
His Excellency Roberto A. Parker, Minister of  Public Works 
His Excellency Rafael  Meza Ayau, President of  the Salvadoran Associa-
tion of  Manufacturers  and former  Minister of  Economy 
Dr. Tomas Regalado, President of  the Salvadoran Coffee  Company and 
of  the Executive Commission of  the Port ofAcajutla 
Mr. Francisco De Sola, President of  the Federation of  FarmCredit 
Banks 
Dr. Jorge Sol-Castellanos, Economic Advisor to PresidentLemus 
Ambassador Kalijarvi 
E - Mr. Beala 
A R A - Mr.Turkel 
OT - Mr. Frank 
OPT - Mr. Propps 
COPIES TO: A R A - Mr.Rubottom 
Ambassador Randall 
W - Mr. Dillon 
A R A - Mr.Turkel 
E - Mr. Mann 
Mr. Beale 
OT - Mr. Frank 
ED - Mr. Ross 
OAP - Mr. Steuart 
Mr. Gawf 
American Embassy, San Salvador 
American Embassy, Tegucigalpa 
American Embassy, Managua 
American Embassy, Guatemala 
American Embassy, San Jose 
Mr. De Sola said that as a result of  the Frank-Turkel visit El Salvador saw the possibility of 
accelerating integration with Honduras by forming  a customs union and using a common fund. 
Dr. Sol said El Salvador had in mind the points mentioned by Messrs. Frank and Turkel. 
The Minister of  Economy of  Honduras had also expressed agreement. President Lemus had 
had a telegram from  the President of  Honduras authorizing the former  to speak for  them both 
in Washington. 
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Mr. Frank recalled that Nicaragua wanted to be in the new customs union from  the 
beginning. 
Ambassador Kalijarvi said it was important not to alienate people who had done a great 
deal to prepare the present integration plan. 
Dr. Sol said that although Nicaragua wants to participate from  the outset, it doesn't want 
to be relegated to the role of  raw material producer and wants some guarantee of  industry. 
Mr. Frank said he and Mr. Turkel had made clear to the President of  Nicaragua and to 
Delgado that industry guarantees were out, and they had agreed. 
Mr. Turkel referred  to Somoza's circular letter calling for  a special meeting of  Ministers of 
Economy and wondered whether this meeting might not be postponed until June. 
Dr. Maneia said this was a very delicate problem which should be discussed thoroughly. He 
would like later to give a joint Honduran-El Salvadoran answer. 
Mr. Frank suggested that in the meanwhile officials  of  the Department of  State might 
prepare a draft  statement or agreement, along the lines of  the principles explained earlier, for 
a customs union between Honduras and El Salvador. 
Mr. Beale and Mr. Frank emphasized the need for  avoiding publicity at this stage. 
Dr. Maneia agreed. 
Dr. Sol said it might be well to avoid a document which went into details. "More details 
mean more difficulty"  in getting agreement. What was needed was a basic treaty setting forth 
objectives, stages and scope of  the plan. Perhaps it would be better to have a simple statement 
of  intentions, rather than a treaty. 
Mr. Frank agreed that it might be easier to draft  and to get agreement on a short document. 
But the document should be self-executing;  it should not require other documents, otherwise 
it would represent no real advance. The alternatives seemed to be a general document (easily 
acceptable) or a specific  one (self-executing,  but less readily acceptable). Perhaps a fairly 
general document would [be] desirable with provision for  an institution with supra-national 
authority to decide detailed questions. 
Mr. Turkel asked whether this would raise any constitutional difficulties. 
Dr. Sol said it would not, and that no one would object to a simple treaty of  this kind. 
Mr. Turkel wondered whether the document might not be an agreement pursuant to Article 
XXVII of  the present treaty. 
Dr. Sol said El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua all have constitutional 
provisions authorizing the conclusion of  agreements for  integration. He said a new treaty 
should stem from  the constitutions rather than from  the previous treaty. 
Ambassador Kalijarvi said there was no need to freeze  the plan in a detailed mold. The 
agreement should state basic principles. Annexes or protocols could be added later. 
Discussion turned to El Salvador's development program. 
Dr. Rochac then referred  again to the letter from  the President of  Nicaragua suggesting an 
early meeting of  the Ministers of  Economy of  the five  Central American republics and United 
States representative to discuss Central American republics and United States representative 
to discuss Central American integration. He said that such a meeting would lead to long 
speeches, resolutions, etc., which might prove embarrassing., He therefore  suggested that El 
Salvador might reply that the idea of  a conference  is interesting but the time is inopportune. 
An annual meeting of  the Ministers is due to be held in San Jose in June. ECLA activities and 
the economic report for  the year are to be discussed. He suggested it might be wise to keep 
ECLA activities and the proposed customs union plan separate. 
Mr. Beale and Mr. Frank agreed. 
Mr. Turkel said we would do all we could to help. 
OT: CPT: HFPropps: cet E -Mr. Beale OT -Mr. Frank 
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6. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN MARKET (1956) 
From: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Foreign Commerce, American Republics 
Division, Investment  in Central  America: Basic Information  for  United  States  Businessmen. 
Study prepared by firm  of  Albert O. Hirschman and George Kalmanoff,  Economic 
Consultants (Bogotá, Colombia, December 1956), pp. 33-34,39-43. 
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN MARKET 
Table 1 presents a number of  comparable statistical series that indicate the purchasing power and 
size of  markets in Central America, as revealed by the availability and apparent consumption of 
selected goods and services. 
If  per capita consumption in each country were the same, the percentage for  each statistical series 
relating to a given country would be identical with its percentage of  the total population for  the area. 
The extent to which these percentages deviate from  the population percentages suggests therefore 
the degree to which per capita consumption in that country is larger or smaller than in other countries 
in the area. 
In making these comparisons, it should be borne in mind that the statistical material available on 
a comparable basis for  this type of  investigation is severely limited and that the rapid rate of 
development presently experience by the area naturally brings with it an uneven pace for  the 
individual countries. The data are useful,  however, for  an appraisal of  the general magnitude of  the 
overall Central American market and of  the approximate position of  each country. 
Turning to the country breakdown of  the total Central American market, it has previously been 
pointed out that there is a decrease in size of  population per country as one moves southeastward 
from  Guatemala to Costa Rica. However, as indicated in the discussion of  national income, the 
ranking for  purchasing power and standards of  living is quite different.  Costa Rica's top rank with 
respect to per capita national income is proved by the data in Table 1. In each of  the 16 statistical 
series Costa Rica's percentage of  the total for  the 5 countries is well above its 10-percent share of 
the total population; in most instances it is much more than double that percentage. 
Honduras and Guatemala are at the bottom of  the scale, having the greatest number of  items well 
below the standing of  the two countries populationwise. In Honduras, this is indicative of  the 
generally low standard of  living and, in Guatemala, it reflects  the downward pull on the average 
standard of  living exerted by the large Indian population. El Salvador and Nicaragua are in the 
middle of  the scale, the 16 items being about equally divided below and above their relative shares 
of  the total population. 
In summary, if  the relative shares of  each country of  the 16 indicators are averaged, as is done in 
the second line of  Table 1, the ranking is Costa Rica first,  followed  closely by Guatemala and El 
Salvador, with Nicaragua and Honduras close together at the low end of  the scale. These average 
percentages give the combined effects  of  population size and per capita purchasing power. Thus, 
despite its much higher standard of  living, Costa Rica is only slightly ahead of  Guatemala and El 
Salvador because of  its very much smaller population. Also, Honduras' share of  the total market is 
only slightly below that of  Nicaragua, because its larger population almost compensates for  its lower 
per capita purchasing power. 
The commodities and other indicators shown in the table are all representative of  goods and 
services whose consumption shows important increases as personal incomes rise. Obviously, the 
country distribution of  the total Central American market would correspond much more closely to 
the population breakdown if  such articles of  consumption as corn or beans had been used as 
indicators. 
With respect to the items selected it appears from  the investigation that Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
and El Salvador each represents roughly one-fourth  of  the Central American market, the remaining 
one-fourth  being shared by Nicaragua and Honduras. However, since the most comprehensive 
free-trade  treaty in the area is the one in effect  between El Salvador and Honduras, it should be 
borne in mind that these two countries combined represent virtually a single market, or about 35 
percent of  the total. Similar combinations of  countries for  market purposes are developing in certain 
fields  as the Central American Economic Integration Program progresses. 
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Table V.6.1 
SOME INDICATORS OF THE SIZE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN MAREKT 
(Quantities  in units indicated) 
Population (end of  1954 
Average of  16 indicators 
below 
Registration of  automotive 
vehicles (1952) 
Imports of  automotive 
vehicles (1953) 
Imports of  gasoline (1953) 
Radios in use (early 1954 for 
all countries except Costa 
Rica, for  which 1952) 
Imports of  radios (1953) 
Telephones in use (early 
1954) 
Motion-picture theater seating 
capacity (19S4) 
Circulation of  daily news-
papers (1952) 
Imports of  newsprint (1953) 
Imports of  kraft  paper 
(1953) 
Imports of  structural steel 
(1953) 
Imports of  flat  glass (1953) 
Imports of  refrigerators  (1953) dollars 
Imports of  sewing machines 
(1953) do. 
Imports of  watches (1953) do. 
Imports of  typewriters (1953) do. 
' Persons per set. 
Persons per instrument. 
e Persons per seat. 
Persons per newspaper. 
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CHAPTER V Economic Integration 
A factor  of  considerable interest to the potential investor in Central America is the trend in recent 
years toward a closer economic relationship among the Central American Republics. Obviously if 
the boundaries that divide the five  Central American countries were to be eliminated and the whole 
area were to form  a single free  market with more than 9 million people, investment opportunities 
would be far  more numerous. Many industries find  too great the risk involved in becoming 
established in a country having 1,2, or more million people whose standard of  living is relatively 
low.1 
The smallness of  the markets of  the individual Central American countries has been a definite 
factor  in retarding the economic progress of  these countries and specifically  explains why the 
development of  this area has lagged behind other larger Latin American countries, such as Brazil, 
Mexico, and Colombia. Consequently, it is important that the potential investor be fully  informed 
about the current efforts  of  the five  countries to move in the direction of  a single market so that he 
can gauge the chances of  success of  this attempt. 
BACKGROUND AND CURRENT EFFORTS 
The five  countries have a common historical background. During the colonial period, they formed 
the Captaincy General of  Guatemala, which was formally  a part of  the Viceroyalty of  Mexico, but 
generally reported direct to the Spanish Crown. After  the area acquired independence from  Spain 
in 1821, and after  a short period during which Mexico unsuccessfully  attempted to assert its 
sovereignty, the Republic of  the United Provinces of  Central America was formed  in 1823, but was 
dissolved 16 years later into the five  independent Republics that exist today. Panama, not included, 
has quite a distinct history as it did not belong to the Captaincy General of  Guatemala during the 
colonial period and later formed  part of  Colombia until 1903. 
In the 19th century a number of  attempts were made to reestablish the former  union among these 
countries but all of  them failed.  Nevertheless, the citizens of  the five  Republics recognize their 
common past and feel  that they belong not only to their own country, but also to Central America 
as a larger unit. A tangible expression of  this feeling  is found  in the special concessions that are 
generally granted to Central American nationals by the naturalization and labor permit statutes in 
each of  the five  countries. 
In spite of  territorial disputes and frequent  political conflicts,  this situation provided a favorable 
historical setting for  the drive toward economic integration of  the last few  years. This drive proceeds 
from  two principal sources: First, the negotiation by El Salvador of  free-trade  treaties with each of 
the other four  countries; and, second, the formation  in 1952 of  a Central American Economic 
Cooperation Committee composed of  the Ministers of  Economy of  the five  countries. 
This Committee, which was established under the auspices of  the United Nations Economic 
Commission for  Latin America (ECLA), has held several sessions and has made a number of 
important decisions. It has an able secretariat and staff  at the ECLA office  in Mexico City, where 
basic research on the integration program is being conducted and where the successive steps in the 
program are being planned in close consultation with officials  from  the five  countries. Considerable 
help is also being given by the Technical Assistance Administration of  the United Nations, which 
has sent several teams of  experts to survey the area's resources, needs, and opportunities for 
cooperative development. 
In the following  paragraphs achievements of  the drive for  economic integration will be briefly 
surveyed and evaluated. These achievements may be summarized under three headings: (1) Needs 
and resources; (2) free-trade  area; and (3) industry and other fields. 
'This discussion is directed primarily to manufacturing  and processing industries producing for  the domestic market. 
Extractive industries producing principally for  export would obviously not be so vitally concerned. 
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NEEDS AND RESOURCES 
Economic integration of  sovereign countries is so complex and is certain to arouse so much 
resistance from  sectional interests that careful  planning and concentration on strategically important 
areas are essential for  success. Two factors  -transportation and electric power- are basic to 
economic progress anywhere. Cooperation and coordination of  efforts  in these fields  could result 
in great benefits  and large savings to the five  Central American countries, in both fields  basic studies 
have been prepared which present a complete inventory of  present resources and contain 
recommendations and suggestions for  future  coordinated action.2 
In transportation, a beginning of  integration has been brought about by the Inter-American 
Highway, which permits continuous travel from  Guatemala City to San José, Costa Rica. This 
international artery cannot be fully  utilized, however, as long as document requirements and other 
regulations for  crossing frontiers  are excessively complicated. The transportation report makes 
recommendations in this respect which have yet to be acted upon by the Governments concerned. 
The report also points to the port situation in Central America as one in which coordination could 
result in substantial savings of  capital outlays. Consequently, the possibility of  establishing a joint 
port administration as well as a Central American merchant fleet  is under study by the Economic 
Cooperation Committee. 
The electric power report does not recommend, at the initial stage, an interconnection between 
the distribution systems of  the individual countries, not does it propose building a station that might 
serve the needs of  two or more countries. However, it provides a complete picture of  combined 
facilities,  expansion plans, and major shortages, with recommendations for  remedying the latter. At 
a later stage of  Central America's economic development, some interconnection probably will be 
desirable, and the report also describes briefly  two hydroelectric projects, one on the border of 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica and the other on the border of  Honduras and El Salvador which, because 
of  their magnitude and international scope, would have to be undertaken as joint projects of  two or 
more countries. 
United Nations experts have also made a comprehensive study on the possibilities of  establishing 
a pulp and paper industry in Central America. This report has prompted decisive action and is 
discussed in a later section in this chapter. 
A basic study of  the livestock and dairy industries has also been carried out by an FAO mission, 
and studies are under way in the fields  of  financial  organization and resources, capital markets, and 
tax systems. Obviously, such work is of  great importance in connection with the financing  of  joint 
investment projects. 
FREE-TRADE AREA 
If  the five  Central American countries are eventually to represent a single unified  market, they must 
establish among themselves a customs union. This means that there would be no customs or other 
barriers to the movement of  goods within the whole Central American territory and that tariffs 
applicable to goods from  other countries would be the same at all points of  entry in Central America. 
The drive for  the establishment of  a free-trade  area has come principally from  El Salvador, which 
has concluded free-trade  treaties with the four  other Central American countries. However, the 
Central American Economic Cooperation Committee is carrying on valuable complementary work 
in the trade field.  Its principal accomplishment thus far  has been the adoption of  the Standard 
Central American Customs Nomenclature (SCACN or, in accordance with the Spanish initials, 
NAUCA). 
2El  Transporte  en el  Istmo  Centroamericano,  September 1953; and Informe  Preliminar  sobre la Electrificación  en 
América  Central,  August 1954. Both of  these reports were prepared by teams of  United Nations experts. 
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A unified  classification  of  commodities for  customs purposes is essential for  SCACN's two 
principal objectives, which are (1) to lower, on a reciprocity basis, and eventually to eliminate, 
customs barriers within the area; and (2) to unify  these barriers with respect to foreign  countries. It 
is, therefore,  of  interest that Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua already have introduced the 
unified  nomenclature and that Guatemala and El Salvador are studying customs reforms  based 
thereon. A standard export nomenclature for  Central America has been prepared and approved by 
the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee. 
The Secretariat of  the Committee has prepared also detailed studies of  the trade among the 
Central American countries and of  the existing free-trade  treaties. At the May 1955 session of  the 
Committee the secretariat was requested: 
"(a) to draw up a preliminary draft  for  a multilateral Central American free-trade  treaty; 
"(b) to study those commodities, whether they are raw materials, semimanufactured  or 
manufactured  products, which might be included in a minimum list of  commodities to be subject to 
free  trade in Central America; and 
"(c) to initiate, in reference  to this list, work towards possible equalization of  customs duties on 
commodities which are important for  Central American economic integration."3 
In January 1956, the Committee adopted a more specific  resolution concerning the characteristics 
of  the projected multilateral treaty. 
In the light of  these ambitious plans it appears possible that henceforth  progress toward a Central 
American free-trade  area will be promoted by the Central American Economic cooperation 
Committee and its active secretariat. 
From the point of  view of  some firms  doing business or planning to do usiness in El Salvador, 
Central America is already a free-trade  area, as a result of  the four  free-trade  treaties concluded by 
that country. El Salvador has taken the lead in this field  since it has been looking to industrialization 
as a means of  absorbing some of  its surplus population and since it has realized that its industries, 
to be vigorous, need a larger market than that contained within its own boundaries. On the other 
hand, El Salvador is the only Central American country with a chronic food  deficit  so that it has been 
able to offer  the other countries a stable market for  some of  their surplus produce. 
El Salvador concluded its first  free-trade  treaty with Honduras in 1918. This is the most 
comprehensive treaty, as well as the oldest, and it stipulates freedom  from  customs and similar duties 
for  all commodities except a few  listed articles, such as alcohol and alcoholic beverages, coffee,  and 
articles that are not considered domestic products. 
The free-trade  treaties with Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica date from  1951, 1952, and 
1954, respectively, and are more limited than the treaty with Honduras inasmuch as freedom  from 
customs duties applies only to a specified  list of  commodities which are enumerated in annexes to 
the treaties. This situation arose from  the fact  that, despite the greater industrialization of  Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, and Costa Rica, as compared with Honduras, they lagged behind El Salvador in certain 
fields  and feared  the competition of  Salvadoran manufactures  in their domestic markets. This was 
particularly true with respect to textiles, an industry which is strongest in El Salvador, but which the 
other Central American countries are also trying to develop. 
In view of  the active foreign  trade of  all five  countries with other countries, it was necessary to 
exclude from  the benefit  of  the free-trade  treaties articles which do not originate in the Central 
American countries and which might evade the Customs duties applying in each country to imports 
from  abroad by being shipped into a country through one of  its free-trade  neighbors. In this 
connection, El Salvador's treaty with Honduras defines  as "domestic" the products in which foreign 
materials do not account for  more than 40 percent of  their f.o.b.  value. In recent years, this stipulation 
has given rise to some difficulties  of  interpretation but, as a result of  the consultation procedure 
provided for  under all of  the free-trade  treaties, mutually satisfactory  compromises have been 
worked out. In the treaties with the other three countries, it is generally stipulated that the products 
to which the freedom  from  customs duties applies should be declared by the exporter to be natural 
products of  his country or articles manufactured  "substantially" from  such products. 
3United Nations Economic Commission for  Latin America. Informe  de Progreso sobre el Programa de Integración 
Económica Centroamericana, July 20,155, E/CN.12/366. 
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In spite of  the limited character of  the free-trade  treaties concluded thus far,  the treaties have 
had a stimulating effect  on the volume of  trade between El Salvador and the other Central American 
countries. The growth of  this trade since the dates of  the treaties is shown in table 2. 
A particularly interesting experience has been that of  Costa Rica in connection with its free-trade 
treaty with El Salvador. At the time the treaty was negotiated, there was widespread concern in Costa 
Rica about "ruinous" competition from  Salvadoran industries; actually, Costa Rica has found  a good 
market in El Salvador for  some of  the products of  its own industries, such as processed foods  and 
leather. As a result, El Salvador is now hoping to expand the free  list to include more of  its own 
manufactures,  and Costa Rica has been so satisfied  with its experience under the treaty with El 
Salvador that is concluded a similar trade treaty with Guatemala in December 1955 which includes 
both a free  list and a list of  commodities with preferential  duties. 
To cover the whole Central American area with bilateral free-trade  treaties, 10 such instruments 
would be necessary. Obviously, it would be more practical and much time would be saved if  the five 
countries could agree to negotiate a single multilateral master treaty. This is a project which is now 
under active consideration by the secretariat of  the Central American Economic Cooperation 
Committee. 
Table V.6.2 
EL SALVADOR EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 
1934-51 (AVERAGES) AND 1952-54 
(In  thousands  of  dollars) 
Average 
Year 1952 1953 1954 
1934- 1940- 1946-





























































Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for  Latin America, Política Comercial, y Libre Comercio en Centro 
América, E/C N.12/CCE/11. October 20, 1954, page 134; for  1954, El Salvador, Dirección General de Estadística y 
Censos, Comercio Exterior, Í954. 
The gradual creation of  a free-trade  area in Central America would be consistent with United 
States as well as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade) policies. Despite the fact  that 
the Central American countries, through these treaties, grant exclusive preferences  and privileges 
to each other, this departure from  the most-favored-nation  rule has been generally accepted because 
of  the geographical propinquity and historical ties among the Central American countries and 
because of  the proclaimed goal of  a customs union among them. 
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INDUSTRY AND OTHER FIELDS 
The process of  freeing  the trade among the five  Central American countries from  customs duties 
and other artificial  obstacles is of  great importance in their efforts  to achieve economic integration. 
It is also a laborious task and subject to many delays and frustrations  as a result of  opposition from 
existing sectional interest. 
An approach toward integration is suggested by the Central American Economic Cooperation 
Committee which, from  the start of  its activities, has given particular attention to the progress of 
industrialization in the area with a view to discovering industries that might be established as regional 
projects. Obviously, the planning, and actual carrying out, of  such a project is not an easy task. In 
one field,  however, the Committee already has achieved a measure of  success. During its session in 
San Salvador in 1955, it decided that a complete study should be made of  the location, development, 
and financing  of  a pulp and paper mill to be established in Honduras. 
This decision was the result of  a complete survey of  Central America's forest  resources and 
possibilities for  the establishment of  a pulp and paper industry. The survey was undertaken, at the 
Committee's initiative, by a team of  United Nations experts. In their exhaustive report,4 the experts 
analyzed the substantial lumber resources of  Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, but came to 
the conclusion that, from  a short-range point of  view, Honduras was the country comparatively best 
suited for  the establishment of  a pulp and paper industry. In spite of  the disappointment that this 
finding  caused the other countries (with the exception of  El Salvador, which has negligible forest 
resources), the decision to proceed with the detailed study of  a mill in Honduras meant it was 
accepted by the Ministers of  Economy of  the five  countries, who make up the Central American 
Economic Cooperation Committee. The further  development of  this project may well set a pattern 
for  similar joint projects in the future. 
The projected pulp and paper mill may represent an investment opportunity for  private capital. 
The resolution of  the Economic Cooperation Committee endorsing a detailed study of  the pulp and 
paper mill in Honduras requests that in the financing  of  the industry all or some of  the following 
factors  would be taken into account: "the support of  governments, the aid of  private enterprise either 
Central American or foreign  and the participation of  international financial  organizations." 
4United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization report on Los Recursos Forestales  y las Posibilidades  de 
Producción  de  Celulosa  y Papel  en Centroamérica,  1954. 
sBecause of  its considerable interest, the full  text of  the resolution is reproduced here: 
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMITTEE, HAVING NOTED with 
satisfaction  the Report on Forest  Resources and the Possibilities  of  Pulp  and Paper Production  in Central  Ametica,  and having 
expressed its appreciation to the international agencies responsible; 
CONSIDERING that forest  resources in certain Central American areas have characteristics favorable  to large-scale 
industrial development; 
CONSIDERING that, given the extent of  the Central American market for  pulp, paper, cardboard, and other 
products and the considerable cost of  a plant of  economic size, it appears advisable that the Central American project on 
pulp and paper consist of  a single plant located in whichever zone presents the best possibilities for  immediate development, 
and 
CONSIDERING that the Republic of  Honduras, in accordance with this report, offers  the most favorable  conditions 
for  the establishment of  an industry of  this type.: 
RESOLVES 
1. To request the Technical Assistance Board to provide the following  experts to make a complete study of  the 
location, development, and financing  of  a pulp and paper mill in Honduras, in whichever zone presents the best conditions 
from  the point Of  view of  forest  resources, costs, transport, power, and markets: 
a) an expert in forest  resources and forest  management; 
b) an expert on the location of  pulp and paper mills, costs, and markets; 
c) an expert to draw up plans for  a pulp and paper mill and related industries; 
d) an expert to draw up plans for  the financing  of  this industry, taking into account the advisability of  combining all 
or some of  the following  factors:  the support of  governments, the aid of  private enterprise either Central American or 
foreign,  and the participation of  international financial  organizations; 
2. To recommend to governments that in formulating  their development plans they bear in mind the project for  a 
Central American pulp and paper industry and take appropriate measures to expand the Central American market for  the 
products of  this industry; 
3. That the continuation of  the studies and projects relating to this industry should not delay or interfere  with the 
consideration and formulation  of  projects relating to the establishment of  other Central American industries which would 
tend to make the economic integration of  the area effective. 
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Several other industries might merit a similar approach. In its January 1956 meeting at Managua, 
the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee declared the following  industries to be of 
interest under the integration program: Petroleum derivatives; fertilizer;  insecticides and pesticides; 
veterinary and biological products; surgical cotton; tires and tubes; paints and varnishes; inks; 
ceramics; glass, plastics, and metal containers; fisheries  products; and metal pipes. It laid stress on 
the fact  that private initiative should participate actively in the development of  these industries. Since 
Honduras is the site for  the projected pulp and paper mill, other industrial projects ought to be 
located in the remaining countries, in the interest of  distributing equitably the gains that will be 
derived from  economic integration. 
In connection with integration, two projects of  the Central American Economic Cooperation 
Committee should be mentioned which, although not industrial ventures, are important for  the 
economic and industrial development of  the area and bring considerable benefits  to the host country. 
One is the Advanced School of  Public Administration for  Central America (Escuela Superior de 
Administración Pública para la América Central, or ESAPAC), which has been functioning  in San 
José since 1954 as a result of  an agreement between the five  participating Governments and the 
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. The school was established in Costa Rica 
because of  the progress that country has made in education, civil service, and related fields. 
The school is conducted in the form  of  intensive seminars for  high-level officials  and executives 
in Government and business. There is little doubt that by raising the standards and stability of  public 
administration, the school could make a very important contribution to the improvement of  the 
general business climate in Central America. 
The second joint project which has been carried out by the Central American Economic 
Cooperation Committee is of  more direct interest to the potential investor. During the 1955 session 
of  the Committee in San Salvador, it was decided that a Central American Research Institute for 
Industry was to be established. The Institute, which will be located in Guatemala, is to be staffed 
with highly qualified  engineers supplied by the United Nations. It will investigate industrial uses of 
local raw materials, will be active in the planning of  regional industries, and will act as a technical 
adviser to the national development institutes. Its creation may well prove to be of  great importance 
for  the future  economic progress of  the area and will certainly be of  substantial value in guiding 
potential investors. 
At its Managua session early in 1956, the Economic Cooperation Committee also set up a Central 
American Commission for  Industrial Initiatives, which will meet twice a year and is to serve as a 
clearinghouse for  information  regarding industrial projects. It will be assisted by the Research 
Institute experts and the ECLA Secretariat. 
In spite of  serious political problems among some of  the five  countries, continuous progress has 
been made, largely because of  the popularity within each country of  the concept of  economic 
unification.  Conflicts  of  interest that have arisen in the development of  the program have been 
successfully  resolved because of  united determination to proceed with the undertaking. 
Consequently, despite the fact  that political unification  is out of  the question for  the time being 
and that a complete customs union is not envisioned for  the immediate future,  the prospects for 
future  progress toward economic cooperation and integration among the five  countries are 
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